On June 16th, Sherman continued the advance and this time Johnston withdrew from Lost Mountain. Now Johnston held a much shorter, but far stronger position on Kennesaw. This position defended his supply lines back to Atlanta.
Nothing occurred on the 17th and 18th due to heavy rains and on the 19th Johnston contracted his lines still further on Kennesaw making his position almost unassailable. He held the high ground of Kennesaw Mountain, while both of his flanks were covered by creeks.
During the next couple of days, Sherman extended his lines in an effort to force the enemy to make a corresponding extension, thereby causing Johnston to weaken his extraordinarily strong lines. If Sherman could get a few days of decent weather, he was determined to make an assault at Kennesaw Mountain. June 27th was decided upon as the day of the assault and orders were issued to that effect.
The assault began about 9 o' clock that morning as the Federals advanced all along the ten mile front. Three different times the Yankees moved to the attack, but not once did they successfully reach the rebel parapets. The Confederates were placed behind extremely strong fortifications and for the most part it was just target practice for them. The battle was over by 11:30 that morning. The Union suffered some 2500 casualties, while the Confederates lost but 800 men.
While the main battle for Kennesaw raged along Thomas' and McPherson's fronts, Schofield was able to cross Olley's Creek on the right and threaten Johnston's line of retreat. Using this advantage, Sherman determined to move his army by his right in another effort to flank Johnston out of his strong position. The night of July 2nd, McPherson was withdrawn from his position and moved behind Thomas' army to the Federal extreme right. Johnston detected what was being attempted and on July 3rd abandoned both Kennesaw Mountain and the town of Marietta.
As July began, Sherman was pressing ever closer to the city of Atlanta. As the Union forces entered Marietta, Johnston withdrew to make a stand at the Chattahoochee River. Sherman commenced an immediate pursuit with Thomas on the left, Schofield in the center and McPherson on the right. The Confederates held the south bank of the Chattahoochee in very strong fortifications built a month earlier in case of just such an eventuality. The Nationals held the north side of the river for a distance of some 28 miles, but now Sherman held one advantage for the first time. Instead of Johnston holding the high ground and being able to see all of Sherman's movements, Sherman was on the bluffs and Johnston in the valley, revealing all of Johnston's movements. For the first time, Sherman could see the houses of Atlanta.
On July 9th, Schofield affected a crossing over the Chattahoochee at Soap's Creek. By nightfall, he was dug in on high ground awaiting a counterattack by the rebels. Later that day, Garrard's cavalry also secured a crossing at Roswell and was soon supplanted by an infantry division. By the 17th, the entire army was over the river which was the last natural obstacle between Sherman's army and Atlanta.
The army was approaching the city from the northeast with McPherson on the left moving toward Stone Mountain, Thomas on the right moving toward Buckhead and Schofield occupying the center. As the army approached Atlanta on July 18th, Sherman received news of Johnston being replaced by General John Bell Hood. He instantly inquired of Schofield what he knew of Hood, being Schofield knew Hood from West Point. Schofield advised that Hood was bold and courageous. Sherman deduced from this change that the Confederates meant to take the offensive in an effort to save Atlanta.
Jefferson Davis had never liked or respected Joe Johnston, which was unfortunate for the Confederacy. Johnston was an excellent general and his movements during the advance on Atlanta were proper. He was trying to buy time hoping the Presidential election in the fall would go against Lincoln. Davis' selection of Hood as the replacement for Johnston was exactly what Sherman wanted and played right into his hands. Hood was sure to attack and when he did, the Yankee advantage in numbers would crush the rebels. Hood was bold to the point of stupidity.
On July 19th, McPherson was moving west from Decatur toward Atlanta along the railroad. Thomas was crossing Peachtree Creek approaching Atlanta from the north and Schofield was approaching Atlanta between the two from the northeast. None of the armies were encountering much resistance. As the armies closed on the city, quite a gap developed between Thomas and Schofield which Sherman tried to fill by sending over two divisions from Howard's corps. About noon, while Sherman was with Schofield in the center, heavy firing was heard from Thomas' sector. It was soon discovered that the enemy had viciously attacked Hooker's corps after they had crossed Peachtree Creek. The battle lasted a couple hours with much hand to hand fighting. Confederate losses were about 4800 men, while the Yankees lost about 1800. Both forces had about 20,000 troops engaged. This was Sherman's introduction to General Hood.
During the evening of July 20th, Sherman's army pressed as close as possible to the heavy fortifications of the enemy. By now the Union lines ran directly east of Atlanta, covering the Augusta Railroad as it wound around to the north of Atlanta. McPherson was on the east, with Thomas due north and Schofield in between. Sherman's intent was to destroy the Augusta Railroad completely between the Federal lines and Decatur. Once that was accomplished, McPherson was to move behind the Union lines to the extreme right of Thomas in an attempt to reach the Atlanta and West Point Railroad which ran southwest from Atlanta. If he could do this, it would deprive Hood of all three railroads which ran into and out of the city.
Hood was not going to wait for Sherman to make any moves, so on July 22nd he attacked again, this time along McPherson's front. Hood wanted to turn Sherman's left flank sending Hardee's corps from in front of Thomas, behind the Confederate lines to attack McPherson's rear, sort of what Sherman planned with McPherson in reverse. It was during the Battle of Atlanta on July 22nd that General McPherson was killed. McPherson was in conference with Sherman when firing was heard to the rear toward Decatur. Not knowing the meaning of this, McPherson called for his horse and rode off in the direction of the firing to investigate. As McPherson began to take charge of operations along his front, while he was passing from one position to another, he was intercepted by enemy skirmishers. They ordered him to surrender, but McPherson only tipped his hat and began to gallop off. He was immediately shot dead by the rebels.
Before long, McPherson's body was brought to Sherman's headquarters. Sherman felt this loss greatly as did Grant. McPherson was universally loved and admired.
Realizing what Hood was attempting, Sherman urged Thomas and Schofield to attack, sensing the Confederates had weakened their line in order to be able to mount such a severe attack. The battle raged for a couple hours, but by 3 o' clock that afternoon most of the heavy fighting was over. The Army of the Tennessee, now under General Logan, fought the lion's share of the Battle of Atlanta. Although Hardee made many gallant charges, Grant's old army fought like tigers to hold off the onslaught. Union casualties were: killed - 430; wounded - 1559; and missing - 1733. 4 On the Confederate side, total casualties were estimated at 5000. 5
On July 24th, Sherman telegraphed Halleck recommending General Oliver O. Howard supersede General McPherson in command of the Army of the Tennessee, which was approved. When Howard's selection was announced, General Hooker asked to be relieved as commander of the Twentieth Corps which was heartily approved. Hooker thought he should have received McPherson's command based on his previous status. Sherman at once recommended General Slocum, currently in Vicksburg, to be Hooker's successor.
Sherman's intentions remained the same after McPherson's death as they were before. He planned to move Howard's army from the extreme left, over behind Schofield and Thomas, to the extreme right, advancing upon the Atlanta and West Point Railroad. At the same time he planned to send 6500 cavalry against the Macon Railroad at Jonesboro.
The orders were issued and the movement commenced the morning of July 27th. Howard's army moved rapidly and by the evening of the 27th found itself across Proctor's Creek and to the right of Thomas's army. Early on the 28th, the adva
nce reached Turner's Ferry and began to move southeast toward East Point.
Before long the Union advance came to a halt along a ridge just short of a place called Ezra Church. At 11:30 A.M., the next morning the Southerners made a fierce attack on Howard's army, assaulting no less than six times. It was evident from this demonstration that Hood was not going to let Sherman get far enough south to jeopardize his one remaining rail link. This was the third attack Hood had made since assuming command some ten days earlier. The Battle of Ezra Church was substantially over by 4 P.M. with Confederate losses approaching 5000 and Union losses probably under 500. In those three battles, Hood had lost some 15,000 men, which was a substantial portion of his army.
As the dog days of August opened, Sherman was, for all intents and purposes, besieging Atlanta on three sides. Both cavalry detachments sent to destroy the railroads south of Atlanta failed to achieve their objectives, so he was left with one option and that was to encircle the city and force Hood to surrender. Therefore, Sherman's vital objective became the possession of the Macon Railroad.
During the first week of August, Sherman directed Schofield to extend his lines from east of Atlanta to the south toward East Point. Not only did Sherman threaten the city with capture, but throughout the siege he continually bombarded Atlanta causing fires and much distress among the populace that remained.
While he continued his efforts to encircle the city and capture Hood's army, Hood sent his cavalry, under General Wheeler, to raid Sherman's long drawn out supply lines between Atlanta and Chattanooga.
In an effort to stretch his manpower and complete the investment, Sherman left the thinnest force he felt advisable to hold his railroad crossing at the Chattahoochee and reinforced the armies farther south in one last push against the railroad running south from Atlanta.
Finally, after a solid month of maneuvering, on August 28th, both Howard's and Thomas' armies reached the Atlanta and West Point Railroad. The National soldiers spent the best part of the 29th tearing up the tracks for miles.
August 30th saw General Schofield make a bold movement toward Rough and Ready, which all but completed the encirclement of Atlanta. On September 1, 1864, the Northern advance reached Jonesboro some twenty miles south of Atlanta and that evening the Confederate army evacuated Atlanta blowing up munitions all through the night. General Slocum, who had arrived at the Chattahoochee on September 1st to assume command of the Twentieth Corps, entered Atlanta on September 2nd causing Sherman to send the President the following message, "Atlanta is ours and fairly won." 6
Sherman also sent word to Grant announcing the capture of Atlanta. Grant received the dispatch on September 4th, and immediately telegraphed congratulations to Sherman. "I have just received your despatch announcing the capture of Atlanta. In honor of your great victory I have ordered a salute to be fired with shotted guns from every battery bearing upon the enemy. The salute will be fired within an hour, amid great rejoicing." 7 Shortly, a message was received from Sherman acknowledging Grant's kind gesture and words and reciprocating the same.
Next Grant wrote a letter to Sherman manifesting his willingness to praise his subordinates and insure they received all the credit they deserved. "I feel that you have accomplished the most gigantic undertaking given to any general in this war with a skill and ability which will be acknowledged in history as unsurpassed, if not unequalled. It gives me as much pleasure to record this in your favor as it would in favor of any living man, myself included." 8
With the capture of Atlanta came the assurance of President Lincoln's re-election in November. Lincoln was also confident, not only of Grant's choice of commanders, but that Grant's strategy was indeed succeeding.
Raiding the Rails
As depicted earlier, by the middle of June, Grant was besieging the critical Confederate transportation hub of Petersburg, while Sherman was driving Johnston back toward Atlanta.
At this juncture it would be worthwhile to examine the relative size of the two armies which opposed each other before Richmond and Petersburg. Meade's returns for June 30th reflect the aggregate total present for duty in the Army of the Potomac as 86,000 men. 9 The total in Butler's Army of the James is estimated at less than 20,000, bringing the Union total before Richmond and Petersburg to approximately 105,000.
Lee's returns for June 30th, list his present for duty at 65,562. 10 It must be remembered that when both returns were filed, Lee had sent General Early north on a mission to relieve pressure on Petersburg and Grant had correspondingly sent General Wright's Sixth Corps to Washington to protect the capital.
Grant had been unable to bring Lee to battle in the open field, before he got to the James River, so his plan had been to besiege Lee at Petersburg. Now that the assaults on Petersburg had failed, he set out to starve Lee's army into submission. In order to accomplish this, he had to take possession of the railroads which ran through Petersburg.
There were five railroads which ran through Petersburg. They were the Weldon and Petersburg; the Norfolk and Petersburg; the Petersburg and Lynchburg (commonly referred to as the Southside Railroad); the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad; and the railroad which ran to City Point.
When Grant began siege operations at Petersburg, he controlled the City Point Railroad and the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad. What Grant needed was a plan to seize the Weldon Railroad first and then the Southside. Once these were in hand, Lee would be unable to feed his army using, solely, the Richmond and Danville Railroad which ran from Danville to Richmond.
The plan he decided upon was to occupy both the Weldon and Southside roads, therefore, compelling the evacuation of Petersburg. By forcing the enemy out of Petersburg, he could operate against the vital Richmond and Danville line. Not only would the capture of the Richmond and Danville line force the surrender of Richmond, but it would cut Lee off from receiving European supplies through one of his last remaining blockade running seaports, Wilmington, North Carolina.
What General Grant needed to do was extend the left of his line far enough to cover the Weldon Railroad. In preparation for this movement, Meade had his engineers construct a strong fortress called Fort Sedgwick along the Jerusalem Plank Road. With this strong anchor on the far left of the Federal lines, it was hoped the advance would be successful in moving the remaining few miles to the Weldon Railroad.
Meade began the operation by moving the Second Corps under Birney and the Sixth Corps under Wright to the left behind the Union lines. The remainder of the Union army was ordered to fill in the vacated spots of these two corps. Birney took up a position on the immediate left of Warren and Wright took up a position to Birney's left.
General Lee, who was firmly entrenched around Petersburg, made a lateral move along with the two Union corps once their movements were detected.
On June 22nd, Birney and Wright advanced. After passing the Jerusalem Plank Road, the two corps became slightly separated. General A. P. Hill, the Confederate commander in this sector, vigorously attacked the gap between the corps. In doing so, Hill's forces drove the Yankees back in confusion. Total Union losses amounted to almost 3000 men, including 1600 prisoners. On the 23rd, the Nationals were able to secure a foothold on the Jerusalem Plank Road, but Grant's plan to seize the Weldon and reach the Southside was foiled. The move had come up about three miles short of its objective.
It appeared during this operation that Wright had handled his corps poorly allowing Hill to intervene between the two Union corps. On other occasions, when Meade ordered Wright to attack he appeared lacking in spirit. Not only Wright, but his entire corps seemed to be missing their old fighting spirit. Possibly the Union army was just worn out after so many weeks of continuous fighting. In any event, Wright's dilatory actions left the Federal left flank in jeopardy. In telling Halleck about this operation, Grant curtly said: "the affair was a stampede." 11
In making the attempt on the Weldon, Meade also sent two cavalry divisions, under General Wilson and General Kautz, with Wilson in command, to pen
etrate deep into enemy territory in an attempt to break up the Weldon, Southside and even the Danville lines. They used the advance against the Weldon as a cover. Wilson's cavalry started out the morning of June 22nd, with some 6000 troopers. With Sheridan on a mission north of the James, it was hoped that Wilson's force would be unopposed. In fact, Sheridan had been sent on a similar mission of destruction aimed at the Virginia Central Railroad. Sheridan's mission was the diversion Grant had ordered in his move away from Cold Harbor. Lee had sent Wade Hampton to counter Sheridan's force.
Sheridan had been given orders that, if possible, he was to rendezvous with General Hunter, who was also on a raid toward Charlottesville. Sheridan and Hampton's forces tangled at Trevilian's Station while Sheridan was destroying the railroad. From some captured prisoners, Sheridan learned that Hunter was not at or about Charlottesville, but was near Lynchburg. Upon determining he could not rendezvous with Hunter, Sheridan, after destroying part of the Virginia Central, opted to return to the Army of the Potomac via White House. The key to this bit of sidetracking from Wilson's raid was that Wade Hampton was now free to return to Lee, which he did.
Wilson's force of 6000 first struck the Weldon Road at Ream's Station and then the Southside at Ford's Station, fourteen miles west of Petersburg before advancing as far west as Roanoke Station on the Richmond and Danville Railroad. Much damage was done; some sixty miles of railroad were destroyed, but nothing causing permanent loss to the Confederates. After he could advance no farther, due to enemy opposition, Wilson began his return. By now his return was blocked. Not only was Hampton, free from chasing after Sheridan, blocking Wilson's return, but he had a small force of infantry with him. On June 28th, Wilson encountered the rebels south of Ream's Station. As Wilson began to withdraw from in front of the enemy on the morning of the 29th, the Southerners struck him in flank causing a separation of his force. The enemy quickly closed on all sides and Wilson found himself nearly surrounded.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 48
