Meade, who had been receiving intelligence reports about heavy rebel movements to intercept Wilson, directed Wright to send part of his corps to Ream's Station. Additionally, Meade sent Sheridan, who had returned, to make a demonstration in Wilson's favor, but neither move aided Wilson.
Wilson burned his wagons and abandoned his artillery. He and Kautz were separated, but Kautz's group was able to make their way through the woods to the cover of the National lines. The enemy rapidly pursued Wilson's broken division handling it roughly until he finally crossed to safety on July 1st. Wilson lost 1500 troopers, 12 guns and all his wagons.
The results of these early strikes at the enemy's supply lines have been criticized by many, least of which was James Harrison Wilson, who participated in some of the missions. It is true that not much, if any, permanent damage was done and most have been characterized as nuisance raids, but it is interesting to note a comment made after the war by General J. M. St. John, who was in charge of the Confederate railways during the time of these raids. He told Wilson the following: "I want to tell you what I never told any Federal officer. That raid of yours against the Danville and Southside railroads was the heaviest blow the Confederacy ever received, until it was destroyed at the battle of Five Forks." 12
While, none of these early attempts succeeded in achieving Grant's ultimate aims, his overall strategy of depriving Lee of resources and supplies was absolutely correct. While, the raids have been condemned by many critics, General Grant envisioned this strategy as early as April, 1864. Lee had seen this strategy coming when he confided to Jubal Early some time earlier, "We must destroy this army of Grant's before he gets to James river. If he gets there it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere question of time." 13
Lee also warned A. P. Hill in much the same manner, "we shall at last be obliged to take refuge behind the works of Richmond and stand a siege, which would be but a question of time." 14
Grant's critics may not have thought much of his strategy, but it is obvious that both Grant and Lee knew he was doing exactly what was necessary. Grant was trying to deny Lee his resources. No one would expect every effort in war to be successful, but the efforts were made in accordance with Grant's overall strategy.
Even the disconcerting defeat of Wilson had no lasting impact on Grant, he just kept his eyes focused upon his objectives. Later in August, he was ready for another crack at the same objectives.
During the month of August General Sheridan was in the Shenandoah Valley combating moves being made by General Early against the North. In an effort to prevent reinforcements from being sent to Early, Grant moved Hancock's corps north of the James River to Deep Bottom to threaten Richmond. This move was made on August 14th. While Lee made a counter move to meet the threat, Grant had Meade send Warren to make a lodgment on the Weldon Road.
Warren moved at dawn on August 18th. The National lines were within three miles of the railroad. Warren made a lodgment near Globe Tavern and soon began tearing up the road. Before long, Lee discovered the situation and began moving troops south of the James in an effort to recapture that important artery. All during the afternoon of the 18th and the following day, the rebels attacked violently. During this series of counterattacks, the Confederates captured nearly two brigades from one of Warren's divisions, but in the end the Yankees held their ground. Soon Warren was reinforced and the Union trenches extended to cover the Weldon Railroad. Grant's plan was beginning to bear fruit by constricting the amount of supplies available to Lee.
Grant's critics felt these operations useless and a waste of time, but the capture of the Weldon was so critical to Lee that on August 22, 1864, he wrote a letter to Jefferson Davis almost entirely devoted to the topic of the effect of this capture on his army.
Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia
August 22, 1864
Mr. President:
The enemy availed himself of the withdrawal of troops from Petersburg to the north side of the James River, to take a position on the Weldon Railroad. He was twice attacked on his first approach to the road, and worsted both times, but the attacking force was too small to drive him off.
Before the troops could be brought back from north of James River, he had strengthened his position so much, that the effort made yesterday to dislodge him was unsuccessful, and it was apparent that it could not be accomplished even with additional troops, without a greater sacrifice of life than we can afford to make, or than the advantages of success would compensate for. As I informed Your Excellency when we first reached Petersburg, I was doubtful of our ability to hold the Weldon road so as to use it. The proximity of the enemy and his superiority of numbers rendered it possible for him to break the road at any time, and even if we could drive him from the position he now holds, we could not prevent him from returning to it or to some other point, as our strength is inadequate to guard the whole road. These considerations induced me to abandon the prosecution of the effort to dislodge the enemy.
I think it is his purpose to endeavor to compel the evacuation of our present position by cutting off our supplies, and that he will not renew the attempt to drive us away by force.
His late demonstration on the north side of the James was designed I think in part, to cause the withdrawal of troops from here to favor his movement against the road, but also to endeavor if possible to force his way to Richmond. Being foiled in the attempt, he has brought back all the troops engaged in it, except those at Dutch Gap, and it is possible that they too will be withdrawn to this side of the James. It behooves us to do everything in our power to thwart his new plan of reducing us by starvation, and all our energies should be directed to using to its utmost capacity our remaining line of communication with the south. The best officers of the Quartermaster Department should be selected to superintend the transportation of supplies by the Danville road and its Piedmont connections and all roads south of it.
I shall do all in my power to procure some supplies by the Weldon road, bringing them by rail to Stoney Creek, and thence by wagons. One train has already been sent out, and others are prepared to go. I think by energy and intelligence on the part of those charged with the duty, we will be able to maintain ourselves until the corn crop in Virginia comes to our relief, which it will begin to do to some extent in about a month. It should be our effort to provide not only for current wants but if practicable, to accumulate a surplus to provide against those occasional interruptions of the roads which the enemy's policy justifies us in anticipating. I think this can be done with proper effort, and by the full use of all the rolling stock we can accumulate.
Our supply of corn is exhausted today, the small reserve accumulated in Richmond having been used. I am informed that all the corn that was brought from the south was transported to this place and Richmond, but the supply was not sufficient to enable the Quartermaster Department to accumulate a larger reserve. If this be true, it is desirable that steps be at once taken to increase the quantity brought over the southern roads, and if practicable, corn should be brought into Wilmington until our crop becomes available.
I trust that Your Excellency will see that the most vigorous and intelligent efforts be made to keep up our supplies, and that all officers concerned in the work, be required to give their unremitting personal attention to their duty.
With great respect, your obt servt
R. E. LEE
Genl 15
The letter reveals that Lee keenly felt the gravity of the situation even if Grant's critics failed to comprehend the importance of his strategy.
Prior to the arrival of winter, Grant made one more attempt at the last remaining railroad serving Petersburg. On October 24th, he ordered Meade to attempt the capture of the Southside Railroad. Simultaneously, Butler was ordered to attack White Oak Swamp, north of the James River, and attempt to get possession of the Richmond and York River railway. This diversion, it was believed, would aid Meade's movement against the Southside. On October 27th, a force of 32,000 me
n advanced against the Southside Railroad. Hancock was able to cross Hatcher's Run at Burgess's Mill, but the Confederates disputed the crossing so vigorously he had to be withdrawn. The Yankees had failed to get closer than six miles of the Southside Railroad.
Butler also attacked as planned, but his assault collapsed when his lack of tactical planning for maneuver failed. All he did was advance against the enemy's fortifications losing about 1100 men. The movement against the Southside cost about 1800 casualties. The Battle of Hatcher's Run concluded Grant's attempts to obtain possession of the railroads supplying Lee's army. It would not be until April 1, 1865 at the Battle of Five Forks, that Grant would finally succeed in threatening one of the remaining two railroads supporting Lee. When Grant finally succeeded in his strategy and Lee's line of retreat and supplies was jeopardized, Lee was forced to evacuate his stronghold. At that time, Grant's strategy proved eminently successful.
Early's Excursion
While Grant was beginning his momentous move from Cold Harbor, across the James River and on to Petersburg, Lee dispatched General Jubal Early with Ewell's corps of between 12,000 and 14,000 men to the Shenandoah Valley. His orders were to dispute the advance of General Hunter and, if possible, to advance up the valley toward Maryland to relieve pressure on the Richmond area. Early began his movement from Cold Harbor on the morning of June 13th.
Lee summarized fully the intent of this mission in a letter he sent to Secretary of War, James Seddon, written on July 19, 1864.
Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia
July 19, 1864
Sir:
I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of Genl Early of his late operations in the Valley and in Maryland.
In forwarding this report I deem it proper to state briefly for the information of the Department the object of detaching the force under Genl Early. I think, however, that it would not be prudent to give publicity to this statement at the present time.
Finding that it would be necessary to detach some troops to repel the force under Genl Hunter, which was threatening Lynchburg, I resolved to send one that would be adequate to accomplish that purpose effectually, and if possible strike a decisive blow. At the same time Genl Early was instructed, if his success justified it, and the enemy retreated down the Valley, to pursue him, and, if opportunity offered, to follow him into Maryland. It was believed that the Valley could then be effectually freed from the presence of the enemy, and it was hoped that by threatening Washington and Baltimore Genl Grant would be compelled either to weaken himself so much for their protection as to afford us an opportunity to attack him, or that he might be induced to attack us.
After the retreat of Genl Hunter towards western Virginia his pursuit by Genl Early was attended with great difficulty, owing to the obstacles in the way of supplying our troops. At the same time the pressure of Genl Hunter's forces in the Kanawha Valley endangered important interests in southwestern Virginia. It was thought that the readiest way to draw him from that region would be to push down the Valley and enter Maryland, and at the same time it was hoped that the other advantages of such an invasion before alluded to might be secured. In addition to these considerations there were other collateral results, such as obtaining military stores and supplies that were deemed of sufficient importance to warrant the attempt.
Genl Early's report will explain his operations, and the value of the results obtained need not be further stated at present, as there are yet some to be expected in the future. I may, however, say that so far as the movement was intended to relieve our territory in that section of the enemy, it has up to the present time been successful.
With great respect, your obt servt
R. E. LEE
Genl 16
With his objectives in mind, Early raced toward Lynchburg in an effort to arrive before Hunter. He succeeded in this, and on both June 17th and 18th, a sharp fight ensued at Liberty, Virginia, some 24 miles from Lynchburg. The battle was not decisive for either side, but realizing Early had arrived in force and he was low on ammunition, Hunter decided to retire. Regretfully, for the Union, Hunter opted to retire by way of the Gauley and Kanawha Rivers, to the Ohio River and then by rail to Harper's Ferry. He began his retreat on June 18th, and did not reach his home base in Maryland until July. In the meantime, Hunter's chosen direction of retreat opened up the Shenandoah Valley as Lee and Early were hoping. Early was free to advance upon the north as Lee had so often done before.
Early pounced and promptly advanced toward Maryland. Picking up reinforcements along the way, his advancing force numbered somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000 men. (No one has ever been able to ascertain the exact number in Early's force.)
By June 27th, he had reached Staunton, Virginia. On July 2nd, Early's army reached Winchester. Now official Washington was becoming alarmed at the approaching horde. Hunter was still off in western Virginia, although Washington had at last made contact with him. If Early advanced, Hunter would be of no assistance. This left Sigel in charge of the forces along the upper Potomac.
No one knew how many men were with Early, but Grant, concluding the situation was serious, decided to reinforce the capital, but to Lee's chagrin, he refused to relax his grip upon Petersburg. He directed Meade to send an infantry division and all the dismounted cavalry to Washington. On July 6th, this force embarked; Rickett's division of Wright's corps, 5000 men in all and 4000 of Sheridan's dismounted men. Along with these troops went a message from Grant to Halleck. Typically, Grant viewed this event as an opportunity. He told Halleck: "We now want to crush out and destroy any force the enemy have sent north. Force enough can be spared from here to do it." 17 Grant, of course, figured Hunter would return in time to help.
On July 3rd, Early divided his forces sending Breckinridge toward Martinsburg, while the remainder moved toward Leetown to cut off Sigel's retreat from Martinsburg. Sigel evacuated Martinsburg on July 4th, and withdrew to the heights overlooking Harper's Ferry.
Because Sigel held such a strong position, Early decided to bypass Harper’s Ferry. On July 8th Early moved his infantry to Frederick, Maryland and sent his cavalry to cut the railroads leading north from Washington.
Halleck became despondent when he realized Hunter was not going to be able to return in time to aid Washington. In Hunter's absence, command of the department surrounding Washington devolved upon General Lew Wallace in whom Grant had little confidence. Coincidentally, General Canby in New Orleans, had begun sending the Nineteenth Corps north and 6000 men were due to arrive at Fort Monroe at any time.
On July 9th, Grant telegraphed this message to Halleck: "If you think it necessary order the Nineteenth Corps as it arrives at Fortress Monroe to Washington. About the 18th or 20th is the time I should like to have a large force here; but if the rebel force now north can be captured or destroyed I would willingly postpone aggressive operations to destroy them, and could send in addition to the Nineteenth Corps the balance of the Sixth Corps." 18
Grant had been bombarded with urgent pleas from Washington for more than a week, so without waiting for a reply from Halleck, he sent Halleck another message later on the 9th. "Forces enough to defeat all that Early has with him should get in his rear south of him and follow him up sharply, leaving him to go north, defending depots, towns, etc., with small garrisons and militia. If the President thinks it advisable that I should go to Washington in person I can start in an hour after receiving notice, leaving everything here on the defensive." 19
On July 9th, Lew Wallace was able to collect all his forces plus those of Rickett's and Sheridan which had been sent north and made a stand at Monocacy River. Early was able to drive the Union forces back, but Wallace was able to delay Early's advance. Regretfully, when Wallace retired, he moved toward Baltimore instead of falling back upon Washington. Now, nothing stood between Early and the capital.
Early's legions reached Rockville the evening of July 10th, only fifteen miles from the capital. Later on the 10th, Grant heard from Linc
oln about Wallace's defeat at Monocacy. The situation had grown worse and Lincoln passed on to Grant his thoughts on the matter. "Now what I think is that you should provide to retain your hold where you are certainly, and bring the rest with you personally and make a vigorous effort to destroy the enemy's force in this vicinity. I think there is really a fair chance to do this if the movement is prompt. This is what I think, upon your suggestion, and it is not an order." 20
However, Grant was not one to let Lee call the shots. By leaving Petersburg, Grant felt Lee would have succeeded in making him respond in a way he did not want. Later that day Grant sent the following to the President: "I have sent from here a whole corps commanded by an excellent officer, besides over three thousand other troops. One division of the Nineteenth Corps, six thousand strong, is now on its way to Washington. One steamer loaded with these troops having passed Ft. Monroe today. They will probably reach Washington tomorrow night. This force under Wright will be able to compete with the whole force under Ewell.
Before more troops can be sent from here Hunter will be able to join Wright in rear of the enemy, with at least ten thousand men, besides a force sufficient to hold Maryland Heights.
I think on reflection it would have a bad effect for me to leave here, and with Gen. Ord at Baltimore and Hunter and Wright with their forces following the enemy up, could do no good.
I have great faith that the enemy will never be able to get back with much of his force." 21
At first light on July 11th, Early's force advanced arriving before Fort Stevens at noon. He was only seven miles from the city. Early ordered Rodes' division forward with a line of skirmishers to reconnoiter the works, but before Rodes' men could advance, Wright's men began to fill the defenses of Washington. There was skirmishing all day between the opposing forces, but by the evening of the 11th, Early canceled the attack he had planned for the 12th. He remained in front of the Washington defenses on the 12th, trying to ascertain the strength of the Union reinforcements. By the evening of July 12th, he became convinced he was facing a veteran force, so that night he began to retire toward Rockville, eventually re-crossing the Potomac near Leesburg on July 14th.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 49
