This provides another example of how history has skewed the truth about Ulysses S. Grant. Grant, who history records as nothing but a general who pushed headlong against the enemy's works in frontal assaults, received absolutely no credit for any of the maneuvering done by his armies prior to the detonation of Burnside's mine. In fact, Lee had fallen for the diversion enough to have moved over 60% of his forces north of the James River, but Grant is faulted for the failure of Sheridan's mission being unable to cut loose and make an attempt on the Virginia Central and later for the failure of Burnside's mine. The primary reason for Hancock's mission had been to draw troops away from Petersburg and this was entirely successful.
Hancock remained north of the James to keep up appearances until the evening of the 29th, when he began to move back toward Petersburg along with Sheridan's cavalry.
All was ready to spring Burnside's mine. Meade gave the necessary instructions and the time of detonation was set for 3:30 A.M. the morning of the July 30th. For this attack, General Ord of the Army of the James, was placed under Meade's command. Ord was supposed to support Burnside's right and Warren, Burnside's left.
Burnside had selected Ferrero's colored division to make the initial attack. Meade told Burnside that this would not do. The colored division had seen almost no action and if there was wholesale slaughter Meade did not want to be accused of sacrificing the black soldiers, so he told Burnside to select another division. Burnside, who was no leader, asked the remaining three division commanders to draw straws. The honor of being the lead division fell to General James H. Ledlie. Unfortunately for the Union, this was probably the worst selection in the entire Army of the Potomac.
Apparently Ledlie was one of those people, who by some means, rises to their level of incompetence. Based on comments made by others, Ledlie was a coward and a drunk, but evidently he had done nothing to date which caused a lack of confidence on the part of the chain of command.
Meade instructed Burnside to make ready for the advance following the explosion. Under cover of night, the soldiers were supposed to remove the abatis in front of their lines and level their own log-and-dirt trench to facilitate their advance. Inconceivably, this was not done and was not discovered by Burnside.
On the morning of July 30th, both Grant and Meade were at Burnside's headquarters before daylight. Burnside, himself, was at the front. The appointed time came and nothing happened. Thirty minutes passed before word came that the fuse had been lit at the appointed hour but apparently had failed. About 4:30 A.M., word reached Grant that Lieutenant Doughty and Sergeant Rees of the 48th Pennsylvania were going into the tunnel to investigate the problem. It was now becoming light and before long the Confederates would spot the massing of troops.
Finally, at 4:40 A.M., some one hour and ten minutes late, a huge explosion occurred. The explosion shook the ground like an earthquake. The smoke and dirt rose two hundred feet into the air lifting timber, guns and men alike and returning them to the ground in a ruinous state. When the dust and smoke lifted, an enormous crater was left some thirty feet deep, sixty feet wide and one hundred and seventy feet long.
By now, it was determined that Lee had no reserve lines behind the lines which had been destroyed. The way into Petersburg was open with nothing to stop the Yankee assault. With most of Lee's army up near Richmond, an aggressive assault would capture Petersburg, split Lee's army and possibly end the war.
Now, at a time when Grant needed someone to seize the moment with courage, valor and daring, the Army of the Potomac again rose to demonstrate its lack of leadership in its generals. Meade's plan called for four divisions to attack in successive charges, but Ledlie's lead division was without a commander. Ledlie was hiding in a bomb shelter, drinking rum and providing no leadership at all, but on this day his actions were the least of the problems. Nothing had been prepared in front of the Union lines for the assault, so instead of being able to advance rapidly in formation, the division was left to funnel through a small runway some ten feet wide. Not only did Ledlie's division have to advance through this crowded lane, but Burnside's other divisions were forced to follow. Grant learned later that not one of the division commanders was at the head of their divisions. A sorry demonstration of the lack of leadership which so typified the actions of the general officers in the Army of the Potomac.
As soon as the smoke cleared from the explosion at the crater, over one hundred cannons and fifty mortars zeroed in on the rebel lines near the site of the cataclysm. Nowhere were the Confederates able to contest the advance, but it was 5 A.M. before the head of the first division reached the crater. Remarkably, no one had told the men to push past the breach in the enemy's lines, so soon the crater began to fill with gawking Yankee troops. Recall Grant had cautioned Meade about this very thing in his orders issued for the assault dated July 24, 1864. "All officers should be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating it....." 32 Historians have said that no one instructed the troops on what to do so they piled into what they thought was a shelter from flying bullets. Most historians must have missed the above quote from Grant's orders. This represents another example of historians’ lack of perceptiveness, in failing to recognize Grant's incredible foresight. This episode demonstrated more vividly than ever the lack of communication which so often occurred in the Army of the Potomac. Grant's insight and instructions could not have been clearer, but somehow the word never reached the lower echelon commanders.
Soon all four divisions of Burnside's corps had found their way to the vicinity of the crater, but only a smattering of troops had advanced beyond. Unbelievably, these circumstances lasted a full hour. It was 6 A.M. before the rebels mounted a counterattack, but when it came, it came with a vengeance.
At 5:45, Meade learned the troops were stopping at the crater and accordingly ordered Burnside to direct his men to push on and call upon Ord to advance. Potter's division was immediately ordered to attack the ridge beyond, but as he began to draw his men out from the crater, the enemy counterattacked.
By this time the Confederates had moved reinforcements into line to cover the breach and before long they began to pour plenty of artillery fire into the crater. By the swift action of General William Mahone, the northern assault (as weak as it had been) was stemmed. Mahone, was in front of Warren's corps, but leaving only a skeleton force in that sector skillfully moved over to plug the breach. Needless to say, Warren did not discover the weakening of the rebel lines on his front. Once again recall Grant's instructions to Meade in his orders of July 24th. "One thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders. If they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without waiting for orders from army commanders." 33
Grant's prescience in military matters was manifested only to be ignored by lesser minds when the actual event occurred. Shortly after the enemy began to enfilade the Federal position in the crater, Grant himself, made his way to the front on foot to talk to Burnside. Grant was appalled at the handling of the entire operation and told Burnside in no uncertain terms, the following. "The entire opportunity has been lost. There is now no chance of success. These troops must be immediately withdrawn. It is slaughter to leave them here." 34
Imagine Grant actually being concerned for the well-being of his troops and of all people, the "butcher," Grant being repulsed by the useless slaughter of his men.
Grant returned at once to Meade's headquarters where a direct order was issued to that effect. Burnside received the order, but refused to give up the fight. Meade insisted and Burnside personally paid a visit to Meade which lead to a furious altercation between the two.
Burnside received another order to withdraw at 9:15 A.M., but he did not send the order to the crater until after noon. By two o' clock in the afternoon, the sad affair was over. The Nationals suffered abou
t 4000 casualties in killed, wounded and captured, while the Southern losses were about 1500 total.
The entire affair was one of the most unfortunate episodes of the whole war. The failures were numerous.
1) Failure of Burnside to assign a competent division commander to lead the assault.
2) Failure of Burnside to communicate the objectives of the operation to his subordinates.
3) Failure of Burnside and his division commanders to communicate instructions.
4) Failure of Burnside to have the abatis removed from in front of the Union lines.
5) Failure of Burnside to have division commanders prepare proper assault lanes.
6) Failure of the 48th Pennsylvania commander to insure the mine was ready for detonation. The bad fuse connection caused a one hour delay and got the whole operation off to a bad start.
7) Failure of the division commanders to be at the head of their troops giving direction.
8) Failure of Burnside to withdraw his troops promptly causing greater casualties and agony.
9) General failure of leadership from Burnside.
10) Failure of Warren to comply with instructions to advance when the weakening in his front provided the opportunity.
All in all, Burnside's mine was one of the saddest events of the war. There was plenty of blame to go around and Grant was quick to accept responsibility for the disaster. A Court of Inquiry was convened following the affair which primarily blamed Burnside and Ledlie and both were soon released from the service. After the war, the Committee on the Conduct of the War held hearings at which Grant testified. "I think if I had been a corps commander, and had had that in charge, I would have been down there and would have seen that it was done right; or, if I had been the commander of the division that had to take the lead, I think I would have gone in with my division.....I think the cause of the disaster was simply the leaving the passage of orders from one to another down to an inefficient man. I blame his seniors also for not seeing that he did his duty, all the way up to myself." 35
As always, Grant's honesty comes is apparent, but the responsibility for the failure of the operation must surely rest with him. The author believes, as amply demonstrated, that the Army of the Potomac lacked the spirit and aggressiveness of other army commanders. Their failures throughout the entire war were too numerous to recount and began way before Grant ever arrived on the scene or before Meade became their commander. By now though, Grant should have realized their inability to carry out tasks to which they were assigned, so he should have been more diligent in insuring everything was in place for such an operation. The Army of the Potomac lacked leadership which possibly emanated from the emphasis on dotting i's and crossing t's instead of completing the mission. This could possibly be traced back to McClellan. There always seemed to be a lack of confidence in their ability to meet the challenge. This could best be demonstrated by Joe Hooker's comments after his defeat at Chancellorsville when he said, "I just lost confidence in Joe Hooker." 36 And so it was with the Army of the Potomac.
Grant summed up the operation in the following letter to Halleck.
City Point Va. Aug. 1st 1864
(Cipher)
Maj. Gen Halleck, Washington,
The loss in the disaster of saturday last foots up about 3500 of whom 450 were killed and 2000 wounded. It was the saddest affair I have witnessed in this war. Such an opportunity for carrying fortifications I have never seen and do not expect again to have. The enemy with a line of works five miles long had been reduced by our previous movements to the North side of James River to a force of only three Divisions. This line was undermined and blown up carrying a battery and most of a regiment with it. The enemy were taken completely by surprise and did not recover from it for more than an hour. The crater and several hundred yards of the enemy's line to the right & left of it, and a short detached line in front of the crater, were occupied by our troops without opposition. Immediately in front of this and not 150 yards off, with clear ground intervening, was the crest of the ridge leading into town and which if carried the enemy would have made no resistance but would have continued a flight already commenced. It was three hours from the time our troops first occupied their works before the enemy took possession of this crest. I am constrained to believe that had instructions been promptly obeyed that Petersburg would have been carried with all the Artillery and a large number of prisoners without a loss of 300 men. It was in getting back to our lines that the loss was sustained. The enemy attempted to charge and retake the line captured from them and were repulsed, with heavy loss, by our Artillery. Their loss in killed must be greater than ours whilst our loss in wounded and captured is four times that of the enemy.
U. S. GRANT
Lt. Gn. 37
Both Meade and Grant (as he said in his letter to Halleck) felt the operation could have easily gained possession of Petersburg. General Mahone, who had saved Petersburg by his quick actions, confirmed Grant and Meade's opinions in the following postwar comment. "If the mine--itself a success, making an immense breach in General Lee's works, unsupported by any reserve force, and consternation all around the breach rampant--had been followed up by a vigorous attacking column, and the force was there, it may not be too much to say that the retreat to which he was compelled nine months later would then have been unavoidable and most likely in the order of the d____l take the hindmost. After the explosion there was nothing on the Confederate side to prevent the orderly projection of any column through the breach which had been effected, cutting the Confederate army in twain.....opening wide the gates to the rear of the Confederate capital." 38
An incredible opportunity had been missed. The fiasco was over, but Grant was not one to dwell on the past, nor would he be able to if he had wanted, for General Early appeared ready to renew his thrust northward.
Victory in the Valley
Immediately following the disaster of Burnside's mine, Grant, realizing that Lee still maintained most of his forces north of the James River, ordered Meade to send a force to destroy 15 or 20 miles of the Weldon Railroad. Later that day he had to rescind those orders because of what he learned about events occurring at Washington. Apparently, Wright's pursuit of Early had been feeble owing predominantly to contradictory orders emanating from the War Department. When Early realized Wright was not in active pursuit he turned his command around and headed north. When Early reached the Potomac, he sent his cavalry under McCausland to raid and burn Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, in retribution for the burning of southern homes. This occurred on July 30th, and by now Grant had had enough of this nonsense.
Grant's own words best describes how he felt about this intolerable situation. "It seemed to be the policy of General Halleck and Secretary Stanton to keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost.....I determined to put a stop to this." 39
Grant promptly sent Sheridan to that field of operations. He had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned to that command, but Stanton had objected on the grounds of his age. So on the 1st of August, when Grant sent more reinforcements for the protection of Washington, he sent along these orders.
CITY POINT, VA.,
August 1, 1864, 11:30 A.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.
I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is being expelled from the border. Unless General Hunter is in the field in person, I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. Once started up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possession of the Virginia Central Railroad. If General Hunter is in the field, give Sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division. All the cavalry, I presume, will reach Washington in the cou
rse of to-morrow.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General. 40
Somehow the President saw the dispatch to Halleck. On August 3, 1864, Lincoln sent an eye-opening telegram in response to Grant's which certainly revealed how little confidence Lincoln had in Stanton and Halleck.
OFFICE U. S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C., August 3, 1864.
Cypher. 6 P.M.,
LT.-GENERAL GRANT,
City Point, Va.
I have seen your despatch in which you say, "I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also." This, I think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. But please look over the despatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of "putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the death" in any direction. I repeat to you it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it.
A. LINCOLN. 41
Grant replied that he would start for Washington in two hours and went directly to Monocacy where Hunter had his headquarters. The two generals met at once and Grant asked Hunter where the enemy was. Hunter replied he did not know. He said he was so chagrined by the orders emanating from Washington moving him to the left and right that he lost all touch with the enemy.
Distressed by this kind of talk, Grant said he would find the enemy and immediately ordered trains filled with troops to advance toward Harper's Ferry. He knew the enemy would soon show themselves in front of the Federals to protect their precious Shenandoah Valley, the breadbasket of the Confederacy.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 51
