Grant wrote out Hunter's orders spelling out plainly what he wanted done.
"MONOCACY BRIDGE, MARYLAND,
August 5, 1864--8 P.M.
"GENERAL:--Concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in this concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander a sufficient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force, the brigade of cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville may be taken into account.
"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start to-morrow. In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should rather be protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards.
"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this, you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes.
"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER." 42
Grant told Hunter to make his headquarters anywhere in the department he wished, but give command of the troops in the field to Sheridan. To this, Hunter replied he thought it best to relieve him entirely expressing that General Halleck had so little faith in his abilities he thought for the good of the cause it would be better for him to step aside. Such a display of patriotism was not too common in the army at this time. Grant was very impressed with his offer of self-sacrifice and agreed to accept it.
Grant sent at once for Sheridan and waited at Monocacy to give him the same orders and confer with him on what needed to be accomplished. On August 7th, the "Middle Military Division" was created with Sheridan placed in temporary command. With everything in place, Grant returned to City Point.
The reader will recall from Sherman's advance on Atlanta, the death of General James B. McPherson during the Battle of Atlanta on July 22, 1864. Grant was very much saddened by his young friend's death. While, he was in Washington he received a letter from McPherson's elderly grandmother. Grant has often been portrayed as the "silent" man, never showing emotion, callous toward death and showing more concern for horses than men.
On August 10th, he answered Mrs. Slocum's letter about her grandson, General McPherson. The author challenges anyone who reads this letter to still come away with the opinion that Ulysses was some uncaring, "butcher."
HEADQ'RS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
CITY POINT, VA., August 10.
Mrs. Lydia Slocum:
My Dear Madam: Your very welcome letter of the 3rd instant has reached me. I am glad to know the relatives of the lamented Major General McPherson are aware of the more than friendship existing between him and myself. A nation grieves at the loss of one so dear to our nation's cause. It is a selfish grief, because the nation had more to expect from him than from almost any one living. I join in this selfish grief, and add the grief of personal love for the departed. He formed for some time one of my military family. I knew him well. To know him was but to love him. It may be of some consolation to you, his aged grandmother, to know that every officer and every soldier who served under your grandson felt the highest reverence for his patriotism, his zeal, his great, almost unequalled ability, his amiability, and all the manly virtues that can adorn a commander. Your bereavement is great, but cannot exceed mine.
Yours truly,
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General. 43
As expected, Early soon formed in front of Sheridan. Sheridan's force consisted of about 30,000 men, while Early had a force of between 15,000 and 20,000 men when he initially advanced against Washington. To this, Lee added reinforcements hoping to aid Early's operations. Lee sent the following orders to General Hampton.
Headquarters
August 11, 1864
General:
I desire you to proceed with your division to Culpeper. On arrival you will report to Lt. Genl R. H. Anderson, commanding in that quarter. The object is to threaten the enemy's flank and rear should he move across the Blue Ridge into the Valley, and to retain his forces about Washington for its protection. It is desirable that the presence of the troops in that region be felt, and should the enemy move up the Potomac, leaving his capital uncovered, that the cavalry cross the Potomac if practicable east of the Blue Ridge. Should the enemy's cavalry be concentrated in the Valley, ours must meet it, if it cannot cause its withdrawal by other operations. Specific instructions will be given you by Genl Anderson.
Very respectfully, your obt servt
R. E. LEE
Genl 44
Grant knew once he dispatched Sheridan after Early, Lee would make every effort to give whatever support he could to Early and the above orders from Lee proves again Grant's ability to foretell the enemy's actions. In order to counter Lee's actions, Grant planned a movement of his own as a diversion in favor of Sheridan.
In an operation similar to the movement of the last week of July, Grant again sent Hancock north of the James River in an effort to force Lee to recall the forces sent north to aid Early.
On August 12th, the 2nd Corps was marched to City Point, giving the impression of embarking for Washington, and on the 13th, it embarked instead, for Deep Bottom, arriving at 2 A.M. August 14th. Accompanying Hancock, and under his orders was Gregg's division of cavalry and Birney with 9000 men from the Tenth Corps. Hancock had all his infantry landed by 9 A.M. and proceeded to Bailey's Creek where he found the enemy intrenched as strongly as they had been the month prior. Both Birney and Barlow made advances, but owing to raw recruits and inexperienced officers, nothing much was accomplished militarily other than Grant's objective to have Lee recall some of his forces.
Later that night, Grant sent a telegraph to Sheridan. "We captured six pieces of artillery, and prisoners from four different brigades of Field's division, Longstreet's corps. This is a division I had supposed gone to the Valley. It is now positive that Kershaw's division has gone, but no other infantry has. This reinforcement to Early will put him nearer on an equality with you in numbers than I want to see, and will make it necessary for you to observe more caution about attacking. I would not however, change my instructions further than to enjoin caution." 45
One thing Grant was mistaken about was the difference in numbers between Early and Sheridan. While, Early had a force of at least 20,000, including reinforcements, and was a formidable opponent, Sheridan's force numbered at least 30,000 which gave him a significant edge in manpower.
To prove that Grant's diversion in favor of Sheridan worked, the following are dispatches written by General Lee on August 14, 1864. The first is to General Wade Hampton.
Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia
August 14, 1864
Halt your command and return toward Richmond. Gregg's division [of cavalry] is crossing at Deep Bottom. Send back an officer to ascertain position.
R. E. LEE 46
&n
bsp; Later, Lee wrote to General Charles W. Field.
Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia
August 14, 1864
Have sent to halt Hampton and ordered cavalry from this side. If unnecessary let me know. Aid the cavalry all you can and drive back enemy.
R. E. LEE 47
Lee followed these telegrams with one to General Richard S. Ewell at 6:15 P.M.
Headquarters
August 14, 1864
6.15 P.M.
I wish Hampton to return to Richmond as soon as practicable with his whole command. You must reinforce Field from Richmond. Where do you expect them from this side?
R. E. LEE
General 48
After Sheridan assumed command of the Middle Military Division, he advanced toward Winchester, Virginia, on August 10th and pursued Early southward until August 13th. The rebels reached Strasburg and Sheridan encamped along Cedar Creek just north of town. As Sheridan prepared to attack Early's force, he received an urgent message from Grant via special courier. Grant's message warned of Lee sending reinforcements to Early and cautioned Sheridan against an attack upon an intrenched foe of unknown strength. Sheridan, following the advice of his superior, fell back toward Winchester devastating the country as he went. For the time being, Sheridan opted to go over to the defensive not knowing how many reinforcements had been sent to Early and from what direction they might appear.
Sheridan occupied a position at Berryville, while the enemy's forces under Early and Anderson were united at Winchester. Once in position, Sheridan telegraphed Grant of his intentions. "I have taken up a position near Berryville, which will enable me to get in their rear, if they should get strong enough to push north." 49 On August 20th, Sheridan wired Grant: "Troops passing from Culpeper into the Valley. I have taken the defensive till their strength is more fully developed." 50 Sheridan has been heavily criticized for going on the defensive owing to the large advantage in numbers he enjoyed, but the above telegram, written at the time, indicates he was uncertain of the size of his opponent's forces. For that matter, General Grant, one of the most offensive-minded generals in world history, was also urging caution because he could ascertain the number of reinforcements Lee had sent. It is easy to sit back 150 years later and add up the numbers, but the decision had to be made on the spot and with far less certainty. In addition, Grant was proceeding carefully with Sheridan because this was his first independent command and he was only 33 years of age. Grant did not want Sheridan to get into a situation he could not handle. For all these reasons, Sheridan acted with prudence which merited less criticism than he received.
While all this was happening in the valley, Grant was still attempting to get his hands on the Weldon Railroad. On August 20th, he sent this response to Sheridan's telegram. "Warren's corps is now entrenched across the Weldon road; I shall endeavor to stay there, and employ the enemy so actively that he cannot detach further." 51
The jousting continued with Early advancing and Sheridan falling back to Halltown on August 22nd. On the 25th, Early seized Shepardstown, but on the 26th they fell back. Grant communicated with Sheridan again on the 26th. "I now think it likely that all troops will be ordered back from the Valley, except what they think the minimum necessary to detain you.....Yielding up the Weldon road seems to be a blow the enemy cannot stand.....Watch closely, and if you find this theory correct, push with all vigor. Give the enemy no rest, and if it is possible to follow to the Virginia Central road--follow that far." 52
The general's incredible prescience is manifested again. If one was not aware, a case could be made that Grant was reading Lee's mail for on August 26, 1864, in a letter from General Lee to General Early, Lee made the following statement. "I am in great need of his troops, and if they can be spared from the Valley, or cannot operate to advantage there, I will order them back to Richmond. Let me know." 53 The person's troops to which Lee refers is General Anderson's.
So it appeared Grant's strategy of forcing Lee to recall his reinforcements for Early had worked. Now Sheridan could feel more confident of success when he renewed his offensive.
While Sheridan was on the defensive in the Shenandoah Valley, Grant penned a couple of letters of significance. Both letters reflected keen political insight about current events and questions.
City Point Va. Aug. 16th 1864
Hon. E. B. Washburn,
Dear Sir:
Your letter asking for Autographs to send to Mrs. Adams, the wife of our Minister to England, was duly received. She had also sent to Mr. Dana for the same thing and his requisition, he being with me at the time, was at once filled. I have directed Col. Bowers to send with this a few of the original dispatches telegraphed from here. They have all been hastily written and not with the expectation of ever being seen afterwards but will, I suppose, answer as well as anything els, or as if they had been written specially for the purpose of sending.
We are progressing here slowly. The weather has been intolerably warm, so much so that marching troops is nearly death.
I state to all Citizens who visit me that all we want now to insure an early restoration of the Union is a determined unity of sentiment North. The rebels have now in their ranks their last man. The little boys and old men are guarding prisoners, guarding rail-road bridges and forming a good part of their garrisons for intrenched positions. A man lost by them can not be replaced. They have robbed the cradle and the grave equally to get their present force. Besides what they lose in frequent skirmishes and battles they are now loosing from desertions and other causes at least one regiment per day. With this drain upon them the end is visible if we will but be true to ourselves. Their only hope now is in a divided North. This might give them reinforcements from Tenn. Ky. Maryland and Mo. whilst it would weaken us. With the draft quietly enforced the enemy would become despondent and would make but little resistance.
I have no doubt but the enemy are exceedingly anxious to hold out until after the Presidential election. They have many hopes from its effects. They hope a counter revolution. They hope the election of the peace candidate. In fact, like McCawler, the hope something to turn up.
Our peace friends, if they expect peace from separation, are much mistaken. It would be but the beginning of war with thousands of Northern men joining the South because of our disgrace allowing separation. To have peace, "on any terms" the South would demand the restoration of their slaves already freed. They would demand indemnity for losses sustained, and they would demand a treaty which would make the North slave hunters for the South. They would demand pay or the restoration of every slave escaping to the North.
Your Truly
U. S. GRANT 54
In the above letter, Grant manifested remarkable insight with regard to the upcoming election and the draft. Grant was 75 years ahead of Neville Chamberlain of "peace in our time" fame, yet his usage of peace "on any terms" is insightful. People who believe in peace by appeasement have been shown throughout history to be wrong, but this is exactly what the "peace" Democrats in the North were demanding. Grant came down on the issue exactly where one would expect to find him, on the side of principle. To appease would be nothing but the beginning of war. No one ever gave Grant credit for deep thought, but this letter provides another glimpse of keen intellect.
The other issue he addressed in this letter was the draft. At the front, Grant was very aware, from intelligence sources that the South was down to its last man. He knew what others far from the front did not. He also knew the North was its own worst enemy. The southern strategy was to prolong the war until after the election of 1864, hoping the peace candidate would win. This was the very strategy Joe Johnston was following in his slow retreat in front of Sherman. In addition, resistance to the draft, spurred on by the Northern Copperheads, was helping to divide the North and Grant knew it. Grant again took a principled approach unwilling to be distracted by resistors to the draft. His position on this issue is best shown in correspondence with Halleck. Halleck was afraid of d
raft resistance riots throughout the North and suggested to Grant that combat troops be sent North to suppress any riots which may occur. Grant's response was uncompromising. "If there is any danger of an uprising in the North to resist the draft or for any other purpose our loyal Governors ought to organize the militia at once to resist it. If we are to draw troops from the field to keep the loyal states in harness it will prove difficult to suppress the rebellion in the disloyal states. My withdrawal now from the James River would insure the defeat of Sherman." 55
Grant's uncompromising position drew the immediate attention of the President, who promptly forwarded to Grant the following response. "I have seen your dispatch expressing your unwillingness to break your hold where you are. Neither am I willing, hold on with a bulldog grip, and chew and choke as much as possible." 56
As usual, Lincoln's way with words delighted Grant, who broke into uproarious laughter, telling his staff that, "the President has more nerve than any of his advisors." 57
The second letter which Grant wrote during this time also dealt with a touchy subject which critics have used to depict him as callous, uncaring and cold-hearted.
City Point, Va. Aug 19th 1864.
Hon. W. H. Seward
Sec. of State,
Washington D. C.
Dear Sir:
I am in receipt of copy of F. W. Morse letter of the 22nd of July to you inclosing copy of statement of C. W. G in relation to desertions from this Army. There are constant desertions, though but few of them go over to the enemy. Unlike the enemy however we do not loose our veterans and men who entered the service through patriotic motives. The men who desert are those who have just arrived and who have never done any fighting and never intended to when they enlisted. They are a class known as "Bounty Jumpers" or "Substitute" men, men who enlist for the money, desert and enlist again. After they have done this until they become fearful of punishment they join regiments, in the field, and desert to the enemy.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 52
