Of this class of recruits we do not get one for every eight bounties paid to do good service. My Provost Marshal Gn. is preparing a statement on this subject which will show the reinforcements received from this class of recruits. Take the other side: the desertions from the enemy to us. Not a day passes but men come into our lines and men too who have been fighting for the South for more than three years. Not unfrequently a commissioned officer comes with them. Only a few days ago I sent a regiment, numbering one thousand men for duty, to Gen. Popes Department composed wholly of deserters from the rebel Army and prisoners who took the oath of allegiance and joined them.
There is no doubt but many prisoners of War have taken the oath of allegiance and enlisted as substitutes to get the bounty and effect their return to the South. These men are paraded abroad as deserters who want to join the south and fight her battles, and it is through our leniency that the South expects to reap great advantages.
We ought not to make a single exchange nor release a prisoner on any pretext whatever until the war closes. We have got to fight until the Military power of the South is exhausted and if we release or exchange prisoners captured it simply becomes a War of extermination.
I have the honor to be
Very respectfully
your obt. svt.
U. S. GRANT
Lt. Gn 58
The importance of the above letter is centered on the last paragraph. As mentioned previously, time and again, critics have suggested Grant was callous, cruel, insensitive, heartless, etc. They would point to the first sentence of the last paragraph ("We ought not to make a single exchange nor release a prisoner on any pretext whatever until the war closes.") as a perfect example of his determination to win at any cost through his unlimited supply of men. At the same time, the critics would ignore the last sentence of the paragraph. ("We have got to fight until the Military power of the South is exhausted and if we release or exchange prisoners captured it simply becomes a War of extermination.") It is obvious from his last statement what he wanted to avoid was a "war of extermination." Yet, if he truly was the bloodthirsty, war-monger his critics have made him out to be, he would not care one way or the other how the war progressed as long as his own fame and glory was enhanced.
The author would submit that not only did Grant want to avoid a slaughter, but by stopping the exchange of prisoners he would be shortening the war and saving lives in the long run. The following quotation is offered as evidence. In a letter to Julia dated February 24, 1862, Grant wrote this. "I want to push on as rapidly as possible to save hard fighting. These terrible battles are very good things to read about for persons who loose no friends but I am decidedly in favor of having as little of it as possible. The way to avoid it is to push forward as vigorously as possible." 59
Far from being callous, Grant was simply proposing to end the war as soon as possible and the prisoner exchanges were only prolonging the war. Instead of Grant being viewed as callously turning his back on the Northern prisoners of war, he was desperately trying to shorten the war by saving lives, needless mutilation and more prisoners of war. In lieu of being viewed as a butcher, Grant more rightfully, should be viewed as a humanitarian.
The letter to Seward was written on August 19th, but by August 21st, Grant had decided to put the idea of prisoner exchanges into practice. On August 21st, he wired Stanton requesting him to order General Foster to stop exchanging prisoners: "Exchanges simply reinforce the Enemy." 60
By the end of August, Grant had done all he could to facilitate Sheridan's offensive in the valley and was anxious for Sheridan to attack Early vigorously. On the 28th, he wired Sheridan: "If you are so situated as to feel the enemy strongly without compromising the safety of your position, I think it advisable to do so. I do not know positively that any troops have yet returned from the Valley, but think you will find the enemy in your immediate front weaker than you are." 61
After hearing rumors that Early had detached part of his force, Grant wrote to Sheridan exhorting him to action. "If it is ascertained certainly that Breckinridge has been detached to go into Western Virginia, attack the remaining forces vigorously with every man you have; and if successful in routing them follow up your success with the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, and send Crook to meet Breckinridge." 62 Surprisingly, Sheridan expressed reluctance to attack stating, "I believe no troops have yet left the Valley, but I believe they will, and that it will be their last campaign in the Shenandoah." 63
The authorities in Washington were now beginning to doubt Sheridan's ability. They were beginning to see Sheridan in the same light as his predecessors. Finally, on September 3rd, Anderson began his return to Richmond, but he moved slowly remaining in the valley for almost two weeks. The authorities in Washington were growing ever more restive about the continuing threat of invasion.
Sheridan still felt apprehensive with Anderson in the vicinity and Grant was reluctant to order Sheridan to attack without knowing the exact whereabouts and sizes of the enemy forces. In the back of his mind, Grant knew the election was only two months off, so he could ill afford a defeat.
With Sheridan exhibiting behavior similar to the previous commanders and mounting pressure for action coming from Washington, Grant realized something had to be done. He was afraid to telegraph a direct order through Washington to Sheridan fearing it might be intercepted and changed, so he decided to visit Sheridan in person.
On September 15th, he left City Point to see Sheridan. He went direct to Charlestown near Harper's Ferry and sent for Sheridan to join him there. Before he left, he had drawn up a plan of attack to rid the valley of Early's forces. When Sheridan arrived, Grant asked him to point out the positions of both armies on a map. Sheridan took a map from his pocket plotted the positions of both armies and told Grant how he would move if he had the permission. Grant was so impressed with Sheridan's plan he never mentioned his own asking if Sheridan would be able to move by the following Tuesday. Sheridan replied he could be off before daylight on Monday. Apparently all Sheridan needed was a slight boast in confidence. He never needed another. Grant left immediately and returned to City Point via Baltimore and Burlington, New Jersey. He wanted to get as far away from the scene as possible so credit for its success would not be heaped upon him. This was typical Grant.
On September 18, 1864, Sheridan's army moved from Berryville toward Winchester. At daylight on the 19th, his army encountered Early near Opequon Creek. Sheridan deployed the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps in line of battle keeping Crook's division in reserve. At 9 A.M., he advanced against weak opposition, but soon Early brought up two divisions which had been sent toward Martinsburg. The rebels stiffened and counterattacked. Sheridan now directed Crook to strike the rebel left and any reinforcements arriving in flank. Crook attacked with the support of Torbert's cavalry which swept down the Martinsburg road. Next Sheridan ordered both infantry corps to advance again with support from Wilson's cavalry on the left. The onslaught was too heavy and the rebel defenses broke everywhere sending Early's entire force fleeing through Winchester.
The Battle of Opequon Creek was a big Union victory. Yankee losses were approximately 500 killed, 3500 wounded and 500 missing. Rebel losses were approximately 5000 with about 3000 wounded and 2000 prisoners.
Early's retreat was a rout with Sheridan following closely on his heels. By nightfall on September 19th, Early was in Newtown. On the 20th, he fell back to Fisher's Hill four miles south of Strasburg. At Fisher's Hill, Early's men erected breastworks across the entire valley (at that point only 3 1/2 miles wide).
By the evening of the 20th, Sheridan took up a position near Strasburg. Once again Sheridan planned to use Crook's division to turn the enemy's left and come in on his rear. Because the rebels held high ground, they could view the Yankee movements at will, so Crook's force was concealed in a forest on the 21st in preparation for the attack. Torbert's cavalry was sent off through the Luray Valley in an effort to cut off Early's retreat.
By daylight on
the 22nd, everything was in place. The Sixth and Nineteenth corps moved up to a position just opposite the rebel center. The attack began with Rickett's cavalry division advancing toward Early's left. As the enemy moved to meet the threat, Crook's division appeared from the woods and the advance quickly struck the rebels in their flank and rear. As the attack developed, the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps advanced along the rebel front. The rebels soon broke and fled in disarray.
The Battle of Fisher's Hill was another victory for the Nationals. Total Federal losses numbered 528, while the Confederates lost 1235 men and a dozen pieces of artillery.
The Federals were fast on the rebel heels driving them to Mount Jackson on the 23rd and six miles south of New Market by the 24th. New Market was the place where Torbert was to have intercepted Early, but his force had been held up by a small Confederate force in the mountains.
By September 25th, the Yankees had driven the rebels completely from the Shenandoah Valley. Instead of pursuing Early farther, Sheridan set to work gathering up crops and cattle and destroying what might be of use to the enemy. This was in accordance with his orders from Grant.
Shortly after he arrived back at City Point, Grant received news of Sheridan's big victories in the valley and the rout of Early. He sent congratulations to Sheridan along with a note that in honor of his victories he would have the army fire 100 gun salutes toward the enemy. Grant had done the same thing on September 4th, on learning of Sherman's capture of Atlanta.
While Sheridan began the task of desolating the Shenandoah Valley, or as Grant put it, "devastate the whole area so thoroughly that a crow flying across over the Valley would have to carry its own rations," 64 Early began the task of refitting his broken legions. While, the Union leadership thought they had seen the last of Jubal Early, he was to remain a thorn in their side. Before long, General Early, who had more tenacity than ability, was moving back into the valley.
Sheridan's forces were busy destroying crops and before much time had passed possessed the entire valley as far as Staunton. The rebels did maintain a foothold about Waynesboro. Grant suggested that Sheridan move a force east of the valley and attempt to destroy the railroad between Charlottesville and Gordonsville and then make a move against the James River Canal. This would further limit Lee's resources, but Sheridan lacked the strategic insight Grant possessed. Therefore, Sheridan proposed that Crook be maintained in the valley to finish the burning of the crops and the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps be sent elsewhere.
As was typical Grant, he let the on-scene commander call the shots, so on October 3rd, he gave his approval to Sheridan's plans. "You can take up such position in the Valley as you think can and ought to be held, and send all the force not required for this immediately here." 65
Lee was still not willing to abandon attempts to retake the valley and save what precious little remained, so he sent Rosser's brigade of cavalry which arrived at Early's position on October 5th. In addition, under Lee's request to the Governor of Virginia, every available man in that vicinity was placed under Early. Other reinforcements were sent from Breckinridge, so by October 5th, Early was making plans to attack Sheridan at Harrisonburg.
As luck would have it, Sheridan began his movement down the valley during the evening of October 5th. Now, as Sheridan moved down the valley, Early followed, waiting for an opportunity to strike. On the 8th of October, Rosser's cavalry harassed Custer's division of cavalry just south of Fisher's Hill, but on October 9th, with Torbert in charge of the National cavalry, Rosser was routed and pursued 25 miles back down the valley. Sheridan captured 11 guns and 330 prisoners and lost but 60 men.
On October 10th, the Union forces crossed Cedar Creek, while, the Sixth Corps, which had been detached en route back to City Point, moved to Front Royal. It was discovered that Early had moved as far north as Fisher's Hill, so Sheridan recalled the Sixth Corps until Early's intentions were clear.
Grant, still wanted damage done to the Virginia Central Railroad and the James River Canal, so he sent Halleck the following message on October 11th. "After sending the Sixth corps and one division of cavalry here, I think Sheridan should keep up as advanced a position as possible towards the Virginia Central road, and be prepared to advance on to that road at Gordonsville and Charlottesville at any time the enemy weakens himself sufficiently to admit of it. The cutting of that road and of the canal would be of vast importance to us." 66 As was so often the case with Halleck, he took it upon himself to modify the message to fit his vision. He urged Sheridan to take up a position as far south as possible and dig in. Naturally, Sheridan vehemently objected. Consequently, on October 14th, Grant telegraphed Sheridan direct.
CITY POINT, VA.,
October 14, 1864.--12.30 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN,
Cedar Creek, Va.
What I want is for you to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad and canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself ready to advance, if the enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction. If you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here all the force you can. I deem a good cavalry force necessary for your offensive, as well as defensive operations. You need not therefore send here more than one division of cavalry.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General. 67
Secretary Stanton, on October 13th, had summoned Sheridan to Washington for consultations before he went to visit General Grant. Believing everything secure, Sheridan left for Washington the evening of October 15th, leaving Wright in charge. Sheridan took with him the entire cavalry force in order to comply with Grant's wishes for a strike at the Virginia Central Railroad. Upon arriving at Front Royal, Sheridan received an intercepted enemy dispatch forwarded by Wright. The message was from Longstreet to Early advising him to be ready to move their combined commands to crush Sheridan. Sheridan immediately discontinued plans for the raid on the railroad and sent Torbert and his cavalry back to Wright at Cedar Creek. Sheridan sent a message to Wright assuring him of his ability to withstand any attack by Early and telling him that he was returning the cavalry and then he proceeded to Washington for his meeting with Stanton.
Early was, in fact, making final preparations for one final assault in an effort to dislodge the Yankees, but he did not have Longstreet with him. The Federals were camped on the eastern bank of Cedar Creek about three miles northeast of Strasburg. The Yankees were intrenched in a very strong position. The evening of October 16th, the Confederates were encamped at Fisher's Hill some five miles to the southwest of the National position. After heavy reconnaissance on the 16th and 17th, Early determined the most advantageous position to hit the Federals was on the Federal left. On the evening of October 18th, Early sent General Gordon, with three divisions, around the mountain in an attempt to turn the National left. With the remainder of his infantry, Early marched through Strasburg to confront the Federals. He also sent Rosser's cavalry around the Federal right to hold the Union cavalry. Another force under Lomax was sent via Front Royal to get in the Federal rear and cut off their retreat.
Soon after dark the movement began. Shrouded in darkness and fog, the rebels moved by stealth and before daylight struck Crook's command on the Federal left. Both Kershaw and Gordon struck simultaneously completely surprising the Federals and demolishing the Federal left. At the sound of this success, the Confederates attacked all along the front. Before long, the entire Union command was disorganized and confused. The Sixth Corps on the Union right initially repelled the onslaught, but soon found that the whole army was retreating. It was not long before the entire Union command found itself six or seven miles to the rear of its initial encampments. The Union army was in a state of panic.
Now one of the most remarkable sights of the war took place. Sheridan had spent the night of the 18th in Winchester some 20 miles from his command on his way back from Washington. At 9 A.M., he rode out of Winchester unaware of
the impending disaster. Soon he encountered torrents of fleeing men and wagons streaming from the battle. Ordering a halt to the trains, he left his staff and a brigade to stem the tide and with an escort of 20 men pushed ahead rapidly to the front. As he galloped to the front he swung his hat wildly, yelling to the men: "Face the other way boys! we are going back. Face the other way!" 68 The effect was electrifying upon the men as hundreds turned around, began to cheer and followed their commander charging the enemy.
By 10 A.M., Sheridan reached the front where only the cavalry and Getty's division were opposing the enemy. He ordered up the retreating masses from both the 6th and 19th corps determining to make a stand.
Again Sheridan rode along the front waving and yelling, re-energizing his men. At 1 P.M., the rebels made their last assault, falling principally upon the Nineteenth Corps, but were repulsed. By 3 P.M., almost all of the Union soldiers who fled in the morning were back and ready to advance. Before long, the rebel left gave way, first Gordon's division then those of Kershaw and Ramseur in order. Finally, a panic ensued as Early gave the order to retreat. The Yankees drove the rebels right into Cedar Creek with the aid of a cavalry charge by Custer. Finding a ford, the Union cavalry crossed the creek and during the night were able to capture a significant part of the enemy's ordnance plus wagons, ambulances and all the Union guns seized in the morning. The Federals drove the rebels back to Fisher's Hill where Early tried to rally his men but to no avail.
The Union victory cost about 5000 casualties to the South's 3000, but the Confederate defeat was devastating.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 53
