Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  By the end of 1864 Grant's plans were succeeding and even Robert E. Lee alluded as much in a letter dated December 13, 1864. In a letter to Adjutant and Inspector General Samuel Cooper, Lee admitted what the untrained observer could not comprehend.

  Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia

  December 13, 1864

  Your dispatch of today received. Every available man at the south should now be sent to Savannah. As long as Grant retains his present force here I do not think this army can be weakened. If he withdraws any part, I can detach proportionally. If the department thinks otherwise I will send whatever it directs.

  R. E. LEE 134

  Recall that Grant's plan from the start was to hold fast to Lee's army so he could not detach any part of it to inhibit the actions of Grant's subordinates, particularly Sherman. Lee begrudgingly admitted that Grant had succeeded in the above letter. If this is not confirmation enough, Lee wrote a letter to William P. Miles on January 19, 1865, that confirmed the logic of Grant's strategy. In this letter, Lee responded to Miles' request for troops to defend against Sherman's advance. "I have been obliged to detach troops to Wilmington to resist the movement against that place, and in addition to the brigade sent to South Carolina, have ordered Butler's division of cavalry to Genl Hardee. It will be impossible for me to send sufficient troops from this army to oppose Sherman's and at the same time resist Grant." 135

  Whether Lee wanted to admit the end was near or not, there were officials within the Confederate government that could see the handwriting on the wall. On January 31st, after returning from a visit to Fort Fisher, Grant found three Confederate commissioners at City Point to greet him. Apparently an old politician from Kentucky, Francis Preston Blair, had concocted an eccentric plan to bring about an end to the war. After Sherman reached Savannah, Lincoln realized the Confederacy was on its deathbed and was ready to listen to almost any overture made on behalf of peace. Lincoln's only sticking point was that peace should be brought back to the people of one common country. Blair's scheme for ending the Civil War was to encourage joint military action on the part of both the Union and Confederacy against a common enemy, the French installed Emperor of Mexico, Maximilian. Blair even suggested that Jefferson Davis supersede Maximilian, once that despot was ousted.

  Lincoln listened and while not approving of such an outlandish idea at least grasped at the idea of cooperation leading to discussions between the two parties. Lincoln gave Blair a pass to get him through the Union lines and Blair proceeded to Richmond. After meeting with Blair, Davis too, grasped the true mission, which was to get the two parties to talking. It was agreed that Blair would return to Washington to see if Lincoln would receive peace emissaries from Richmond.

  The three commissioners awaiting Grant were: Alexander Stephens, the Confederate Vice-President; John A. Campbell, the Confederacy's Assistant Secretary of War; and R.M.T. Hunter, the President pro tem of the Confederate Senate. Grant met with the three emissaries and provided them comfortable accommodations on board the steamer Mary Martin which was docked at City Point.

  Because the Confederate commissioners arrived prior to Grant’s return, the government was aware of the situation and Lincoln had sent Secretary of State Seward to Fort Monroe to meet with the Southerners if they met Lincoln's most basic demand, that being the principle of being one country. Secretary Stanton had already taken the liberty of sending his own representative to City Point to interview the Southerners and see what was on their mind. Stanton's emissary was Major Thomas Eckert and his instructions were specific. If the Confederates were willing to accept a restored Union and the abolition of slavery, he was to escort them to see Seward. If they would not agree to those preconditions, then their mission was at an end and they could return to Richmond. Eckert was to have full responsibility in this matter and not submit to anyone in authority at City Point, including Grant.

  When Eckert talked with the three commissioners, he found that they were bound by instructions from Davis insisting on a peace between two separate countries. This position was diametrically opposed to Lincoln's and acquiescing on this point would mean the rebels had established a separate nation. Neither Lincoln nor the North would ever accept this demand, so for all intents and purposes Eckert’s mission was at an end.

  Grant, who had come to know and respect these men, was not willing to throw in the towel so quickly. Realizing he had no part to play in politics, a point he strictly adhered to during his military career after his ill-advised communication with the Kentucky legislature in 1861, Grant decided he could not allow this chance for peace to slip away without being explored fully.

  Hesitating to send a message directly to Lincoln regarding political matters, he sent a telegram to the Secretary of War on February 1, 1865, cautiously advising what he viewed as the commissioner’s honest intentions. Grant knew he would be out of line to approach Lincoln on this matter, but he also knew Lincoln saw many of the dispatches sent to the War Department, so he gambled that his message would be viewed by the President. Grant's telegram to Stanton read as follows: "Now that the interview between Major Eckert, under his written instructions, and Mr. Stephens and party has ended, I will state confidentially, but not officially to become a matter of record, that I am convinced, upon conversation with Messrs. Stephens and Hunter, that their intentions are good and their desire sincere to restore peace and union. I have not felt myself at liberty to express even views of my own or to account for my reticency. This has placed me in an awkward position, which I could have avoided by not seeing them in the first instance. I fear now their going back without any expression from anyone in authority will have a bad influence. At the same time I recognize the difficulties in the way of receiving these informal commissioners at this time, and do not know what to recommend. I am sorry, however, that Mr. Lincoln cannot have an interview with the two named in this dispatch, if not all three now within our lines. Their letter to me was all that the President's instructions contemplated, to secure their safe conduct, if they had used the same language to Major Eckert." 136

  The plain and simple fact is that Grant was not attempting to interfere in politics as some of his critics have charged. He viewed this opportunity as possibly the only chance of beginning some form of dialogue between the two parties and he was going to make sure every avenue for peace had been explored. Critics who have charged him with dabbling in politics and nosing into areas where he did not belong do not understand the very essence of what it means to be in the military. They would be the first to make the charge of Grant "the butcher." They cannot have it both ways. Grant cannot be faulted for taking a strong stance in war and in the same breath be faulted for taking a strong stance for peace.

  What the critics fail to comprehend is the military man's position on war. Most military people loathe war because in war they are the ones who will suffer the greatest. Most people who enter the military do so out of patriotism for their country. There are but few who could be categorized as war-mongers. U. S. Grant was no war-monger let alone a butcher. He could not stand idly by and permit this one opportunity for peace to slip away without making some effort to allow these commissioners the chance to see Lincoln.

  Soon after he sent his telegram to Stanton, Lincoln replied to Grant with his own message. "Say to these gentlemen I will meet them personally at Fortress Monroe as soon as I can get there." 137

  Grant's gamble had worked. He would not be allowed to go to Fort Monroe, but Lincoln would meet with the commissioners. This was a tribute from Lincoln who by now placed a very high value on Grant's opinion.

  The meeting was held aboard the President's steamer, the River Queen, off Hampton Roads on February 3, 1865. Nothing came of this meeting except the expressing of each other's opinions. They could find no common ground for negotiations. The Confederates would not budge from their two countries position attempting to win through negotiation what they had been unable to achieve on the battlefield. They were surprised to find that Lincol
n would not compromise at all. He insisted they were all one people from one country and the restoration of the Union was paramount. He also was insistent upon the abolition of slavery. Once these two conditions were met, he was willing to be incredibly lenient as to the details. Until then, there could be no peace. Lincoln knew he held a strong hand and the Confederates were close to folding.

  Grant’s conscience was clear. He made every effort he could to promote the possibility of peace and prevent the needless effusion of blood. Imagine--Grant the peacemaker, how has that been lost to history?

  Lincoln returned to Washington on February 4th. On the same day, the peace commissioners returned to Richmond via City Point. They had a brief conversation with General Grant concerning prisoner exchanges and were then escorted through the Union lines. Horace Porter escorted the Confederates part of the way and had an interesting conversation about General Grant with Alexander Stephens. Porter recorded Stephens’ comments in his book. "We all form our preconceived ideas of men of whom we have heard a great deal, and I had certain definite notions as to the appearance and character of General Grant; but I was never so completely surprised in all my life as when I met him and found him a person so entirely different from my idea of him. His spare figure, simple manners, lack of all ostentation, extreme politeness, and charm of conversation were a revelation to me, for I had pictured him as a man of a directly opposite type of character, and expected to find in him only the bluntness of a soldier. Notwithstanding the fact that he talks so well, it is plain that he has more brains than tongue. He is one of the most remarkable men I ever met. He does not seem to be aware of his powers, but in the future he will undoubtedly exert a controlling influence in shaping the destinies of the country." 138

  The peace conference was over and the war was drawing to a close. Grant's dilemma now was twofold; one, was to keep Lee in place and prevent him from escaping to unite with General Johnston to oppose Sherman's march northward; and two, was to close the loop keeping Lee's army from becoming an army of guerilla fighters in the mountains.

  Closing the Loop

  Grant originally contemplated having Sherman's army transported by sea north to Virginia to force the capitulation of Lee's army. He advised Sherman of his plan in the following letter.

  HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,}

  CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864. }

  Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding

  Military Division of the Mississippi.

  GENERAL: On reflection since sending my letter by the hands of Lieutenant Dunn, I have concluded that the most important operation toward closing out the rebellion will be to close out Lee and his army.

  You have now destroyed the roads of the South so that it will probably take them three months without interruption to reestablish a through line from east to west. In that time I think the job here will be effectually completed.

  My idea now is that you establish a base on the sea-coast, fortify and leave in it all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantry to protect them, and at the same time so threaten the interior that the militia of the South will, have to be kept at home. With the balance of your command come here by water with all dispatch. Select yourself the officer to leave in command, but you I want in person. Unless you see objections to this plan which I cannot see, use every vessel going to you for purposes of transportation.

  Hood has Thomas close in Nashville. I have said all I can to force him to attack, without giving the positive order until to-day. To-day, however, I could stand it no longer, and gave the order without any reserve. I think the battle will take place to-morrow. The result will probably be known in New York before Colonel Babcock (the bearer of this) will leave it. Colonel Babcock will give you full information of all operations now in progress.

  Very respectfully your obedient servant,

  U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 139

  Upon receipt of Grant's letter, Sherman went to work to make the necessary arrangements, but soon found that collecting the required number of transports would cause a long delay and waste precious time. Meanwhile, Grant began to have second thoughts comprehending the difficulty of assembling such a large contingent of ships to move such an immense army. When he was in Washington en route to relieve Thomas, he wrote Sherman another letter, this time soliciting his opinion.

  [CONFIDENTIAL]

  HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,}

  WASHINGTON, D. C., December 18, 1864. }

  To Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding

  Military Division of the Mississippi.

  MY DEAR GENERAL: I have just received and read, I need not tell you with how much gratification your letter to General Halleck. I congratulate you and the brave officers and men under your command on the successful termination of your most brilliant campaign. I never had a doubt of the result. When apprehensions for your safety were expressed by the President, I assured him with the army you had, and you in command of it, there was no danger but you would strike bottom on salt-water some place; that I would not feel the same security--in fact, would not have intrusted the expedition to any other living commander.

  It has been very hard work to get Thomas to attack Hood. I gave him the most preemptory order, and had started to go there myself, before he got off. He has done magnificently, however, since he started. Up to last night, five thousand prisoners and forty-nine pieces of captured artillery, besides many wagons and innumerable small-arms, had been received in Nashville. This is exclusive of the enemy's loss at Franklin, which amounted to thirteen general officers killed, wounded, and captured. The enemy probably lost five thousand men at Franklin, and ten thousand in the last three days' operations. Breckinridge is said to be making for Murfreesboro.

  I think he is in a most excellent place. Stoneman has nearly wiped out John Morgan's old command, and five days ago entered Bristol. I did think the best thing to do was to bring the greater part of your army here, and wipe out Lee. The turn affairs now seem to be taking has shaken me in that opinion. I doubt whether you may not accomplish more toward that result where you are than if brought here, especially as I am informed, since my arrival in the city, that it would take about two months to get you here with all the other calls there are for ocean transportation.

  I want to get your views about what ought to be done, and what can be done. If you capture the garrison of Savannah, it certainly will compel Lee to detach from Richmond, or give us nearly the whole South. My own opinion is that Lee is averse to going out of Virginia, and if the cause of the South is lost he wants Richmond to be the last place surrendered. If he has such views, it may be well to indulge him until we get every thing else in our hands.

  Congratulating you and the army again upon the splendid results of your campaign, the like of which is not read of in past history, I subscribe myself, more than ever, if possible, your friend.

  U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 140

  Sherman, therefore, proposed to Grant that he be allowed to make the march northward from Savannah through the Carolinas and come up on Lee's rear, thus closing out the war. Sherman sent Grant his proposal for continued operations in this letter.

  HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,}

  SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 24, 1864. }

  Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

  GENERAL: Your letter of December 18th is just received. I feel very much gratified at receiving the handsome commendation you pay my army. I will, in general orders, convey to the officers and men the substance of your note.

  I am also pleased that you have modified your former orders, for I feared that the transportation by sea would very much disturb the unity and morale of my army, now so perfect.

  The occupation of Savannah, which I have heretofore reported, completes the first part of your instructions; and we are now engaged in dismantling the rebel forts which bear upon the sea-channels, and transferring the heavy ordnance and ammunition to Fort
Pulaski and Hilton Head, where they can be more easily guarded than if left in the city.

  The rebel inner lines are well adapted to our purpose, and with slight modifications can be held by a comparatively small force; and in about ten days I expect to be ready to sally forth again. I feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. I have thought them over so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight. I left Augusta untouched on purpose, because the enemy will be in doubt as to my objective point, after we cross the Savannah River, whether it be Augusta or Charleston, and will naturally divide his forces. I will then move either on Branchville or Columbia, by any curved line that gives us the best supplies, breaking up in our course as much railroad as possible; then, ignoring Charleston and Augusta both, I would occupy Columbia and Camden, pausing there long enough to observe the effect. I would then strike for the Charleston & Wilmington Railroad, somewhere between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers, and, if possible, communicate with the fleet under Admiral Dahlgren (whom I find a most agreeable gentleman, accommodating himself to our wishes and plans). Then I would favor an attack on Wilmington, in the belief that Porter and Butler will fail in their present undertaking. Charleston is now a mere desolated wreck, and is hardly worth the time it would take to starve it out. Still, I am aware that, historically and politically, much importance is attached to the place, and it may be that, apart from its military importance, both you and the Administration may prefer I should give it more attention; and it would be well for you to give me some general idea on that subject, for otherwise I would treat it as I have expressed, as a point of little importance, after all its railroads leading into the interior have been destroyed or occupied by us. But, on the hypothesis of ignoring Charleston and taking Wilmington, I would then favor a movement direct on Raleigh. The game is then up with Lee, unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you and fights me; in which case I should reckon on your being on his heels. Now that Hood is used up by Thomas, I feel disposed to bring the matter to an issue as quick as possible. I feel confident that I can break up the whole railroad system of South Carolina and North Carolina, and be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time spring fairly opens; and, if you feel confident that you can whip Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident that I can handle him in the open country.