Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  Grant's instructions to Thomas were contained in the following letter.

  HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,}

  CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 31, 1865. }

  Major-General G. H. THOMAS, commanding Army of the Cumberland.

  GENERAL: With this I send you a letter from General Sherman. At the time of writing it, General Sherman was not informed of the depletion of your command by my orders. It will be impossible at present for you to move south as he contemplated, with the force of infantry indicated.

  General Slocum is advised before this of the changes made, and that for the winter you will be on the defensive. I think, however, an expedition from East Tennessee, under General Stoneman might penetrate South Carolina, well down toward Columbia, destroying the railroad and military resources of the country, thus visiting a portion of the State which will not be reached by Sherman's forces. He might also be able to return to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, thus releasing some of our prisoners of war in rebels hands.

  Of the practicability of doing this, General Stoneman will have to be the judge, making up his mind from information obtained while executing the first part of his instructions. Sherman's movements will attract the attention of all the force the enemy can collect, thus facilitating the execution of this.

  Three thousand cavalry would be a sufficient force to take. This probably can be raised in the old Department of the Ohio, without taking any now under General Wilson. It would require, though, the reorganization of the two regiments of Kentucky Cavalry, which Stoneman had in his very successful raid into Southwestern Virginia.

  It will be necessary, probably, for you to send, in addition to the force now in East Tennessee, a small division of infantry, to enable General Gillem to hold the upper end of Holston Valley, and the mountain-passes in rear of Stevenson.

  You may order such an expedition. To save time, I will send a copy of this to General Stoneman, so that he can begin his preparations without loss of time, and can commence his correspondence with you as to these preparations.

  As this expedition goes to destroy and not to fight battles, but to avoid them when practicable, particularly against any thing like equal forces, or where a great object is to be gained, it should go as light as possible. Stoneman's experience in raiding will teach him in this matter better than he can be directed.

  Let there be no delay in the preparations for this expedition, and keep me advised of its progress. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 146

  As it turned out, Thomas was late in sending Stoneman. It was March 12th, before he moved and when he moved it was toward South Carolina, but by that time Sherman was in North Carolina. While Stoneman's raid did some damage, it failed to aide Sherman's operation.

  While the cooperative movements Grant had ordered out West amounted to less than he desired, he was having greater success back east with the operations of Sheridan and Schofield.

  Grant had ordered Schofield east to cooperate with Sherman. His mission was twofold. First, he was to secure Wilmington which could be used as a base of supplies. Second, he was to move inland to Goldsboro to rendezvous with Sherman and provide him with a source of reinforcements if needed.

  Grant outlined his instructions to Schofield in a letter dated January 31, 1865.

  HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,}

  CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 31, 1865. }

  Major-General J. M. SCHOFIELD, commanding Army of the Ohio.

  GENERAL: I have requested by telegraph that, for present purposes, North Carolina be erected into a department, and that you be placed in command of it, subject to Major-General Sherman's orders. Of course, you will receive orders from me direct until such time as General Sherman gets within communicating distance of you. This obviates the necessity of my publishing the order which I informed you would meet you at Fortress Monroe. If the order referred to should not be published from the Adjutant-General's office, you will read these instructions as your authority to assume command of all the troops in North Carolina, dating all official communications, "Headquarters Army of the Ohio." Your headquarters will be in the field, and with the portion of the army where you feel yourself most needed. In the first move you will go to Cape Fear River.

  Your movements are intended as cooperative with Sherman's movement through the States of South and North Carolina. The first point to be obtained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or Newbern, or both, as you may deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro, you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast, as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. The enterprise under you has two objects: the first is, to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on the line of his march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or Newbern, you can best use for throwing supplies from to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get these as many as you can house and protect, to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy.

  I believe General Innis N. Palmer has received some instructions directly from General Sherman, on the subject of securing supplies for his army. You can learn what steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance-stores will also be necessary.

  Make all your requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments, in the field, with me at City Point. Communicate with me by every opportunity, and, should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph.

  The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required by your own command.

  The movements of the enemy may justify you, or even make it your imperative duty, to cut loose from your base and strike for the interior, to aid Sherman. In such case you will act on your own judgment, without waiting for instructions. You will report, however, what you propose doing. The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro anytime from the 22nd to the 28th of February. This limits your time very materially.

  If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be supplied from Washington. A large force of railroad-men has already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a day or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 147

  Grant was wise to select Schofield. He assumed his position on February 9th, as he and his troops arrived at Fort Fisher to begin their campaign against Wilmington. Schofield moved immediately against Wilmington and on February 22nd, took the town following its evacuation by Braxton Bragg. Schofield was soon busy repairing railroads and advancing toward Goldsboro for his rendezvous with Sherman.

  The last of the cooperative movements to be made by a Federal army was Sheridan's move down the Shenandoah Valley. As Sherman began his movement north, the remaining rebel forces in the valley were withdrawn and sent south to oppose him. This left the valley more or less undefended. Grant, wanting the remaining communications and sources of supplies cut off to Lee's army before a general movement in the spring, ordered Sheridan to move on February 20th. He telegraphed his instructions to Sheridan on that day.

  "CITY POINT, VA., February 20, 1865 - 1 P.M.

  "GENERAL: -- As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no furth
er use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information you might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the streams in Virginia to the westward of Danville, and push on and join General Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or five thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last.

  "U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

  "MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN." 148

  Grant had wanted Sheridan to get off earlier to be in sync with Sherman's movements, but the weather held him up unlike the movements out west which were just dilatory. This is manifested by communications Grant had with Sheridan earlier in February. On the 8th, he wrote: "I believe there is no enemy now to prevent you from reaching the Virginia Central railroad, and possibly the canal, when the weather will permit you to move." 149 Later, on the 13th, Grant again expressed concern about the weather: "I do not care about your moving until the weather and roads are such as to give assurance of overcoming all obstacles except those interposed by the enemy." 150

  Finally, Sheridan was ready to embark on February 27th, but the thought of uncovering the capital unnerved many in Washington. They still did not understand the situation as it truly existed. The politicians thought Grant and Lee were stalemated outside Petersburg. That point of view exists today and was demonstrated in the PBS documentary a few years ago. It too, portrayed Grant as hung up by Lee at Petersburg, when, in fact, Grant was holding on to Lee while the remainder of the Confederacy collapsed around him. Lee's subsistence was dwindling, reinforcements were drying up, Confederate ports of entry had vanished, rebel factories had been destroyed and Confederate territory had shrunk to nothing. If Lee was able to detach any forces at all they would be sent to defend what precious little remained of the Confederacy. So, Lee was unable to detach an invasion force north to threaten Washington, but still the politicians did not understand.

  Trying to soothe nervous politicians, Grant telegraphed the following to Lincoln on February 26th. "Sheridan's movement is in the direction of the enemy, and the tendency will be to protect the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and to prevent any attempt to invade Maryland and Pennsylvania." 151 Still the authorities were not assuaged. On March 2nd, Grant was obliged to send a telegram to Stanton. "If the returns I have of troops for the Department of Washington are anything like correct, there need not be the slightest apprehension for the safety of the capital. At this time, if Lee could spare any considerable force, it would be for the defence of points now threatened, which are necessary for the very existence of his army." 152 Later that same day, he again telegraphed the Secretary of War. "I don't think it possible for Lee to send anything towards Washington, unless it should be a brigade of cavalry." 153

  Sheridan's movement began on February 27th, from Winchester, Virginia. He moved with two divisions of cavalry, some 10,000 strong. By March 2nd, Sheridan had reached Staunton. The remaining rebel forces were located at Waynesboro, some ten miles from Staunton. The rebels, under General Early, were dug in for the winter at Waynesboro. Not stopping, Sheridan proceeded straight to Waynesboro and without so much as reconnoitering the enemy position, attacked. The battle was a rout. Early escaped, but Sheridan's army captured over 1000 rebels, 200 wagons and eleven pieces of artillery. Early headed back to Petersburg, while Sheridan escorted his prisoners back to Winchester.

  By March 3rd, Sheridan reached Charlottesville destroying the Virginia Central Railroad as he went. He spent two days in Charlottesville destroying railroads toward Lynchburg. Sheridan left Charlottesville on March 6th. He divided his forces into two columns, sending one down the Orange and Alexandria Railroad toward Lynchburg which destroyed the railroad all the way to Amherst Court House some sixteen miles north of Lynchburg. Regretfully, this column could not reach Lynchburg due to the poor conditions of the roads. The other column was sent to Scottsville on the James River. Their mission was to destroy the locks along the James River Canal.

  Sheridan hoped to secure a bridge to cross the James so he could move toward Farmville and destroy the Southside Railroad, but the enemy had already destroyed all the bridges. Due to the high level of water in the James, his pontoons would not reach the other side, so Sheridan could not go south of the river. The only options left for him were either to return to Winchester or make for a base such as White House. Sheridan chose the latter and arrived there on March 19th.

  While Sheridan was not successful in reaching Sherman, his actions proved very fruitful in destroying most of what remained of Lee's communication and supply lines.

  By the end of February the noose around the neck of the Confederacy was beginning to choke the victim. Sherman was about to enter North Carolina, Sheridan was laying waste to what remained in western Virginia and Schofield had taken Wilmington and was moving inland.

  Back in January, Jefferson Davis had appointed General Lee to command all the Southern armies, but this was too little too late. In February, Lee had General Joseph Johnston recalled to active duty and sent to oppose Sherman's march north.

  In a letter to Jefferson Davis dated February 23, 1865, Lee gave some insight into how desperate the situation had become and what options were left to the dying Confederacy.

  Headquarters

  February 23, 1865

  Mr. President:

  I have received the copy of Genl Beauregard's despatch of 21st instant, & wish it was in our power to carry out his plan. The idea is good, but the means are lacking. I have directed all the available troops in the Southern Department to be concentrated, with a view to embarrass if they cannot arrest Sherman's progress, & still hope that he cannot make the march contemplated by Genl Beauregard. I think it probable he may turn east by Camden towards the coast. It seems to me he ought not to be allowed to gather sufficient supplies for his journey, & indeed I do not know where they can be obtained. Our troops seem to be much scattered, but by diligence & boldness they can be united. I am much obliged to Your Excellency for ordering Genl Johnston to report to me. I have placed him in command of the army operating against Sherman, & directed him to assign Genl Beauregard to duty with him. Genl Beauregard is a good soldier, & I know will cheerfully & heartily cooperate with him. I hope for favourable results from their union & that Sherman may still be driven back. I have heard from many sources that Genl Beauregard's health was very feeble & feared he might entirely give way before he was willing to announce it. I know of no one who had so much the confidence of the troops & people as Genl Johnston, & believe he has capacity for the command. I shall do all in my power to strengthen him, & should he be forced across the Roanoke, unite with him in a blow against Sherman before the latter can join Genl Grant. This will necessitate the abandonment of our position on James River, for which contingency every preparation should be made.

  Genl Gilmer has arrived at Genl Beauregard's headquarters, Charlotte, & will be of much service to him.

  I am with great respect, your obt servt

  R. E. LEE

  Genl 154

  The reader will recall the Peace Commission which attempted reconciliation about the 1st of February. As things became more desperate the rebels again sought some form of reconciliation. The problem was twofold. First, the North refused to recognize the existence of the Confederate government and second, Jefferson Davis was unwilling to recognize that the war was lost. Southerners who wanted the bloodshed stopped thought there might be a way around these obstacles, a military convention.

  In late February, General Longstreet
met General Ord under a flag of truce to discuss the exchange of political prisoners. During the meeting the two generals who had known one another before the war, began to talk of the chance for peace and the topic of a military convention surfaced. Longstreet took news of his discussion back to headquarters and on March 3rd, a letter arrived at Grant's headquarters from General Lee.

  Headquarters, Confederate States Armies

  March 2, 1865

  General:

  Lieutenant General Longstreet has informed me that in a recent conversation between himself and Major General Ord as to the possibility of arriving at a satisfactory adjustment of the present unhappy difficulties by means of a military convention, General Ord stated that if I desired to have an interview with you on the subject you would not decline, provided I had authority to act. Sincerely desiring to leave nothing untried which may put an end to the calamities of war, I propose to meet you at such convenient time and place as you may designate, with the hope that upon an interchange of views it may be found practicable to submit the subjects of controversy between the belligerents to a convention of the kind mentioned. In such event I am authorized to do whatever the result of the proposed interview may render necessary or advisable. Should you accede to this proposition I would suggest that, if agreeable to you, we meet at the place selected by Generals Ord and Longstreet for their interview at 11 A.M. on Monday next.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant