Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  "All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may be commenced at once. The reserves of the 9th corps should be massed as much as possible. While I would not now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. In case they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the army. To prepare for this, the 9th corps will have rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. General Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. A success north of the James should be followed up with great promptness. An attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached largely. In that case it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence of Richmond. Preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north of the James, except inclosed works--only to be abandoned, however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy.

  "By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against Richmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the moving column, and return. It cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. The very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move promptly, and notify the commander of their action. I would also enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are engaged. In like manner, I would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy.

  "U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

  'MAJOR-GENERALS MEADE, ORD, and SHERIDAN." 160

  All was set to begin the final campaign, but just before Grant issued his orders he did something unusual for him. On March 20th, he sent a note to the President asking him if he would not mind coming to City Point for a couple days to visit and rest. This was very out of character for Ulysses. Grant was not a socialite, but he and the President had gained immense respect for one another. Possibly, Grant realized that terms of surrender were near at hand and wanted to ascertain Lincoln's feelings about how he wanted the enemy treated. Whatever the reason, the invitation pleased Lincoln and he immediately accepted. Lincoln and his party arrived at City Point at 9 A.M., on March 24th. Instead of spending a day or two, Lincoln spent two weeks and was there when the rebels attacked Fort Stedman. Lincoln even visited the battlefield later in the day after the enemy had been repulsed.

  Coincidentally, in a letter Sherman sent to Grant dated March 23rd, he expressed an interest in coming to City Point to visit for a day or two. Possibly, Sherman desired the same illumination from Grant as Grant sought from Lincoln. Sherman arrived at City Point on March 27th and on the 28th, the two great generals sat down with Admiral Porter to talk with the President.

  The famous conference which occurred aboard the President's steamer, the River Queen, lasted a number of hours. Sherman did most of the talking to the President, while Grant, as usual, did most of the listening. Sherman related many stories about his march through the South, but finally the conference got down to the heart of the problem, the surrender of Lee's and Johnston's armies. Throughout the conference, Lincoln expressed great anxiety that Sherman was away from his command, probably harking back to the early days of incompetent generals in command of the Army of the Potomac. Time and again, Sherman and Grant had to assure the President that Schofield was a top notch commander and it was physically impossible for Johnston to escape. As Grant and Sherman laid out their plans for the upcoming campaign, Lincoln expressed great interest in attaining a final surrender without any big battles. Of course, both generals could not assure him of this as it was the enemy who would control that decision. The most important topic for discussion was the degree of generosity to be included in any peace terms. Lincoln was only insistent on the two principles he had outlined to Grant during the visit of the peace commissioners, those being a preserved Union and the abolishment of slavery. After that, he was willing to be most generous. On the subject of what was to become of Jefferson Davis and his crowd, Lincoln could not say directly, but intimated strongly that he would be pleased if they somehow just got away. With the conference at an end, Sherman took his leave and Porter provided him with a much faster ship to return him to his command.

  The movements beginning the last campaign began the evening of March 27th. The roads were sufficiently dry and much war material had been stockpiled for the great move around the left. When Sheridan arrived he had become quite disturbed upon reading Grant's orders and in talking to Sherman. Sherman fully expected Sheridan to move to Grant's left cut the Southside and Danville roads and move south to form a junction with him. Sheridan was vigorously opposed to this. Finally, Grant pulled him aside and explained that he had inserted the wording about Sheridan in his orders as a means to deflect any criticism from the peace parties up North. He was concerned that if the move met with repulse public opinion would be outraged about great loss of life at this stage of the war, whereas, if it could be explained that Sheridan's move could be explained as a way of bringing the two armies into closer contact the question might not arise. Grant finished the conversation by telling Sheridan, "I mean to end the business here." 161

  Battle of Five Forks

  Both Grant and Sherman had been unable to assure Lincoln there would be no more battles, but little did they know how soon their prophesy would be borne out. By the evening of March 29th, the Union forces were strung out in the following manner. Weitzel was left in front of Richmond, Parke and Wright held the lines at Petersburg, Ord had extended to the left as far as the intersection of Hatcher's Run and the Vaughn Road, Humphreys had moved to Dabney's Mill and Warren was located at the junction of the Vaughn Road and the Boydton Plank Road. Sheridan's cavalry led the way and had made it to Dinwiddie Courthouse.

  Grant, ever vigilant to take advantage of whatever opportunity arose, sent Sheridan the following message during the evening of March 29th. "Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie. We are all ready, however, to give up all from the Jerusalem plank road to Hatcher's run, whenever the force can be used advantageously. After getting into line south of Hatcher's run, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position.....I feel now like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning, push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your action. We will all act together as one army, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy." 162

  On the morning of March 30th, the ever exuberant Sheridan appeared at Grant's headquarters wanting confirmation that Grant's orders meant he could attack and end the war. His ardor confirmed Grant's own instincts and Sheridan left with instructions to gain possession of Five Forks. If Sheridan could gain control of the intersection at Five Forks he could cut the Southside at will and Lee would be forced out of Petersburg.

  All the day of the 30th, Grant moved troops to reinforce Sheridan, so the latter could get into a position to turn the enemy's right. Throughout the day, Grant received reports from commanders all along the line that as the rebels made corresponding moves to their right, the Confederate lines in their front were weakly held. All counseled that a general assault should be made. There had been heavy rains on both the 29th and 30th, so all that could be done was make preparations for the upcoming ass
ault.

  On the 31st, Sheridan asked Grant for the Sixth Corps who had been with him in the Valley, but Grant refused because it was miles from Five Forks. Sheridan did not want the Fifth Corps, which was the closest because of the deliberate nature of the commander, General Warren.

  Realizing how critical Five Forks was to his very existence, Lee sent General Pickett to defend the place at all hazards. Fearing a junction of Warren's infantry and Sheridan's cavalry at Five Forks, Pickett attacked Warren's corps on the 31st driving it back about a mile from its most advanced position near the White Oak Road. Later in the day, Warren's corps advanced to the point from which they were originally driven and secured a lodgment on the White Oak Road. Once again Warren's actions had been dilatory which greatly exasperated both Meade and Grant.

  Late on the evening of March 31st, Meade ordered Warren to move to aid Sheridan who was confronted by Pickett's force of 10,000 combined infantry and cavalry. Meade explicitly articulated to Warren that he must be prompt in carrying out this movement.

  Everyone anticipated Warren's corps to be in place to support Sheridan by midnight, but Warren's first division did not report to Sheridan before 5 A.M., on April 1st. His other two divisions were not ordered to leave their positions until 5 A.M., on April 1st. Throughout the night, Meade exhorted Warren to action, but unfortunately Warren second guessed everyone's orders which caused unnecessary delays.

  Unknowingly, Grant sent Sheridan word that Warren's command would be in place by midnight and Sheridan was to assume command upon the junction of the two forces.

  At 3 A.M., Sheridan sent word to Warren describing the situation and directing him to attack at daylight. This presumed Warren was in position, but he was not. Hearing nothing from Warren, Sheridan attacked at daylight. He soon discovered Warren was nowhere to be found, so he halted the attack to reconsider the situation. Meanwhile, Ayers division arrived at 5 A.M., followed by Griffin's division about 8 A.M. By 11 A.M., Crawford's division reported along with Warren himself.

  Sheridan now devised a flanking maneuver using the Fifth corps to move to the right and turn the enemy's left flank. This would insure separation of Pickett's force from any possible reinforcements. At the same time, Sheridan would have Merritt's cavalry make a diversion on the rebel's right flank. Regretfully, Warren moved too slowly, so his corps was not ready to attack until 5 P.M.

  At 5 P.M., the Fifth corps advanced and Merritt's cavalry also moved to the attack. As the attack progressed, Sheridan became furious with Warren who had moved with Griffin and Crawford too far to the right to be of any use, forcing Sheridan to lead the troops on his front himself. He sent officer after officer to find Warren requesting him to close up, but to no avail. Before long, the entire rebel force was routed and fleeing for their lives. Without any word or cooperation from Warren, Sheridan felt he could no longer tolerate Warren's endless delays and meaningless tangents, so just before the battle ended Sheridan relieved him of command and placed Griffin in command of the Fifth Corps. Grant had previously given Sheridan approval to relieve Warren if he failed him. Grant and Meade had at various times wanted to relieve Warren, but had never agreed at the same time. Now both had had enough.

  In the Battle of Five Forks, 4500 rebels were captured and another 2000 were killed or wounded. The remainder dispersed as they fled. Union losses in the battle were 1000 killed, wounded or missing.

  The last major battle of the Civil War was over and it had been a massive Federal victory. Lee's fate was sealed with the loss at Five Forks. On April 1st, he sent the following letter to Jefferson Davis.

  Headquarters, Confederate States Armies

  April 1, 1865

  Mr. President:

  The movement of Genl Grant to Dinwiddie Court House seriously threatens our position, and diminishes our ability to maintain our present lines in front of Richmond and Petersburg. In the first place it cuts us off from our depot at Stoney Creek at which point forage for the cavalry was delivered by the Weldon Railroad and upon which we relied to maintain it. It also renders it more difficult to withdraw from our position, cuts us off from the White Oak road, and gives the enemy an advantageous point on our right and rear. From this point I fear he can readily cut both the South Side & the Danville Railroads being far superior to us in cavalry. This in my opinion obliged us to prepare for the necessity of evacuating our position on James River at once, and also to consider the best means of accomplishing it, and our future course. I should like very much to have the views of Your Excellency upon this matter as well as counsel, and would repair to Richmond for the purpose, did I not feel that my presence here is necessary. Should I find it practicable I will do so, but should it be convenient for Your Excellency or the Secretary of War to visit headquarters, I should be glad to see you. The reported advance of Stoneman from the west, and the movement of the enemy upon the Roanoke, add to our difficulties.

  Very respectfully, your obt serv't

  R. E. LEE

  Genl 163

  Upon learning of the victory at Five Forks, General Grant ordered a general assault all along the line for 4 A.M., the morning of April 2nd.

  On the morning of April 2nd, the Nationals assaulted all along the line and broke through along General Wright's front southwest of Petersburg. The Federals severed Lee's army and rolled up his right flank, capturing thousands of prisoners.

  On April 2nd, Lee sent Davis this dispatch.

  Petersburg

  April 2, 1865

  I think it is absolutely necessary that we should abandon our position tonight. I have given all the necessary orders on the subject to the troops, and the operation, though difficult, I hope will be performed successfully. I have directed General Stevens to send an officer to your excellency to explain the routes to you by which the troops will be moved to Amelia Court House, and furnish you with a guide and any assistance that you may require for yourself.

  R. E. LEE 164

  That night, General Lee evacuated Petersburg and Richmond. His time had run out and the chase had begun.

  CHAPTER FOURTEEN

  "The war is over; the rebels are our countrymen again"

  April 2, 1865 - April 9, 1865

  The Appomattox Campaign

  When the Federals assaulted on April 2nd, they severed Lee's army and rolled up its right flank, but they failed to capture the innermost line of works at Petersburg. Consequently, Lee's army was able to hold Petersburg into the night of April 2nd, allowing his army to escape.

  During the evening of April 2/3, the Army of Northern Virginia moved out of the fortifications it had defended for so long. Lee was determined to make a valiant effort to join forces with General Johnston in North Carolina. The first step in this process was to concentrate his forces at Amelia Court House, west of Petersburg and located on the Richmond and Danville Railroad.

  During the day of April 2nd, Grant was able to visit the captured works at Petersburg. While there, he exhibited more excitement than he did during the entire war in a letter to Julia.

  April 2, 1865

  Dear Julia: I am now writing from far inside what was the Rebel fortifications this morning but what are ours now. They are exceedingly strong and I wonder at the success of our troops carrying them by storm. But they did do it, and without any great loss. We have captured about 12,000 prisoners and 50 pieces of artillery. As I write this news comes of the capture of 1,000 more prisoners. Altogether this has been one of the greatest victories of the war. Greatest because it is over what the Rebels have always regarded as their most invincible army and the one used for the defence of their Capitol. We may have some more hard work but I hope not. Love and kisses for you and Jess.

  Ulyss 1

  Later in the day, Grant sent this letter to Joe Bowers at City Point asking the President to come visit on the 3rd.

  BOYDTON ROAD, NEAR PETERSBURG,

  April 2, 1865.--4.40 P.M.

  COLONEL T. S. BOWERS,

  City Point.

  We are n
ow up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hours will be intrenched from the Appomattox below Petersburg to the river above. Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, such part of them as were not captured, were cut off from town, either designedly on their part or because they could not help it. Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps is above them. Miles's division, 2d corps, was sent from the White Oak Road to Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad, where he met them, and at last accounts was engaged with them. Not knowing whether Sheridan would get up in time, General Humphreys was sent with another division from here. The whole captures since the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men, and probably fifty pieces of artillery. I do not know the number of men and guns accurately however. * * * I think the President might come out and pay us a visit to-morrow.