Truth, Knowledge, or Just Plain Bull: How to tell the difference

by Bernard M. Patten

  Principle: Committees can be wrong and often are wrong.

  p. 66 The decision of the admiralty was a committee decision. In chapter 6, we will discuss why committee decisions often go awry. Here I just wish to alert you to the fact that often decisions by committees are sometimes less reasonable than would have been predicted by analysis of the rational qualifications of the individual members of that group.

  Principle: Authorities can be dead wrong.

  Example: The US secretary of war was dead wrong about an important weapon program: “That idea is so damned nonsensical and impossible that I’m willing to stand on the bridge of a battleship while that nitwit tries to hit it from the air.”[6] This was Newton Baker’s reaction to Gen. Billy Mitchell’s claim that airplanes could sink battleships by dropping bombs on them. How could a man of Newton Baker’s caliber conclude he’d be perfectly safe standing on the bridge of a ship while the country’s best pilot attacked it? On the other hand, how could a gnat of a plane sink a giant battleship? There is an issue here, a big one. There is a controversy, too. How can it be settled? What information would be needed to prove or disprove Baker’s conclusion?

  Baker’s main error was not so much what he believed but his utter conviction that he was right. He believed he was so right that he refused to let the navy test the idea. Baker was satisfied that the most available evidence at that time was that a battleship was made of heavy steel and would be a difficult moving target. Thus, the secretary of war, at the time the highest authority in the United States on the subject of war, made the mistake of letting his beliefs dictate his actions without considering alternative evidence that could have been made available by a test.

  Think for a second: How could Billy Mitchell prove Baker’s generalization wrong?

  When Warren Harding succeeded Wilson, Baker was retired and General Mitchell’s squadron of tiny planes turned a supposedly unsinkable dreadnought into a permanent part of the ocean floor.

  Lucky for Baker that he did not have to stand on the bridge while the test boat got demolished. Baker’s error and that of the admiralty illustrate the errors of thinking you know something when you don’t. Their errors prove that an authority can be wrong, grievously wrong. When authorities are wrong, it is usually because they are overconfident about their knowledge and have anchored their opinions in a single statistic or fact that from then on dominates the thinking process.

  p. 67 Principle: Ignorance plays a major role in stupid decisions, particularly those of committees, particularly those of government committees, and particularly those of government officials. Not just ignorance, but pigheadedness, which often arises from overconfidence, a systematic defect in many modern leaders who tend to anchor their opinions on single facts that dominate their thinking.

  From which follows:

  Lesson: Although you are not responsible for the ignorance or pigheadedness of others, try to correct such ignorance when you come across it. And always suggest objective testing when cherished beliefs or single facts dictate important policies and actions.

  Principle: Failure to consider counterevidence or contrary positions is an error in reasoning.

  The advantage of iron boats would be that, unlike wood, iron boats would not be subject to wood rot and sea worms, a problem that plagued the British navy at the time. Iron is stronger than wood, so it will withstand the actions of wave, wind, and enemy cannon fire better than wood. Furthermore, iron does not burn as readily as wood. Clearly, the admiralty did not think about these possible advantages of iron over wood. Therefore, the committee was not thinking clearly when it rejected iron boats. It had failed to consider the advantages and disadvantages of iron and wood and all the possibilities. This failure means that the admiralty’s thinking was black and white: According to them, iron had to be bad. Wood had to be good. Their analysis was simple, simplistic, and, let’s face it, probably stupid. In fact, their statement, when closely examined, doesn’t make sense. It is a non sequitur. In its simplicity it fails to consider a large body of evidence that runs counter to the admiralty’s received standard opinion.

  Iron versus wood? Which is best for boats? Of course, we know the answer from our modern experience and perspective, but I believe the answer also could have been figured out at the time that the admiralty issued its ridiculous statement. I believe by clear thinking we p. 68 could have figured out at the time that the admiralty statement was probably wrong.

  Prospective thinking is often an overgeneralization and therefore can result in erroneous conclusions.

  Because of the nature of contingent events, understanding things in retrospect, like the iron boat issue, is easier than understanding the same thing in prospect. That doesn’t mean prospective understanding isn’t possible. It just means it is difficult and less reliable than retrospective analysis. Because prospective thinking is less reliable, it requires more circumspection, but often, when done properly, it can provide a true view of reality.

  For instance, take this statement: “A machine that thinks? That is simply not possible.” What do you think about a machine that thinks? Is it possible? Or not possible? Solve this question the way we solved the iron boat question. Solve this question the way the Wright brothers solved the heavier-than-air question. Ask yourself if a thinking machine is possible by restating the question as a statement that makes a definite claim. Then try to prove the claim wrong by finding an exception.

  Question restated: A thinking machine is not possible.

  If such a thing were not possible, then how come each of us has a thinking machine in the hollow round of our skull? Yes, that and all the other brains on this planet, from the brain in the littlest mite to the brain in the biggest elephant, are electrochemical jellies that think. If those electrochemical jellies are thinking, why couldn’t some man or woman of the future make something similar that would also think? Clearly a thinking machine is not only possible; billions of such machines already exist.

  Given that, think about this: Isn’t it also possible that sometime in the future it would be possible to make a machine that would think faster, better, and more efficiently (that is, use energy better) than the human brain? Who would construct such thinking machines? Humans, of course. If they last that long, humans will make a better thinking machine than the human brain, just as they have made a better flying machine than the human body. By the power of pure rational thought, we can then induce that sometime in the future, the machines made by humans will not only be thinking better than humans, they will feel better, have better moral standards, work better, and play better. This is the future. It has to happen. An authority that said differently would likely be wrong.

  p. 69 Another related error is to attribute authority erroneously and then generalize from that erroneous attribution.

  Erroneous attribution of authority is an error that leads to false conclusions.

  For example, take this statement: “The official US government policy about the health hazards of smoking must have changed because I saw President Clinton smoking a cigar. If he smokes a cigar, smoking can’t be all that bad.”

  What President Clinton does in his private life has nothing whatsoever to do with the health policy of the US government. To conclude that because Clinton does something, it is OK for us to do it is an error that wears multiple hats: It is a false analogy because we are not him. It is an overgeneralization because it infers that what is OK for Clinton is OK for us. It is an unsupported assumption because it assumes that he and we share certain characteristics that make it OK. And it involves the Tu quoque defect in reasoning, which rejects criticism by accusing one’s critic of doing the same thing (that is being criticized), diverting the argument to an irrelevant issue, and then extending the conclusion by overgeneralization.

  Example: “Clinton smokes cigars. So it must be OK for me, too.”

  Whether the other party does something or not is not materially related to the conclusion. It is often just a diversion to focus a
ttention away from the real issue. The Latin name for this error in thinking is tu quoque, translated as “you (do it) too.”

  “At your age, you shouldn’t be working so hard, Roy. You might get a heart attack.”

  “Look who’s talking.”

  The questions of age and working hard were not addressed. Instead, it is implied that since the speaker does it too, it must be OK. What others do or don’t do, insofar as those actions are not supported by reason, is irrelevant to the implied conclusion that hard work is OK at that age. Even if it were relevant, outside evidence would have to prove that the conclusion could reasonably be generalized to include the particular person or persons cited.

  “Allegra hit first.” Children should not feel entirely justified in anti-social behavior if they can explain it that way. Because someone else is bad, that doesn’t give you general license to be bad, too.

  “George, if I were you, I wouldn’t smoke so much.”

  “If I were you, Paul, I wouldn’t smoke so much, either.”

  The respondent knows that the other is not him and that therefore p. 70 the statement is not only tu quoque, it is also contrary to fact. Contrary to fact statements ignore evidence and are therefore irrelevant.

  “Mickey, I don’t think you should be drinking. Alcohol tends to dull your senses, reduces your physical control, and may even become addicting.”

  “Pop, that’s not very convincing with you standing there with a scotch whiskey in your hand.”

  A father has a duty to tell his son his concerns about his son’s drinking. The father is under no moral requirement to follow such advice himself.

  “You must stop smoking, or you’ll get another heart attack.”

  “Nice of you to say that, Doctor. But I saw you ditch that cigarette just before you came into the room.”

  The doctor has a perfect right, some say a duty, to advise patients about the adverse health effects of anything. But the doctor is under no obligation to follow that advice himself. In fact, whether the doctor smokes is irrelevant to the issue under consideration, which is clearly stated by the doctor. Even if it were OK for the doctor to smoke, that doesn’t mean that conclusion would apply with equal vigor to the patient, especially one who has had a previous heart attack.

  Prejudice is a form of overgeneralization.

  When we overgeneralize about race, we are bound to make errors and suffer the consequences, as illustrated by the following story told to me by a lawyer friend who lives in Kentucky. The story was front page news for several weeks as journalists tried to figure out what went wrong in the thinking of the police. See if you can figure out what went wrong. How could the police have handled the situation better? How would you have handled the situation better?

  Case study: Two cops in a patrol car were on the side of a highway watching traffic. Along came a brand new red Cadillac driven by a black man who was wearing a blue suit, white shirt, and red tie. The Cadillac was cruising at and not above the speed limit. There didn’t seem to be anything irregular about the driving, the license plate, or the inspection stickers. Nevertheless, the cops pulled out and followed the Cadillac for a few miles and then pulled the Cadillac over.

  “Anything wrong?” asked the black man.

  The only reply was, “Driver’s license and insurance.”

  One cop examined the documents while the other covered his partner. They were on condition orange, a police term that means pretty alert for armed attack but not actually under attack.

  p. 71 The documents were in order. The black man asked again why he had been stopped.

  “Wait here,” he was told while the cops went back to their patrol car and punched in the license plate and the driver’s name. The dispatcher said both were clear. The Cadillac was not reported stolen. There were no outstanding warrants for the black man’s arrest. Furthermore, the result on the title search showed that there was no lien on the vehicle. The black man owned the car, free and clear! The brand new car was paid for.

  With this knowledge in hand, the cops returned to the Cadillac. “Get out. Put your hands on the roof and spread them,” they told him. Cop number one frisked the driver while cop number two provided cover. They found no weapon.

  At this point, the black man started saying things the cops thought sounded strange, almost crazy: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”

  “What?” said one of the cops.

  “And no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by an oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

  The statement might have triggered an idea in the heads of the police for at that point, the cops searched the car for drugs. They found none. The black man then arrested the cops.

  Question: What power or position enabled the black man to arrest the cops?

  Answer: He was the county judge.

  In fact, when he announced that he was the county judge, one of the cops recognized him and exclaimed, “Oh, shit!”

  Why did the judge arrest the cops?

  The judge put the two cops under arrest for violation of numerous civil rights laws, official oppression, and harassment.

  What errors in thinking led the cops to perdition?

  Before I go over this case study for you, before I point out what I think were the errors in thinking, go over it yourself. Think about where the cops made errors. Think about how those errors led to the social, political, and personal disaster that occurred. After you have considered for a while, take a look at my explanations. My explanations are not exhaustive, just designed to make some suggestions.

  p. 72 First, the cops had no business stopping the Cadillac.

  Cops are not expected to be logical, though it would have helped if they were. But cops are expected to follow the law. The police must obey the laws laid down for them by the Constitution of the United States of America. And that law, the supreme law of the land, says that unless there was a violation of the law, or reasonable evidence for a probable violation of the law, citizens must be left alone.

  That is the law. That law must be followed. If that law is not followed, the police are subject to criminal prosecution.

  Second, the cops were not thinking. Or if they were thinking, they were not thinking properly. Their appraisal of the situation might have been something like this: “Here’s a big black guy in a new Caddy. Except for criminals, all blacks are poor” (overgeneralization); “therefore, this black man must be a criminal” (erroneous conclusion, actually a deduction from the erroneous overgeneralization).

  This idea then probably became elaborated to the further conclusion (also an error) that the car had to be stolen because (they thought) a black guy couldn’t possibly own a Cadillac without being involved in some illegal activity.

  If the cops had been thinking right, they would have recognized that there are many rich black men, including famous actors, sports stars, movie personalities, statesmen, and so forth. Therefore, the overgeneralization that this person must be a criminal was easily refuted.

  Third, since the cops had no right to stop the black man, they had no right to ask for identification or a license. They should have known that even if they found something wrong, the courts would have ruled the evidence inadmissible. That did not prevent them from pursuing their errors even further.

  Fourth, when it was proven that the black man owned the car and had paid cash for it, the cops made the further overgeneralization that such a black man must be a drug dealer. The overgeneral reasoning might have gone like this: “Only black men who are drug dealers can pay cash for a car. Since this black man paid cash for his car, he must be a drug dealer. Since he is a drug dealer, he might have drugs in his car. Therefore, we will search his car for drugs.”

  Overgeneralization in Advertising

  p. 73 Advertising, as most of us know deep
in our heart’s core, is often irrational. The reasons that advertising is often irrational are myriad, but in this chapter, I want to focus on advertising as overgeneralization.

  In order for a generalization to be reasonable, it must be based on evidence that must include a fair sample and not carefully selected instances. That a famous movie star uses Lux soap means at best simply that and at worst that she has been paid for her endorsement. If paid, she was probably paid handsomely. The more she was paid, the more likely her endorsement was biased and the less we should believe in it.

  Advertisements often imply generalizations that are unwarranted.

  The implied generalization in this form of advertisement is that we should use Lux soap also. Whether we should is, of course, a moot question because as far as I know, Lux soap is no longer sold in the United States. But that is beside the point. A movie star’s endorsement does not provide a reasonable argument for us to buy that soap. If thousands of purchasers are genuinely satisfied and only a few dissatisfied, it is probable that the soap in question is OK and may in fact provide good value. But one movie star? One movie star’s endorsement is not enough to conclude anything. One movie star doesn’t mean beans, just the way one sparrow doesn’t make a summer. Furthermore, the ad, strictly speaking, doesn’t apply to us except by overgeneralization. It might apply to movie stars, but because I am not a movie star, it doesn’t apply to me. The pernicious appeal of such an advertisement like this one derives from the wish of most people to be movie stars or, at least, famous like a movie star.