Zibaldone

by Leopardi, Giacomo

  But the said effect was the fault not of Christianity but of the causes that had given rise, as has been said, to the need for this remedy, causes that sooner or later had to emerge from the advance of reason (namely, from the superiority that it had acquired, and which naturally had to grow and carry man to that point) and from the state of society to which man had been irrevocably reduced. So that sooner or later the birth of Christianity was indispensable and certain, or of another [429] Religion acceptable to reason, indeed produced by it in a certain way, and much more rational than the ancient religions, which could not conform or adapt except to a much lower level of reason and knowledge. Therefore, given the corruption brought upon man by reason and knowledge, he had at some stage to arrive at that low point of happiness in life, which Christianity establishes as dogma, and which it also actively produces, though as a secondary and necessary cause, not as one that is primary and free. I mean that Christianity was indispensable sooner or later, given the corruption wrought by reason, and it was so: (1) at a human level, because reason, before arriving at that extreme which it has reached today, naturally had to be frightened by itself, and, seeing the reality of things disappear before its eyes, and life and the world then moving toward destruction, had to regard itself as absurd, and to conclude that there must be some unknown truth that gave things that reality which it could no longer discover or admit. Thus, even from itself [430] it had to take refuge in the bosom of a religion that was abstract and metaphysical, and appropriate to its speculative nature, a mysterious religion, and precisely for this reason rational, because the reality of things, which reason could not clearly and specifically persuade itself of with its own resources, was established by the plausible belief, held to be true, in an infallible God, the revealer of hidden mysteries tending to provide a general basis for the said reality. In this way, reason, resting on an obscure foundation but one believed to be true, came to believe those things which, on the one hand, it could not believe on a clear and well-defined foundation, but which, on the other, it seemed absurd to deny, against nature and the intimate feeling that affirmed them. So that even reason itself, in its natural course, before destroying everything, had necessarily to imagine and convince itself of a revealed religion; (2) at a much more divine level. Because, supposing a God, and one that takes care of his creatures, when, in order to ensure that [431] the first of his earthly beings did not inevitably perish and that his life here below was not destroyed or reduced to extreme unhappiness, there was no other means than belief in a revelation, and it was so greatly in accord with God’s mercy for him to use that means, and, in order that this belief be firm and certain, to act to make it true, that is, to reveal truly.

  In any case, although I affirm that a middling degree of civilization is the best state for corrupt and social man, and that Christianity places him in no greater or lesser state, this does not contradict what I wish to add, which is that man was happier before Christianity than after it. Because this state of middling civilization can have various levels, in other words it can contain more or less nature, or reason, or natural or nonnatural beliefs, and it can, therefore, be more or less happy. But as it is no longer possible to return to the state of ancient civilization, because of the greater increase in reason, I maintain that the happiest state now possible in this life is that of true and pure Christianity. See also my other thoughts about the effects of Christianity (or of the causes that produced it) [432] on society, on the quality and the happiness of this life.1

  For that matter, observe that Christianity greatly limits the exercise of reason, that faculty which destroys life, that faculty which made Christianity necessary, the faculty whose ravages Christianity came to remedy, the faculty that in a way invoked and produced Christianity. Because, apart from certain general fundamental propositions, which require reason in order to be judged and believed, namely, the existence, providence, manifestation, and infallibility of a God, all other specific propositions that religion teaches are independent from the investigation and intervention of reason. And while reason works rationally and in accordance with these general propositions, believing them and regulating life and actions with their help, nevertheless it is very rarely used and exercised in Christian life, limiting itself only to the foundation and only to general principles, which essentially excludes the operation of reason in all specific cases, which are [433] the majority, and which structure and regulate life. In this respect as well, Christianity leads man toward the middling state of civilization, enjoining inaction and the blinding of reason in life, even though reason itself is the source of this inaction, etc., deriving from its active persuasion in its fundamental propositions. (18 Dec. 1820.)

  For page 398. Furthermore, God added: “nunc ergo ne forte mittat manum suam, et sumat etiam de ligno vitae, et comedat, et vivat in aeternum” [“now therefore lest perhaps he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever”]. (Genesis 3:22.) Therefore, the reasoning is clear. If he eats the fruit of the tree of life, he will truly live forever. Therefore, having picked and eaten from the tree of knowledge, he had truly acquired such knowledge. And God had not deprived him of it, because in the same way he could have deprived him of immortality if he had eaten from the tree of life. Now, inasmuch as he desired not to deprive him of this immortality in the event of him eating from it, yet so that he could not eat from it (not for sin, but for this very reason, according to the very clear account in Genesis), he drove him from paradise, where the tree of life grew. “Et emisit eum” (as Genesis [434] continues immediately) “Dominus Deus de paradiso voluptatis … et collocavit ante paradisum voluptatis Cherubim, et flammeum gladium atque versatilem, ad custodiendam viam ligni vitae” [“And the Lord God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure … and placed before the paradise of pleasure Cherubims, and a flaming sword, turning every way, to keep the way of the tree of life”]. (3:23–24.) Now let the theologians come and tell me that the corruption of man consisted in the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, and in the superiority acquired by the flesh, or rather in the subjugation of reason and intellect. Or that this was the very effect of corruption and sin. It is true—and I would agree—that from then began that enmity between reason and nature of which I have always spoken, an enmity that is not to be found among other living beings, though they, too, are furnished with reasoning and the principle of knowledge. Rather, this enmity, this imbalance, this clash of two qualities that had become incompatible, originated and consisted in the increase and predominance of reason; and the degradation of man was not that of reason or of knowledge, or the obfuscation of the intellect. Indeed, the intellect of man was greatly illuminated after his sin, and by way of his sin. He acquired the knowledge of good and evil, and became effectively in this way “quasi unus ex nobis” [“as one of us”], in the words of God.1 [435] The Scriptures tell us this in the clearest terms. Then, in short, man’s reason began to contradict (1) his inclinations, (2) his primitive beliefs, something that had not previously happened. And this was a rebellion of reason against nature or of the spirit against the body, not of nature against reason or the body against the spirit.

  Note that my system is the only one capable of giving an explanation of the account in Genesis that is new as well as literal, simple, spontaneous—indeed, such that there can be no other explanation, without straining the meaning of the text or regarding it as absurd. And in fact, according to the theologians,1 who regard the increase in reason and knowledge as an absolute benefit for man, and who think that the rational part is absolutely and essentially primary in him (not accidentally, in other words, in light of his corruption), according to the theologians, I repeat, the very clear sense of Genesis remains absolutely absurd, for it posits the increase of reason and the acquisition of knowledge as a precise and direct effect of sin. Whereas my system, which establishes the true and essential perfection of man in his primitive state, namely [436] that state in which he was created, and in which
he came immediately from the hands of God, and places his corruption in the predominance of reason and knowledge, finds that the literal and incontrovertible sense of Genesis is very profound, and in harmony with the most sublime and most recent philosophy. (19 Dec. 1820.)

  Nothing can be found in Genesis to support the claim for infused knowledge in Adam, except for his having a certain form of language, as I stated at the end of p. 394. God, in the words of Genesis, “adduxit ea” [“brought them”] (the animals) “ad Adam, ut videret quid vocaret ea: omne enim quod vocavit Adam animae viventis” [“to Adam to see what he would call them: for whatsoever Adam called any living creature”] (which is perhaps the same as saying: omnis enim anima vivens, quam vocavit Adam, that is to say omne animal vivens) “ipsum est nomen eius. Appellavitque Adam nominibus suis cuncta animantia, et universa volatilia caeli, et omnes bestias terrae” [“the same is its name. And Adam called all the beasts by their names, and all the fowls of the air, and all the cattle of the field”]. (Genesis 2:19–20.) This does not in any way suggest infused natural history in Adam, or the knowledge of the qualities in animals that are not known without study, but knowledge only of the qualities that appear at first sight, upon a first hearing, etc., qualities from which names are ordinarily obtained for all perceptible objects [437] in the earliest stages of any language—those names and those words, I would say, that form the roots of idioms.1

  In any case, I, too, support the proposition—indeed, it forms an essential part of my system—that Adam had infused knowledge, but in the following way. Every being capable of choice, or one, rather, that cannot resolve to act (not even to carry out an action necessary for his own survival, except what are called acts hominis [of man], if there truly are any),2 and as a result cannot live, without a chosen and defined act of his will, needs to have beliefs, that is, he needs to believe that things are good or bad, and that this particular thing is good or bad, otherwise his will has no reason for deciding whether to embrace that thing or run away from it, whether to act or not, whether to agree or disagree. And man and animal in this indifference would necessarily become like the ass of the paradox, for which see p. 381. Plants and rocks, which do not move by themselves or depend on themselves in action and life, do not need beliefs, but the animal that does depend on itself in action and life needs to believe, since there is no other cause [438] or impetus or other force (except extrinsic forces) that can decide and define its choice. Any being that is not a machine needs to have beliefs in order to live. Therefore, animals, too, unless they are purely and simply machines, have the principle of reasoning, without which there is no belief, because believing is none other than drawing a consequence.

  But I am talking about beliefs, not knowledge. The object of knowledge is truth. The object of belief is a credible proposition, and I mean credible in relation wholly and utterly to the general or individual, essential or accidental qualities of the believing being, because something can be credible to one species or genus and not to another, to an individual in that species or genus and not to another, to this same individual today and not tomorrow.

  Truth, therefore, is irrelevant to this discussion; rather, we only need to know what sources of belief are capable of producing a decision to act that is beneficial (and truly beneficial) to the thinking and living being, and consequently to know what sources of belief, that is, what beliefs, are capable of producing its happiness.

  I therefore say that the beliefs that decide man in the right way (that is, in the way appropriate to his own, particular being), and therefore lead [439] to happiness, are (as in the other animals) the beliefs that are inborn, primitive, and natural.

  In this way, I suggest that Adam did not have knowledge as such, but that he had infused beliefs. Not the knowledge of truth, irrelevant to him, but convictions that he believed to be truly true, convictions about believing the true (without which there is no belief), and convictions that were truly proper to his nature and to his happiness, and would therefore lead to perfection. And Adam had to have them, just like other animals, because without beliefs there is no life for those beings which depend upon determining their own will in order to act, as I have demonstrated.

  These inborn, primitive, and natural beliefs are none other than what is called instinct, innate ideas, etc. It is beyond doubt that animals have them, but this does not mean they are not free. If they were not free, they would be mere machines. Instinct is simply what I have described, that is, inborn beliefs. These do not deprive them of their freedom, because these beliefs do nothing other than determine will, without mechanically forcing the bodily organs, in the same way [440] that any belief, whether inborn or acquired, does not deprive man of freedom or choice. Whether the reasoning necessary in order to make a choice is determined by natural and innate principles, or by principles acquired through knowledge, by true principles, or by false principles that are believed to be naturally true, is indifferent to freedom, in the same way that absolute truth or untruth is of no concern to the relative happiness that depends upon it. And the reasoning that leads to the choice is reasoning in exactly the same way, no matter what principle it starts from. So that the brutes have instinct and at the same time full freedom.1 So that man, who had full freedom, also had, and still has, instinct. Consider natural man, the child, etc., and how many of his actions are determined by inborn principles, whether formed through belief alone, or through knowledge of things as they are. The baby, for example, putting its lips to the breast, sucks milk from it without being taught. But something that has already been observed, that happens so naturally that most people have difficulty noticing it, and yet that should be ever more closely observed, is that the power of instinct weakens in proportion to the growth of other determining powers, namely reason and knowledge. And thus, [441] as man moves away from nature and toward society, the methods that nature has provided for attaining these ends are changed or replaced by other methods, etc. etc. And as man loses his natural happiness—indeed, before that—so, too, he loses his actual power of instinct, and those inborn methods for achieving this happiness. Therefore, it is real blindness to suggest that nature teaches the brute everything it needs to exist, but not man, and to deduce from this that man therefore needs teaching, society, etc., in other words, that he is imperfect when he leaves the hands of nature, and has to obtain perfection by himself. Man also had all that he needed naturally. If he now no longer feels that he has it, this is because he has lost it. He has lost perfection by wanting to perfect himself, and thereby changing and corrupting himself. Let us observe primitive man, the child, and, in proportion, the uneducated man, and we shall see how they either know what we have discovered, or believe what we no longer believe but ought to believe, and it would have truly served our needs, and was the instrument that was expedient for us, and that [442] nature had placed in our hands. And even if this belief was false in absolute terms, it was true in relative terms and was entirely sufficient for its purpose, that is, in short, for our perfect existence according to our particular essence, and thus for our happiness.

  But it is necessary to understand fully what these inborn beliefs, or true instinct, and innate ideas really are. Ideas that are innate in the strict sense do not exist in any living being and were the fantasies of old schools of thought.1 Nature influences the ideas and beliefs of every animal, instilling those ideas and beliefs into us not in an identical and immediate way but indirectly, that is, by disposing the animal, and all things relating to it, in such a way that the animal naturally decides to believe this and not that. Thus belief is not determined from the beginning, any more than will is, but it, too, must take shape before it can shape the will. But, in the same way that actions or determinations of will are natural when they stem from natural beliefs, so beliefs or determinations of the intellect are natural when they are consistent with the way in which nature has arranged and provided for the mind to reach a determination. Consistent, that is, with the means of belief that [443] natu
re has given us, in the same way that it has given us the means to act through our beliefs.

  All the modern ideologues1 have established that all the most primitive ideas or beliefs, the most essential for the most vital action, and, therefore, all the motivating ideas or beliefs of the newborn child (and likewise every other animal), all the ideas or beliefs that determine or do not determine, that is, relative to action, stem simply from experience, and are therefore no more than consequences drawn by way of reasoning and a syllogistic operation, from a major premise, etc. (And observe here the need for reasoning in the brutes.)

  This experience, which must necessarily form the basis or, as they say, the antecedents of the syllogism, without which syllogism there is neither idea nor belief, can be of two sorts. One is that which derives from natural inclinations, passions, feelings, etc., all things that are truly inborn, and absolutely primordial, even if many of them may develop to a greater or lesser extent, or not at all; they can change, become corrupted, etc. A man who feels hungry (this is an experience) and feels himself led by nature toward food (this is not an idea but an inclination) deduces from this that he needs to eat, that food is something good. This is the consequence, that is, [444] the belief. He therefore determines and resolves to eat. This is the determination of will produced by the prior determination of the intellect, or in other words by belief. It is followed by eating, that is, the action, which arises from the will determined in that way.