Zibaldone

by Leopardi, Giacomo

  Coming back to the topic, adultuma of adolesco and of adoleo is the contraction of adoletum, rather of adolitum, the regular supine of adoleo, as docitum is of doceo, then contracted to doctum. In fact inolesco (or rather the unknown inoleo) has inolĭtum not inoletum. Obsoletum, exoletum and the like are irregular, and corruptions of the unknown exolitum, obsolitum. Unless docitum is a corruption of docētum, which would be regular like amātum from amare. Or [3702] unless doctum is a contraction of docētum, like docui of docēvi. This is why the regular and original supine of the second conjugation is in ētum from ēre, like exoletum, netum, fletum, suetum (from the ancient sueo) and others like it, and like amātum from amāre, and why those in itum, like exercĭtum, habĭtum, etc., are corruptions, as dormĭtum and the like are corruptions of domātum, etc. That is what I believe. See p. 3704, and 3853, 3871.

  The perfect adolui is also attributed to adolesco. Forcellini under adolesco.

  Aboleo es evi ĭtum also from oleo. Priscian also allows abolui. Abolesco neuter. Deleo es evi itum also from oleo. See Forcellini under Deleo and Leo es. Oboleo es ui. Obolitio. Suboleo es ui–Subolesco is.

  Adoleo in the meaning in which it could have produced adolesco [to increase] is in fact still to be found. Forcellini under Adoleo. In the same way as adolesco is still to be found in the meaning which corresponds to the normal one of adoleo [to burn]. Forcellini under adolesco.

  The meaning of oleo (different from or identical to the oleo [to emit a smell] which we still have) must have been little different from cresco [to increase]. In fact obsoleo differs little if at all from obsolesco [to grow old]. The same should apply to adoleo in relation to adolesco, etc. See Forcellini under Adoleo. Which perhaps from to burn in sacrifices was transferred to mean accrescere [to increase], as on the contrary mactare [to sacrifice, to glorify] [3703] was transferred from accrescere to immolare, sacrificare, etc. [to immolate, to sacrifice]. And the same can be said of oleo, etc. etc. That is that its first meaning was ulire [to emit a smell] (as it is today), then to burn scented things, etc. (like adoleo), then accrescere or crescere, and in this last sense it will have been understood in its compound derivatives, adolesco, exolesco, etc., in the compound obsoleo, in exoleo, etc., and will have produced the derivative olesco, that is cresco, for which see Forcellini and see also under macto, etc. etc., and under sobolesco [to grow up]. (15 Oct. 1823.)

  For p. 3688, beginning. That cretum and cretus do not properly belong to cresco (see Forcellini cresco, end), but to another verb, is shown by their difference in meaning (cretus from cerno [to distinguish by the senses, to see] is another word). Cretus means generated. I am convinced that it is a contraction of creatus; that cresco comes from creo as, as hisco comes from hio as, and that it properly is the same as to be in the process of creating, generating, forming, which is exactly what the person growing does. At each moment there is being formed and generated what is added to him and that in which his growth consists. Growth is a continuous formation and generation, [3704] not of the whole, but of the accidental parts, etc. etc. See Forcellini under Crementum and cretus. This etymology has not perhaps been given by anyone before. And the reason for that is because no one, I believe, has considered cresco as a verb in our category of verbs in sco which are formed from other original verbs, with analogous variation in meaning, etc. We discover this and confirm it by means of analogy and the general property of meaning, formation, etc., of verbs in sco. Cretus therefore comes not from cresco but from creatus, as shown also by its meaning, whereas other similar forms, e.g., suetus, which is grammatically from sueo, but in meaning from suesco, etc. (15 Oct. 1823.)

  For p. 3702. These observations, and the comparisons with fletum, netum, and other such supines all from the second conjugation, confirm that suetum, exoletum, and the like, are not from suesco, exolesco, etc., which are verbs of the third conjugation, to which such a desinence does not belong, but from other verbs of the second conjugation from which they are derived. Cretum from cerno and its compounds is a very corrupt form, standing for cernitum, which is the true one, and the desinence in etum is accidental to it, etc. (15 Oct. 1823.) See p. 3731. The same applies to what we have said about second-conjugation perfects, and the comparison with nevi, flevi, etc., shows that suevi, crevi, adolevi, etc., do not come from suesco, etc., which are third-conjugation verbs. (15 Oct. 1823.) See p. 3827. The desinence of perfects in evi or [3705] in vi, proper to the first conjugation and, as we have shown [→Z 3698–99], to the second, which now is more often in ui, which is the same, and finally even to the fourth conjugation which however also preserves the desinence in ii, is completely foreign to third-conjugation verbs, except where there is a rare anomaly, as with crevi from cerno, and its compounds, a highly irregular perfect, instead of cerni, and with sevi from sero [to sow] and its compounds, a verb however which is still highly irregular, as can be seen in its supine satum, situm in compounds, the usual quality change in composite forms, etc. See p. 3848, etc. Or it can be for some other reason as with the verb no (for which see p. 3688) which must have been third conjugation, which has novi [I got knowledge of] as its perfect to avoid the rather ugly ni, which would be its regular perfect, and which in fact agrees with the particle ni: in addition to the fact that no Latin perfect, as far as I can recall, is monosyllabic, even if it comes from a monosyllabic stem: except for ii from eo, and from fuo, fui, which were monosyllables, and perhaps they still are for Latin poets of the good period, etc., according to what I have said elsewhere about the ancient monosyllabic quality of such diphthongs, etc. [→Z 1151–53, 2266–68]. From the monosyllables do, sto, etc., came the two-syllable perfects by duplication: dedi, steti, etc. In this way from no there could have been a neni. Or perhaps the verb from which nosco [to get knowledge of] comes, was not no, but noo (νοῶ), so that the perfect [3706] novi instead of the regular noi will have come about (like the perfects of the first conjugation in avi instead of ai, those of the second in evi instead of ei, and those of the fourth in ivi instead of ii) in order to avoid the hiatus, though this hiatus can only be accidental in perfects of this conjugation. See p. 3756. So instead of fui, the regular perfect of the ancient fuo, a third-conjugation verb, and this perfect is still preserved today, and that alone, and completely regular, Ennius said fuvi, and not metri causa [for the sake of the meter] as Forcellini believes (under fuam), but in my opinion, to avoid the hiatus.a The avoidance of which was dear to the hearts especially of writers (as also those in other languages), and it is to them, I believe, that we must attribute the fact that the desinences avi and evi have become the norm (later ui) of the first and second conjugations in the perfects and their dependent forms, and partly the desinence ivi in the fourth, in place of the original ai, ei, ii. And those in avi, evi, ivi, in my opinion, are only proper to writing, or certainly to illustrious language, at least in the main, and the plebs never or very seldom adopted them, because the plebs preserved the original ai, ei, ii, as is shown by Italian (and also French [3707] aimai, whence Spanish amè, as I have said in my theory of continuatives). Coming back to our subject, the desinence in vi, apart from the cases and anomalies, etc., mentioned is in no way proper to, in fact is improper to, third-conjugation perfects, except by pure accident, as in solvi, volvi, and the like. In these cases the v does not belong to the desinence, neither of the perfect, nor of the ordinary inflection of third-conjugation verbs in the perfect, etc., but to the stem (solvo, volvo), and is the root letter of the whole verb, etc. However there are many third-conjugation verbs which (by anomaly) form their perfect in ui (as do the majority of those of the second), and these are much more in number than those of the third which form their perfect in vi (just as today even in the second conjugation there are more verbs in ui than in vi). For example the other sero [to bind together, to weave] (different from the one discussed earlier on p. 3705) which has the supine sertum, in the perfect has the form serui, as do its compounds. So does colo is ui [to cultivate]. And there are many others. But this desinenc
e is also completely improper to the third conjugation and is always anomalous, like that in vi or evi, etc., which originally were the same as that in ui.

  In any case from the above observations one could conclude that the true, regular, and original supines of the four conjugations are these: (1) ātum, (2) ētum, (3) ītum (see the following thought and p. 3710, paragraph 1, etc. etc.), (4) ĭtum. [3708] And the perfects (with their dependent forms): (1) avi (original ai), (2) evi (original ei, more recently ui), (3) i preceded by the last root letter of the stem, (4) ii (original but preserved) and evi (later). (16 Oct. 1823.)

  For p. 3698. E.g., solutum, volutum, are only ways of pronouncing or writing or of pronouncing and writing the regular supines volvitum, solvitum, and such like, of which there are quite a lot; or they are contractions of the regular supine, formed by elision of the i and nothing else (since the u and the v, as I say, are the same letter),a an ordinary contraction and elision, and one could say, regular (because of its widespread use) both in third-conjugation verbs, such as dictum for dicitum, etc. etc., and those of the second, such as doctum for docitum (which we do not have, while we do have nocitum, placitum, tacitum, habitum, etc., and not noctum, etc.: see p. 3631), etc. etc. (16 Oct. 1823.)

  For p. 3689, beginning. Vivesco [to become alive] has neither perfect nor supine, not even borrowed. But its compound revivesco has revixi. Now Forcellini recognizes that it is not its own but comes from revivo, and recognizes it although revivo, as he says, *“is, so far as I know, not adopted by anyone, excepting only Paulinus of Nola,”* etc. [3709] (see also the Glossary). Why therefore does he not recognize that, e.g., scivi scitum are not from scisco but from scio, which in fact is a verb *“adopted by all”* that suevi suetum do not come from suesco but from sueo, though this last *“has been adopted by no one”*? In any case the existence of revivo, confirms my opinion that all the verbs in sco are formed from another analogous verb, even if they are not always known. And when we see that revivisco gives revixi and revictum (demonstrated by revicturus, supposing that this does not come from revivo), as in fact does revivo, it confirms that the perfect and supine of verbs in sco, where they have them, are always borrowed from the original verbs, and are never proper to the verbs themselves, either because they never had them (but nosco, e.g., had its own supine, noscitus, as I have said on pp. 3688 and 3690), or because they have lost them. Though we did not need revivo to show all this in our case, it being sufficient that there was, and it was known, the verb vivo, from which indeed, without revivo, or from vivesco (which comes from vivo) as a compound, the verb revivisco could easily have been formed, and perhaps in fact this is what has happened.

  In any case, both revivisco, and the analogy (because the e in the desinence of verbs in sco has no place unless they are formed [3710] from verbs in eo;a and, e.g., from meno is which is the same conjugation as vivo is, is formed reminisco [to remember], as on p. 3691, and not reminesco), from tremo is, tremisco and compounds; ingemisco, etc.—on this matter see Forcellini under tremisco, etc.—all persuade me that we have to say vivisco and not vivesco. And see Forcellini under vivesco end, and the Glossary under vivescere. (16 Oct. 1823.) See pp. 3828, 3869.

  Viviturus is regular, for victurus in good Latin, showing the true supine vivitum (vivuto), according to our theories (see, among others, p. 3709, end), see it in a document of the 11th century in the Du Cange Glossary. (16 Oct. 1823.)

  For p. 3694. This confirms our conjecture about the origin of the verb bito [to go] or beto, the barbarian Latin rebitare [to turn back], where in fact we can see the proper conjugation of continuatives, so that it should be more regular than the ancient bitere, etc., and can go to show that this (from which indeed it comes, or to which it is kindred) is likewise a continuative as rebitare, etc. etc., most certainly is. See the Du Cange Glossary under revidare, correcting it according to our theory and observations, etc., and confirming by these the lesson of rebitare (from which revidare differs only in pronunciation, which is proper to the Spanish, etc., so that it can be considered a form in barbarian Latin), and clearing up doubts, etc. And who knows whether bitere or betere, etc., [3711] is not truly bitare or betare (more likely the former, both because of rebitare, and also because from batus which belongs to bo or bao should be formed, according to the rule, bitare and not betare) corrupted by the scribes out of ignorance of our theory, and for the same reason not restored by the critics, etc. In fact, that both the former and the latter have hesitated over this verb, is shown by the different ways of writing it, bitere, betere, bitire, and the fact that in many codices we find vivere for bitere (see Forcellini), etc. etc. In Curculio 1, 2, 52, bitet could as well be the present subjunctive of bitare, as the future indicative of bitere, etc. (16 Oct. 1823.)

  Excisare or excissare. See Forcellini under Excissatus. (16 Oct. 1823.)

  Against what I have said elsewhere [→Z 3002] about the verb cillo [to move] in relation to oscillo it would appear that it is possible to use as an objection the verb percello [to beat down] and procello [to throw down], etc. But, whatever the origin of these verbs may be, I do not believe that they have anything to do with cillo, given the difference (aside from the letters e and i) of the conjugation of their perfect and supine, etc. I might well believe that percello, etc., is from κέλλω [to push ashore], and that therefore the simple cello is is lost, but never that it is from cillo as, etc. “Quod os cillent, idest inclinent praecipitesque [3712] in os ferantur” [they move, one against the other, in such a way as to brush against the face]. Festus in Forcellini, under Cillo.1 Is it not clear to a child that that cillent is from cillare and not from cilleo nor from cillo is? So where does Forcellini get his cillo is from? Unless it was, as I believe, a printing error is for as. As far as the cilleo in Servius is concerned (if there is not a mistake) it could possibly be from cio [to move, to shake], formed like conscribillo [to scribble on] from conscribo [to write together, to enroll], etc., though it is from a different conjugation (that is, first instead of second) by anomaly, like viso is from video for viso as, and other such continuatives of anomalous formation, that is belonging to a conjugation other than the first, to which I have alluded in various places [→Z 1114, 2225–26, 2813ff., 2821, 2885–86], together and separately. Or perhaps cillEO is from ciEO? (16 Oct. 1823.)

  All the qualities and causes which produce grace in people or in behavior or actions, etc., that are human, are more efficacious, and their effects more notable on observers, etc., of a different sex. For they conceive that grace to be much greater than the same grace appears to observers of the same sex. But such a difference in ideas has nothing at all to do with nature or with grace in general, nor [3713] with that particular example of grace. And that great effect does not come from grace, but from the difference in sex, aided by grace, or vice versa from grace aided, etc., insofar as it is aided, etc. This can also be said of beauty, etc. (17 Oct. 1823.)

  Advento as [to come forward]. I have spoken about this, I think, in my theory of continuatives [→Z 1107]). I say further. What ever is there in its meaning, which could, even through similarity, allow it to be described as frequentative? What is there which is not continuative, and which does not fit this name, and justify it, and denote it clearly? And with what other name would that meaning generally be able to be indicated, other than that of continuative? (17 Oct. 1823.)

  For p. 3622. The idea and nature of which1 essentially excludes both that of pleasure and that of displeasure, and assumes the absence of one and the other. Indeed one can say that it implies it, since this double absence is always the cause of boredom, and once you have that, you will always have boredom. [3714] Whoever says absence of pleasure and displeasure, says boredom. Not that these two things are one and the same in an absolute sense, but they are in relation to the nature of the living being, in which one without the other (while he feels he is alive) absolutely cannot exist. Boredom always and immediately hastens to fill all the empty spaces which pleasure and displeasure leave in the mind
s of the living. The emptiness, that is the state of indifference and emotionlessness, does not occur in the mind itself, as, according to the ancients, it did not happen in nature. Boredom is like the air here below, which fills all the gaps left by other objects, and hastens immediately to take the place that they have vacated, if other objects do not replace them. Or we can say that the very emptiness of the human mind, and the indifference, and the absence of all emotion, is boredom, which itself is emotion. Now, what does it mean to say that the living being, when he neither enjoys nor suffers, cannot help but experience boredom? It means that he can never do anything other than desire happiness, that is pleasure and enjoyment. This [3715] desire, when it is neither satisfied nor directly thwarted by what opposes enjoyment, is boredom. Boredom is the desire for happiness, left, so to speak, pure. This desire is an emotion. Therefore the mind of the living being can never be truly without emotion. This emotion, when it is on its own, when no other occupies the mind at that moment, is what we call boredom. All this is proof of the perpetual continuity of that emotion. For if this were not the case, it is not that it would always exist where the other emotions do not, it would not exist at all.1 (17 Oct. 1823.) See p. 3879.