In any case it is certainly true, as I have said, that strength of body makes the living creature more material, and prevents or weakens his action and internal passion, and therefore diminishes, properly speaking, life. Hence it is the case, generally speaking, that the greater in the living creature is its strength and operation and passion and sensation of the body particularly so-called (whether by nature, or habit, or act), so much the less is the life, action, and passion of the spirit, that is life properly so-called. But this has to be understood, assuming an equality of circumstances in the remainder. I mean, that if the lion has more strength of body than the polyp, it is not therefore less alive than the polyp. For at the same time it is much more organized than the polyp, and therefore has much more life. Hence it would be as false to conclude from its greater corporeal strength that it has more life, and is therefore more unhappy, than the polyp, as it would be to conclude that it is more unhappy than man, as we would have to conclude if life was to be measured merely by strength, or by extrinsic strength (in which the lion far surpasses man) and not by organization [3926], etc., in which man is far superior to the lion. If woman is in body weaker than man, and the female than the male, it does not follow that generally and naturally the woman and the female have more life, and are more unhappy than the male. It would be necessary first to establish whether in spirit the female is more or equally strong, that is alive, etc., than the male, and to ascertain or show in some way whether or not to the lesser degree of her corporeal strength with respect to the male there corresponds generally in her spirit a certain quality of organization, a certain lesser degree of delicacy, etc. etc., from which it turns out that the spirit of the female is lesser, less alive, that the female has less internal life, and therefore properly less life, than the male, with a certain and proportionate equality to the lesser degree of corporeal strength which the female has with respect to the male. I entirely believe that this is the case and that the male in short properly lives (by nature and in general) more than the female, and quite correctly, etc. See p. 3938. It can be similarly argued about nations, about individuals, and about the various states of the same individual, taking into consideration their various natures, characters, and habits in relation to both the body and the spirit (see p. 3932), and these disparities, together with those of their degrees, and the different combinations of the latter and the former produce on this topic of ours, as, one could say, in every other thing (and in the whole of nature and all its parts the same thing happens), infinite and very great differences in results. All of which however, although it is impossible to specify and explain them one by one, and although, given the multiplicity and ephemerality of the causes which contribute to their modification into this and this and this form (and if any one of them were missing, or were not exactly thus and thus, or in that precise degree, or in that proportion in relation to the others, or [3927] so combined, etc., the result would not be the same) are indeed very difficult to explain, and to take back to their beginnings, and to understand their relationship and similarity with other results, for anyone who is not extremely competent, very shrewd and very industrious in examining them. Nevertheless in substance they correspond to the principles expounded by me, and they should not be considered contrary, as I have no doubt thousands of them and in thousands of cases, at first sight, will appear to be, and even after a careful, but not appropriate nor just nor sufficient examination. One must have much practice and habit and ability in applying general principles to effects which are more particular and distant, and in discovering and recognizing and investigating even the most abstruse and secret and remote ones. I intend this protestation to be taken generally for all the other principles and parts of my system on nature. See pp. 3936, 3977.
Existence can be greater without life being greater. One could describe the existence of the lion as greater than that of man. Life the opposite. The existence together with the life of the lion are greater with respect to the oyster, the tortoise, the snail, the beast of burden, the polyp. The life of the lion is greater than that of plants which are much bigger, than the heavenly spheres, etc. Existence the opposite.
See on the subject of this thought pp. 3905–906 (27 Nov. 1823) and p. 3929, ll. 11–12.
To what is said in the theory of continuatives at the beginning, about sectari, seguitare [to follow], etc. [→Z 1108–109], add our conseguitare, the same as conseguire [3928] in its various meanings. See the Crusca. (27 Nov. 1823.)
Participles in us in a neuter sense, etc. To what has been said elsewhere [→Z 3060] about defectus from deficio [to withdraw, to leave], add its compound indefectus [perpetual], for which see Forcellini, from which the modern indefettibile (indéfectible, etc.) [unfailing] not in a passive but a neuter sense, as also indefectivus, defectivus, defettibile, etc. See Forcellini, Glossary, Crusca, French and Spanish Dictionaries. (27 Nov. 1823.) See Forcellini, fisus [trusting], confisus [trusting], diffisus [mistrusting], etc.
To what has been said elsewhere in several places [→Z 2843–45, 3019, 3851] on the subject of avvisare [to inform], add ravvisare [to recognize] for which see Crusca, and se raviser [to change one’s mind], and see the Spanish.
Note too that avvedere–avvisare are also part of that category which scorgere–scortare, assalire–assaltare, etc., belong to, identified by me elsewhere [→Z 3588–90]. (27 Nov. 1823.)
For p. 3826. And the fact that it1 is not good Latin, and the other one mentioned being the opposite, and consistently, that is facibilis and not factibilis (if ancient Romans had formed that sort of verbal adjective from facio, as from doceo they formed docibilis and not doctibilis; now factum and doctum are the same form), Impercettibile, etc. (from perceptum)—concepibile, etc., from concepitum and the like, shows that the proper supine form was as we say it is, and not the more modern, etc. (27 Nov. 1823.)
For p. 3784. War and any sort of voluntary homicide is contrary and essentially repellent no less to the particular nature of men than to the general nature of animals, and the universal nature of things and existence, by reason of the same principles which make suicide essentially repellent to it. For, as each individual, and equally each species taken together is charged by nature [3929] to obtain by any means possible its preservation and happiness, so much the more is it charged not to obtain and bring about—as far, one might say, as is in its power—its own destruction. And this law is necessary and suitable in itself, and would imply a contradiction, if it did not exist, etc., as elsewhere [→Z 181–82, 2499, 3783–84] about the self-love, etc., of individuals. The individual, for example man, inasmuch as he is an individual, hates the other members of his species; inasmuch as he is a man, he loves them, and loves the human species. Therefore this tendency toward his fellows more than toward any other creature in certain respects, and at the same time that hatred toward his fellows, greater in certain respects than toward any other creature, they both, one no less than the other, and both together in many ways, with so varied effects, and in such diverse guises reveal themselves in living creatures, and especially in man, who is the most living of all (pp. 3921–27). And just as the second, which is no less necessary and natural than the first, is harmful by its nature to both the preservation and the happiness of the species, and this on the other hand is directly against particular as well as universal nature, and the species taken as a whole must tend toward and always serve (regularly) its own preservation and happiness, nature had no other option than to place living creatures in such a state toward their fellows that the inclination of one group toward the other was operative and existed, that hatred toward the same was not operative, did not develop, did not have effect, did not arise, and properly, that it did not exist in act, but only in potential, like so many other evils, for which, because they are always or according to nature only potential, nature is not to blame. This state could not be anything else than that of either no society at all, or of a society which was not [3930] close-knit.1 And less close-knit in those species in
which hatred of individuals, as individuals, toward their fellows, was in the nature of the species, greater in potential, and if converted to act, and having effect, would do more harm to the preservation and the happiness of the species. And in this, among all living creatures, the hatred of human individuals toward their fellows occupies, by their nature and that of other species, the topmost rank. In this form, therefore, nature in fact regulated proportionately the mutual relations and society of individuals of the various species, and among these the human; and laid down that that was how they should be, and brought it about, and placed obstacles to prevent it happening differently. So that close-knit society, especially among human individuals, is found, by following this line of argument also, to be by its essence and the essence and reason of things, directly contrary to nature and reason, not just particular but also universal and eternal reason, according to which all species should tend toward and serve as far as they can their own preservation and happiness, whereas the human species in a state of close-knit society necessarily (as is proved both by reason and by the evidence of all social ages) not only does not serve but itself harms its own preservation and happiness, and serves almost as far as is in its power its own destruction and unhappiness: than which nothing could be more contradictory in itself, and more repellent to reason, order, principles, nature, no less to the nature particular to the human species and each species of beings than to that which is universal and inclusive of all things, and of existence itself, as well as of life. (27 Nov. 1823.)
[3931] To what is said elsewhere [→Z 961, 3012–14, 3041–47] on the dialects of Homer, and that of Empedocles, who though Dorian used Ionic dialect, add that Hippocrates is in the same position, and see Fabricius, Bibliotheca Graeca, old ed., “De Hippocrate,” § 1, tome 1, p. 844, ll. 4–6 and notes i, k. (27 Nov. 1823.)
For p. 3906, margin. Someone who is drunk is still living, operating and thinking and speaking, but he does not reflect on himself, nor on his life, actions, thoughts, and words, or he does so less than he normally does and more rapidly, hurrying away. —In fact the timid person usually becomes more open, fluent at that point. A sign that he now acquires an ability not to reflect, which is the mother of openness and necessary to it (even for the best minds, and in anyone), and whose absence and opposite is sometimes the only, sometimes the principal cause of timidity. Nevertheless, he is at the same time wittier, quicker, cleverer, and also deeper, etc., than is his wont, which seems to show on the contrary a greater capacity and enactment of reflection. But this is a kind of reflection that does not reflect.1 It is almost organic, an almost mechanical action of the brain and the tongue that is slightly influenced and barely guided by the mind and the reason. It is an almost material and spontaneous and αὐτόματος [mechanical] effect of the habits contracted and exercised and possessed outside of that state, which at that moment perform with very little intervention of the will and the intellect itself, even though, in large part, they belong wholly to them, and those actions, thoughts, words, etc., originate from and operate in them. (27 Nov. 1823.)
For p. 3899. “L’homme est fait pour agir, non pour philosopher” [“Man is made to act, not to philosophize”]. Frédéric II, Letter I to d’Argens on the weakness of human mind, Oeuvres complettes, 1790, tome 15, p. 9. (28 Nov. 1823.)
[3932] “Verdaderamente yo tengo que ay muchos tiempos y años que ay gentes en estas Indias” (la America meridional), “segun lo demuestran sus antiguedades y tierras tan anchas y grandes como han poblado; y aunque todos ellos son morenos lampiños, y se parecen en tantas cosas unos a otros: ay tanta multitud de lenguas entre ellos que casi a cada legua y en cada parte ay nuevas lenguas” [“Truly I hold that for a long time and many years there have been people in the Indies” (South America), “as is demonstrated by their antiquities and the broad and large lands they have populated; and although they are all dark and hairless, and are so alike in so many things, there is such a multitude of languages among them that almost at every league and place there are new languages”]. Chronica del Peru, first part (see pp. 3795–96 of this work) fol. 272, chapter 116, beginning.1 (28 Nov. 1823.)
For p. 3926. — ages, conditions, illnesses, climates, any moral or physical circumstances, whether their own or external, any circumstances which are national, local, common to the period, to the nation, or particular and individual, common to the age or not common, natural or acquired, accidental, habitual, or of the moment, durable or transient, etc. etc. (28 Nov. 1823.)
For p. 3802, end. Although however in relation to the mind, the knowledge of truth, the spiritualization of man (pp. 3910ff.) which are all things in part necessary to civilization, in part its natural effects, in part substance and almost synonymous with it, the state of civilized man is undoubtedly a long way inferior to that of the most savage and brutal societies, and incomparably further from nature, and in this respect no less than through its own doing infinitely more unhappy.2 The individual in civilized society is less harmful to others, but much more to himself. And as far as others are concerned too, he is less harmful to their physical being but much more to their moral being, he damages them less physically, but morally in a thousand ways and in a thousand respects, much more. Now the moral in civilized man, the spirit, etc., is by the nature of man in such a state the principal part and τὸ κυριώτατον [the dominant element] of man, rather almost the whole of man, in no different way and no less [3933] than in primitive man or savage society the principal part, and almost the whole, is the body. Therefore in civilized society, since individuals are much more morally harmful to their fellows than in savage society, and since one group contributes to the unhappiness of spirit of others, they do not mutually harm each other less, nor does one cause another less unhappiness, nor are they less the reason of the unhappiness, than happens in barbarous society, where mutual harm, and the unhappiness which is the consequence of society itself is more physical than moral, because their subjects, that is those men are correspondingly more matter than spirit in the same proportion. On the contrary the greater the unhappiness of the spirit is than that of the body, the greater the moral damage, or that which is most influential on the moral, and afflicting the moral, which civilized men mutually cause each other (even when they offend in physical things and by physical means); and therefore the greater is the unhappiness which one group in such a society causes the others, and proportionately greater than that which happens in barbarous, or semibarbarous, or semicivilized societies. And as to their own selves, no one in savage society harms himself morally, as inevitably happens in civilized society. Indeed the savage cannot harm himself physically except by accident. The civilized person gets as far as suicide. In short one concludes that balancing everything together, although civilized society by its nature causes man less apparent and physical unhappiness (or rather lesser physical misfortunes, because we have shown in several places [→Z 68–69, 1597–602, 1631–32, 3179–82] how it does general harm to the physical particularly through illnesses, which are almost all due to civilized society), it does cause, again by its nature, greater moral misfortunes and, taken all together, [3934] much greater unhappiness than does savage or poorly civilized society. And similarly, balancing everything together, it is much further from nature, although the unnatural aspects of savage society are much more striking, for no other reason than that they are more material and physical, like the men who make up such societies, and like the misfortunes and the general unhappiness which come from them. There is nothing more contrary to nature than that spiritualization of human things and of man which is the essential companion, effect, substance of civilization. As the unnatural aspects, calamities, and unhappiness of savage societies, because they are naturally more physical, in fact entirely physical and material, are more evident and such that everyone can recognize them for what they are, there is no one who does not agree that if human society were unable to be anything other than savage, the society of our race would be something against nature, a
nd man would not be made for society, and in society would necessarily be very imperfect and very unhappy. But because the damages and unnatural aspects of civilized society are more moral and spiritual—which is entirely fitting, since civilized man is the same, and cannot be otherwise—it follows that however much more serious and against nature those damages are, and however much greater are society’s unnatural aspects, no one comes to the conclusion that civilized society is against nature, and that man was not made for such society, and that it is necessarily unhappy, and still less that it is by its very essence more contrary to nature, and overall more unhappy than savage society. In truth this is not the reasoning of civilized, that is spiritualized, man, it is the reasoning of primitive or savage, that is material man, which is only concerned with [3935] material and perceptible unnaturalness and unhappiness, easily recognizable without reasoning, either always judging to be much less what reason shows to be much more, or completely refusing to recognize what in truth is much greater unnaturalness and unhappiness, and doing so because only reasoning can show that it is so, and that it is unnaturalness and unhappiness, and that it is much greater. Even the most civilized and philosophical of men, by doing this (as almost all do, even the highest among them), deliver in the very excess of their civilization and spiritualization a strong confirmation of our proposition that there is nothing so contrary to nature as the spiritualization of man and of anything whatsoever, and that everything in short is by its nature material, and that matter always prevails, and that they, so civilized and spiritualized, are utterly corrupt. For in the very reasoning which they adopt to defend this state of theirs, and which it inspires in them, they give preference to matter and wish only to reason materially.
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