“Tout homme qui pense est un animal dépravé” [“The man who thinks is a depraved animal”].1 Therefore civilized man and society are all the more so, and to a greater degree the more civilized they are, since they are little else than spirit, and a thinking being, or collection of such beings.
All this discussion agrees with the observations and proofs which in thousands of my thoughts have been made about the unnaturalness and true unhappiness of man corresponding proportionately to his greater civilization. For which see in particular the following thought, and the one to which it refers, how by its nature, civilization is supremely contrary to both man’s and universal nature, and a greater cause of supreme unhappiness than is the savage state, as a consequence of the theory of the universal laws of all things, [3936] and of existence. (28 Nov. 1823.)
For p. 3927. It is not in any case difficult to conceive the very great and multiple consequences which flow from the principles expounded above, in order to demonstrate that civilization which by its nature makes man wholly spirit in a manner of speaking (pp. 3910ff.), and consequently gives infinite increase to life properly so called, and self-love, also by its nature greatly increases the unhappiness of man and society. And similarly how by transferring action, and activity, energy, etc., in a thousand ways from matter to spirit, and, by placing a thousand obstacles in the way of present and effective corporeal action (governments, customs, the lack of needs, the diminishing of strength, the taste for study, etc. etc.), and by diminishing the degree and the force and the frequency of sensations, passions, actions, and material pleasures, and the capacity for them, etc., civilization horrendously concentrates self-love, turns it all back on itself and into itself, increasing it beyond all belief in consequence, and taking away or impoverishing what might distract or occupy it, etc. etc. The savage by the nature both of his body and of his customs and society, since he is less alive in spirit, that is properly less alive, is less unhappy than the civilized man, beyond all comparison. So the peasant, the ignorant, the man who does not reflect, the hard, the stupid man, is either by nature or habit inactive in mind, in imagination, in heart, etc. etc., in comparison with the man, etc.1 Civilization increases excessively in man the totality of life (meaning internal life) by diminishing in proportion his existence (meaning external life). Nature is not life, but existence, and tends to the latter, not the former. Because it is matter, not spirit, or matter in nature prevails and must prevail over spirit (and this in fact happens constantly in all its other parts whether animate or inanimate, and [3937] one can see that this is its intention, and that things are universally and particularly ordered toward this result, according to their species and their mutual differences and proportions, but in everything the result is as I have said): the opposite of what happens in civilized man and the civilized human race, by the very nature of civilization—etc. etc.—See the previous thought. (28 Nov. 1823.) —From these principles it also follows that the active life, since it is more material, and more abundant in existence than in life proper, life rich in sensations, etc., is naturally, and according both to its proper nature and to universal nature, happier than the contemplative, etc., which is the opposite. See the following page.
To what is said elsewhere [→Z 3743–44] about possente, puissant [powerful], pujanza [power], etc., add sobrepujar [to excel]. (29 Nov., anniversary of the death of my grandmother, 1823.)1
Elsewhere I have placed tremolare, trembler, temblar [to tremble], etc., among the positivized diminutives [→Z 3182–83] (whether they were frequentative, or something similar, in origin). If however these verbs are formed from tremulus [trembling], they are not diminutives, because tremulus is from tremere like speculum [mirror] is from specere [to look at], and neither one nor the other is diminutive, and tremulare would be no more diminutive than speculare [to spy out, to examine], jaculari [to throw] and similar, for which see p. 3875. (29 Nov. 1823.)
I have said elsewhere in various places [→Z 965ff., 1499ff., 2869ff., 2989–90, 3395, 3573] that French intrinsically and extrinsically is of all the sister languages the one which is furthest away from the mother. It was much closer in past centuries (as in the 16th, etc.) intrinsically, as it still is extrinsically, that is, through the pronunciation of their writing (which is so much more similar to Latin than is their speech) they were much closer to Latin not only in the 14th century, etc., as I have said elsewhere [→Z 2869], and at the beginnings of the language, but also in the 16th and 17th as time went on, etc. (29 Nov. 1823.)
[3938] For the previous page, margin. Now from all aspects one sees that nature had destined both man and animals, in the same way in which it has evidently ordered all things, for external and material action, and for the active life, etc. And the principles stated agree very well indeed with the whole course of our thoughts which everywhere prefer the active to the contemplative in a thousand ways, etc. (29 Nov. 1823.)
For p. 3926. One can reason in the same way about old people with regard to young. The former have much less vigor of body, but also much less vigor of spirit—so that the condition of the one is tempered and balanced by that of the other—they are less strong in body, but also a lot less alive in spirit, for physical reasons, that is physical decay and deterioration of their internal organization and faculties, which corresponds to the deterioration of the external, etc. (29 Nov. 1823.)
Concerning the extremely frequent usage in Latin of both passive and active participles in adjectival form, about which elsewhere in several places [→Z 1107, 2841–42, 3298–301, 3851–52], see my annotation to Canzone 6 (“Bruto minore”) stanza 3, line 1, and the brief marginal observations and the general comments on the same annotation.1 (29 Nov., anniversary of the death of my Grandmother, 1823.)
Latin monosyllables. Lux [light], primitive idea. φάος, φῶς [light]. (30 Nov. 1823.) Falx [sickle].
To what is said elsewhere [→Z 3283] about fictus, fixus, etc., add confitto from configgere or configere [to fasten together] (not from conficcare as the Crusca says). One does not say confisso. On the other hand affisso and not affitto participle. See though the Crusca under affitto adjective, unless that is an incorrectly transcribed example, as it appears, etc. (1 Dec. 1823.)
[3939] To what is said elsewhere [→Z 2947] about intentatus from intento [to stretch out], and in the sense of non tentatus [not touched], add inauratus from inauro [to gild] and in the sense of non auratus [not gilded]. (1 Dec. 1823.)
Exchange of v for g, on which elsewhere [→Z 1678–79, 2986, 3547–48]. See Forcellini under erivo [to draw off]. Rigo [to wet], irrigo [to water], etc., and for rivo, irrivo, irrivus (for irriguus), as de-rivo, etc. And see Forcellini under all of these words, etc. (4 Dec. 1823.)
Andare for essere, on which elsewhere [→Z 3004, 3617, 3902]. See Virgil, Aeneid 1, l. 50.1 And Forcellini under incedo [to go along]. (5 Dec. 1823.)
Not only verbal adjectives in ibilis or in bilis, as is said elsewhere [→Z 3757, 3825–26], but also other types of verbal adjectives, like those in ilis short (docilis, facilis, missilis, fissilis, fictilis, coctilis, versatilis, aquatilis, etc.) or long (mictilis and many others), in alis (genitalis, etc.), in ivus (defectivus, etc.), in itius or icius (emptitius, etc.), in bundus (errabundus, ludibundus, pudibundus, etc.), all formed from regular or irregular, known or unknown, etc., supines can and must be part of the discussion on supines and in order to confirm our observations on these, both in particular cases and in general, observing the most frequent, common, ancient, regular, whole, and proper form of each of such types of verbal adjectives considered collectively, etc. (5 December 1823.) See p. 3984.
To what is said elsewhere on the true supine of pingo, fingo [to fashion], etc. [→Z 1155, 3543–45, 3903],2 add mingo [to urinate] which forms minctum from which minctio, etc., and also one can find mictus us, etc., corruptions, like the one which has taken place in the actual supine of fingo, pingo, etc., where the corrupt supine has completely driven out the regular, etc. (5 Dec. 1823.) Commingo inxi
ictum inctum [to pollute], commictus a um, commictilis. And see the other compounds. See p. 3986.
[3940] On the subject of the ancient fuo [to be] on which elsewhere [→Z 2821–23, 3735, 3742] it should be observed that it is originally the same as fio [to become] from φύω [to produce, to become] with the υ changed to i, as in silva, whereas in fuo it is changed to u. And this observation about fuo and fio should be applied to what I have said in several other places both about the reciprocal exchange of the vowels u and i, and also about the Latin pronunciation of the Greek υ [→Z 1277, 2152–53, 2824–25], which perhaps, even in very ancient times, as later on (in the times of Cicero, or Martianus, etc.) the pronunciation of the y, was between i and u (that is the pronunciation of the French u), as one can conjecture both from seeing the Greek υ sometimes changed to u sometimes to i, and also from seeing it sometimes in the same word changed to one and the other, as in φύω–fuo–fio, which in ancient times must have been a single verb both in meaning and in every way, as well as from the reciprocal exchange of u and i which is so frequent in Latin, as in fact between fuo and fio, and in a thousand other words., etc. etc. (5 Dec. 1823.)
That titillo [to tickle], as I say elsewhere [→Z 2811] (see p. 3986) is a duplication (born in Latium, or formed for example by the Aeolians or from another Greek dialect, or proper to the ancient mother language of Latin and Greek, or from ancient common Greek, etc. etc.) of the Greek τίλλω [to pluck], formed in the Greek manner, is confirmed by observing that the vowel of such duplication, that is the i, is exactly the one that Greek uses in such duplications, as in τιτρώσκω [to damage], etc. See p. 3979. Whereas in other Latin duplications, as in dedi [I gave], cecidi [I fell, I cut], etc., the duplication vowel is e. And this also is according to Greek usage, which in duplications of the perfect uses the ε. And it is to be noted that this, like the former e is short, except in cecīdi [I cut], which many people write caecidi, where perhaps it is not short to distinguish it from cecĭdi [I fell]. In any case [3941] such usage conforming exactly to Greek takes place in many Latin verbs which have nothing to do with any known Greek word, and is a very ancient use in Latin, and not one introduced by men of letters. All of which confirms the ancient conformity of its origin, and the sibling relationship between Greek and Latin. From which origin must have come this usage in one and the other language, in the latter more preserved and written out, in the former much less, and one might say, lost, except in certain specific words, whose ancient form was still preserved, without however ever applying such a form to other verbs, or to verbs gradually being introduced from those most ancient times onward, etc. Such usage can still be found in Sanskrit, as in the Annali di scienze e lettere of Milan, cited elsewhere on the subject of that language [→Z 929].1 (5 Dec. 1823.)
τιτρώσκω [to damage] too, as I have said elsewhere [→Z 3285] about ὀφλισκάνω [to owe], is a double alteration, that is from τράω, τιτράω [to pierce] (which still exists, see Scapula under τιτράω) and afterward τιτρώσκω [to injure] (so Schrevel), or from a τρώω [to injure], τιτρώω and then τιτρώσκω. So from τράω and τιτράω, τιτραίνω [to pierce], it is a double alteration: however always with the same meaning as the primitive. So also not a few others. (5 Dec. 1823.)
Positivized diminutives. Pretto (puretto) for puro [genuine]. (6 Dec. 1823.)
The faculty of imitation is nothing other than the faculty of habituation. Because someone who is easily habituated—whether by seeing or hearing or apprehending through any of the senses, or ultimately by reading—turns those sensations [3942] or apprehensions easily, and in hardly any time as well, into habit, so that they quickly become like his own, sometimes after just once, and more or less perfectly. This means that he can represent them well and easily and in a natural way, and express them rather than imitate them, for the good imitator should, so to say, gather what he imitates into himself and make it his own, so that true imitation is not really imitation but expression, because it comes from himself. For I do not call the expression of one’s own emotions or thoughts or feelings or imaginings, etc., however conceived, imitation, but expression.1 Now the way in which the faculty of imitating is a quality and an extremely important part and perhaps the sum of great intellects, and so of other talents in proportion, is something that has been observed and explained by many. Therefore it is again confirmed that intellect is the faculty of habituation. (6 Dec. 1823.) See p. 3950.
Exchange of g and v. Nivis–neige–ningit or ninguit [snow, it snows] (from which our negnere) and nivit [it snows], from which our nevicare [to snow], almost nivicare, as from vello comes vellico [to pluck], etc., frequentatives, for which see p. 2996, margin: and see the Glossary if you will. (6 Dec. 1823.)
For p. 3275, margin. On the contrary many of these2 much prefer to have enemies than friends. They are more content to be hated than loved, they willingly pick quarrels with anyone, not out of sensitivity, not even out of misanthropy or because of natural hatred toward others, etc., but because their natural state is the state of war, and they much prefer to fight than to be in peace and rest, a restless life to a quiet one. And this very simply, without malice, with no black and hateful character nor feelings. In fact they are very open, very sincere, very compassionate, and they do more good than others, but the very people whom they sympathize with or do good to, they would much prefer [3943] to have to fight and be hated by. And the same with others whom they would rather have opposing them than being affectionate or indifferent, and so all the time, without the slightest passion, or none at all, and over the tiniest trifles, they torment and provoke and offend them either in words or deeds, for the pleasure of fighting them and being at war. And as each person normally pictures what he most desires, so they normally take delight in thinking that others wish them ill, and in twisting someone else’s every least word and action toward them as having a bad and hostile intention, and take the opportunity at every point to enter the lists with anyone, even those who are closest to them, most intimate, friends and companions. I say again that all this is accompanied by very great simplicity and even nobility, certainly not by duplicity and baseness of character; without any black and melancholic humor (on the contrary such people are normally very cheerful or bordering cheerfulness), without any atrabilious character, nor what is called δυσκολία [discontent] and morositas [peevishness], any sour character, etc., any prickliness of temperament and behavior,a1—in fact all these things are proper to weak and unfortunate men (and therefore with truth they are particularly attributed to old people, especially women)—without any discontentedness, bitterness, dissatisfaction, without any overly choleric and inflammatory humor. Strength of body and age, and prosperity of circumstances, give to people like this so much confidence in themselves, that not only do they not look for or concern themselves about the favor of others, they are more satisfied to have them as opponents, and they enjoy regarding others as hostile rather than friendly or indifferent, and even to have them really more or less as enemies as the opportunities arise [3944] and according to their physical strength. Their conversation and company, especially over a period of time, is truly very difficult and unpleasant, although they are incapable of treachery, and are obliging and benevolent and compassionate and generous. They are, in spite of this, not very able to love, and not very suited to be friends, but they are likewise more liable and desirous to have enemies than they are suited to being one themselves, because they are much better at anger than hatred, at fighting than hating, at taking revenge than persecuting. Indeed they are almost incapable of hating, and anger even when properly aroused in them is very mild and brief, perhaps because it is very frequent. (6 Dec. 1823.)
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