Altro [other] redundant. Ricordano Malespini, Cronica or Storia fiorentina, Florence 1816, ed. Vincenzio Follini, p. 219, note 2 to chapter 12: “Ora incomincieremo a dire delle divisioni grandi le quali vennono in Roma tra il popolo minuto e gli altri maggiori” (that is the great, the powerful, the optimates, the rulers) “di Roma” [“Now we will begin to speak about the great divisions which took place in Rome between the lower and other upper echelons of Roman society”]. Following Greek exactly. (17 Feb., first Thursday in Lent, 1825.)
Σωμάτιον for σῶμα [body]. Apollonius Dyscolus, Historia commentitia, ch. 3, twice,7 where σῶμα also appears twice indifferently and with the same sense. (17 Feb. 1825.)
The Greeks also said (at least in somewhat later times) ὠτάριον auricula for οὖς auris [ear]. See Apollonius Dyscolus loc. cit., ch. 28, from Aristotle. See Scapula too under ὠτάριον and ὠτίον. See if the Glossary has anything as well. (17 Feb. 1825.)
The first syllables of chri-stianisme [Christianity] and cry-pte [crypt] are pronounced in exactly the same way. So why are they written so differently? That certainly does not happen in Italian (where, with the exception of only a few cases in which there is a different spelling to make a distinction, like ho; o [I have; or], whatever is written differently, is always pronounced differently, and vice versa) and there is no reason to believe it happened in Latin or in Greek either. This is another of the principal flaws [4125] that spelling can have, that words and syllables pronounced the same, are written differently; and vice versa that those written the same may be pronounced differently. Both happen in French, in English, etc., and in Spanish too. (18 Feb., first Friday in Lent, 1825.)
In the Historia commentitia of Apollonius Dyscolus, ch. 24, there is a passage which makes you believe that even the ancients knew the race of men called white Moors, on which see Voltaire, Opere scelte, London (Venice), 1760, in three volumes; tome 1, p. 113, and Robertson, Storia d’America, Venice 1794, tome 2, pp. 125ff., and that this race was found in Europe as well. Eudoxus of Rhodes is cited. See if Pliny, Buffon as well, etc., have anything on the subject. (18 Feb. 1825.) See Histoire de l’Académie des Sciences, year 1734, pp. 20–23, tome 1, Amsterdam ed., 12°.1
Σμηνίον diminutive for σμῆνος [beehive], Scapula. Likewise in Apollonius, loc. cit. above, ch. 44, σμηνιῶνος where perhaps you should read σμηνίωνος from the diminutive σμηνίων. See the grammarians, the Lexicons, and Aristotle in a passage cited there by the author and by Meurs.
Active verbs taking the accusative, used with the genitive as in Italian, French, etc. (like mangiar del pane, prendere della terra [to eat some bread, to take some land]). See Antigonus of Carystus, Historiarum mirabilium collectanea, ch. 40, 41, 44, 56, end.2
In Antigonus, ch. 56, mentioned above it seems you find καινὸν used adverbially for di nuovo [again]. The passage is corrupt and I must look it up in the latest editions.3 (20 Feb., Sunday, 1825.)
Positivized diminutives ἤρυγγον–ἠρύγγιον [thistle]. See Meurs, on Antigonus of Carystus, Historiarum mirabilium collectanea, ch. 115. Κώρυκος–κωρυκὶς [knapsack, wallet]. Scapula. Πετρίδιον [rock]. See Scapula and Antigonus, loc. cit., ch. 174.4
Τιθέναι for efficere, reddere [to cause to become], as in Spanish poner, mentioned elsewhere [→Z 4020], see Plato, Gorgias, Opera, ed. Ast, tome 1, p. 360, line 24.5 (27 Feb. 1825.)
Mille–mila [thousand–thousands] plural from millia: and likewise miglio–miglia [mile–miles].
Gerere [to bear, to conduct]—belli-gerare [to wage war], fami–gerare [to bear, to report a tale], etc.
Altro [other] redundant. Ricordano Malespini, Storia fiorentina, Florence 1816, ch. 96, end. Villani6 in a parallel passage, bk. 5, ch. 33, omits altri. (3 March 1825.)
“᾿Εμβαλοῦσα εἰς κύλικα τοῦ φαρμάκου” [“having poured the poison into the cup”] the genitive for the accusative, Herodian, Historiae, bk. 1, Lyon 1611, p. 50.7 (5 March 1825.)
Positivized diminutives. ᾿Ατμὸς–ἀτμὶς ίδος [vapor]. Scapula and Herodian, loc. cit., p. 13, end. ὅρος–ὅριον [boundary].
Σωμάτιον for σῶμα [body] (as he says shortly after). Herodian, Historiae, bk. 2, beginning.
[4126] Χωρὶς, ἄνευ for oltre, praeter [besides], like our senza, and French sans, and à moins and Spanish sin and a men (or amen) de, etc. See if Forcellini has anything, etc. (8 March 1825.)
Ferramenta [iron tools], vasellamenta [tableware], and the like, from nouns in ento. Comandamenta [commandments].
It follows from my theory of pleasure that man and any living being, even at the moment of the greatest pleasure of their life, want not only more, but infinitely more than they have, that is greater pleasure to infinity, and an infinitely greater pleasure, because they always want infinite happiness and therefore infinite pleasure. And that man in each and every instant of his thinking and feeling life wants infinitely more or better than he has. (12 March 1825.)
Discordato for discordante, discorde [discordant].
Cinta plural of cinto [belt]. Ricordano Malespini, ch. 162.
On the origins, if not of religion itself (that is of opinions of divinity), at least of religious devotion, from fear see in the Abrégé de l’origine de tous les cultes, by Dupuis, Paris, 1821, ch. 4, pp. 86–93, how in nearly all peoples, once having acknowledged two principles, two kinds of divinities, some good and benign, others evil and malign, the more savage among them reduced or reduce their cult entirely or principally to the latter, and some judged them more powerful than the former, whereas the more civilized (like the Greeks in the myth of the Giants) have supposed the evil principle conquered and subdued by the good one.1 (19 March 1825, Feast of St. Joseph.)
Improvviso for qui non providit, or non providet, sprovvisto [who does not provide, unprovided] (and the latter is still used for chi non ha provvisto [someone who has not provided] rather than for chi non si è or non è provvisto [someone who is not provided for], and likewise sprovveduto). Ricordano Malespini, Florence 1816, ch. 49, p. 44, end; ch. 168, p. 134; non provveduto with the same sense, Ricordano, ch. 198; G. Villani, bk. 7, ch. 24.2 See Forcellini, Crusca, etc. (21 March 1825.)
Gioia–gioiello, jewel (English). See French, Spanish, etc. Bush (English)—buisson. See the French dictionaries.
Porfiado for que porfia [stubborn, who insists]. Profuso for che profonde [who is lavish]. See Crusca, Forcellini, Spanish, French, English.
Obliviscor from a lost verb oblivio–obbliare for obbliviare [to forget], with v swallowed as usual, and the two i joined in one, as obblio from oblivium. See Forcellini, etc.
Sporgere–sportare [to stick out]. (23 March 1825.) Could porto as [to carry] come from [4127] porrigo [to reach out], with its porrectus contracted to portus (see Forcellini, etc.), as with us (porgere–pórto [to hand, handed], sporgere–spórto), and as perrectus is contracted to pertus in Spanish despierto and despertar from expergiscor [to awake], which we mentioned elsewhere [→Z 2194]? (24 March, Vigil of the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin Mary, 1825.)
Bollito for bollente [boiling]. Fiorito for fiorente [flourishing], florido in Spanish, fleuri.
Particolare, particulier, etc. (like chose particulière), is often said for singolare, straordinario, non comune [singular, extraordinary], etc. See this same use of Greek ἴδιος in my brief observations on the Greek authors de mirabilibus [of extraordinary things] in Meurs, p. 9, line 6 of these observations and the addition made in a note.1 (27 March 1825, Palm Sunday.)
Detenido for que se detiene [who stops, delays], cunctator (otro detenido Fabio),2 and likewise ritenuto [cautious], etc.
Reprimo is—Spanish repressar [to repress].
“Ciascun vizio per se senza altra cagione” [“Each vice in itself without any cause”] (that is without an extrinsic cause, without any cause outside of itself). Della Casa, Galateo, ch. 29, Opere, Venice 1752, tome 3
, p. 298. (29 March, Tuesday of Holy Week, 1825.)
Positivized diminutives. French vallon [valley].
Senza altro pane or biada for senza punto di pane or biada [without any bread or fodder at all]. G. Villani, bk. 7, ch. 7.
Arrojado hombre, Uomo avventato [reckless man]. (2 Apr., Holy Saturday, 1825.)
“D. Le plaisir est-il l’objet principal et immédiat de notre existence, comme l’ont dit quelques philosophes? R. Non: il ne l’est pas plus que la douleur; le plaisir est un encouragement à vivre, comme la douleur est un repoussement à mourir. D. Comment prouvez-vous cette assertion? R. Par deux faits palpables: l’un, que le plaisir, s’il est pris au-delà du besoin, conduit à la destruction: par exemple, un homme qui abuse du plaisir de manger ou de boire, attaque sa santé, et nuit à sa vie. L’autre, [4128] que la douleur conduit quelquefois à la conservation: par exemple un homme qui se fait couper un membre gangrené, souffre de la douleur, et c’est afin de ne pas périr tout entier” [“Q. Is pleasure the principal and immediate object of our existence, as some philosophers have told us? A. No: no more than pain is; pleasure encourages us to live, pain pushes death away. Q. How do you prove such an assertion? A. By two palpable facts: first, pleasure, if taken beyond need, brings self-destruction; for example, a man who abuses the pleasures of eating or drinking, damages his health and harms his own life. Second, pain sometimes ensures survival: for example a man who has a gangrenous limb cut off, suffers pain, and that so as not to perish entirely”]. Volney, La loi naturelle, ou Catéchisme du citoyen français, ch. 3, following Les ruines ou Méditation sur les révolutions des empires, by the same author, 4th edition, Paris 1808, pp. 359–60.1 We need to distinguish between the end or aim of nature in general and that of human nature, the end of universal existence and that of human existence, or rather, the natural end of man and that of his existence.2 The natural end of man and every living being, in every moment of being aware of their existence, is not and cannot be other than happiness, and so pleasure, their own pleasure; and that is also the only end of a living being, as far as the sum total of his life, action, and thought is concerned. But the end of his existence, or rather the end of nature in giving it to him and in modifying it for him, as also in modifying the existence of other beings, and in fact the end of existence in general, and of the order and mode of being that things have both in themselves, and in their relation to other things, is certainly not happiness nor in any way the pleasure of living beings, not only because such happiness is impossible (Theory of pleasure), but also because although nature, in the modification of each animal and other things in relation to them, provided for and perhaps aimed to give some pleasures to these animals, these things are nothing compared to those in which the mode of being of each living being, and of other things with any relationship to them, cause them necessary and constant sorrow. So that both the amount and the intensity of pain in each animal’s whole life is beyond compare to [4129] the amount and intensity of his pleasure. Therefore nature, existence does not have in any way as an end the pleasure or the happiness of animals; rather it is the opposite; but that does not mean that every animal has not by its nature as its necessary, perpetual, and only end, its own pleasure, its own happiness, and that goes for each species as a whole as well as the universality of living beings. An evident and undeniable contradiction in the order of things and in the mode of their existence, a terrifying contradiction, but not for that reason any less true: a great mystery, which can never be explained, unless we deny (according to my system) every absolute truth and falsity, and abandon in a certain sense the very principle of our understanding, non potest idem simul esse et non esse [the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time]. Another contradiction, or another way of considering it, in this being of animals, necessarily and regularly according to their own nature and of universal nature, unhappy (being—unhappiness, contradictory things), has been set down by me elsewhere [→Z 4099–100].
After all, Volney’s argument is equally valid against what he says is “le but immédiat et direct de la nature” [“the immediate and direct aim of nature”] (he probably means, I think, the nature of man), that is “la conservation de soi-même” [“self-preservation”] (expressly denying that “le bonheur” is “le but immédiat et direct de la nature” [that “happiness” is “the immediate and direct aim of nature”], but rather that it is “un objet de luxe, surajouté à l’objet nécessaire et fondamental de la conservation” [“an object which is a luxury, additional to the necessary and fundamental object of preservation”]). Since, even allowing, which is certainly not the case, that their own preservation is the immediate and necessary object or aim of the nature of animals, it is certainly not the object of universal nature, nor of the nature of other animals in relation to each of them (which applies as well to what was said [4130] above). In fact the end of universal nature is the life of the universe, which consists equally in the production, preservation and destruction of its component parts, and therefore the destruction of every animal is part of the end of such a nature at least as much as its preservation, even more than its preservation, insofar as one sees that there are more of those things which conspire to destroy each animal than those which favor its preservation; insofar as naturally in the life of any animal its decline and wearing down or in other words its getting old (which begins in man even before he is thirty) occupies more space than all the other ages put together (see “Dialogo della Natura e di un Islandese,” and “Cantico del Gallo silvestre”),1 and that is the case speaking about the animal itself independently from anything happening to it from the outside; finally insofar as the period of preservation, that is the longevity, of the animal is nothing in relation to the eternity of its nonbeing, that is of the consequence and, as it were, the longevity of its destruction. Likewise a thousand things and a thousand animals that do not have in any way as their purpose the survival of this one animal, that have rather a completely natural tendency to destroy it, either for their own survival or for some other reason. And that goes for individuals and species. And the number of such individuals or species whether animal or not, who have a natural tendency to destroy any other species of animal or individual (like those who have a natural tendency to cause them the opposite of pleasure) is greater than the number who have a natural tendency to ensure their preservation (and likewise their pleasure).
After all, that the natural end of any animal is not directly and immediately its own preservation, that is for its own sake, [4131] has been demonstrated in the “Dialogo di un Fisico e un Metafisico.” Man naturally and immediately loves only his own good, and his greatest good, and naturally and immediately avoids only his pain and his greatest pain: that is, what he judges as such. If men prefer life to everything else, and avoid death above all else, that is only because and insofar as they judge life to be their greatest good (either in itself, or insofar as without life no good can be enjoyed), and death their greatest pain. So the love of life, the care one takes to ensure one’s own preservation, the hatred of and flight from death, the fear of it and of the dangers in meeting it, is not in man the effect of any direct natural tendency, but of a line of reasoning, a judgment formed by them1 right from the start, on which are founded this love and fear; and therefore they both have no other natural and innate principle than love of one’s own good, which amounts to one’s own happiness, and so pleasure, a principle from which derive in turn all the other feelings and actions of man. (And what I say about man is to be understood about all living beings.) This principle is not an idea, it is a natural tendency, it is innate. That judgment is an idea, so cannot for that reason be innate. Though it is universal, and men and animals do it naturally, in which sense it can be called natural. But that does not prove that it is innate or correct. E.g., man believes and naturally judges that the sun goes from east to west, and that the earth does not move: all children, all men who first see this phenomenon of [4132] day and who think about it (unless they have alrea
dy been forestalled by education) conceive such an idea, form such a judgment, and do so immediately, invariably, and are entirely persuaded of its truth. This judgment is therefore natural and universal, and yet it is neither innate (because it comes after the experience of the senses, and derives from it), nor true, because in fact the opposite is the case. And it is the same with a thousand other errors and illusions, a thousand false judgments, in physical matters, and still more in moral, natural, universal ones, which everyone invariably holds, and is entirely persuaded of their truth, yet their very naturalness and universal character does not at all prove that they are true or that they are innate. I conclude that the love for and care to ensure one’s own preservation is not an unmediated quality, etc., in man, but derives from love for one’s own happiness (which really is unmediated) and derives from it through an idea, a judgment (a false one), which when that fails or alters, then a man loses his love for his own survival, and converts it into self-hatred, making him flee life, and pursue death; which he never does and never can do, even for a moment when it is a matter of his own happiness, or pleasure on the one hand, and on the other his own unhappiness; even when he is raving mad; in which state he sometimes kills himself, but he never stops loving above all else and trying as well to procure what he judges is his happiness, his greatest happiness. (5–6 April 1825.)
Sa-v-ona. Many ancients, like G. Villani (e.g., bk. 7, ch. 23), Sa-ona, like Faenza even today for Faventia, although Guicciardini and other ancient writers say Faventino for Faentino, mentioned elsewhere [→Z 4030, 4036]. (6 April 1825.)
[4133] Positivized diminutives Νόννα–νονὶς [nun]. See Du Cange, Greek Glossary and Fabricius, Bibliotheca Graeca, old ed., tome 7, p. 682, note a. Probably a corrupt form from Domna [mistress, lady] (like the Nonne of the French), as Du Cange thinks, Latin Glossary under Nonnus, and not from Egyptian, as Fabricius says, unless the same corrupt form was actually used in Egypt as well, or unless it was originally formed in Egypt, that is in the Coptic language, but still from the Latin word Domnus and Domna. (6 April 1825.) The French have Nonnette too, but Nonne and Nonnette both have a mocking and pejorative tone at present, so that there is very little difference of meaning between either of them. (6 April 1825.) —Σχοῖνος–σχοινίον [cord]. See the Greek index of Cassius Dio. (8 Apr. 1825.)
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