The whole of nature lacks sensation, with the exception of animals. And they alone are unhappy, and not being is better for them than being, or rather not living than living. Less unhappy, though, the less sensitive they are (both species and individuals) and vice versa. The whole of nature, and the eternal order of things is not aimed in any way at all at the happiness of sensitive beings and animals. In fact it is quite the opposite. Nor is their own nature and the eternal order of their being aimed at it. Sensitive beings are naturally souffrants [suffering], a part of the universe that is essentially souffrante.1 Since they do exist and their species perpetuate themselves, it must be said that they are a necessary link in the great chain of beings, and in the order and the existence of this universe as it is, to which their harm is useful, since their existence is harmful to them, being essentially a souffrance. Therefore this necessity of their being is an imperfection of nature, and the universal order, an essential and eternal imperfection, not one that is accidental. If however the souffrance of the smallest part of [4134] nature, which is the whole of the animal genus taken together, deserves to be called an imperfection. At least it is a very small part and like the tiniest speck in universal nature in the order and existence of the whole universe. The tiniest because animals in relation to the sum total of all other beings, and to the immensity of the whole universe are nothing. And if we consider them as the principal part of everything there is, the beings most worthy of consideration, and so not as the tiniest but greatest part, because great in value if small in extension, this judgment of ours comes from the way we consider things, weigh up the relations between them, appraise them comparatively, assess and regard the great system of everything; a natural way of judging for us who are ourselves part of the animal and sensitive genus, but not a true one, nor one founded on independent and absolute grounds, nor one which fits the reality of things, or conforms to the judgment and to the way of thinking (if we can call it that) of universal nature, or corresponds to the way the world works, or to the fact that all nature, except this smallest part of it, lacks sensation, and that sensitive beings are necessarily souffrants, and always more so the more sensitive they are.1 Hence we really ought to conclude, that they themselves, or sensitivity in an abstract sense, are an imperfection of nature, or rather that they are the last, the lowest in degree in terms both of nobility and dignity in the succession of beings and properties of things. (9 April, Saturday after Easter, 1825.) See p. 4137.
Sentido de la perdida for que siente la perdida [who feels, grieves for the loss]. Penato for penante [suffering]. Crusca on penato and on penare, last example.
Halo as–halitans [to breathe–breathing]. (10 Apr., Low Sunday, 1825.) Alitare.
Σανὶς ίδος [plank], perhaps originally a diminutive, afterward positivized.
Più tempo for del tempo [some time], a frequentative phrase our writers use (e.g., Ricordano [4135] ch. 178; Villani, bk. 6, ch. 88, beginning)1 in both the 14th and 16th centuries. —πλείονα χρόνον in the same sense. See my observations on Phlegon, De mirabilibus, ch. 1, col. 81, line 2.2 (14 April 1825.)
Calza–calzetta, calzino [stocking, sock]. Bruzzo–bruzzolo [twilight].
Filo–fila [thread–threads]. Uova [Eggs].
“Senz’altra” (that is niuna) “considerazione avere dei suoi meriti” [“Without any consideration of his merits”]. Della Casa, Galateo, ch. 14, Opere, Venice 1752, tome 3, p. 261, end.
Φησὶ, φήσει, with τις understood, for φασὶ, φήσουσι [says, they say]. See Toup, on Longinus, § 2, beginning, § 29, end, 44, p. 234, end, where I do not agree with the emendations.
Now, more than ever before, society contains seeds of destruction and has characteristics which are incompatible with its preservation and existence, and that is mainly owing to knowledge of the truth, and to philosophy. Indeed all the latter has done, especially for the multitude, is to teach and establish negative not positive truths, that is to destroy prejudice, in a word to take and not to give.3 It has purified their minds and taken them back to something like the state of nature as far as kinds of knowledge are concerned, where there are no or very few of the prejudices it has destroyed. How then has it done any harm to society? The truth, meaning the absence of this or that error, how can that be harmful? Harmful though it may be to know some truths hidden from us by nature, how can it be harmful to purify men from errors they did not naturally have, and that a child does not have? This is how I reply: man in nature does not have even close-knit society. The errors that are not necessary to man in his natural state may be necessary to him in the social state; he did not have them naturally; that does not prove anything; he did not have a thousand other things that he has need of to conserve the social state. To take man back to his natural condition [4136] in some respects, while leaving him at the same time in society, may not be good, may be very harmful, because a certain part of his natural condition may be repugnant to the state of close-knit society, which anyway does not exist in nature. Many medicines are not natural, but just as the diseases they are a remedy for do not exist in nature, they may be appropriate for man, once those diseases do exist. Illusions are not natural, but their destruction has destroyed the love for one’s country, for glory, for virtue, etc. Then universal egoism is born, in fact reborn. Egoism is natural, it is characteristic of man: all children, all real savages are genuine egoists.1 But egoism is incompatible with society. The effective return to a natural state in this respect is destructive of the social state.2 The same may be said for religion, and likewise for a thousand other things. I conclude that philosophy which frees human life from a thousand nonnatural errors that society has given birth to (naturally), philosophy which brings the intellects of the multitude back to a state of natural purity, and man to a natural way of thinking of and doing many things, may be and actually is, harmful and destructive of society, because those errors may be, and actually are, necessary to the subsistence and preservation of society, which has always had them in some way or another in the past, and among all peoples; and because that purity and that natural state, excellent in themselves, may be harmful to man, given society; and society may not be able to survive in their company, or may survive in the worst way, as is happening in fact at present. (18 April 1825.)
Αὐτίκα for luego.3 See Toup on Longinus, § 23, beginning.
Σακκία ἁδρά. See ibid., p. 229, end. Positivized diminutive. (27 April 1825.)
[4137] For p. 4134. Since happiness does not seem to be able to exist except in beings conscious of themselves, that is living beings, and such consciousness of oneself cannot be conceived of without self-love, and self-love necessarily desires an infinite good, and it does not seem that that can exist in the world, it follows that not only men and animals, but any being at all, cannot be or is happy, that happiness (which by its nature could not be any other than good or rather an infinite pleasure) is by its nature impossible, and that the universe is by its nature incapable of happiness, which turns out to be a being of reason1 and a pure product of man’s imagination. And since moreover the absence of happiness in beings who love themselves implies unhappiness, it follows that life, or rather the feeling of this existence divided among all the beings of the universe, is by its nature, and by virtue of the eternal order and of the mode of being of things, inseparable from and almost the same as unhappiness and implies unhappiness, hence to live and to be unhappy are almost synonymous. (3 May, Feast of the Finding of the Holy Cross, 1825.) See p. 4168.
“A crown of gold, which, as the Hungarians believed, had descended from heaven, and conferred on him who wore it an undoubted right to the throne.” Robertson, Storia del regno dell’Imperatore Carlo V, bk. 10, Italian translation from the French, Cologne 1788, tome 5, p. 440.2 Here we do finally have the true foundation of rights to the throne and of the legitimacy of all Sovereigns ancient and modern. It consists in the crown they wear. And whoever takes it away from them and can put it on their ow
n head, takes over ipso facto full rights and legitimacy. (3 May 1825.)
[4138] Pauso as [to pause] perhaps from the ancient pauo or pavo (παύω, παύομαι), pausum. (7 May 1825.)
The more man grows (especially in experience and wisdom, because there are many who always stay as children), and by growing becomes more incapable of happiness, the more he becomes prone to and feels at home with laughter, and a stranger to tears. There are many who at a certain age (when misfortunes loom larger than in youth) almost completely lose the ability to cry. The most terrible disasters may afflict them, but will not be able to draw a tear from them. This is very common. There are so many times in a man’s life when he becomes familiar with pain.
Every philosopher, but especially the metaphysician needs solitude. A man who thinks and reflects, living today, or even one used to living in society, naturally throws himself into considering and speculating about men and their relations with one another, and about himself in relation to other men. This is the subject which interests him above all others, and from which he is unable to detach his thoughts. So he naturally comes to have a very narrow field of vision, and substantially limited horizons, because in the end what is the whole human race (considered only in its internal relations) next to nature, and the universe? The man on the contrary who is used to solitude is little interested, little moved to curiosity about how men relate to one another, and about himself with other men, which naturally seems a small and trivial subject to him. On the contrary his relations with the rest of nature do interest him very much, and they have first place for him, just as for the man who lives in society the most interesting and almost the only interesting relations are human relations. What interests him is speculation and knowledge about himself as himself; about men as part of the universe; [4139] about nature, the world, existence, things that for him (and actually) are much more serious than the deepest questions relating to society. And in fact one can say that the philosopher and the reflective man used to social life can hardly not be a philosopher of society (or a psychologist, or a politician, etc.), and that if he is used to solitude he necessarily turns out to be a metaphysician. And if at first he was a philosopher of society, when he contracts the habit of solitude, he directs his attention in the long run insensibly to metaphysics and in the end it becomes the principal, the favorite, and the most agreeable object of his thoughts.1 (12 May, Feast of the Ascension, 1825.)
Tetta, tettare [teat, to suckle], etc.—τιτθὴ [nurse].
Positivized diminutives. Brachium [Arm]—βραχίων perhaps from a βράχιον or βράχιος or βραχιὸς, etc., now lost. (21 May, Vigil of Pentecost, 1825.)
“Παρ' ὀλίγον διαφθαρείην” [“I was very nearly killed”] Josephus, De vita sua, § 59. (27 May 1825.) § 68: “θάνατον αὐτοῦ παρ' ὀλίγας ψήφους κατέγνωσαν” [“his death was decided by a few votes”] Contra Apionem 2, 37, p. 493, line 7.2
“Κατὰ νώτου δ' αὐτὸν λαμβάνουσιν οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας.” Italianism. Lo prendono (that is lo colgono, lo soprapprendono) alle spalle [They seize him from behind]. Josephus, De vita sua, § 72.3
Senz’altro (niun) fine [Without any purpose]. Della Casa, “Istruzione al Cardinale Caraffa,” Opere, tome 2, p. 4, line 19, Venice 1752.
Αὐτίκα for primum, luego, etc. Pseudo-Josephus, De Maccabaeis, § 1, end, § 3, p. 499, line 4, before the end.4 (31 May 1825.)
Grado–gradino [level, step]. Pisum–pisello [pea]. Struffo–strufolo [pad, wad], etc. See Crusca.
Latin monosyllables. Flo [to blow].
Arrischiato [reckless] (Baldi, Vita di Federigo di Montefeltro, Rome 1824, tome 1, p. 89, beginning), arrisicato (Crusca) for che suole arrischiarsi, che si arrischia [who takes risks].
Disonorato, Inonorato, Inhonoratus, etc., for disonorevole [dishonorable].
Honorus, inhonorus for honoratus, inhonoratus.
῎Εξω for praeter [beyond, besides]. Isocrates, Panegyricus, Cambridge 1729, p. 177, line 1.5
[4140] Stella [star] as it were astella or astellum from ἀστὴρ or from ἄστρον. (12 July, Feast of St. John Gualbert, 1825.)
Artifice is so necessary in living with men that even sincerity and frankness must be used with artifice.1 (Milan, 22 Sept., 1825.)
Spasimato for spasimante [yearning]. Crusca. Entendu for intendente [understanding]. Innamorato for che innamora [who enamors]. Petrarch, Sonnet “Ma poi che ’l dolce riso,” last line, and Canzone “Poi che per mio destino,” stanza 5, line 9.2
“Sì ch’i’ vo già della speranza altiero” [“So that already I am proud in hope”]. Petrarch, Sonnet “Quando fra l’altre donne.” See the sestina as well “A qualunque animale,” penultimate line and Canzone “Sì è debile il filo,” stanza 6, l. 2, and Canzone “Lasso me,” stanza 4, l. 9.3
Gaio [Merry], French gai, etc.—γαίων [exulting].
Miglio, milium, etc.—millet [millet], positivized diminutive. Entrailles–ἔντερον, interiora [intestines], etc. Spanish ladrillo. Laterculus, etc.–later [brick]. Scalino–scala, scaglione [step–stairs, terrace], etc.
Tra via, for in via [on the way]. Petrarch, Sonnet “A piè de’ colli”4 and very often elsewhere fra via and tra via, Petrarch as well, and others, prose writers and poets.
Poi for εἶτα, that is nondimeno [nonetheless], etc., mentioned elsewhere.5 Petrarch, Sonnet “Perch’io t’abbia guardato.”
Εὐθὺ πρῶτον. Eupolis Comicus in Stobaeus, discourse 2, p. 32, princeps edition by Gessner, Zurich 1543.6
“῾Ησσημένων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν αἱ γνῶμαι πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς κινδύνους ὅμοιαι εἶναι” [“when men have been defeated once, their minds cannot be the same against the same dangers”]. Thucydides in Stobaeus, discourse 6, περὶ δειλίας [“On Cowardice”] (Milan, 22 Sept. 1825), bk. 2, in the discourse of Phormio. See Plato, ed. Ast, tome 4, p. 228, line 12, p. 236, line 30, p. 358, lines 20, 23.7
Se Dio facesse altro di me, means, facesse alcuna cosa, nulla [If God were to do anything with me]. Likewise Machiavelli, Comedy in prose without title, Opere, Italy 1819, vol. 6, act 2, scene 1, p. 328. “Io guarderei molto ben chi egli fusse, prima ch’io facessi altro” [“I would consider very carefully who he was, before I did anything”], that is nulla, that is cosa alcuna. “Senza pensare altro, io mi avvierò là” [“Without giving it any thought, I will make my way there”], ibid., 2, 7, 337–38. “E del vecchio eramo come certissimi che prestatomi indubitata fede, ne dovesse andar là senza pensare altro” [“And we were almost certain that once the old man had given me his unquestioned faith, he would go there without thinking any more about it”]. That is nulla, 3, 1, 340. “La padrona subito si spoglia, e senza pensare ad altro” (a nulla) “nel letto si corica” [“The lady of the house gets undressed at once, and without thinking about anything, goes to bed”]. Ibid., 341. (Milan.)8
[4141] *“Aggresser, active verb. To attack, to be the aggressor. Jean Molinet, Dicts et faits notables, p. 125.”* Article in Archéologie française, by Charles Pougens, appendix to the letter a, Paris 1821–25, tome 1, p. 48. (Bologna, 6 October 1825.)
Dissimulato, Simulato, Dissimulé, etc., for dissimulatore [dissembler], etc. See Forcellini.
In the course of his sixth luster1 man suffers a perceptible and painful change in his life when he is with other people, which is that where in the past he was used to dealing mainly with men either older than himself or at least the same age, and rarely with men younger than him, because those younger than him were only children, now he often finds himself dealing with younger men, because there are many under his age, who are not children though, so that the world he finds himself in is changed, and not without surprise, if he thinks about it, he becomes aware that he is regarded by a large part of his companions as more experienced than they are, something he is so unaccustomed to that it often hap
pens that for some time he is still not aware of it, and he carries on generally thinking of himself as either younger or the same age as his companions, as he used to, and rightfully, in the past. (Bologna, 8 October 1825.)
Who among us would be capable of imagining, let alone of carrying out, the design of the universe, its order, concatenation, artifice, the wonderful precision of its parts, etc. etc? Sure sign that the universe is [4142] the work of an infinite intellect. —But do you realize that between the extent and power of man’s intellect, and the extent and power of an infinite one there is an infinite distance? The human intellect is not capable of imagining a design like that of the universe. But an intellect a thousand times stronger and more extensive than the human would be capable of imagining it. Does that seem impossible to you? Let’s say, then, an intellect a million, a billion, a trillion, a trillion trillion times greater than the human one. You will never arrive at an infinite intellect, and therefore never at a great intellect, except relatively (since an intellect even a trillion times greater than ours, would not be a great intellect in itself, but only relatively to ours, and would be still infinitely less than an infinite intellect), and so never at a divine intellect. It is the same with power. Man cannot make the world. This does not mean that making it requires an infinite power, but only a much greater power than the human. When you deduce from the existence of the world the infinity and therefore the divinity of its creator, you show that you suppose the world to be infinite, and of an infinite perfection, and to show an infinite skill, all of which is false, and if that is false, nothing infinite should be attributed to the author of nature. See p. 4177. Not to mention the innumerable imperfections we see, not just physically, but metaphysically and logically speaking, in the universe.
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