Zibaldone

by Leopardi, Giacomo

  For p. 4354. Most probably in the earliest true writing, in which the vowels which are now called long were in fact double, i.e., 2 short vowels, they were written in those cases omitting the 2nd short vowel: e.g., instead of ἐγὼ ἀρξάμενος they wrote ἐγο ἀρξάμενος or ἐγο' ἀρξάμενος, since the ordinary way of writing ἐγὼ was ἐγοὸ, of ἤδη ἐέδεε, etc. In short, the vowels which are now called long were in fact diphthongs, two short sounds; one of which could be elided, etc. (25 Feb. 1829.) See p. 4469.

  For p. 4403. Xenophon in the Anabasis, at the beginning of books 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, briefly summarizes all of the previous narrative, and says: these things “ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν” (book 2 ἔμπροσθεν) “λόγῳ δεδήλωται” [“I showed in the logos before”] i.e., not in the previous book—which does not contain all of the account he narrates and summarizes (and the division of the Anabasis into books is perhaps more recent than Xenophon)—but in the earlier part of this history, exactly as λόγος is used by Herodotus.1 Leunclavius translates this wrongly in books 2 and 3 as “superiore libro” [“in the preceding book”], less wrongly in book 4 as “superioribus commentariis” [“in the preceding expositions”], correctly in book 5 as “hactenus hoc commentario” [“so far in this exposition”], and in book 7 as “superiore commentario” [“in the preceding exposition”]. Book 6 begins ex abrupto in the same way as the first, and without epilogue, nor any kind of introduction.2 (25 Feb. 1829.)

  For p. 4462. And indeed nature’s purposes, its final causes, even in many of those things in which the intentional will of nature as their author is clear, either cannot be guessed, or are (if they truly exist) completely divergent and distant from those which they apparently ought to be. For example, [4468] what is the purpose of those organs in many species of animal which the naturalists call rudiments: organs that are imperfect, inchoate only, and insufficient for the animal’s use—in certain species of snake two, in others four, little feet which are of no use for walking, indeed do not even touch the ground, even though they are accompanied by all the apparatus for walking (i.e., pelvis, scapulae, clavicles, and so forth)? Or in certain species of birds, wings which are of no use for flying? And so forth. Signor Hauch, professor of natural history in Denmark, in his dissertation “Degli organi imperfetti che si osservano in alcuni animali, della loro destinazione nella natura, e della loro utilità riguardo la storia naturale” [“On the imperfect organs which are seen in certain animals, on their purpose in nature, and on their utility in relation to natural history”], written in Italian, and published in Naples in 1827 (Giornale arcadico, tome 38, 2nd of 1828, pp. 76–81), believes that these organs serve as a nexus between the various orders of animals (e.g., those little feet, between snakes and lizards), as an intermediate scale or grade, in order to avoid the leap;1 and that they are almost rough copies which nature is testing and trying out in order then to gradually make similar organs more developed and perfect in other neighboring species of animals. I do not know how much this object, this final cause, may seem useful, and worthy of nature and of the whole question. See p. 4472. But if this theory is accepted (which is the argument and purpose of that book), it can be seen how the final causes of nature would be distant from every outward appearance and from our entire way of thinking. For who among us would not think it obvious that feet are made for walking? (as eyes for seeing). And yet those little feet with all their apparatus for walking, would not in fact be for walking at all, but for an entirely different purpose. And in fact they do not walk because they are insufficient. And those wings do not fly, although otherwise perfectly organized (Hauch notes further that in some of those birds [4469] they are not even sufficient nor do they serve in any way to balance the birds and help them run, as is said of the wings of the ostrich): and so on.1 (26 Feb., Last Thursday of Carnival, 1829.)

  For a “Discourse on the current state of literature,”2 etc. —Removing literature from studies, from the civilized world, is like taking spring away from the year, taking youth away from life. (6 March 1829.)

  “Τῷ Βίωνι” (Borysthenes, philosopher) “δοκεῖ μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν, εἰ μὴ πλακοῦντα γενόμενον ἢ Θάσιον.” Dio Chrysostom, Oration 66, “De gloria,” p. 612, ed. Reiske. “Bion said: it is not possible to please the crowd unless you become a pie or a sweet wine from Thasos.”3 (8 March, Sunday, 1829.) May be useful for “Moral etiquette” or “Social Machiavellianism.”

  For p. 4245. These ἔρανοι [communal meals] are discussed (I think) thoroughly, as can be seen, by Coray, “Notes sur les Caractères de Théophraste.”4 (8 March 1829.)

  Synizeses. See Forcellini, etc., under Suavis and similar words.

  Sperno is–aspernor aris [despise].

  Contemtus, despectus, neglectus, etc., for contemnendus [despicable], contemnibilis, etc. And likewise in Italian, French, and Spanish. —Scitus, scite, scitulus, scitule, etc., saputo, saputello [know-all], etc.

  For p. 4467. And likewise the diphthongs. These, moreover, when they were made short, must have been written without the last vowel: οὔ το' ἀπόβλητ' ἐστὶ [not to be flung aside], for οὔ τοι, as it is now written. And similarly in the middle of words, the diphthongs and the so-called long vowels when they were made short, must have been written simply: ο for ω, οι, etc.; ε for η, ει, etc. etc. (8 March 1829.)

  For p. 4430. Similarly those many sayings that are found under the name of Diogenes the Cynic in Laertius, and in Stobaeus, Antonius, and Maximus, and others, collected by Orelli, loc. cit. p. 4431, tome 2, Leipzig 1821, very many of which are found to be attributed in other places to entirely different people; they demonstrate that [4470] all caustic, sharp-witted, etc., sayings, not only moral or philosophical but of any kind whatsoever, were popularly ascribed to Diogenes. (8 March 1829.)

  The passage from Laertius in Orelli, loc. cit. in the previous thought, p. 84, no. 111, which no one has understood, and least of all Kühn (whose explanation is thought of as correct by Orelli, ibid. pp. 585–86, where he describes this passage as “very difficult”), according to whom (see Orelli, p. 586) we would have roosters πίπτοντας ἐπὶ στόμα fallen face down, i.e., on their beak, something never seen before; to me it seems absolutely clear, and it contains a satire against doctors (whose god is Asclepius), who end up killing those who fall ill.1 That πλήκτης [fighter] was not a rooster, but a man, a fighter, not real, but probably represented in wax, according to the custom of the ancients, especially the poor, in those ἀναθήμασι [votive offerings]. See a similar passage, confirming this explanation, ibid., p. 102, no. 216; and the note, p. 595: this passage also concerns Diogenes. The rooster promised by Socrates to Asclepius was admitted to Kühn’s mind quite inadmissably, and led him into error. (9 March 1829.)

  For p. 4464. Philo the Jew has a similar passage οὐδ' ὄναρ [not even in dream] in Orelli, ibid, tome 2, p. 116, no. 269. In any event, see Forcellini, etc. (9 March 1829.)

  For p. 4437 end. It was neither through ignorance nor carelessness, but deliberately and intentionally, that the author of those five moral Διαλέξεις (Orelli: Dissertationes, Fabricius: Disputationes) in Doric dialect approached that perplexing style of writing, etc., that Democritan manner, indeed without any order or any rule of phrasing, and all in exaggerated and disproportionate fashion. They are to be found at the end of many manuscripts of the works of Sextus Empiricus, which were published by Henri Estienne, by Gale, by Fabricius, and most recently by Johannes Conradus Orelli (loc. cit. on the previous page, end). Their author, who is not particularly ancient but wanted to be thought of as such, sought to use that style in order to feign antiquity in this respect as well. (10 March 1829.) See p. 4479.

  [4471] If writers knew their future readers personally, one by one, perhaps they would not be so concerned about acquiring their respect by writing with care, or perhaps they w
ould not write at all. The fact of thinking about them in imagination, in a blurred way, all together, is what makes their praise or respect desirable or valuable, etc. (10 March 1829.)

  For p. 4426. Those who have traveled much (Vieusseux’s conversation with me), observe that for them one of the causes of pleasure, when traveling, is that, having seen many places, the ones which they happen to go through from time to time easily recall others to mind that they have seen before, and that this reminiscence, in and of itself, is a delight. (And for the same reason observing places, walking, etc., where they have chosen to stay, also delights them.) So it is: a place seems romantic and sentimental to us, not because of itself, for it is nothing of the kind, but because it awakens the memory of another place that we have known, in which, though, if we were there now, it would not seem, it never did seem, romantic or sentimental in the least. (10 March 1829.)

  For p. 4365. To be sure, when Greek literature and science, philosophy, etc., passed over into Italy, many Greek words belonging to those fields acquired Latin citizenship as a result, and thence became a part of the modern languages, not only written but also spoken. The same occurred with the Christian religion, and I do not mean the technical words of theology, but the many other words belonging to Christianity which were transplanted into Latin and thence passed into the modern languages (even those not the daughters of Latin), and there became very commonly used, so much so that many of them are very disfigured (either in form or meaning) and their etymology barely discernible. These include (in Italian) chiesa [church], clero [clergy], chierico [tonsured clerk], prete, canonico, vescovo [bishop], papa, battesimo, battezzare, cresima [confirmation], eucaristia, catechismo, parroco [parish priest], parrocchia, epifania, pentecoste, elemosina (limosina, limosinare, etc.) [alms], accidia [sloth], etc. (10 March 1829), angelo, arcangelo, demonio, diavolo, [4472] patriarca, profeta, profezia, apostolo, martire, martirio, martíre, martoro, martoriare, etc., cattolico, eretico, eresia (resia, etc.), evangelo (vangelo) [gospel], monaco [monk], monastico, monasterio, eremo [hermitage] (ermo, etc., eremita, romito, romitorio, etc.), anacoreta, mistero (also referring to all kinds of unknown things, outside religion), etc. Many others translated, such as κατανύσσω, κατάνυξις, compungo, compunction [compunction], in the moral sense; πειρασμὸς tentatio [temptation]; and an infinite number of others, not just words, but phrases and phraseology from Scripture (a great source of Grecism in late Latin and in the modern languages) or from the Greek fathers, which passed into our languages and over time were applied also to secular meanings and uses. Prossimo [‘one’s neighbor’] (ὁ πλησίον, ὁ πέλας), for simile [one’s like], etc., also comes from the Greek by way of Christianity, although Forcellini has something similar in pagan authors. (12 March 1829.)

  For p. 4468. Such an observation may seem sufficient as an explanation of the phenomenon, but not of its purpose. (12 March.)

  “ἐς ἴσον τῷ” fragment by Archytas, or under the name of Archytas, in Orelli, loc. cit., p. 4469, end, p. 248, line 13.—à l’égal de. La Bruyère, and contemporaries.—adverbial locution, meaning aeque ac [as much as].1 (12 March 1829.)

  “Moral etiquette.” “Il y a des ménagements que l’esprit même et l’usage du monde n’apprennent pas, et, sans manquer à la plus parfaite politesse, on blesse souvent le cœur” [“There is a kind of tact which even intelligence and knowledge of the world cannot teach, and, while not wanting in the most perfect politeness, one often wounds the heart”]. Corinne, bk 3, ch. 1, 5th ed., Paris 1812, tome 1, p. 92. “Les Anglais sont les hommes du monde qui ont le plus de discrétion et de ménagement dans tout ce qui tient aux affections véritables” [“The English are the most discreet and tactful people in the world when it comes to dealing with sincere affections”], bk. 6, ch. 4, tome 1, p. 281. (13 March, 2nd Friday of Lent, 1829.)

  “Mille piacer non vagliono un tormento” [“A thousand pleasures are not worth one torment”].2 So how can one pleasure be worth a thousand torments? And yet such is life. (14 March 1829.) This line contains within it a death sentence on human life, and on those who agree to live, in other words on all living beings.

  Latin monosyllables. Nix [snow].

  κέραμος–κεράμιον [earthenware vessel]. See Orelli, loc. cit. here above, p. 279, end. This passage is copied from Aristotle, as indicated in the notes.

  [4473] εὐθέως or εὐθὺς, as luego, for therefore, thus, iccirco, consequently, necessarily. See Orelli, ibid., p. 312, lines 8–9, and the note p. 697. Noteworthy passage. Likewise, often, with the negative: e.g., οὐ γὰρ εἰ, etc., διὰ τοῦτο εὐθὺς καὶ, etc., or omitting the διὰ τοῦτο therefore. (23 March 1829.)

  μωκάομαι [to ridicule, to mock], with derivatives and compounds (see Scapula in μῶκος, and Orelli, ibid., p. 752, end)—se moquer with derivatives, etc. And note the neuter passive, or reciprocal, neuter form of both verbs, etc. (25 March 1829.)

  σκίμπους οδος—σκιμπόδιον [small couch].

  caUneas–caVe ne eas [beware lest you go!].

  tenebrosus–tenebricosus [dark, gloomy]. In the popular dialect of Viterbo (Patrimony of St. Peter), menicare and trenicare, frequentative verbs of menare [to shake] and tremare [to tremble]. (Orioli in the Antologia of Florence.)1

  ἁρμάτιον for ἅρμα [chariot]. Procopius, Historia arcana, p. 31 ed. Alemanni.2 (Nothing in the Lexicons and Glossaries.)

  ῎Επος [word] from εἰπεῖν [to say] seems to have been considered, and thus named, as a kind of step, an intermediate form between λόγος, from λέγειν, oration, prose; and μέλος [song]. (27 March 1829.)

  ῾Αφὴ [sense of touch], ἐπαφὴ, [touch] used in relation to musical instruments, in Orelli, ibid., p. 292, line 3; p. 302, lines 13, 18, 23, p. 336, line 19.—tocco, toccare, toucher, etc., in the same sense.

  In general the Spanish diminutive form (either derogatory or of endearment, etc.) with illo, and ico, ecillo, ecico, cillo, cico, and the Italian with glio and chio (icchio, ecchio, acchio, etc.), and the French with il, ill; ail, aill; eil, eill, etc., both for nouns and for verbs (in which it is generally called frequentative), is none other (also in words that are not of Latin origin) than simply the Latin with aculus, iculus, culus, iculare, culare, uscul…, etc., contracted first into clus, clum, iclus, clare, etc. (27 March 1829.) See p. 4486.

  Fama rerum [Fame of things]. Tacitus, Vita Agricolae, at the end. A phrase which stirs a vast idea, [4474] or multitude of ideas, and in the most indefinite way.1 The ancient languages abound in such phrases, and, in general, the ability to express themselves in such a way, Latin especially, even more than Greek. And that is the reason why Latin prose, as far as expression and language are concerned (not ideas and style, as in French), is often more poetic than verse, not just modern verse, but Greek verse as well; although Latin has no separate poetic language. (28 March 1829.)

  Latin monosyllables, in parallel to the corresponding Greek words. Do–δί-δω-μι [to give], from the obsolete δόω.

  Sufficiente [sufficient] said of a person, sufficienza, etc.—ἱκανὸς, ἱκανότης [sufficient, sufficiency], etc.

  For p. 4442. Eremo [hermitage] noun from ἔρημος [deserted] adjective, with τόπος [place] understood. Deserted. See Forcellini. Nulla (res) for nihil [nothing]. And by way of such implications of meaning, endless other adjectives, not only of time and place, but of every kind, have become nouns in every language, replacing the original corresponding nouns. In any case, Greek too abounds in ellipses of this sort in adjectives of time and place. (28 March 1829.)

  One of life’s errors, no less serious than it is frequent, is to believe that people are more cunning and evil, and their actions and behavior more deceitful than they are: almost no less serious, nor less common, than the contrary.2 (28 March 1829.)

  “Tanto, inquit, melius [so much the better].” Phaedrus.3—tant mieux, tant pis.

 
“Ce que les intérêts particuliers ont de commun” (in society) “est si peu de chose, qu’il ne balancera jamais ce qu’ils ont d’opposé” [“What particular interests have in common” (in society) “is so little that it will never match what they have against them”]. Rousseau, Pensées, Amsterdam 1786, 1st part, p. 23.4 (28 March 1829.)

  “On n’a de prise sur les passions, que par les passions; c’est par leur empire qu’il faut combattre leur tyrannie, et c’est toujours de la nature elle-même qu’il faut tirer les instrumens propres à la régler” [“We have no hold over the passions, except through the passions themselves; it is by their rule that we must combat their tyranny, and it is always from nature itself that we must take the instruments needed to govern it”], ibid. p. 46.5

  Strascicare and strascinare are certainly frequentative verbs corrupted from trahere [to drag].

  [4475] For p. 4446. A very true observation about drama, similar to the other on p. 4459. But such memories, legends, and songs, can only be found among peoples who effectively have a national life and interest. By this I mean a life and interest which truly exists in the people and therefore can only be found in democratic states, or states of popular or semipopular monarchies (as in ancient and medieval times), or in states in national combat against foreigners who are hated by the people (as in the time of El Cid,1 with the Spanish against the Arabs), or finally in states where tyrannies are fought from within (as in modern Greece, and in several provinces and periods of ancient Greece and its colonies). But in the state to which European nations have been reduced since the end of the 18th century—a state of calm absolute monarchy—the peoples (apart from the Greeks) have been unable to have such traditions and poems, nor can they have them. These nations have no heroes. If they had, they would be of no interest to the people, and the ancient ones they did have have been forgotten by them, in such a way that as the peoples have become strangers to public affairs, so they have become strangers to their own history. If, that is, you can call their own what is a history of princes, not of peoples.2 In fact, there is no heroic remembrance, no affection, perfect ignorance of national history, whether ancient or very recent, among the peoples of modern Europe. In such states, the only heroes of popular legends are Saints or lovers: subjects, at most, for novels, not heroic poems or songs, nor heroic tragedies.