16–17: Some details of Jawahir’s experience with Hamza and Ahmed al-Ghamdi from the FBI 302 of her interview on September 11, 2001, for file no. 265D-NY-280350.
17: Information about the gate for United 175 from “Staff Monograph on the Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 9/11 Commission, September 2005.
BOOK ONE
19: The phrase “a war of unknown warriors” is derived from a speech delivered by British prime minister Winston Churchill four days after the Battle of Britain began. His exact words were:
There are vast numbers, not only in this Island but in every land, who will render faithful service in this war, but whose names will never be known, whose deeds will never be recorded. This is a War of the Unknown Warriors; but let all strive without failing in faith or in duty.
The allusion should be clear. The fight against terrorism is one built on intelligence and secrecy, and the identities of many of those who joined in the battle will never be known.
Chapter 1
21: The timing of the unofficial White House evacuation from the live CNN broadcast on 9/11. The formal evacuation of the executive mansion, called for by White House security, began at 9:45 A.M.
21–22: Some details about Mineta’s experiences from his March 23, 2003, testimony before the 9/11 Commission.
22–23: Some details of Cheney’s trip down the tunnel to the PEOC were first reported by Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, “America’s Chaotic Road to War,” Washington Post, January 27, 2002.
23: Most details about Moussaoui’s learning of the 9/11 attacks from his March 27, 2006, testimony in United States v. Moussaoui.
25: Some details of Canoles’s experiences from two sets of handwritten notes from a government interview at the FAA on March 25, 2004. Also see Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams, and Blake Morrison, “Amid Terror, a Drastic Decision: Clear the Skies,” USA Today, August 12, 2002.
25: Timing of events inside the PEOC from the Secret Service log maintained by an agent stationed at the center.
25–26, 27: Some details of the conversations between Mineta and Belger from Mineta’s testimony before the 9/11 Commission, and Belger’s June 17, 2004, testimony before the group.
26: Details of the speed of flight 77 and the events immediately preceding and after its crash into the Pentagon from American Society of Civil Engineers, The Pentagon Building Performance Report, Structural Engineering Institute, January 2003.
26–27: Some details of Sliney’s experiences from 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the Record, “Interview with Benedict Sliney,” May 21, 2004; “Written Testimony of Benedict Sliney to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,” June 17, 2004. Also see Levin, Adams, and Morrison, USA Today, August 12, 2002.
27–28: Some details of Rumsfeld’s departure from the Pentagon and his efforts to help responders from a contemporaneous video at the site; Andrew Cockburn, Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy, Scribner, 2007; and Steve Vogel, The Pentagon: A History, Random House, 2008.
28, 29: Details of the engineering elements that led to the collapse of the two towers from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, World Trade Center Building Performance Study, May 2002.
29: Some details of Bush and Cheney’s conversation from the 9/11 Commission Report; Bill Sammon, Fighting Back: The War on Terrorism—from Inside the Bush White House, Regnery Publishing, 2002.
29: The location of the limousine’s arrival at the Sarasota Airport from a Secret Service log from that day. The proximity of that spot to Jones Aviation from direct observation.
29, 30: The timing of Cheney’s arrival in the PEOC from a Secret Service log.
30: The final moments of United 93 were revealed in the 9/11 Report.
31: Some details about the marine barracks attacks in Beirut from Robert McFarlane, “From Beirut to 9/11,” New York Times, October 22, 2008.
32: The dialogue between Cheney and the military aide was recounted by Norm Mineta in his testimony before the 9/11 Commission. Also see excerpts from handwritten notes of Lewis “Scooter” Libby taken in the PEOC on 9/11. Some details of Bolten’s discussion with Cheney also from Libby’s notes; notes from an April 5, 2004, interview with Bolten by the 9/11 Commission; and the 9/11 Commission Report.
34–35: The dialogue between Rumsfeld and Cheney from an edited recording played for the author. The conversation was also contained in the 9/11 Commission Report.
38: Some details about Yoo’s background from University of California at Berkeley, “Faculty Profile,” undated. Background of his writings from Yoo, “Foreign Affairs Federalism and the Separation of Powers,” Boalt Working Papers in Public Law, 2001; and Yoo, “Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding,” Columbia Law Review 99 (1999).
38–40: Some details of events on Bush’s flight from Florida from a press pool report compiled by Judy Keen of USA Today and Jay Carney of Time; from Lynn Spencer, Touching History, Free Press, 2008; and from the Secret Service log maintained at the PEOC.
40: Details of the Dougherty conference room from direct observation. Bush’s statement from Public Papers of the President, George W. Bush 2001, Vol. 2, United States Government Printing Office, 2003.
40–41: Some details of Blair’s experiences on 9/11 from contemporaneous diaries written by Alastair Campbell, the prime minister’s director of communication from 1997 through 2003 (the Campbell Diaries). Also see Tony Blair, A Journey: My Political Life, Knopf, 2010; and the January 29, 2010, testimony of Blair before Iraq Inquiry chaired by Sir John Chilcot (the Chilcot Inquiry). The formation of the inquiry was announced by Prime Minister Gordon Brown on June 15, 2009.
42–43: Some details of El-Maati’s experience at the border, as well as his background, from the Canadian report, “Internal Inquiry in the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmed Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin,” written by an official government commission led by the Honorable Frank Iacobucci (the Iacobucci Report); “Report of the Events Related to Maher Arar, Factual Background,” Vols. 1 and 2, from the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, led by Dennis O’Connor (the O’Connor Report); Stephen J. Toope, “Fact Finder’s Report” for the Arar Commission (the Toope Report); the August 27, 2001, letter written by Ann Armstrong, a manager at Highland Transport; a telex from the U.S. embassy in Ottawa to the secretary of state, “Canadian Media Reporting on Alleged Terrorist Activities,” August 4, 2002 (State Department August 4 telex); and a copy of the map carried by El-Maati that day.
42–45: The El-Maati story is somewhat complex. The inclusion of El-Maati on lists of suspected security risks in both the United States and Canada was completely reasonable. His presence in Afghanistan for five years, his involvement with the faction of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the intelligence labeling his brother, Amr, as a threat were more than sufficient to raise concerns about him.
However, the evolution of his portrayal by the intelligence agencies—from a person of interest to a primary member of a Canadian terrorist cell—was not reasonable. The Iacobucci Commission concluded that labeling El-Maati as an imminent threat, terrorist, and associate of bin Laden was inaccurate, unreliable, and lacking an investigative basis. The Canadian Parliament’s Public Safety Committee voted to issue an apology to El-Maati and the others, and give them compensation. While the Canadian prime minister has not done so, the vote in itself underscores the poor quality of the intelligence labeling El-Maati and the others as terrorist threats.
Several items here must be addressed. There is a great deal of public misunderstanding about Muslims who traveled to Afghanistan to join in the battles there. In essence, there are multiple groups—those who traveled there from the late 1980s to 1990, those who joined bin Laden’s Afghan Arabs, those who arrived in 1991 through 1995, and those who traveled there after 1996 to join with the Taliban. The differences are attributable to the chaotic nature o
f Afghanistan itself—in the early years, the mujahideen and the Arabs were fighting the Soviets, and America backed them; the ones who traveled there in the early 1990s could be there to help the war-ravaged country, join with the government, or wage war alongside the mujahideen who had turned on their own countrymen for power. And, of course, those who arrived after 1996 were, for the most part, dedicated jihadists.
El-Maati was in the second group, traveling to Afghanistan in 1991 and leaving in 1996. In doing so, he was in the company of Muslims worldwide.
“The perception among Muslims was that these people fighting in Afghanistan were victorious over the Soviets by God’s aid and a lot of learned people and students started flocking there,” said Khaled Abou El Fadl, a professor at UCLA School of Law who was appointed by President George W. Bush to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. “Afghanistan in the early 1990s was becoming a mecca for a lot of Muslims who wanted to attain true Islamic knowledge.”
In this instance, the bottom line is that there was a reasonable basis for suspicion of El-Maati, but it was not tempered with a sophisticated understanding of the perception of Afghanistan among young Muslim men in the early 1990s.
43–45: Some details of the El-Maati interrogation from the Iacobucci Report. Also see the Arar Report and BC Civil Liberties Report, “Ahmad Abou El Maati: A Chronology.”
45–46: Details of the Offutt videoconference from notes of the meeting read to the author.
46: Details of Ashcroft’s arrival from Dan Eggen, “Ashcroft Jet Had Scare on Sept. 11,” Washington Post, September 28, 2001; and John Ashcroft, Never Again: Securing America and Restoring Justice, Center Street, 2006.
49: Details of the work on Bush’s speech were first reported in Balz and Woodward, op. cit. The author also reviewed notes that were taken during the discussions, and drafts of the address.
50: Bush’s words in the Oval Office address from a transcript in Public Papers of the President, Vol. 2.
50–51: Some details of the meeting from contemporaneous notes maintained by one of the participants. Also see Bob Woodward, Bush at War, Simon & Schuster, 2002.
51–52: Some details of Salim Hamdan’s experiences from FBI 302s of interviews with Hamdan, conducted in Guantanamo Bay detention center on June 26 through July 9, 2002; August 6, 2002; August 19, 2002; August 24, 2002; November 13, 2002, from cases numbered 262-NY-277013 and 265A-MM-C99102. Also from CITF, Report of Investigative Activity, activity no. 99221031841338, May 17, 2003.
Chapter 2
53–55: Some details of the COBRA meeting from the Campbell Diaries; Blair, A Journey: My Political Life; and the January 29, 2010, testimony of Blair before the Chilcot Inquiry. Also see House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, The Home Office’s Response to Terrorist Attacks, Sixth Report of Session, 2009–2010.
55–56: Most details of the NSC meeting from contemporaneous notes taken by one of the attendees, and confirmed by another participant. Also see Woodward, Bush at War; and George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, HarperCollins, 2007. Bush’s position is also reflected in an October 1, 2001, State Department Cable to all American embassies and missions, “Subject: September 11: Working Together to Fight the Plague of Global Terrorism and the Case Against Al-Qa’ida.” Also see untitled memo of Rumsfeld to Bush, dated September 23, 2001.
58: Some details of Addington’s background were first reported by Jane Mayer, “The Hidden Power,” New Yorker, July 3, 2006.
59–61: Some details of the 1991 Iraq resolution, and its revisions into the 2001 version, from copies of the original 1991 document, a draft of the 2001 version, and the final 2001 resolution.
62: Details of the CIA’s review of the performance at the Counterterrorist Center from the CIA Office of the Inspector General, “Inspection Report of the DCI Counterterrorist Center, Directorate of Operations,” August 2001.
63–64: The meeting at Salah’s house was described by Salim Hamdan in the FBI 302 notes of the August 4, 2002, interview conducted at Guantanamo by Ali Soufan, for file No. 262-NY-277013/265A-MM-C99102. The heading of the document incorrectly gives Hamdan’s first name as “Salem.”
63: Details of original proposal by Sheikh Mohammed from “Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,” Defendant’s Exhibit 941, United States v. Moussaoui. Also see the 9/11 Commission Report; FBI Electronic Communication from New York I-49, “Title: Manila Air; AOT-IT; OO:NY,” June 10, 2002; and FBI Electronic Communication from New York I-49, “Title: Manila Air; AOT-IT; OO:NY,” July 8, 1999.
64–65: Most details of the September 13 meeting from contemporaneous notes taken by one of the attendees, and confirmed by another participant. Also see Woodward, Bush at War; and Tenet, At the Center of the Storm.
65: Information about the War Powers Resolution, and its controversy, from Noah Feldman, “Our Presidential Era: Who Can Check the President?” New York Times, January 8, 2006.
67: The timing and location of the meeting from the scheduling book of one of the attendees.
68–71: The depiction of the events on the floor of the Senate from a C-SPAN video recording from that day.
69: Dashle’s response to the White House request for authority to use force in the United States from Barton Gellman, “Daschle: Congress Denied Bush War Powers in U.S.,” Washington Post, December 23, 2005.
71–72: Some details of the Bush-Blair conversation, and the subsequent discussion between the prime minister and his aides, from the Campbell diaries. Also see Simon McDonald, “Iraq: Options,” a December 3, 2001, paper prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at Blair’s request.
72–73: The description of Camp David from W. Dale Nelson, The President Is at Camp David, Syracuse University Press, 2000.
72–75: Some details of the Camp David meeting from the contemporaneous notes of one of the participants. Also see Woodward, Bush at War; Tenet, At the Center of the Storm; and National Archives, “9/11 Photographic Timeline from George W. Bush Library,” undated.
76: Details of the history of and potential damage of smallpox from Stefan Riedel, “Edward Jenner and the History of Smallpox and Vaccination,” Baylor University Medical Center Proceedings, January 2005; Steve Connor, “How Terrorism Prevented Smallpox Being Wiped Off the Face of the Planet Forever,” Independent, January 3, 2002; and Richard Preston, The Demon in the Freezer, Fawcett, 2002.
77: Some details of Ivins’s psychiatric and personal history, including his obsession with Kappa Kappa Gamma, from a confidential analysis prepared by the Expert Behavioral Analysis Panel at the request of Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth of the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia (Anthrax Panel Report). For the report, the panel was permitted to examine all of Ivins’s psychiatric records and to interview his former psychiatrists and counselors. Other information from Officer Robert Wayne Pierce, Incident/Investigation Report, July 27, 2008—the formal report assembled by the Frederick, Maryland, Police Department in its investigation of Ivins’s suicide that month. Also see the first Arredondo affidavit. His use of Celexa from FBI Electronic Communication from Washington Field Office AMX#3, “Title: Amerithrax; Major Case 184,” June 7, 2005.
Chapter 3
78–79: Details of the September 17 meeting from contemporaneous notes kept by one of the participants. Also see Woodward, Bush at War; and Tenet, At the Center of the Storm.
79: Details of the structure of a Memorandum of Notification from National Security Decision Directive 286, signed by Ronald Reagan on October 15, 1987. Some details of National Security Presidential Directive number nine from a limited summary released by the White House on April 1, 2004. Also see “Sixth Declaration of Marilyn A. Dorn, Information Review Officer, Central Intelligence Agency,” January 2007, from the case American Civil Liberties Union v. Department of Defense, no. 04 Civ. 4151, filed in Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York.
79: Details of the Bush meeting with reporters, including the location a
nd time, from Public Papers of the President, op. cit., and a video recording of the event.
80–81: Details of the military’s efforts to secure regional bases from a Pentagon report from the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth entitled “The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF),” October 2001–September 2005; “A Different Kind of War,” June 2009 (Combined Arms Center Report); and Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Handbook: Operation Enduring Freedom III,” no. 05–06, January 2005 (OEF Handbook).
81: Details about the difficulties in the relationship between the Americans and the Russians from James Kitfield, “Putin’s Leap of Faith,” National Journal, October 6, 2001.
82: Details of the Mayaguez incident from Major A. J. C. Lavalle, USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, Vol. 3, Monographs 4 and 5, The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951–1975, Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1976; and John L. Frisbee, “The Mayaguez Incident,” Air Force Magazine, September 1991.
84: Some details about the Nazi saboteur case from Louis Fisher, CRS Report for Congress, Military Tribunals: The Quirin Precedent, March 26, 2002; and United States Supreme Court opinion, Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 1942. Also see Lieutenant Colonel Judy Prescott and Major Joanne Eldridge, “Military Commissions, Past and Future,” Military Review, March–April 2003; and the November 19, 2001, memo from William J. Haynes II to Rumsfeld headed “Info Memo.”
84–85: Information about the classified Canadian report of September 18, 2001, from the original document.
85–86: Some details of Almalki’s encounters with CSIS from the Iacobucci Report; the O’Connor Report; BC Civil Liberties Association, “Abdullah Almalki: Chronology”; and Kerry Pither, Dark Days, Viking Canada, 2008. Also see State Department August 4 telex.
87: Details of Schroen’s experiences on the last day before his departure were first reported in Gary Schroen, First In, Presidio Press, 2005. Also see Richard A. Best Jr. and Andrew Feickert, Congressional Research Service, Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress, as updated December 6, 2006, Order Code RS22017.
500 Days: Secrets and Lies in the Terror Wars Page 68
