88: Some details of Chamberlain’s experience from Casey Chamberlain, “My Anthrax Survivor’s Story,” September 19, 2006; and Tom Brokaw’s testimony of September 10, 2008, before the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (the Brokaw testimony). Details of the letter from a copy of the original document.
89: Some details of the Feith draft memo from a footnote in the 9/11 Report.
89: Details about the actual contacts between Saddam and al-Qaeda from Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, “Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments,” September 8, 2006 (Senate Postwar Report on Iraq). Details of the administration’s military plan for Iran from November 27, 2001, Pentagon memo. The document is unsigned and has no subject line.
90–91: Some details of the Blair-Bush dinner from the Campbell diaries.
91–92: Details of Huden’s experience from Eric Lipton and Kirk Johnson, “Tracking Bioterror’s Tangled Course,” New York Times, December 26, 2001.
92: Details of Arteta’s performance from an opera review by Joe Banno, “Così: Playing It Safe,” Washington Post, September 15, 2001.
92: The destruction of the Buddhas from Barry Bearak, “Over World Protests, Taliban Are Destroying Ancient Buddhas,” New York Times, March 4, 2001; and Bearak, “Afghan Says Destruction of Buddhas Is Complete,” New York Times, March 12, 2001.
94–95: Bin Laden’s meeting with the reporter, and all of the dialogue, from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service with the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology, “FBIS Report: Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements, 1994–January 2004,” January 2004 (FBIS Report); and “Usama bin Laden Says the Al-Qa’idah Group Had Nothing to Do with the 11 September Attacks,” Ummat Karachi, September 28, 2001.
96–97: Some details about the operations and requirements of FISA from Majors Louis A. Chiarella and Michael A. Newton, “So Judge, How Do I Get a FISA Warrant? The Policy and Procedure for Conducting Electronic Surveillance,” Army Lawyer, October 1997. Also see Congressional Record—Senate, February 26, 2003, p. 4542.
97: Details of the detection on Sana’a phone line and its importance in developing other intelligence from the 9/11 Report; a classified report from an intelligence agency dated December 29, 1999; the prepared statement of Cofer Black for his testimony before the Joint Intelligence Committees of Congress of September 26, 2002.
97–98: Some details of the rules allowing for the NSA to monitor calls coming into the United States from U.S. Department of Justice, “Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President,” January 19, 2006. The existence of this element of the program was first reported by James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,” New York Times, December 16, 2005.
99: Some elements of the e-mail interception program were first disclosed in an article by Daniel Klaidman, “Now We Know What the Battle Was All About,” Newsweek, December 13, 2008.
100: The code name for the NSA program was first disclosed by Michael Isikoff, “The Fed Who Blew the Whistle,” Newsweek, December 13, 2008.
101: Details of the appearance of Stevens’s spinal fluid and Dr. Bush’s experience were first reported in Preston, The Demon in the Freezer.
101–102: Information about the fax from the original document. Some details about Almalki’s work from the Iacobucci Report. Also see the O’Connor Report.
103–104: Some details of the personal background revealed by Zubaydah from the CIA document “Psychological Assessment of Zain al-Abedin al-Abideen Muhammad Hassan, a.k.a. Abu Zubaydah,” December 30, 2004.
104: Details of Zubaydah’s comments on the recruiting video from the original recording. Also see memo of November 11, 2008, written by D. M. Thomas Jr., “Joint Task Force Guantanamo to the Commander for United States Southern Command in Miami, Recommendations for Continued Detention Under DOD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9GZ-010016DP (S)” (Detainee Assessment, Abu Zubaydah); and the CIA document “Psychological Assessment of Zain al-Abedin al-Abideen Muhammad Hassan, a.k.a. Abu Zubaydah,” dated January 31, 2003.
107: Details of Brokaw’s encounter with NBC security from the Brokaw testimony.
107–108: The experience of Zaki and his team was first reported in Preston, The Demon in the Freezer; also see John Jernigan et al., “Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax: The First 10 Cases Reported in the United States,” Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, Centers for Disease Control 7:6 (December 2001); and David Brown, “Stopping a Scourge,” Smithsonian, September 2003.
108: The work at Fort Detrick with infectious agents is conducted through a division called the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease, best known as USAMRIID. The work and appearance of the unit from Memorandum for Commander, “Legal Review—AR 15-6 Investigation into Contamination at USAMRIID,” May 15, 2002; undated floor plan of the facility; Memorandum for Record, “Area Surveys for B. anthracis Conducted in Bacteriology Division from 15 to 18 April,” April 19, 2002; sworn statement of the USAMRIID chief of the bacteriology division, provided on a DA Form 2823, May 5, 2002; sworn statement of the researcher involved in making mutants in anthrax genes, provided on a DA Form 2823, May 6, 2002; sworn statement of Bruce Ivins, provided on a DA Form 2823, May 6, 2002; an FBI case summary memo, “Amerithrax; Major Case 184, case ID 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID”; and Colonel Edward M. Eitzen Jr., Memo for Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Subject: Biological Defense Mishap,” April 23, 2002. Also see USAMRIID’s Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, April 2005.
108–109: Ivins’s time in the lab from an original work sheet compiled by the FBI and a partial review of laboratory access records for Building 1425. Also see FBI 302, no interviewee, June 18, 2005, for file no. 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1326. The degree to which this differed from his normal practice from Department of Justice, “Amerithrax Investigative Summary,” February 19, 2010 (Amerithrax Report). Also see “Application and Affidavit, Search Warrant,” signed by Marlo Arredondo, February 22, 2008, filed in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia (first Arredondo affidavit); and “Application and Affidavit, Search Warrant,” signed by Postal Inspector Thomas Dellafera, October 31, 2007, for case number 07-524-M-01, filed in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia (Dellafera affidavit).
109: Ivins’s discovery of the change in the availability of anthrax vaccine, and its impact on his work, from the Amerithrax Report.
109–111: Some of the details of the first anthrax mailing from Department of Justice, “Amerithrax Investigative Summary,” February 19, 2010 (Amerithrax Report); the Anthrax Panel Report; and the first Arredondo affidavit.
110: Pauley’s connection to the sorority from an undated document from Kappa Kappa Gamma entitled “Famous Kappas!”
Chapter 4
113–114: Details of the bombing of Afghanistan from Combined Arms Center Report and OEF Handbook. Also see Peter Baker, “Kabul and Kandahar Hit in Attacks Through Night,” Washington Post, October 8, 2001; Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. and Britain Strike Afghanistan, Aiming at Bases and Terrorist Camps,” New York Times, October 7, 2001; David Rohde, “Thunderous Blasts and Bright Flashes Mark Kabul Strikes,” New York Times, October 8, 2001.
114: Some details of the events preceding Bush’s speech from Laura Bush, Spoken from the Heart, Scribner, 2010. Speech transcript, including timing, from Public Papers of the President, George W. Bush 2001, Vol. 2, United States Government Printing Office, 2003.
114–115: Bin Laden’s comments from the FBIS Report. Descriptions from the video recording.
115: Details of the second anthrax mailing from the Amerithrax Report, the Anthrax Panel Report. Details of the Daschle letter to the Pentagon from the Anthrax Panel Report and the original document.
116: Background of Prince Bandar from Elsa Walsh, “The Prin
ce,” New Yorker, March 24, 2003.
116: Details of the Pan Am 103 attack and the culpability attributed to Libya from Colin Boyd, “Workshop: Police Investigations of ‘Politically Sensitive’ or High Profile Crimes: The Lockerbie Trial,” International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law, 15th International Conference, August 16–30, 2001.
118–121: Some details of the police search and the detention of Belkacem Bensayah from the declaration of Anela Kobilica filed in Boumediene et al. v. Bush et al., civil action no. 04-cv-1166 in Federal District Court for the District of Columbia; declaration of Nermina Pivic of October 9, 2008; Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Decision on Admissibility and Merits”; Mustafa AIT DIR v. Bosnia Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, case no. CH/02/8961; Federation Ministry of Interior–Crime Police Department, Receipt of Temporarily Seized Objects, October 8, 2001, no. 12/5-5/-2-01; and the May 6, 2008, testimony of Stephen Oleskey before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight (Oleskey testimony).
118–119: Details of Bosnia’s failures to stem terrorism and of its stepped-up efforts after 9/11, from a declaration of Alija Behmen, October 6, 2008; and Evan Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network, Berg Publishers, 2004.
121: Details of the Muhamed Bes˘ić statements and the timing of them from a declaration of Nedim Dervisbegovic, October 17, 2008; and George Jahn, “Police Arrest Terrorist Suspect After Tracing Phone Call to Bin Laden Aide,” Associated Press Worldstream, October 8, 2001.
121–122, 123–125: Some details of O’Connor’s experiences and the testing of her samples from the Brokaw Testimony.
125–126: The description of Mango’s Café and the shopping mall from personal observation. Some details of the meeting from the formal surveillance report from that day, as well as depictions from the Iacobucci Report. Information about Arar from the O’Connor Report.
125, 126: The exact nature of the weather on October 12 in Ottawa has been a major element of the RCMP investigation and the resulting suspicions about Arar. There has been testimony as well as documents submitted to investigative commissions about what the surveillance teams saw and reported. But I can find no evidence that anyone ever checked the hourly reports filed by the Ottawa weather station for that date and at that time. Those records are quite revealing. The day bounced between overcast and light rain. At no time was there a rainstorm of any significant size. At five o’clock, when the fateful walk took place, the weather was clearing. The humidity had dropped—from 94 percent to 88 percent—and visibility had increased from seven miles to ten. The overcast sky was breaking up. In other words, not only was it impossible for there to have been a major rainstorm, but the weather station specifically noted that the precipitation was light—and, based on these data, misty. This conforms with Arar’s and Almalki’s public statements that they did not remember it raining and did not get wet.
There is, however, a more important point to note: The absolute absurdity of the RCMP’s purported observations. By the official depiction, both men would have been dripping wet, their clothes soaked through, by the time they arrived at the house of prayer and then at Future Shop. Directly across the street from Mango’s Café is a gas station, which sells umbrellas. About a hundred yards farther is a grocery store, which sells umbrellas. And one hundred yards after that is a discount retailer, which sells umbrellas. Moreover, on the walk from Mango’s to the prayer house these are multiple other stores that sell umbrellas. It strains credibility to the breaking point to believe that these men would walk in a downpour, arriving drenched at a holy site, when they could have easily purchased an umbrella. Or they could have simply driven in one of their cars. Everything suggests that the RCMP reports are both wrong and illogical.
Assume, for a moment, that the independent data and logic are wrong, and that both men, for some unknown and unnecessary reason, walked in the rain. So what? The implication, of course, is that they were somehow trying to be alone so they could discuss something nefarious. Meeting in public, walking on a busy street—these are not the actions of people trying to maintain a secret. A private meeting, perhaps, but one at a strip mall is hardly suspicious. Then there is the speculation that Arar and Almalki were speaking in a way that appeared to the investigators as if they were trying to keep from being heard. The belief came from the fact that the men “leaned in” when they spoke to each other. The conclusion that there was something being hidden because they were speaking to each other in modest tones—at a time when they were meeting and walking in public—is again an illogical conclusion.
The idea that any of these events led an investigator to conclude that something untoward was occurring—particularly when the evidence from that day proves the official statements to be wrong—is frightening and reflects an utter incompetence on the part of the RCMP, one that ultimately led to the abduction and torture of an innocent man.
126: Details of Brokaw’s realization that the powder had been anthrax from the Brokaw testimony.
126–127: Some details of the Castelli-Battelli meeting from a transcript of Battelli’s interview with Armando Spataro, deputy chief prosecutor in Milan. Also see Spataro, “The Kidnapping of Nasr Mostafa Hassan alias Abu Omar (Milano, 17.02.2003),” January 23, 2008.
127, 130: Some details of the American rendition program from Note d’Information Commissaire, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CID/NSIB 2004–14, February 6, 2004.
127–128: Some details about the panic at NBC and the subsequent meeting from the Brokaw testimony.
128: Details of the FBI warning from the original release, headed “Warning of Possible Future Terrorist Attacks,” October 10, 2001.
128: Ashcroft’s comments from a transcript of a press conference held at the Department of Health and Human Services on October 12, 2001.
128–129: Cheney’s comments from Tom Pelton and Scott Shane, “Woman in N.Y. 4th Anthrax Case,” Baltimore Sun, October 13, 2001.
129–130: Some details of El-Maati’s experience seeing the news story from the Iacobucci Report. Also see the O’Connor Report.
131: Some details from the experience in Daschle’s office from the Amerithrax Report and a copy of the original letter.
131–132: Some details about Ivins’s magazines and relationship with the American Family Association from the Anthrax Panel Report.
132–133: Public details of Bush’s meeting with the Italian prime minister from “Remarks Following Discussions with Silvio Berlusconi of Italy and an Exchange with Reporters,” October 15, 2001, Public Papers of the Presidents, Vol. 2.
133: Some details of Ezzell’s experience from Preston, The Demon in the Freezer.
134: Some details of the intercepted phone call and related details from Narrative for Petitioners, in Boumediene v. Bush, filed in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia; and Andrew Purvis, “The Suspects: A Bosnian Subplot,” Time, November 12, 2001.
134: Some details of Ivins’s work from the Amerithrax Report; the Anthrax Panel Report; an FBI Electronic Communication from the Washington Field Office Amerithrax-3 Team to Inspection, headed “Amerithrax; Major Case 184,” dated May 24, 2005, for case no. 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID. The report quotes from the original document.
134–135: Some details of the encounter between Behmen and the American officials from a declaration of Alija Behmen, October 6, 2008; the declaration of Wolfgang Petritsch of September 15, 2008; and Ijava Zlatko Lagumdžija (Lagumdžija declaration), September 22, 2008.
Chapter 5
137–138: Some details about Blair’s frustration with American policy regarding the Northern Alliance from the Campbell diaries.
138–139: The experiences of the Alpha Teams were first reported in the Combined Arms Center Report and OEF Handbook.
140: Details of the Yoo memo to Gonzales and Haynes from original document, John C. Yoo and Robert J. Delahunty, “Authori
ty for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States,” October 23, 2001.
140–141: Some details of the ground assault from the Combined Arms Center Report and OEF Handbook.
142: Some details of the Jack Straw–Dick Cheney meeting from the Campbell diaries.
145–146: Some details of El-Maati’s decision to travel to Syria and his experiences at the airport from the Iacobucci Report; the O’Connor Report; and BC Civil Liberties Report, “Ahmad Abou El Maati: A Chronology.”
146, 149: Some details of the NSC meeting from partial notes taken by one of the participants and Tenet, At the Center of the Storm.
146–147, 149: Some details of the battle from the Combined Arms Center Report; Paul Wolfowitz, speech before the Fletcher Conference, 2001, “National Security for a New Era, Focusing National Power,” November 14, 2001; Peter Tomsen, Barnett Rubin, testimony of November 7, 2001, before the House Committee on International Relations in the hearings entitled “The Future of Afghanistan.” Also see OEF Handbook.
147: Some details of the flow of intelligence about El-Maati from the Iacobucci Report.
150–151: Some details about the Jalalabad meeting from Philip Smucker, “How Bin Laden Got Away,” Christian Science Monitor, March 4, 2002.
152–153: Some details of El-Maati’s abduction from the Iacobucci Report. Also see the Arar Report and BC Civil Liberties Report, “Ahmad Abou El Maati: A Chronology.” Also see State Department August 4 telex.
Chapter 6
156: Details and quotes from the Bush order from the original document.
157–158: Some of the details of Bellinger’s reaction to the military commissions order were first reported in Jane Mayer, The Dark Side, Doubleday, 2008.
500 Days: Secrets and Lies in the Terror Wars Page 69
