Öffentlichkeit. Neue Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Lagerpolitik (Munich, 2000),
135–73.
64. Testimony of Kroeger, 28 Aug. 1967 (ZSt, 76/59, 9, pp. 14 ff.). For further information on Dobromil: ZSt, 204 AR 1258/66, charge of 30 Jan. 1968, and judgement of the Tübingen
District Court of 31 July 1969. According to incident report 24 there were 132 victims.
65. Ogorreck, Einsatzgruppen, 142 ff. Cf. Pohl, Ostgalizien, 60 ff., and Thomas Held, ‘Vom Pogrom zum Massenmord. Die Vernichtung der jüdischen Bevölkerung Lembergs im
Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in Peter Fässler et al., Lemberg—Lwóv—Lviv (Cologne, 1993),
113–66. See also ZSt, 204 AR 1258/66, charge of 30 Jan. 1958.
66. EM 24 (16 July 1941).
67. EM 47 (9 Sept. 1941).
68. EM 86 (17 Sept. 1941).
69. EM 38, EM 47, and EM 86.
70. EM 24; ZSt, 114 AR-Z 269/60, final report, Sonderkommando 4a, 30 Dec. 1964, 150, and
the judgement of 29 Nov. 1968; see also the testimony of Ostermann, 3 Nov. 1965 (12,
2459) and Pfarrkicher, 4 Apr. 1962 (3, pp. 539 ff.). For this and the following operations by Sonderkommando 4a see especially Ogorreck, Einsatzgruppen, 130 ff.
71. EM 14.
72. ZSt, 114 AR-Z 269/60, final report, Sonderkommando 4a, 30 Dec. 1964; Georg Pfarr-
kircher, 4 Apr. 1962 (3, 539 ff.); Johannes Erich August Fischer, 30 Oct. 1963
(7, pp. 1374 ff.); judgement of 29 Nov. 1968.
73. Ibid., final report of 28 Aug. 1962; vol. 2, 387 ff., interrogation of Paul Walter, 24 Oct.
1961; vol. 21, pp. 140 ff., testimony of Heinrich Schlimme, 19 Nov. 1963.
74. EM 47 (9 Aug. 1941).
75. EM 17 (9 July 1941).
76. EM 58 (20 Aug. 1941).
77. EM 47 (8 Aug. 1941).
78. On further ‘reprisal operations’ in the area of Einsatzgruppe C see EM 20 (17 July 1941) and EM 24 (16 July 1941, Dobromil and Zloczow).
79. EM 17 (9 July 1941).
80. EM 43 (5 Aug. 1941).
506
Notes to pages 201–203
81. EM 47 (9 Sept. 1941).
82. EM 58 (20 Aug. 1941). It was not the commando that was responsible for this massacre, however, but the SS Cavalry Brigade. See below, p. 220.
83. Angrick, Besatzungspolitik, 140 ff.; Radu Florian, ‘The Jassy Massacre of June 29–30, 1941: An Early Act of Genocide against the Jews’, in Randolph L. Braham, ed., The Destruction
of Romanian and Ukrainian Jews during the Antonescu Era (New York, 1997), 63–86;
Radu Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the
Antonescu Regime 1940–1944 (Chicago, 1999), 63 ff. The total number of victims is
disputed (ibid. 85–6).
84. Ioanid, Holocaust, 90 ff.; Jean Ancel, ‘The German-Romanian Relationship and the
Final Solution’, HGS 19/2 (2005), 256–7.
85. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (New York, 1985) 771.
86. Activity and Situation report no. 1, NO 2651, published in Peter Klein, ed., Die
Einsatzgruppen, 112 ff. and 121.
87. On the early executions carried out by Einsatzgruppe D, see Angrick, Besatzungspolitik, 131 ff., and the overview by the same author in Klein, Einsatzgruppen, 88–110. There is
an English version: ‘The Escalation of German-Romanian Anti-Jewish Policy after the
Attack on the Soviet Union’, YVS 26 (1998), 203–38.
88. EM 25; Angrick, Besatzungspolitik, 165 ff.
89. EM 37 and RH 20/11–488, report Ic/XXX AK of 2 Aug. 1941 (¼ NOKW 650) and further
documents in the same folder; cf. also the account in Angrick, Besatzungspolitik, 166–7,
Ogorreck, Einsatzgruppen, 153–4, and Krausnick, ‘Einsatzgruppen’, 238–9.
90. BAM, RH 20-11/488, report by Sonderkommando 10b to Army Group South, 9 July 1941
(¼ NOKW 587 and 3453); cf. Angrick, Besatzungspolitik, 148 ff.; Ogorreck, Einsatz-
gruppen, 154–5.
91. EM 40.
92. Ibid. Chotin, for example, was ‘gone through’, and ‘150 Jews and Communists were
liquidated’. Cf. Angrick, Besatzungspolitik, 159 ff.
93. EM 45; see also Angrick, Besatzungspolitik, 177 ff.
94. Ibid., testimony of Zöllner, 26 Apr. 1962.
95. EM 45; State Archive Munich, Case against Sonderkommando 11b, charge of 19 Aug.
1971; see also the testimony of the accused, Johannes Paul Schlupper, 18 May 1962
(5, pp. 1008–9) and the interrogations of Johannes Nentwig, 25 Apr. 1962 (5, pp. 1070 ff.), and August Rosenbauer, 23 Sept. 1969 (18, p. 3823). See also EM 45; Angrick, Besatzungspolitik, 186 ff.
96. EM 61; State Archive Munich, 119 c Js 1/69, charge of 28 Oct. 1972. There are important details in the testimonies by Hermann Siebert, 13 Nov. 1951 (vol. 5, pp. 630 ff.), Karl
Becker, 4 Aug. 1970 (vol. 3, pp. 300 ff.), Erich Rohde, 3 June 1970 (vol. 5, pp. 584 ff.), and Erich Hanne, 17 Dec. 1969 (vol. 3, pp. 362 ff.).
97. Judgement by the Wuppertal District Court of 24 May. 1973 (ZSt, V 205 ArZ 20/60).
98. Andrei Angerick et al., ‘ “Da hätte man Tagebuch führen müssen”. Das Polizeibatal-
lion 322 und die Judenmorde im Bereich der Heeresgruppe Mitte während des Sommers
und Herbstes 1941’, in Helge Grabitz et al., eds, Die Normalität des Verbrechens.
Bilanz und Perspektiven der Forschung zu den nationalsozialistschen Gewaltverbre-
chen (Berlin, 1994); Unsere Ehre heist Treue: Kriegstagebuch des Kommandostabes
Notes to pages 203–208
507
Reichsführer 55. Tätigkeitsberichte der 1. und 2. SS-Inf.-Brigade, der 1.SS Kav.-Brigade
und von der Sonderkommandos der SS (Vienna, 1965), 334 ff.; judgement of
the District Court of Bochum against members of Police Battalion 316 who were
also involved in the massacre (Bochum District Court, 6 June 1968, ZSt, II 202 AR-Z
168/59).
99. YV 053/12, Kriegstagebuch (KTB), Unsere Ehre, 322 (8 July 1941).
100. In his interrogation of 20 Apr. 1966, for example (ZSt, 73/61, 6, pp. 1510 ff.).
101. Ibid., YV 053/127, KTB 322 (9 July 1941).
102. Ibid (12 July 1941)
103. Ibid. (8 July 1941).
104. ZSt, II 202 AR-Z 168/59, order of the state prosecutor of Dortmund, 8 Nov. 1968. On
these shootings see also the judgement of the District Court of Freiburg on 12 July 1963
(¼ Sagel-Grande, Justiz and NS-Verbrechen, xix, no. 555).
105. Note by the public prosecution department, Lübeck, 9 Sept. 1965 (ZSt, AR-Z 82/61). See also the testimonies of Wilhelm Niehoff, 27 Feb. 1962 (1, pp. 12 ff.), Richard Pelz,
undated (1, pp. 354 ff.), Friedrich Niehoff, 18 Aug. 1966 (11, pp. 2723 ff.). Cf. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 546 ff.
106. YV 053/127, KTB 322 (2 Aug. 1941).
107. YV 053/127.
108. YV 053/127 (15 Aug. 1941).
109. BAB, NS 36/13, published in Longerich, Ermordung, 43–4.
12.
The Transition from Anti-Semitic Terror to Genocide
1. IMT xxxviii. 86 ff. (221-L).
2. Angrick, Besatzungspolitik, 152, reconstitutes an execution that was conducted like a court martial on 8 July in Czernowitz (Sonderkommando 10b); the first shootings of Einsatzkommando Tilsit took place in a similar manner (Matthäus, in Christopher Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy 1939–1942 (London, 2004), 254). On the change in practice for executions, see pp. 260–1. The new, more
effective procedures are explained in the so-called Jäger Report of Einsatzkommando 2 of 1
Dec. 1941 (OS, 500-1-25). See also the judgement of the District Court of Kiel of 8 Apr. 1964, which stresses the differences in execution procedures using the example of Einsa
tzkommando 8 (¼ Sagel-Grande, Justiz and NS-Verbrechen, xix. 773).
3. EM 19, EM 24, and EM 32.
4. EM 24, EM 73.
5. EM 73, EM 80.
6. EM 32, EM 47.
7. EM 46, EM 47.
8. EM 50, EM 67.
9. EM 58, EM 68.
10. EM 59.
11. EM 88, EM 90, and EM 94.
12. See above, p. 194.
13. See above, p. 195.
508
Notes to pages 208–214
14. EM 67.
15. EM 73.
16. EM 81.
17. EM 47.
18. For details see Krausnick, Truppe, 209 ff. The commandos sometimes urged that they be deployed not only in the Army Rear Area or the Rear Area of the Army Group but also in
the combat area (see for example the Stahlecker report, 180-L, IMT xxxvi. 670. ff., or
Activity and Situation Report no. 1, NO 2651, published in Klein, ed., Einsatzgruppen,
112 ff. and 113).
19. EM 111.
20. EM 27.
21. ADAP, series D, vol. 12, no. 207.
22. For details, see below, pp. 227 ff.
23. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 574 ff., which has various examples. Gerlach notes amongst other things that for the attitude of the central authorities the meeting of the General
Council of the Four-Year Plan on 19 Sept. 1941 meant a change of direction towards the
use of Jews for work details (ibid. 582; the invitation to this meeting and its agenda are in NG 1853).
24. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 583.
25. Ibid. 628 ff.
26. Ibid. 645 (in summary).
27. EM 31.
28. EM 111.
29. EM 94.
30. On the formation of ghettos, see above all Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 521 ff. and 574 ff.
31. BAM, RW 31/11, cf. Aly, ‘Final Solution’, 190.
32. BAB, RW 12/189; cf. Aly, ‘Final Solution’, 192.
33. At the end of August or the beginning of September, the formation of ghettos in the
larger cities was specifically encouraged by the commander of Rear Army Area South
(BAM, RH 22–6, 28 Aug. 1941 and NOKW 1584). The commander of Rear Army Area
North described the formation of ghettos in an order dated 3 Sept. 1941 as not a priority (BAM, RH 26–285/45 and NOKW 2204). The commander of Rear Army Area Centre
had been issuing orders for the formation of ghettos since July (cf. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 524–5).
34. 1028-PS, IMT xxvi. 567 ff.
35. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 530 ff.
36. EM 19 and EM 21.
37. Published in Paul Kohl, ‘Ich wundere mich, dass ich noch lebe’. Sowjetische Augenzeu-
genberichte (Gütersloh, 1990), 218.
38. EM 31.
39. EM 43.
40. EM 63.
41. EM 106.
42. See below, Chapter 17.
43. 221-L, IMT xxxviii. 86 ff.
Notes to pages 214–218
509
44. BAB, R 43II/683a. Rosenberg had already been assigned the task of establishing an
‘Office for Eastern Questions’ by Hitler at the beginning of April. On Rosenberg’s
preparations for the war against the Soviet Union, see Yitzhak Arad, ‘Alfred Rosenberg
and the “Final Solution” in the Occupied Soviet Territories’, YVS 113 (1979), 265 ff.
45. NG 1688; published in, Führer-Erlasse 1939–1945, ed. Martin Moll (Stuttgart, 1997),
no. 99.
46. Cf. the letter from Stahlecker (leader of Einsatzgruppe A) to Heydrich dated 10 Aug.
1941 (Staatsarchiv (StA) Riga, 1026-1-3) in which he draws attention to the fact that ‘the handling of the Jewish Question is part of the police’s role in securing the newly
occupied Eastern territories so that, according to points I and II of the Führer’s decree on the securing of the occupied Eastern areas by the police of 18 July 1941, the Reichsführer SS is entitled to issue instructions to the Reichskommissar’.
47. In the view of Christopher Browning, most recently in Origins, 309 ff.
48. See above, p. 184.
49. YV, M 36/3 (copies from the Military Archive in Prague), Meeting Minute Ia: ‘The units subordinated to the Command Staff are to be deployed in the area of political
administration. A commitment of larger units in the Rear Army Area is possible.
Members of the Command Staff and the units assigned to it have no business either in
the operational areas or in the Rear Army Areas.’
50. Cf. Rolf-Dieter Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg und die deutsche Siedlungspolitik. Die Zusammenarbeit von Wehrmacht, Wirtschaft und SS (Frankfurt a. M., 1991), 94 ff.
51. According to a communication from Lammers of 10 June 1941 (BAB, R 6/21). On this
see Rosenberg’s opinion, 14 June 1941 and the ‘Denkschrift über Aufgaben und
Befugnisse des Reichsministers für die besetzten Ostgebiete bzw. Die Reichskommis-
sare und über Befugnisse des Reichsführers SS, Chef der Deutschen Polizei sowie des
Reichskommissars für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums’, which Rosenberg sent to
Lammers on 27 Aug. 1943 (no. 3726).
52. NS 19/1739.
53. NO 4724, Reichsführer SS to Lorenz and Heydrich (11 July 1941).
54. Addendum to communication of 11 July 1941, ibid. The original order to Pflaum had
also been issued on 11 July.
55. BAB, NS 22/971, file note by Bormann dated 16 Aug. 1941: ‘There is no clarity about
which areas should most quickly be Germanized after the end of the war, and it cannot
for the moment be obtained, since the Führer will only take the necessary decisions
after the end of the war.’
56. BAB, R 6/23, Himmler to Rosenberg, 19 Aug. 1941, and Rosenberg to Lammers, 23 Aug.
1941.
57. BAB, R 6/23 (cf. Müller, Ostkrieg, 98). In a file note on a conversation with Goering on 9
Aug. 1941 Rosenberg mentioned that Goering too was assuming ‘that the task assigned
to the Reichsführer SS with respect to the strengthening of the German nation was
limited exclusively to the area of the German Reich’ (ibid.).
58. OS, 1323-1-53 and BAB, R 43 II/684a, letter of 6 Sept. 1941 from Lammers to Rosenberg concerning Himmler’s competences.
59. Meeting between Knoblauch and Jüttner on 2 July 1941 (BAM, Film WF800, copies
from the Military Archive in Prague).
510
Notes to pages 218–221
60. KTB Commando Staff RFSS, 27 July 1941, published in Unsere Ehre.
61. Ibid. (9 July 1941 and 17 July 1941).
62. Ibid. (10 July 1941).
63. Witte et al., eds, Dienstkalender, 183.
64. KTB Commando Staff RFSS. The Cavalry Brigade was formed on 2 Aug. 1941.
65. Witte et al., eds, Dienstkalender, 21 July 1941, p. 186.
66. On May see Cüppers, Wegbereiter, 68.
67. BAM, Film M 806 (copies in the Military Archive in Prague), Activity Report for 20–7
July 1941 dated 28 July 1941.
68. In contrast to the two other Command Staff Brigades, the 2nd SS Brigade was not
deployed for the murder of Jews in summer and autumn 1941. Whilst it was subordin-
ated to the Higher SS and Police Commander Russia North, Hans Prützmann, in
September 1941, it was evidently used most frequently for military purposes. Prütz-
mann did not need a large SS formation in his area, since for the mass murder of Jews
in the Reich Commissariat Ostland he had local militias at his disposition (see KTB
Command Staff for September and October, published in Unsere Ehre).
13.
Enforcing the Annihilation Policy: Extending the Shootings to the
Whole Jewish Population
1. The most detailed account is in Cüppers, Wegbereiter, 151 ff.; see also Büchler,
‘Kommandostab’ and Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 555 ff.
2. KTB Commando Staff RFSS, 28 July 1941, published in Unsere Ehre, 220 ff.
3. BAM, RS 3–8/36; on the meeting with Himmler see also BAB, R 20/45b, Bach-Zelews-
ki’s diary, 31 July 1941.
4. BAM, RS 4/441, Divisional Order no. 28.
5. Cüppers, Wegbereiter, 142 ff., shows at several points mass shootings of women and
children by the 1st Cavalry Regiment from the first half of August, which are not
mentioned in the regimental reports. By the beginning of September the 1st Regiment
was avoiding all mention of the murder of women and children in its reports, although
this is contained in the reports of the Regiment’s individual squadrons (ibid. 194).
6. BAM, RS 4/441; Cüppers, Wegbereiter, 151.
7. Ibid.
8. The District Court in Braunschweig notes 4,500 victims in its verdict (¼ Sagel-Grande, Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, xx, no. 570, 20 Apr. 1964), which is based on EM 58. Higher
(and probably more realistic) figures are to be found in Cüppers, Wegbereiter, 155 ff.
The mass murder was described as a ‘reprisal’ for two alleged assaults on members of
the town militia (EM 58).
9. 2nd Cavalry Regiment, Mounted Unit, report of 12 Aug. 1941, USHM, RG-48.004, Reel
2, Box 24 (copies in the Military Archive in Prague), published in Unsere Ehre, 227 ff.
10. USHM, RG-48.004, Reel 2, Box 24.
11. Cüppers, Wegbereiter, 203.
12. Ibid. 194 ff.
13. According to Gerlach’s account of the events of August 1941 (Kalkulierte Morde, 566 ff.).
Notes to pages 221–222
511
14. Judgement of the Berlin District Court of 22 June 1962 (¼ Sagel-Grande, Justiz und NSVerbrechen, xviii, no. 540); ZSt, II 202 AR 72a/60, judgement of the Berlin District
Court of 6 May 1966. On EK 9, see Ogorreck, Einsatzgruppen, 186 ff.
15. EM 50.
16. 202 AR-Z 73/61, vol. 6, pp. 1580 ff., 22 Feb. 1966; see also the interrogation of Filbert of 23
Sept. 1971 (ZSt, 201 AR-Z 76/59, vol. 11, pp. 7563 ff.).
17. ZSt, II 202 AR 72a/60, Judgement of the Berlin District Court of 6 May 1966; judgement of the Berlin District Court of 22 June 1962 (¼ Sagel-Grande, Justiz und NS-Verbrechen,
Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews Page 92
