1938: Hitler's Gamble

by MacDonogh, Giles

  Weizsäcker clearly thought the audience a terrible idea, while Chamberlain for his part seemed to be reluctant to see the gravity of the situation. The impression given is of two ships passing in the night: the British had never had any serious intention of fighting for Czechoslovakia. This message either failed to get through or was not seriously entertained by the Germans in the Opposition who were so bent on ridding their country of Hitler. Beck was out of the picture, but continuity was to some extent assured by the new Chief of Staff, Halder, who agreed to depose Hitler on 2 September.

  Hitler was in his mountain eyrie dreaming of Prague. At an emergency meeting of the British Cabinet on 30 August, it had been decided to make Beneš accept Henlein’s Karlsbad Programme and accord virtual autonomy to the Germans. Responding to British pressure, Beneš tried making concessions: he was prepared to take in four Sudeten German ministers, declare three German autonomous districts, and make sure that a third of all civil servants were ethnic Germans from now on. His more reasoned tone received British backing but Hitler instructed Henlein to stay firm and make no concessions.3

  On the 3rd Keitel and Brauchitsch arrived at the Berghof to run over the plans for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The army was to be ready at the border on 28 September. Two days later, Beneš tried to spike Hitler’s strategy by asking Henlein up to the Hradschin on the 5th and requesting that he write down his demands in full so that he might grant them – something he promptly did on the 7th, thereby removing the casus belli. All Henlein could do was point to the ill treatment of some ethnic Germans in Moravia and seek fresh instructions from Germany. Meanwhile his second-in-command, Karl Frank, was instructed to increase the number of such incidents.

  It was said that the Czechs were prepared to give Henlein a ministry to shut him up. The ministry he wanted was the interior. The story gave rise to inevitable witticisms.i The premier, Hodza, had suggested that Henlein receive the portfolio for the colonies. At this Henlein countered, ‘How come? That’s impossible – Czechoslovakia has no colonies. ‘What of it?’ replied Hodza. ‘Has not Italy a Minister of Finance and Germany a Minister of Justice?’4

  NUREMBERG

  On the evening of the 4th, the chief warmongers, Hitler, Goebbels and Ribbentrop, flew to Nuremberg. Goebbels was looking forward to a week of mounting pressure on the Czechs. He had also succeeded in bullying Furtwängler into conducting Die Meistersinger the next evening. That same day France called up its reserves and the Hungarians quietly introduced conscription. The Rally opened on the 6th with Hess delivering what Goebbels called ‘a good sermon’. The Tribune of Honour at the opening ceremony exhibited evidence that Hitler continued to exert a powerful erotic pull on the women of the world. At one end was Stephanie zu Hohenlohe and at the other Lord and Lady Redesdale, the parents of Unity Mitford. Princess Stephanie was wearing her gold Party badge. The rally kicked off with the Cultural Conference and Hitler made a portentous speech about art, as was his wont. It contained an unusually tolerant line about freemasons: Hitler said that ‘only a man lacking in national respect’ would allow them to get in the way of his enjoying Mozart’s Magic Flute.5

  The Brownshirts were treated to a performance of Bruckner’s Seventh from the Berlin Philharmonic conducted by specialist Hans Weisbach. Once the cultural overture was out of the way, the Nazi leaders descended into their habitual rabble-rousing tirades and malicious squabbles. Rosenberg launched an attack on the Pope’s pretensions to power. He would have had support from Goebbels, for a new Kulturkampf against the Church was never far from the Gauleiter’s mind. Goebbels was pleased that he had succeeded in winding up the exemption from military service previously enjoyed by theological students. Now they had to serve in the front line as stretcher-bearers. Goebbels was seething because he had seen a ‘frightful’ telegram the Kaiser had sent the Abbot of Maria Laach. ‘This simple-minded, cowardly former monarch finds it supremely necessary to open his gob again.’6

  Backbiting was not confined to the leaders. Unity took the trouble to warn Hitler that his friend Stephanie was 100 per cent Jewish. She was also advising Hitler that Britain would not fight, thereby supporting Ribbentrop. The brief reconciliation between Hitler’s two biggest hawks had ended. Goebbels now thought the Foreign Minister a ‘vain, stupid primadonna’.7 As usual, Hitler appeared to take no notice of the discord among his underlings. He was planning a positive cacophony of sabre-rattling for the last day, 12 September. The British ambassador, Henderson, was there, eating the local Bratwürste and disparaging the Czechs to his SS minder. Officially, he was meant to push the idea of holding a plebiscite in the disputed areas, which would hand the initiative to the Czechs. An article in The Times had advocated the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. The leading Nazis believed this had been placed by the Cabinet. Henderson thought Hitler had been led astray by evil people in his entourage, and if the British were to say what a good boy he was, he would behave better. His view was not shared by Halifax, who was now of the opinion that Hitler was mad.

  But Hitler was impervious to any form of pressure to desist, be it from his diplomats (Neurathii thought no good would come of it), his own intelligence service, which brought him news of the Duce’s unhappiness, or the army. Goebbels’ admiration for his master knew no bounds: ‘He faces danger with the surefootedness of a sleepwalker.’ ‘The Führer says and does what he knows to be right, and never lets himself be intimidated.’ ‘Now the most important things are nerves.’8 Goebbels was utterly convinced that the Western powers would stay out of any conflict. Despite his outward resolve, Hitler was less certain.

  The 7th was cold and wet. Goebbels noted, ‘Things are ripening more and more into a crisis.’ The British, Dutch and Belgian armies called up their reserves. The British offer was now insufficient: ‘We have to have Prague.’ He gloated, pleased to hear about a couple of German deaths in Mährisch Östrau. Now there could be a deafening chorus of outrage.9 There was a reception that evening for the diplomatic corps in Nuremberg, and the doyen, the outgoing French ambassador, François-Poncet – whom Spitzy called an ‘all-licensed fool’10 – made a speech in which he said, ‘The best of laurels are those gathered without reducing any mother to tears.’ All eyes turned to Hitler.11 In Berlin there was frenzied activity in resistance circles, where the plan was to seize Hitler and put him on trial before the People’s Court or lock him up in a lunatic asylum. On 9 September, following the usual son et lumière,12 Hitler held an all-night conference in Nuremberg attended by Halder, Brauchitsch and Keitel. He was contemptuous of the army’s plans and demanded there be an uprising in the Sudetenland.

  On the 9th, refreshed from his shooting, Chamberlain met his Inner Cabinet. He rejected Halifax’s proposal of sending a final warning to Germany, and revealed his desire to go to Hitler. He nonetheless set about mobilizing the fleet. He also issued a warning to Hitler on the 10th that France would be duty bound to honour its obligations to the Czechs, and that Great Britain could not stand aside from any general conflict, but Henderson had qualms about delivering this ultimatum and it remained in his baggage. He had difficulty meeting Hitler anyway and had been frightened that any tough talk – or even a toughly worded note – might upset the German leader. He didn’t even attempt to speak to Ribbentrop, thereby causing exasperation in some quarters.13 The message the Germans received was that Britain would agree to the cession of the German areas but would not permit a strike against Prague. ‘That would be disappointing, as it is only the half-measure,’ wrote Goebbels, who showed that he was well aware of Chamberlain’s message despite Henderson’s refusal to deliver it.14 Canaris was also concerned about Hitler. He told Groscurth, ‘He is already on to the next step; thinking about Romania, Ukraine etc.’15

  On the 12th Henderson signed as many as 150 autographs in the Rally’s diplomatic stand, now fragrant from the presence of so many Austrian girls in dirndls. Goebbels noticed them too: ‘I greet a hundred delicious Austrian girls, who can hardly contain their excitement.’16
Goebbels adorned the cards with his signature, and Henderson was happy to hand them out to Sudeten Germans too.17

  Hitler’s final speech had an ‘indescribable’ effect on its audience.18 Göring too delivered a particularly stirring piece of invective, then took to his bed, leaving Hitler in the company of Ribbentrop, who wanted war and as soon as possible. When four of his most senior ambassadors clubbed together to tell him this was a mistake, he banished them from Nuremberg and sent them on leave for the rest of the month. The effect of the Rally was immediate: Hitler and Göring’s oratory inspired civil disobedience in the ethnic Bohemian German towns of Eger and Karlsbad. Czech and Jewish property was attacked. The Czechs responded by firing on the crowds and declaring martial law.

  In Prague the people went to work carrying gas masks. Henlein fled to Bavaria to organize a Freikorps to fight in his native land. The Czechs seemed to be in control of the situation. It was at that moment that French resolve collapsed: their Cabinet vote was badly split with six calling for war and four against. Their leader, Daladier, asked Chamberlain to see Hitler and try to make the best deal he could that would forestall the need for France to honour its obligations to the Little Entente. Hitler’s liaison with the Wilhelmstrasse, Walther Hewel, said that Chamberlain himself had been alarmed by the tone of Hitler’s speech at the Rally.19

  In reality the ground for Chamberlain’s mission had been prepared by Göring and Henderson on 8 September. The Luftwaffe chief had invited Henderson up to his home at nearby Veldenstein, where the suggestion was aired that the Sudeten question be settled by direct talks. Göring dropped hints about a hunting party at Rominteniii at the end of the month, and said he hoped that the Czechs were not going to disrupt it, meaning that peace could be maintained. He even promised Halifax the four best stags in Germany if Britain were to disclaim any interest in Czechoslovakia. Henderson filed a report and had it taken to London on a private plane. On 13 September Chamberlain proposed flying to Germany for a meeting.

  As there was no doubt about Hitler’s invasion plans, Halder conveyed the message to General Witzleben on the 13th. The Opposition had to act fast. While the two men were talking, news came in that Henderson had told Ribbentrop of Chamberlain’s intention to visit Hitler at the Berghof. The note was passed to Schmidt to translate:

  Having regard to the increasingly critical situation, I propose to visit you immediately in order to make an attempt to find a peaceful solution. I could come to you by air and am ready to leave tomorrow. Please inform me of the earliest time you can receive me, and tell me the place of the meeting. I should be grateful for a very early reply. Neville Chamberlain.

  The carpet had been pulled out from under the feet of the plotters. They could not proceed while Hitler was talking peace. It also showed that Ribbentrop had been right all along: the British and the French would not fight. The interpreter Schmidt set off for Munich. He was fully aware of the plot. Weizsäcker’s final piece of advice was: ‘Keep your mind quite clear . . . Tomorrow at Berchtesgaden it will be a matter of war and peace.’20

  BERCHTESGADEN

  On the 15th ‘peace-envoy Chamberlain’ (as the Germans called him), together with Sir Horace Wilson and Sir William Strang, flew to Munich, where he was met by Ribbentrop and Schmidt. They travelled to Berchtesgaden on Hitler’s train. It took the British Prime Minister seven hours to reach him. Not only had he taken his first aeroplane, there had been turbulence. Dressed in Nazi uniform, Hitler received him on the steps of his home. In reply to Hitler’s ‘German Greeting’ Chamberlain waved his hat. He had the inevitable umbrella hanging from his left arm.21 After tea the two men went to Hitler’s study, accompanied only by the interpreter Schmidt. By divesting themselves of advisors, they were able to rid themselves of Ribbentrop.

  The Poles had thrown a potential spanner in the works, which may have rendered Hitler keener to negotiate. The Sejm had been dissolved and new elections in November threatened to bring in Germany’s enemies. The German-Polish cooperation that had been Jozef Beck’s policy was hanging in the balance: the Poles were expected to lend a hand in carving up Czechoslovakia by snatching the Teschen pocket in Czech Silesia.22 Many Poles thought Beck’s policy brought Poland too close to Germany and they feared finding the country on the same side as Germany in a war.23 Leading Nazis also believed the British were being cunning by offloading increasing amounts of guilt on to Germany should war break out.

  The Berghof discussions lasted three hours. Outside the rain pelted down and the wind howled. Chamberlain wanted to know if Hitler would be satisfied by the cession of the Sudeten areas. Hitler mentioned the Hungarians and Poles but he was not interested in the rest. He exclaimed that he was ready to risk world war to settle the matter. Chamberlain rejoindered, ‘If that is so, why did you let me come to Berchtesgaden? Under the circumstances it is best for me to return at once. Anything else now seems pointless.’24 At this Hitler conceded that if Chamberlain were to accept the principle of self-determination then there could be room for talk, and promised not to attack the Czechs before they met again – unless, that is, the Czechs did something particularly atrocious. Chamberlain told Hitler he needed to consult his colleagues. He spent the night in the Grand Hotel Berchtesgadenerhof before travelling back to London with the news. He took with him the impression that Hitler was a man who would stick to his word – not that he had that word: he had not brought an interpreter, and left without a copy of the minutes, because Ribbentrop had churlishly denied him one, an act of ‘private revenge’.25

  After the Berchtesgaden talks Schmidt was able to keep Erich Kordt informed of the conversations between the two men. Kordt took the record to Oster to show that Hitler had not abandoned his war plans. He wanted the terms imposed on the Czechs to be so humiliating that they would refuse to accept; then he could strike. The Opposition was now fired up again and waiting for Hitler’s return to Berlin. At dinner on the 15th, Eva Braun’s friends mocked the old-fashioned Englishman who had seemed so wedded to his umbrella. Hitler was gratified that ‘the old man took an aeroplane for the first time in his life in order to come and see me’.26 Hitler had made a half-hearted offer to go to London, but had expressed the fear that he would be heckled by Jews.27 Chamberlain had to some extent got the measure of Hitler too: he told the Cabinet that he was ‘the commonest little dog he had ever seen’.28

  Chamberlain’s visit had been a small success. His great achievement, if it might be expressed that way, was to get Beneš to agree to detach the Sudeten areas from Czechoslovakia and hand them over to Germany. This obliged Hitler to drop his plans to swallow up the rest of Bohemia and Moravia – for the time being. The Czechs vented their frustration in what they believed to be privacy. Masaryk got wind of the talks on the 14th and referred to Chamberlain’s right-hand man Sir Horace Wilson as ‘the Sow’.29 Goebbels consoled himself that even if their spoils were limited to the Sudeten areas, they would still have put themselves in a better position strategically to take Prague the next time round.30

  Hitler summoned Goebbels and a small staff to the Berghof. He was going to need his propaganda machine.iv Alarmed both by Czech violence towards ethnic Germans and German scaremongering, streams of refugees were seeking refuge in Silesia. Goebbels had foreign journalists sent into their camps to witness their despair. Ward Price was brought up to Berchtesgaden to interview Hitler. They were very happy with the results. In the meantime Hitler and his little pressman distracted themselves by watching popular films and reading the minutes of Beneš’ conversations with Jan Masaryk in London. They would have been amused to hear the British envoy Runciman dismissed as ‘the Lord who wrote the mad book’, and Goebbels in particular would have liked the references to the ‘fat Field Marshal’ – Göring.31

  Beneš, they concluded, was the problem: he was ‘dangerous, mendacious, sly and scheming’.32 They were not wide of the mark: Beneš and his ministers were trying to find friends who would baulk at negotiations and press for war. The former Foreign Secretary
Eden was one of these.33 The Germans were later able to show the British that the Czechs were conniving at the overthrow of the Cabinet. On 19 September they had a meeting with the Labour Party leader Attlee. Churchill had been sounded out and had apparently expressed his hope that they ‘would not put up with it’. On the afternoon of the 22nd there was an optimistic report that Chamberlain’s Cabinet was on the point of resigning. The Czechs also hoped for a change of government in France and referred to the foreign minister Bonnet as ‘the Swine’.34 When the Poles offered to find a solution to the Danzig problem, Hitler was triumphant: in ten years he would reverse not only the punitive clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, but also those of the Treaty of Münster that closed the Thirty Years War.35

  Cadogan was detailed to tell Beneš to cede the Sudetenland on the 18th. The Soviet Union was exerting pressure by massing troops at its border (it had no common border with Czechoslovakia) but Hitler was still undeterred and continued his military preparations. The state the Allies created at Versailles was falling apart. Encouraged by Henlein, the Slovak People’s Party demanded autonomy for their half of the country. This was granted after the débâcle at Munich. On the 19th London and Paris agreed to waive the plebiscite, but at the same time refused to grant concessions to Poland and Hungary. Hitler was furious with Horthy for dragging his heels. The Polish ambassador, Józef Lipski, was conjured up and told to make a gesture. Goebbels thought they had it in the bag, and the Führer ‘a genius’.36 Urged on by Göring, the Poles and Hungarians began to rally on 21 September. The Poles demanded a plebiscite in Teschen, and on the 22nd the Hungarians finally made a similar appeal for the Magyar areas of Slovakia.