The Book of Memory
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so for the rest. And Tullius talks about ‘‘backgrounds’’ in such a way.
The image however serves the memory as a likeness appropriate to a
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sentiment remembered through its separate parts, as afterwards will
appear in the examples which Tullius gives.
7. In response to the problem concerning time, it appears of easy solution
for, since all things remembered are past in time, time does not serve to
classify things-worth-remembering and thus does not lead one more to
one thing than to another. But a formal background mainly classifies
through this feature, that not everything remembered is in one place,
and it affects memory by this means, that it is formally composed
[solemnis] and spare [rarus]. Indeed the mind more firmly latches onto
things formally composed and sparely constructed, and likewise such
things more strongly are imprinted in it and more strongly affect it.
8. Replying to the next, that a ‘‘small-scale’’ or ‘‘curtailed’’ space is so
called by Tullius not literally nor certainly meaning smaller than the
image of the things stored, but meaning more that the mind should
not be spread excessively by traversing through imaginary spacious-
ness, like a field or a city; but the ‘‘place’’ is ‘‘small-scale’’ when the soul
at once flies swiftly around its corners seizing the images hidden away
in them. And through this appears the solution to the following
objection because ‘‘small-scale’’ and ‘‘complete’’ are not contradictory,
but being ‘‘small-scale’’ more ably restricts the straying of the mind,
and ‘‘completeness’’ facilitates the whole matter being remembered.
9. I reply to the next by saying that because a conspicuous background
more affects the soul, and although not every memorable thing is formed
in a conspicuous place, nonetheless each thing-worth-remembering has
to be put away in a likeness having a conspicuous background; so indeed
this background-place is mentally grasped, as was said.
10. To that which was objected next, I say that Tullius by means of his
examples does define the difference between natural backgrounds and
those which are artificial. A cloister garden is a ‘‘natural’’ place, a house
or intercolumnar space, on the other hand, is ‘‘artificial.’’
11. To the previous query concerning the rules for places which Tullius
taught, I say that there are five, as he says, which especially create the
best condition for remembering, and all are construed to prevent
confusion in remembering. But confusion is engendered in respect
either to the background-place or to the matters located in it or that
which by its action makes visible the background and what is in it. And
if confusion arises in respect to the matters in the location, then it will
be the sort covered by the first rule, because a background, which one
frequently makes use of while on one’s mental tour [obambulatio],
heaps up a great many images, and so these images break up in the
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soul and do not remain, just as a great number of waves break up in
water. If however confusion exists with regard to the background-place
only, this is of three kinds, insofar as what affects its relative position.
There is certainly the task of distinguishing one location from another,
and on this principle the second rule is interpreted. Then, there is its
comparableness and proximity to the matter to be remembered, and in
this way the third precept is understood. There is next the extent
[spatium] of the material, in terms of which the closeness or remoteness
of one position from another is determined, and as far as this the fourth
rule is interpreted. 8 If however the confusion results from the quality
which on both sides makes us able to see what’s going on, then it is a
matter of obscurity or brightness, for something glaring certainly
confounds sight and so it escapes from the mind and is not strongly
imprinted; something obscure however does not sufficiently present
things to view, and so again not much is imprinted by the one imagin-
ing. And thus it is clear through analysis in what ways these rules are
interpreted.
12. To the next objection the solution appears through what was said earlier,
because although reminiscence is situated within the rational soul, none-
theless it subjects itself to memory, and thus they bring together in the
backgrounds the things-we-make-images-for [imaginabilia].
13. Replying to the next, the reactions [intentiones] which memory stores
do not exist absolutely apart from the images of particulars, as is
demonstrated in the same part of that treatise [De homine, Q. 40, a. 1].
And so these reactions are taken in at the same time along with the
images, and therefore there is no need to have special rules for them.
14. Replying to the next, that imagination understood as the calculus of
things-imaged, according to what the Philosopher says, by definition is
slave to memory, because it is called ‘‘imagination’’ from its imitating
an object, in that in shaping an object it causes us to have imitated that
object, and that is, when by means of this imagining-action we arrive at
what we earlier had taken in. The image-making-action however,
which more properly is called vis formalis, contains the likeness accord-
ing to what is received from the object into ourselves, and so more
characteristically holds it insofar as it is a shape rather than a mental
image. Because of this it is called formalis by the philosophers.9
15. I respond to the next problem, that Tullius did not teach imperfectly; it
is necessary that he who learns about ‘‘place’’ should understand it
under these different headings. But Tullius wished to say that various
people will place for themselves different backgrounds, those indeed
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which move them more. For some will place a church, from having
turned their minds to churches, others an intercolumnar space, others a
cloister garth, others a hospice, because they are affected by these;
nonetheless it is necessary that anyone learn his background-place
according to these five categories, because otherwise they will not
engender memory but the confusion of mind which leads to
forgetfulness.
16. Replying finally to the question concerning images for things and for
words, that in truth these images convey much to the memory and are
as much for the purpose of making the thing intelligible, as they are for
producing copies.
To that however which is tossed up in opposition, I reply that there
are many literal matters but by transference a few are used to speak
about many matters, and so although literal words make for more
accuracy about the thing itself nevertheless the metaphors move the
mind more and thus convey more to the memory.
17. Replying to the the next, that what is marvelous [mirabile] is more
moving than what is ordinary, and so when images of this metaphorical
sor
t are made up out of marvels [ex miris] they affect memory more
than commonplace literal matters. So indeed early philosophers trans-
lated their ideas in poetry, as the Philosopher says [Metaphysics, I.2,
982b, 15–20; cf. I .3, 983b, 28–32, and Aristotle’s quotation of Hesiod at
I .4, describing him as an early philosopher], because a fable, since it is
composed out of marvels is more affecting. From this it appears that
‘‘from wondering [ex admirari] about befores and afters then and now is
the beginning of philosophical thinking’ [Metaphysics, I.1, 982b, 11–12],
because what is wonderful [mirum] by its vigorous motion causes ques-
tioning, and thence gives rise to investigation and recollection.
18. Replying to a further question concerning the rules for images of things
and of words, that metaphors define many things in one, in that there
are many likenesses within the one metaphor, and thus they are like
letters, but it is true that the literal things themselves are many and
confusing.
19. Replying to the next, that what Tullius means by ‘‘appropriate images’’
are ones which define by express and notable likenesses and not ones
which are particular for each of one’s memory-matters separately.
20. Replying to the next that in his examples Tullius touches on those
which strongly move us and not those which are appropriate; those
which strongly move us adhere in our mind for a longer time and more
quickly occur to us.
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21. Replying to the next that Tullius teaches that for study we require that
every particular [proprium] bit of information adhere in our mind and
indeed that each particular be attached to it by a metaphor, but even so
such a way of studying will not sufficiently cause us to recollect, in that
particulars of our education are excessively numerous and one effaces
another. And therefore the art of remembering is executed by means of
a few rules for backgrounds and images. Through this appears indeed
the solution to the whole objection, and that which Tullius presents
contrary to it clearly is to be conceded.
Appendix C
T H O M A S B R A D W A R D I N E : ‘‘O N A C QU I R I N G A
T R A I N E D M E M O R Y ’’ 1
For a trained memory, two things are necessary, that is, stable locations and
also images for the material. The locations are like tablets on which we write,
the images like the letters written on them. Moreover, the locations are
permanent and fixed, whereas the images are at one moment inked on like
letters and at another erased. The background places must be made before the
images, and so they should be treated first. With regard to these background
places, six matters should be distinguished, that is, size, shape, nature,
number, order, and intervening distance. Each place should be moderate in
size, that is, as great as one’s visual power can comprehend in a single look,
such as a little garden or the space of a small room. Indeed memory is most
powerfully affected by sensory impression, and especially by vision; therefore
something appears to your memory just as it ordinarily appears to your vision.
The shape of a background should be like that of a rectangle. Concerning
its nature, four things should be kept in mind: to wit, that the places should
not be made so dark that they cannot be recovered easily or quickly from
memory, nor made overly bright, for then they will interfere with the
perception of the inscribed images. Secondly, your backgrounds should not
be made in a crowded place, such as a church, the market, and so forth,
because the images of the things crowding such places, which would occur in
a crowd in your memory, may block other images of things that you intend to
place there. So images should be put into regions deserted by men and empty.
Thirdly, you need to know that it is very useful if your places are real rather
than only imagined or made up, for real places one can frequently inspect,
and thus through repetition mentally confirm and secure their appearance.
But one can work with places of one’s own imagining, if one chooses.
Fourthly, it is useful that contrasting backgrounds be formed (a principle
that can also be demonstrated in connection with the number of the
backgrounds). And so the first place might be like land unused and
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empty; the second like a green garden; the third like land having hay strewn
[over it] or produce as at harvest time; the fourth as having stubble after the
harvest has been gathered; the fifth like black ground after the stubble has
been completely burned. Then make for yourself another five places higher
up, if you want, such as a large, high couch; then a cupboard; then a table;
then a tomb; then an altar. Then if you want to climb higher through
another five places, first place the roof of a house made of wood, second of
thatch, third of stone, fourth of red tile, and fifth of lead. Then if perhaps
you want another five, the floors of the upper-storey, the first as though of
earth, the second as though paved in green stone, the third paved with tile,
the fourth spread with grasses or straw, and the fifth furnished with carpets
or cloths. These four sets of five suffice for the placement of all the things to
be remembered – or perhaps ten of them or somewhat fewer, unless a man
should want to work unheard of wonders.
It is particularly essential that your places have a continuous and
straightforward order, so that your memory may find with dispatch all
the inscribed images in their places easily, in forward order or backwards.
As for the interval of the backgrounds, two things should be decided, that
is, its size and its nature. Let it be a moderate amount, which differentiates
the places suitably; its nature, however, should be vacant, an empty void.
On the part of the person remembering, to the extent that he fully surveys
his locations, three things are usefully attended to, that is, a distinct and
secure holding in memory of these places, which is achieved by frequently
inspecting them, or at least thinking about them. Secondly, one should know
at once, without having to calculate it, whatever number any of the places
may have (in the whole order). Thirdly, when one must use one of the
locations for a memory task, one should imagine oneself positioned at an
optimal distance from it, and from there one should view that single place.
These precepts should suffice us in regard to the places; now let us go on
to the images, about which there are four considerations: size, nature,
order, and number. Their size should be moderate, as was said above
regarding the backgrounds. But their nature should be wondrous and
intense, because such things are impressed in memory more deeply and
are better retained. However such things are for the most part not moderate
but extreme, as something greatly beautiful or ugly, joyous or sad, worthy
of respect or derision, a thing of great dignity or vileness, or maybe a person
who has been injured with an enormous op
en wound flowing with a
remarkable river of blood, or in some other way made ugly, having strange
clothing and every bizarre embellishment, the color also very brilliant and
intense, such as vivid, fiery red, and the whole color strongly altering its
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appearance. The whole image also should have some other quality such as
movement, that thus it may be commended to memory more effectively
than through tranquility or repose.
The ordering of images should be done in this way. First, for a subject
matter that you want to remember, fashion for yourself an image of the size
and nature just described, which you should place in the front of the first
location. And if you can, make for the image you have fashioned a right
hand and a left hand; and place the second image to the right of the first, so
that with its right hand the image of the first matter holds, drags, or strikes
the second image, or does something of this nature to it, or, oppositely, the
second behaves in such a way to the first, so that their activity will be, as it
were, a fastening together of their order in the series. And this method
should be observed among all the images added in their turn in the same
location. So, if you can, position the third as though riding around the
second or doing something else around it, and to the third join the fourth,
if you can; and on the left-hand side of the image attach the fifth, and to the
fifth the sixth, if you can.
But if you do not want to gather so many images into one background,
place the first image as I have indicated, the second to the right, and the
third to the left, and then crossing over into the second background, in it
and in any following ones you will place as many images as you like. But
you should pay careful attention that the torso of an image comes before
any of its other parts in the series of things to be remembered. And a hand
or foot and its attachments that is closer to the front of the place comes
before a more distant part and its attachments.
As to the number of images, you should note that in one place three
images can be placed suitably, or five or seven, but not many more, lest a
superfluous multitude of them should blur their distinctiveness. With