Churchill's Folly

by Rogers, Anthony; Jellicoe, Lord;

  Now, with all of our weapons silent, and under constant enemy fire, I give the order: ‘Open sea-cocks. Everybody abandon ship.’

  After reassuring with the I.W.O. [Erster Wachoffizier – First Officer of the Watch] that the order has been carried out properly, I intend to leave the ship as well. However, I then notice that the men in the water are being shot at with tracer rounds from close range and I remain on board until [the] ammunition is hit by further firing and explodes.

  As the sea-cocks seem to be covered by heavy [marine] growth on the ship’s hull and let water in only with difficulty, the ship remains floating in the water for about another 2 hours burning and exploding.7

  During the engagement, the cruisers had been subjected to air attack by Ju 88s and shot at by a shore battery on Astipalaea, albeit without effect. At 8.10 a.m. the unit turned south-east and departed at speed, still firing at those struggling in the water. One badly damaged landing craft – F 496 – was able to reach Astipalaea. On board were at least eighty personnel, three trucks and two 7.5cm guns all of which were captured by Italian troops and the resident LRDG M2 Patrol under Captain Ken Lazarus.8

  After withdrawing, the British warships were harassed by Ju 88s and Bf 109s, until the appearance of eight Lightnings. These jettisoned their long-range fuel tanks and swept in for the kill. At least one of the attackers was shot down before the American fighters had to return to base to refuel. Following an ineffectual attack by three Ju 88s at 11.30 a.m., a dozen Ju 87 Stukas commenced a dive-bombing and machine-gun attack at 12.13 p.m. By this time, the force had rendezvoused with the destroyers HMS Rockwood and the Greek Miaoulis. Sirius and Rockwood were narrowly missed. A bomb that passed straight through the port side of Penelope failed to explode, but nevertheless caused the deaths of one officer and nine ratings and injured twenty-eight others.9 One enemy aircraft was reported to have crashed.10 For most of the afternoon until early evening, air cover was provided mainly by Beaufighters – one of which was shot down by a Messerschmitt Bf 109.11 The force remained together until clear of the Crete–Rhodes area, when Miaoulis and Rockwood were detached to Limassol leaving the remaining ships to continue to Alexandria.

  On 7 October, Vizeadmiral Werner Lange and Generalleutnant Müller were ordered by Heeresgruppe E to carry out Operation Leopard by the 9th, irrespective of the destruction of the Olympos convoy. Müller requested a twenty-four hour postponement due to the unavailability of sufficient landing craft. Sightings of British warships and unsuitable weather conditions caused further delays, which were to continue for the next four weeks.

  Following her successful action on the 7th, Unruly went on to torpedo and sink a minelayer south of Amorgos on 8 October: the Bulgaria, with a crew of eighty-one, was bound for Kos with 285 men, this time of X./Festungsinfanteriebataillon.12

  A day later, the cruiser Carlisle withdrew south with HM ships Panther, Petard, Rockwood and Miaoulis. At 7.50 a.m. on Saturday, 9 October, two low-flying Arados were sighted, evidently shadowing the warships. One aircraft was claimed damaged and the other driven off by a patrolling Beaufighter, following which the convoy continued unescorted until the arrival forty minutes later of a number of Lightnings. Thereafter, air cover was provided for the rest of the morning, with each formation remaining until after the arrival of their relief flight. Beaufighters continued to provide additional protection. There was an untoward incident when three Lightnings mistakenly engaged three aircraft of 252 Squadron. One Beaufighter, hit in both engines and the hydraulic system, crash-landed on returning to Lakatamia, in Cyprus. Fortunately, the crew escaped injury.

  Towards midday several minutes elapsed during which there was no air cover. As fate would have it, Ju 87s of I./Sturzkampfgeschwader 3 (I./St.G.3) arrived overhead at this opportune time.13 One Stuka after another dived on to their chosen targets. They were met with a tremendous barrage by the ships’ guns, but at 12.02 p.m. bombs struck HMS Carlisle aft, dealing a crippling blow. HMS Panther also received a direct hit. The Fleet class destroyer broke in two and sank soon afterwards. Chief Petty Officer L.F.S. (Frank) Forster, electrical artificer on Panther, recalled the ship’s final moments:

  There was a series of heavy explosions which might have been caused by either our guns or enemy bombs and then silence – the ship shuddered but was apparently undamaged, we were still steaming and all the electrical power supplies were unaffected. I climbed the ladder to the upper deck to find out what had happened and was told that the cruiser “CARLISLE” had been hit and was moving with difficulty. Our Captain decided to offer a tow and the First Lieutenant was busily engaged in preparing a line. His seamen had very little time to complete the task, because the guns suddenly opened up again and now we were the target for the enemy planes. I ran to my action station and as I looked at the switchboards, there was a very heavy explosion and the ship lurched. This wasn’t gunfire and a few seconds later all power failed, the lights went out and the ship began to flood up. The ship had been damaged in a previous action by enemy bombs and we had brought her back to port but this was much worse and my torpedoman and I decided to make our way to the upper deck. We splashed through the water to the first ladder and climbed it by the light of an emergency lamp, I had almost reached the top of the ladder when the ship lurched again and I grabbed the ankle of the man above instead of the hatch coaming. The man screamed in terror from fear of being dragged back into the flooding compartment and as I regained my foothold I released his ankle.

  I made my way along the port passage to the break of the fo’c’sle and joined a group of men who were afraid to abandon the ship because of the gaping hole which yawned in front of them. I gave a push to those in front and was about to follow when a heavy inrush of water caught me unaware and carried me back into the darkness of the ship …

  Now I had to decide very quickly whether I should allow the force of the water to carry me into the darkness of the forward compartments and hope to make my way out by opening a hatch or try to fight the rush of sea water and reach the upper deck again. I decided to fight and hung on grimly to the rifle racks – I remember thinking how sad this would be for my wife whom I had married six months previously if I didn’t escape. My half-prayer was answered immediately, the inrush of water subsided for a few moments and the terrifying noise abated as the lower compartments filled up. There was about a foot to spare between the water level and the deck head. I lay on my back on the surface of the water and slowly hauled myself out hand over hand on the cable carrier plate. The way out from the passage was by now completely submerged and I was compelled to try the cross passage to the starboard side. I reached the exit to the upper deck and saw that the ship had broken in two with the stern rising high in the air. The sea was warm and calm and the bright sunshine welcomed me back to safety. I could hear the cries of someone down below but did not have the stomach to go back for anyone and I was the last man out.14

  The I./St.G.3 aircraft departed, narrowly avoiding contact with Lightnings of 37th Fighter Squadron. Major William Leverette was the squadron commander:

  On October 9, 1943, our Squadron took off at 1030 with nine planes to cover a Convoy of one Cruiser and four Destroyers. Two planes were forced to return to base because of engine trouble shortly after take off, leaving seven planes – a four ship Flight led by the undersigned [Leverette] and a three-ship Flight led by Lt. Blue. We sighted the convoy at 1200 hours, approximately fifteen miles East of Cape Valoca on Island of Scarpanto [Karpathos]. The convoy had been attacked and the Cruiser was smoking from the stern. During our first orbit around the Convoy, while flying a Southwesterly course at 8,000’, Lt. Sprinkle called out “bogeys at one o’clock, slightly high, approaching the convoy from the Northwest.” We immediately changed course to pass behind the bogeys and began a gradual climb. Shortly thereafter, we identified the bogeys as JU-87’s, in three flights, totalling approximately twenty-five.15

  II./St.G.3, arriving at the worst possible time, was about to pay for the successful attack o
f I. Gruppe. The slower and less manoeuvrable Stukas were no match for the American Lightnings, as testified by Major Leverette:

  Lt. Blue implicitly followed instructions to maintain his flight of three planes at altitude to cover my flight as we attacked the JU-87’s at about 1215. My flight immediately dived to the left and attacked the JU-87’s from the left quarter. I attacked an E/A [enemy aircraft] in the rear of the formation, fired at about 20° and observed smoke pouring from left side of engine. I broke away to the left and upward, attacking a second E/A from rear and slightly below. After a short burst at about 200 yards this E/A rolled over and spiralled steeply downward. After breaking away to the left again and turning back toward the formation of JU-87’s, I saw both E/A strike the water. Apparently neither rear gunner fired at me. I attacked another E/A from slight angle, left rear, firing just after rear gunner opened fire. He ceased firing immediately and pilot jumped out, although I did not see the chute open. I continued into the formation, attacked another E/A from 30°, observing cannon and machine gun hits in engine. Large pieces of cowling and parts flew off and engine immediately began smoking profusely as the E/A started down. Breaking away and upward to the left, I re-entered the formation and opened fire with cannon and machine guns on another E/A at approximately 15°. The canopy and parts flew off and a long flame immediately shot out from rear of engine and left wing root, rear gunner jumping clear of E/A. Continuing into formation and attacking another E/A from slight angle to left rear and below, I was forced to roll partially on my back to the left to bring my sight onto the E/A, opening fire at close range. I observed full hits in right upper side of engine which immediately began to smoke. I broke away slightly to the left, and my Element Leader, Lt. Hanna, saw the enemy aircraft strike the water. Attacking another aircraft from behind and slightly below, the rear gunner ceased firing after I opened a short burst. The enemy aircraft nosed downward slightly and I closed to minimum range, setting the engine on fire with full burst into the bottom of fuselage. The enemy aircraft dive [sic] abruptly and I was unable to break away upward and in attempting to pass under right wing of the aircraft, three feet of my left propeller sliced through the enemy aircraft. We engaged the JU-87s until they passed over the South coast of Rhodes at approximately 1230 hours.16

  Sixteen Stukas and a Ju 88 were claimed by the American pilots: in addition to Major Leverette’s seven kills, five Ju 87s were claimed by Lieutenant Harry Hanna; three more and a probable by Lieutenant Homer Sprinkle; Lieutenant Wayne Blue was credited with the Ju 88 and Lieutenant Robert Margison (Blue’s wingman) with one other Ju 87.17

  HMS Carlisle was taken in tow by Rockwood and brought back to Alexandria, but the damage was such that she would never again put to sea. Such costly efforts by the British only served to delay the inevitable. The situation might have been very different if the Americans had agreed to extend their air support, for in addition to providing cover for the Royal Navy, Lightnings also carried out shipping sweeps and strafing attacks and bombing raids against Kos. However, just as they were making their presence felt, the Lightning squadrons were recalled. For the British in the Aegean the loss of these superb machines was a devastating blow that would have fateful repercussions.

  Notwithstanding misgivings expressed by Churchill in his correspondence with Roosevelt and Eisenhower, Leros was retained as a British base. At Cairo on 12 October, the British Foreign Secretary presided over a high-level conference in which the recapture of Kos was ruled out, not least because of the massive use of air power this would entail. However, it was agreed that the garrison on Leros would greatly benefit from the destruction of even some of the landing craft that had been assembled for a German assault against the island. Accordingly, the Mediterranean Air Command was requested to carry out a large-scale attack the following day. The response was disappointing: unsuitable weather conditions, distances to be covered, and insufficient time to transfer the necessary aircraft made such a strike impracticable. It was recommended that Beaufighters and other available aircraft be used instead. By this time, the two Lightning Groups at Gambut had already been withdrawn. As some compensation, Air Chief Marshal Tedder provided a squadron of 75mm cannon-armed B-25 Mitchell bombers for shipping strikes. However, the Mediterranean Air Command refused to divert its heavy bombers in order to extend the bombing of enemy airfields in Greece. While Tedder fully appreciated the importance of air superiority for a successful conclusion to operations in the Aegean, Italy remained the priority, and clearly it was felt that enough had been done to assist the Middle East.

  Shipping strikes were therefore made with aircraft to hand. As a result, a number of vessels were damaged, while on the night of 18–19 October, some 40 miles east of Antikythira Channel, Wellingtons of 38 Squadron torpedoed and sank the merchantman Sinfra. On board were 204 German troops, 2,389 Italian and seventy-one Greek prisoners.18 Allied aircraft sunk the coast patrol boat GK 51 and also targeted Antimachia aerodrome on Kos.

  At sea, the Royal Navy achieved significant results, although what should have been the first major success of the month was anything but when, on the night of 8–9 October, ML 835 attacked and drove ashore what turned out to be the Italian Navy auxiliary vessel SS Alessandro Volta (she was later destroyed by German aircraft). A number of caiques and other vessels were sunk by submarines including, off Kinaros on 16 October, the steamship Kari, with 500 troops, by HMS/M Torbay.19 During the night of 16–17 October, UJ 2109 (formerly HMS Widnes) was destroyed and F 338 burned out aft as a result of attacks by destroyers at Kalymnos (a steamship, Santorini, was badly damaged). The next night, the merchantman Trapani was set on fire by naval gunfire. Off the north coast of Kos two nights later, motor torpedo boats (MTBs) attacked a patrol boat (LS 5) and a landing craft (F 131), destroying the latter. North of Kos port, another landing craft (F 330) was burnt out after on-board ammunition detonated. On the 29th, HMS/M Unsparing torpedoed the troopship Ingeborg south of Amorgos and later sank a rescue vessel (Nioi) loaded with survivors.20 Warships also carried out offensive patrols against German ports.

  According to the Kriegsmarine, by 22 October, 29,454 Italian and British prisoners of war had been evacuated from the Aegean to the mainland. Another 6,000 mainly Italian prisoners perished when their transport vessels were lost through Allied action.

  In addition to Allied ships damaged or sunk during the period 7–9 October, LCT 3 had been abandoned and captured during the German invasion of Kos; a few days later, ML 835 was destroyed in an air raid at Levitha. In mid-October, the trawler Hedgehog had been lost at Levitha; on the night of 16–17 October, the destroyer Hursley was damaged by return fire; the cruiser Sirius was damaged and nearly fifty of her crew were killed or wounded in an attack by Ju 88s on the 17th, and on the same day MTB 313 also sustained damage. At about this time HM submarine Trooper disappeared east of Leros, probably after striking a mine. A few days later ML 1015 foundered in heavy seas. East of Kalymnos on the night of 22–23 October, many lives were lost when mines claimed HMS Hurworth and blew off the forecastle of the Greek destroyer Adrias. The minelayer responsible was almost certainly the German Drache. In the early hours of the 24th, the same minefield claimed HMS Eclipse while she was en route to Leros. On the 24th, the merchantman SS Taganrog was bombed and sunk at Samos, and two days later ML 579 was destroyed and four of the crew killed in an air raid at Arki. LCT 115 was lost together with twenty-two men and four heavy anti-aircraft guns some 35 miles off Kastellorizo on the 28th. More than five dozen of her crew were reported killed and wounded when HMS Aurora was severely damaged in an air attack on the 30th; another destroyer, HMS Belvoir, had a lucky escape when she was struck by a bomb that failed to explode, while the Italian Morrhua was sunk at Samos. (The Luftwaffe lost at least three Ju 88s during the day’s attacks). Many more Italian ships and small craft were crippled or sunk during the same period including, in just two weeks, at least seven vessels at Leros (see Chapter 7).

  Any voyage was a potentially hazardous undertakin
g. Sea mines, used by both sides, added to the danger. Some victims vanished without trace; others stayed afloat long enough to allow all or some of the crew to escape, and many vessels were severely damaged, leaving them drifting and helpless in an unforgiving sea. The destroyers Hurworth and Adrias had been on a fairly routine operation when they sailed into a minefield on the night of Friday, 22 October. They were to have provided a diversionary bombardment while HM ships Jervis and Pathfinder made a delivery run to Leros. The captain of the Greek Adrias was Commander Ioannis N. Toumbas, RHN:

  I was standing on the right side of the gyro compass when at 2156 a tremendous double tremor shook the ship. I just had time to ask myself what was happening when I felt that I was being lifted in the air and falling with all my weight on the bridge face down, simultaneously all sorts of things started falling on me. At the same time a big explosion was heard followed by a series of noises of rending metal. I did not lose my consciousness and with superhuman efforts managed to disentangle myself from the debris which was covering me. When I finally got up I perceived that I was wounded at different places. I saw the 4” guns of No. 1 turret over the bridge. The bridge appeared to be deserted, bodies were lying all over the place. I called to the wheel house without getting any answer. I then saw the B.N.L.O. Lieutenant Walkinshaw [British Naval Liaison Officer, Lieutenant Herbert A. Walkinshaw, RNVR] getting up and a British signalman. A small fire started on the bridge due to a short circuit which was immediately extinguished by the B.N.L.O. The whole of the forecastle had been cut off and I thought that we had been torpedoed and ordered a signal saying so to be passed to D. 22 [Commander Royston H. Wright, RN on HMS Hurworth] saying so. At that time I vomited blood. I told the B.N.L.O. that I was going to control the ship from the after steering position (searchlight).