When it became clear that at least part of his Battle Group had gained a foothold on Leros, Müller decided to risk re-deploying his paratroopers. At about 2.30 p.m., the air armada with Kampfgruppe Kühne began its approach at wave-top height: some three dozen transports in line ahead escorted by Arado floatplanes, Ju 87s and Ju 88s. On the order, ‘Fertigmachen!’ (‘Get ready!’) the twelve or so troops inside each noisy, lurching aircraft rose unsteadily to their feet. The nausea caused by a combination of airsickness and fear was ignored as each man went though his pre-jump routine. The Ju 52s climbed to a drop height of just 400–450ft and as the leading machine reached the coastline of Gurna Bay there came the warning order: ‘Fertig zum Absprung!’ (‘Prepare to jump!’). Hooked up and ready to go, the first man of each stick positioned himself in the open doorway in the aircraft’s port side, legs well apart, feet in the corners, hands gripping the vertical support rails on either side. His body was hunched slightly forward with his head outside the aircraft, the distorted features registering the tremendous force of the slipstream. Some, a few, relished the moment: little compares with the dreadful excitement of parachuting into battle. A klaxon sounded; the signal for the first man to leap into space: ‘Raus!’ (‘Out!’). Using the support rails as leverage, the Springer flung himself through the exit, automatically assuming an X position in order to hollow his back against the slipstream. A moment later there was the familiar, reassuring jerk and sudden decrease in acceleration as the parachute canopy deployed. As the roar of the departing Ju 52s faded, the paratroopers became aware of another, terrifying sound – the all too familiar whines and cracks of incoming small arms fire.
Obergefreiter Walter Keller was a machine gunner in 3. Kompanie:
I was third out of the plane, dropped my M.G. – it was secured to my belt with a rope – and suddenly felt something warm running down my right upper thigh. Later it transpired that my water bottle had been pierced by a 2cm Flak shot. A second shot caused it to come loose from my Brotbeutel [haversack]. After the fighting, I found it again and took a photograph of it. All hell had broken loose. Shots were fired from every direction; a tremendous noise. I came down on the edge of a roof of a barracks building about 5m high, but instead of landing on the roof itself, I fell backwards on to the ground with my M.G. still lying on the roof. I pulled the rope and brought it down on to its flash suppressor and crushed it. The feed tray cover had also shifted: in short, the thing was no longer working. I looked for another in a weapons container, but in doing so encountered 10 Tommies who were just as bewildered as I was and before one of them could shoot at me, I was gone again.27
For the British on Leros their first intimation of the impending paratroop assault had been an ominous rumble rising to a roar which steadily grew louder, like the sound of an approaching train through a tunnel. At the same time a number of low-flying aircraft appeared to strafe and scatter anti-personnel bombs, raising the treetops as they swept past. The slower transports followed. Men stared in awe at the fearsome spectacle and even when the sky began filling with parachutes some were slow to react. Others quickly recovered from their surprise. Captain John Olivey recalled:
Everyone seemed to be firing. I’m not sure the officers didn’t fire their revolvers. I had a Bren which got rid of 3 mags. in almost no time … It was impossible to estimate the number of planes, but roughly, I should say [there were] 50 in all. Each troop carrier, about 30 in number, dropped about 10 men … Many of the enemy dropped in the sea. Many never got up again but those that did, very quickly disappeared from sight. It was a perfect day for the manoeuvre and it was excellently carried out. A few of the planes had to come back to drop odd men who obviously hadn’t made it and how they avoided being struck by the plane behind was a wonder I shall never forget. One must give the Germans top marks for that performance …28
The landing was also opposed by ‘D’ Company of the Faughs from Point 36, Germano and San Giovanni, by ‘B’ Company of the Royal West Kents, also at San Giovanni, and by the Buffs at lower Quirico. The paratroopers sustained losses of around 10 per cent during and immediately after their descent, including the adjutant, Oberleutnant Othmar Lichy (who was killed on his 23rd birthday), Unterarzt Felix Katersohn (medic) and the signals officer Leutnant Schukraft. Notwithstanding the intense firing by those on the ground, just one of the transports was shot down; three of its four-man crew died.29 An incredulous Marsland Gander observed events from Meraviglia:
The parachutists surely had all been massacred. We searched the hillside through glasses and could discern parachutes strung on telegraph lines and tree tops. Great optimism prevailed, for it seemed impossible that the survivors, however courageous, could arm and establish themselves before being fallen upon and exterminated by the troops whom we assumed would be in the neighbourhood. This was one of the occasions when all decent feelings of humanity are in most men swamped by the instinct of self-preservation. We thought of those recklessly brave parachutists as vermin to be wiped out ruthlessly, instantly. I still fail to understand why it was not done, before they had time to reach their containers and equip themselves. Nor can I fully understand why such a large proportion escaped the fusillade of fire poured upon them as they descended.30
Major Pat McSwiney, commanding 3rd LAA Battery, recalled:
One of these paratroopers landed above our Battery HQ dugout, and started to slide down the hill towards us with his parachute still attached, but his submachine gun moving in our direction. The Battery Sergeant Major and I, both armed with revolvers, had a pot shot at him before he could steady himself to retaliate. Neither of us were good marksmen, and the paratrooper was later removed to the casualty clearing station in Meraviglia, sufficiently wounded in both the leg and the shoulder not to bother us further.31
The paratroopers were virtually defenceless during their descent but once free of their parachute harnesses they quickly reverted to their role as shock troops. Due to an oversight, the radio that was to have provided communications with Headquarters was not dropped. This might have hindered a less determined force. But these were seasoned veterans, with combat experience on many fronts. The battalion had already taken part in airborne operations in the Netherlands, Corinth and Crete, and had fought in Poland, Russia and North Africa. Officers, platoon and section leaders rapidly assessed the situation, made for the nearest cover and pushed towards their objectives. Hauptmann Martin Kühne explained:
I had chosen this [drop zone] myself as it was most appropriate to achieve our objectives which were to split the north of the island from the south and, based on thorough air reconnaissance which provided a detailed description of the rugged terrain, it appeared most suitable for the jump. In contrast to previous missions, I was of the opinion that in order for the Truppe to re-group – the most dangerous time immediately after the drop – the existence of cover should be the most decisive factor when choosing the drop zone. Jump injuries had to be taken into account. Furthermore, every Springer carried hand-held weapons to increase their battle preparedness once they had reached the ground.32
It is possible that 15 Platoon of the King’s Own had the misfortune to encounter some of Kühne’s Fallschirmjäger. The disappearance of the entire platoon has never been satisfactorily explained. According to the battalion War Diary it was overwhelmed by ‘paratroops’. Casualties are said to have been severe, with the platoon commander, Lieutenant Desmond P.R. Ginn, among those killed, the remainder having all been taken prisoner.
At Point 112, SBS had positioned three MG 15s overlooking the likely drop zone. They were brought into action together with machine guns manned by LRDG as paratroopers descended a few hundred yards away. Within minutes the SBS patrol took its first casualty when a Greek officer was wounded by return fire.
With no orders forthcoming from Fortress Headquarters, Redfern decided to deal with the situation personally. T2 Patrol, with Second Lieutenant M.W. Cross and seven ORs, was ordered to remain on Point 112; Y Patrol was tasked with mov
ing up on the paratroopers from the north side of Point 64 on the nearby Germano feature, which bordered the drop zone; Redfern and Captain Charles Saxton’s T1 Patrol were to move over Germano and into a nearby valley.
Meanwhile, Major Jellicoe directed an SBS fighting patrol under Captain Desmond Holt to the area of Navy House (Alinda Bay); Captain H.W. (Bill) Blyth and six men were ordered to engage the enemy from the nearby Germano feature. Jellicoe himself was to take a patrol towards Gurna Bay. All were to rendezvous at dusk at a building below Germano. Just prior to the three parties moving out, the three MG 15s were required to shift location, presumably to Germano, where LRDG machine-gunners had also been redirected. In the process, Corporal George W. Walshaw was shot in the neck and killed outright.
For the LRDG, the hasty redeployment ended in disaster. Although ‘Y’ Patrol managed to move into position with their machine guns, the SBS were unable to to do so. On the north-east slope, Major Redfern’s party ran into enemy machine-gun and mortar fire. Redfern was shot and killed instantly and the remainder of the group was forced to withdraw. Neither did the rest of the LRDG meet with success and they, too, were obliged to pull back.
That evening, Captain Holt was reported missing in the vicinity of Navy House; his body was recovered later.
Teenager Dimitris Tsaloumas lived between San Quirico and Alinda Bay. He had watched in amazement as paratroopers landed under intense fire near his home. Some did not get up, but remained motionless beneath their silken canopies. Indeed, it seemed to Dimitris that few had survived until, later that afternoon, one, then another seemingly came to life and, taking advantage of a lull in the firing, raced towards cover.
After gathering all available Fallschirmjäger, Kühne soon attained his primary objectives. Supported by Stukas, 1. Kompanie under Oberleutnant Haase covered the northern area, severing all roads and lines of communication; 2. and 4. Kompanie, led by Oberleutnant Fellner and Oberleutnant Möller-Astheimer respectively, took Rachi at the first attempt; to the west of Alinda Bay 3. Kompanie cut off the road between Platanos and Partheni, and reconnoitred northward. On Germano, only 17 Platoon of the Faughs continued to hold out, with Sergeant Daniel P. O’Connell in command following the loss of the OC, Captain M.F. (Bill) Robinson.33 Brigadier Tilney was virtually powerless to react:
There is no doubt that the selection to land [airborne] troops in this area was not only a bold move, but took the defence by surprise since it was not one which had been considered suitable for such an operation. The selection of this improbable and rather hazardous dropping ground by the enemy coupled with the immobility of the defence rendered an immediate counter-attack impossible. Even if the Reserve Coy had not already been committed, it is doubtful whether it could have materially affected the issue, since by the time it would have arrived in the dropping area the enemy would still have had time to re-organise and the coy would have been heavily outnumbered.34
At about 4.00 p.m., Marsland Gander made his way to the eastern exit of the Headquarters tunnel where he witnessed a disconcerting sight:
I encountered an intelligence officer with a great armful of papers which he proceeded to dump on the hillside, drench in paraffin and set a match to … I asked what the idea was. “Oh, we’re just burning secret documents,” he said casually. “Just a precaution, you know, code books and all that.” The fire crackled merrily as others began to make their contributions to the pyre.35
Following the parachute drop, those on and around Clidi experienced a curious lull, although ever-vigilant snipers were quick to deal with anyone careless enough to show himself. Among the casualties was Rifleman Louis J.N. Oelofse; the South African was shot in the head and killed outright.
The situation continued to deteriorate. Wireless communications between Clidi and Meraviglia broke down altogether, leaving only an insecure telephone landline.
On Vedetta, 7./Lw.-Jäger-Rgt.22, together with part of 6. Kompanie, had received orders to join an attack on Clidi, and moved south-west over the ridge between Points 234 and 264, and across to Point 228. By 3.00 p.m., they were in an open valley below their objective. At about this time Sottotenente Pizzigoni went missing after having taken a machine gun and setting off in search of targets. Italian sources state Pizzigoni was taken prisoner, refused to conceal his rank from his captors and was shot – one of a number of Italian officers on Leros who were executed. Olivey later recommended Pizzigoni for an award in recognition of his outstanding performance (see Appendix 4). His own countrymen honoured Pizzigoni with a posthumous award of Italy’s highest wartime decoration for bravery, the Medaglia d’Oro al Valor militare (Gold Medal for Military Valour).
In the afternoon, Olivey risked enemy fire to inspect his area and found Lieutenant I.L. Brown and a platoon of infantry pinned down in a trench to the south-east; another trench had been virtually buried by the bombing. Number 3 gun was covered by the enemy on an adjacent hill and no longer accessible. On returning to his position, Olivey called to Brown but there was no reply. He and his men had disappeared. The forward trench had been overrun, enabling the enemy to advance on Olivey’s left flank. Olivey hurried across to the position held by Major Tilly, who ordered a counter-attack, leading a bayonet charge in which he was seriously wounded:
We gave covering fire as best we could from the right flank. The infantry could not get forward, however, as every time they moved, grenades and mortar fire met them. Major M [Tilly] said he would take them forward himself. It was now about dusk and the enemy were on no. 3 gun position and below number 1. We could hear the orders of the forward officer instructing the mortar how and when to fire. The bombs would drop most accurately at the feet of our infantry. The infantry made a charge but it was impossible to get to the Jerries’ position over such rough ground. Major M was wounded in the neck and went out of action – the infantry withdrew to their hill behind.
It now became a fight between L.R.D.G. and the Jerry. I had a Bren gun with which I could sweep over our left flank and I was able to cause great havoc in a party of the enemy who had moved across to no. 4 gun. I took very careful aim and knocked out their leader as he crossed the wall. This made the enemy withdraw from this flank. They had also occupied my own trench behind no. 1 gun and using grenades, I was able to drive them out of this. They took up a position on the far and almost sheer slope of no. 3 gun emplacement and from here, they would make sallies forward, pelting us with grenades.36
The Germans had found several boxes of British grenades. Olivey and his men, meanwhile, were reduced to using inferior Italian grenades, which did little damage. By 4.10 p.m., enemy troops were on Point 278, just south-east of Battery Ciano:
I was using my Bren like a Tommy gun and a German soldier behind no. 1 gun was firing back at me. It was almost dark and neither of us could see our sights. We would both bob up to get a better view, fire a burst at each other and [get] down again. His shots were going a bit too high, although one struck the stones in front of me, giving me a gash on the cheek and mouth. We were fast running out of grenades and our position was most insecure, as any troops coming round to the right could now very easily get us.37
With the enemy closing in, Olivey’s group was joined by Signalman James Bremner:
Bremner asked for permission to leave his [wireless] set and the chaps pulled him out through the window. He had destroyed the set with his rifle. He was only just out in time as a Jerry must have worked his way up to the fort [command post] and fired in at the window. Bullets came out through the other window and completely destroyed the W/T set. I dropped a grenade over the other side and the Jerry ran and fell as he ran.38
In the event of Clidi being overrun, Olivey had been instructed to destroy the guns. He ordered his men to withdraw to number 2 gun where Rifleman van Heerden was waiting to blow up the position:
We lined up on the steep side of the rear of no. 2 gun and waited for the enemy to appear, when we would give them our last grenades. I told everyone to keep well behind the gun emplac
ement as they were then safe from grenades. Van H [van Heerden] was sitting on the gun. A grenade came over and exploded on the top of the emplacement and Sergeant C.P., who had not got behind the emplacement, got the full benefit of the explosion in his stomach. I ordered two chaps to help him back and we gave the Jerries our last grenades – at the same time, Van H pulled the switch.
This gave us 30 seconds to get away. We made back towards the hill to the west. The 30 seconds seemed like an hour and I almost thought that the charge had failed. But, suddenly, with a tremendous explosion which I knew would signal the fall of the hill to Headquarters, the gun blew up.39
II. Zug of 7./Lw.-Jäger-Rgt.22 had taken the height, at the cost of its commander, Oberfeldwebel Johannes Schröder. More troops arrived about an hour later and mopping up operations continued until about 8.00 p.m. During the assault by part of 6. Kompanie, the officer commanding, Oberleutnant Erich Frenzel, was killed. In 7. Kompanie a soldier also died, and just before reaching the summit, the OC, Oberleutnant Böttcher, was severely wounded. That night, troops from 7. Kompanie secured the northern face; the Pionierzug of II./Gren.Rgt.65 occupied the opposite slope. Kampfgruppe von Saldern had achieved its objectives and now held the high ground stretching from Point 234 (Vedetta) through Points 228 and 320 (Clidi) to 550 yards west of Santa Madonna (Alinda Bay). With Kühne’s paratroopers in control of most of the key points south of Clidi, the Germans had effectively divided the island in two.
Churchill's Folly Page 17
