At 6.00 p.m., LRDG call sign ‘Stupendous’ sent an unofficial situation report, making no effort to disguise the anger and frustration felt by many on Leros:
… Lack of RAF support absolutely pitiful. Ships sat around here all day and STUKAS just laughed at us.40
Earlier, Brigadier Tilney had moved three companies of the King’s Own from the southern coastal region to high ground in support of the gun positions on Scumbarda and to the east of Serocampo Bay, leaving medium machine guns to assist the Italians on the beaches. Towards the end of the day, when it became apparent that the enemy’s main effort was being concentrated in the centre of the island between Clidi and Appetici, the King’s Own was again redeployed, three companies going to the Meraviglia area, and one company moving from the north shore of Lakki to positions covering Point 248 (Patella). Considering the Germans below Appetici to have been contained, Tilney also recalled ‘C’ Company of the Faughs from their hard-won positions at Battery Lago.41 The company returned without their second-in-command, Lieutenant Hugh Gore-Booth having been killed that afternoon during a patrol around the east side of Appetici.
The withdrawal of ‘C’ Company prompted an appeal by the Italian command, fearing that without British help the feature could not be held. It is alleged that Tilney directed 15 Platoon to return to Appetici. Standard military procedure appears to have been overlooked, with the order being passed directly to the platoon, thus bypassing the normal chain of command. The battalion and company commanders were kept in ignorance. At the time, Lieutenant Colonel French is thought to have been with Major Barrington preparing for a night attack to throw the enemy off Rachi.
Tilney makes no mention of the Faughs’ withdrawal, and his recollection of the proposed night operation does not always tally with other accounts. Tilney would later claim to have had at his disposal two companies (less one platoon) of the Faughs and two companies of the King’s Own. Yet other sources refer only to ‘C’ Company of the Faughs and HQ Company of the King’s Own. Lieutenant Clifford A.L. Clark, then 2 i/c of ‘B’ Company of the Royal West Kents, noted at the time that he took charge of his old 10 Platoon in order to form a composite spearhead company with two platoons of the Faughs (these appear to have been 13 and 14 Platoons), which was to have preceded a company (of four platoons) of the King’s Own.
Due mainly to the delayed arrival of the King’s Own, the attack, originally timed to begin at 11.00 p.m., had to be postponed, but apparently not before ‘C’ Company of the Buffs had expended 3,500 rounds in a wasted effort to provide machine-gun support. In the early hours of the 13th, Tilney cancelled the operation altogether:
… due to developments on APPETICI and to the fact that one of the attacking coys had proceeded to the wrong R.V. and had got lost in the darkness. The failure to put in this attack undoubtedly gave the enemy an unexpected opportunity to strengthen what was, initially at all events, a somewhat shaky hold on the narrow neck in the centre of the island.42
Although not mentioned by name, the company referred to can only have been ‘C’ Company of the Faughs. According to Tilney, at about midnight, Fortress Headquarters received word that the platoon on the eastern escarpment of Appetici (evidently 15 Platoon of ‘C’ Company) was hard-pressed by enemy attacks up the eastern escarpment and required reinforcements. After a second request, the brigadier ordered Lieutenant Colonel French to deploy the remainder of ‘C’ Company and to send another platoon to aid in the defence of Pandeli castle.43 However, the move of the platoons to Appetici was apparently countermanded in a message from Fortress Headquarters without Tilney’s knowledge and it was not until 4.00 a.m. on the 13th that they finally moved out.
Lieutenant Johnson provides a different version of events: On returning to Meraviglia, 13 Platoon had been re-supplied and provided with a hot meal. After waiting in vain for further orders, the men settled down to sleep. During the night, Johnson was woken and instructed to make his way to a prearranged rendezvous on a track used by troops moving towards Platanos and Appetici. He was joined by Second Lieutenant G.M. Riordan, OC 14 Platoon:
Sergeant Major Conners suddenly appeared to say that 15 Platoon had already gone back to Appetici and that we, that is 13 and 14 Platoons, were to wait at our present RV for the Company Commander. How it was that the CSM came to give us such an order remains a mystery. It was wrong anyway and he must have known at that stage that Ben Barrington was either already back on Appetici with 15 Platoon or was perhaps en route for that destination even as he spoke. We waited in vain for about one hour. This uncertain grip worried me and I was beginning to realise that I was on my own in this battle. I contacted Battalion HQ by line from Stony Force [an outpost some 500 yards above ‘C’ Company’s defensive position]. When I spoke to Maurice French he told me to join up with 15 Platoon on Appetici. This we duly did after a hard slog across the valley and up the rocky face once again.44
Just before the attack on Rachi was cancelled, Lieutenant Clark had also arranged to meet Barrington:
As arranged, I reported with my Platoon at the R.V. at 0200 and met the Major, whose other two Platoons had so far not turned up. We waited a bit and then went in search of them. After frantic enquiries and phone calls, the Major eventually made the tragic discovery that his two Platoons had gone to a wrong R.V., about two miles away and the other side of the hill, and were out of touch. I have never seen a man quite so worried, as it was then 0230 and half-an-hour to Zero! Eventually he gave me the thankless task of reporting the position to the Colonel while he went in search of his men.45
It is virtually impossible to determine precisely what went wrong that night, but if the timings noted by Clark are correct, the implications are serious indeed.46 It seems inconceivable that Tilney was under the misapprehension that he had at his disposal one more company of the Faughs than was actually available, and yet it does appear that 13 and 14 Platoons of ‘C’ Company were allocated two simultaneous tasks: to join the counter-attack against the German paratroopers on Rachi, and to reinforce 15 Platoon on Appetici. It was dawn when Lieutenant Johnson arrived at Appetici. There he met Major Barrington who had presumably returned to the feature in search of his ‘missing’ companies:
[Barrington] asked me where the devil I thought I’d been all night. Well where the hell did he think I was …47
At dusk, the destroyers Faulknor, Beaufort and Pindos left Alakishli Bay and swept the Leros–Kalymnos area to prevent the arrival by sea of further enemy reinforcements. Between 10.10 p.m. and 10.18 p.m. the warships responded to a request by the army by shelling enemy positions on Mount Clidi. A total of fifty-seven rounds of 4.7-inch and 4-inch heavy explosives (HE) were fired, following which the force carried out an uneventful search for enemy vessels at Levitha before returning to the safety of Turkish waters. The four torpedo boats that had earlier departing Leros, lying-up during daylight hours in the Gulf of Mandelyah, also put to sea. MTB 307 developed engine trouble and 263 struck a rock and damaged two propellers, leaving just 315 and 266 to continue their patrol.
Throughout the day, the Luftwaffe had maintained a menacing presence, with Ju 87 and Ju 88 dive-bombers on call by assault troops. That night, German aircraft delivered an ammunition resupply to the Küstenjäger holding out on Appetici. A radio set was also dropped to Kühne’s paratroopers, only for it to be damaged and rendered unworkable.
Meanwhile, Beaufighters of 46 and 227 Squadrons were prevented by Messerschmitt Bf 109s from approaching Leros, but to the west, later in the day, eight Beaufighters of 47 and 603 Squadrons and two B-25 Mitchells of the USAAF 310th Bombardment Group struck at a convoy reported as comprising two merchantmen and five escort vessels. Two escorting Arado floatplanes were claimed as damaged, at a cost of one Beaufighter and its crew.48 The convoy reached Suda Bay, whereupon fire broke out on the Pierre Luigi resulting in the loss of the steamer. As the original crew had deserted shortly before the vessel’s voyage, sabotage was strongly suspected.
9
Day Two
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Saturday, 13 November 1943
On Friday night, Commander Stuart A. Buss, RN, 5th Destroyer Flotilla, arrived in the Aegean in HMS Dulverton, with Echo and Belvoir in attendance. After being detected and shadowed by German aircraft, the unit was attacked with glide bombs and at about 1.45 a.m. on the 13th Dulverton was hit. There was little warning as the glide bomb approached, only a sinister sound of rushing air immediately before the projectile slammed into the ship, blowing off her bows. Dulverton caught fire but remained afloat. With aircraft still overhead, Echo and Belvoir circled the scene before they risked stopping for survivors. The rescuers were guided by the harrowing screams of terrified, severely injured men, many of whom could be seen in the eerie light of the spreading flames. Others were located due only to the tiny red emergency lamp on their life jackets. From time to time, Belvoir’s guns added to the pandemonium as enemy aircraft were engaged. However, no more bombs fell during the rescue operation. Midshipman Ian H.D. Rankin, RN, risked his own life to assist survivors. Secured with a heaving line, he leapt from Belvoir into the cold sea. Rankin was instrumental in saving two men, but in the confusion no one noticed what became of the officer.
By 3.20 a.m., Dulverton was ablaze from end to end and Belvoir was ordered to sink her by torpedo. At 3.33 a.m., the stricken ship disappeared beneath the waves and the depleted Division departed for the Gulf of Kos, the Echo leaving behind her Carley floats with the Dulverton’s whaler for any survivors who might have been missed. Between them, the destroyers had saved six officers and at least 103 ratings;1 Commander Buss was not among them. Neither was Midshipman Rankin.
Meanwhile, on Leros, German paratroopers spent their first night securing the Alinda Bay area. Obergefreiter Walter Keller was lucky to escape unscathed during a patrol along the coast road in the early hours of the 13th. On reaching the half-open door of a house, he peered inside and was challenged in Italian: ‘Inglisi?’ ‘No, no’, he replied, ‘Tedesco’. Immediately, a hand grenade was hurled from inside the building. Fortunately for the patrol, it fell short and exploded behind the door. Keller recalled:
Behind us at the window was a fixed sMG – a heavy machine gun – and he immediately started firing and the guy behind me, his name was [Obergefreiter Hermann] Horch, from Redbrücken am Main, I’ll never forget, they blew away his entire head. That was the end of him …
[Obergefreiter Helmut] Dassler … said, ‘Come on, we’ll go up on the roof’, so I held my hands open, he stepped into them and, like children, we clambered on to the roof, where he said, ‘I still have a Sprengbüchse’. This was basically a tin with two kilograms of explosive in it; you fix a detonator and a fuse and then it blows up nicely. So we threw this through a ventilation shaft or maybe a chimney, and it exploded. Of course, most of those inside were wounded; I don’t know how many were killed. Anyway, the rest came out. One of them was an officer and our Gruppenführer, [Oberjäger Franz] Prokov, said ‘Mensch, that’s an officer, we will have to hand him in’. Then, the Italian – I don’t know, maybe he understood a little German – immediately started to whimper and said, ‘Bambini’ and outlined a woman’s body with his hands and repeated ‘Bambini’. He had photos and showed them to us. ‘Mensch, what good will it do if he gets shot? It’s not like it will do us any good.’ So, we told him to put on an ordinary soldier’s uniform.2
The Italian was probably well aware of the fate awaiting pro-Badoglio officers captured while resisting the Germans. Hardly daring to believe his good fortune, he hurriedly changed out of his own distinctive uniform. As a token of appreciation, he presented Keller with his watch. The prisoners were passed back and the paratroopers resumed their patrol.
Before dawn, Kampfgruppe Aschoff with II./Gren.Rgt.16 attempted another landing, this time on the north coast. Initially, the attention of the shore defences was diverted when the patrolling MTBs 315 and 266 were mistakenly illuminated and fired on. The torpedo boats were dissuaded from remaining in the area and therefore failed to intercept the landing flotilla. Fahnenjunker-Feldwebel Jürgen Bernhagen described the final approach:
A searchlight was scanning the sea and immediately spotted us. Lit up as if in broad daylight, the landing craft headed towards the island at full speed. Defensive fire started. A lot of hits. A shell struck the landing craft from the front and shot through the stowage room. Soldiers and mules were hit badly. Dead and wounded. We fired with all handguns, machine guns and rifles in the direction of the island.
The Bootsführer wants to turn around now. That would certainly have been the end of us. Oberleutnant [Günther] Steinman pulls his pistol and thus forces the captain to continue. Suddenly next to us we can see a sheer cliff and the shadow of our landing craft. Not just us, but the enemy, too is anxious. They fire into the shadow, instead of directly on to the boat. That was quite lucky for us. By now we have advanced deep into the bay. The searchlights cannot spot us anymore.3
The landing was made near Pasta di Sopra Point at daybreak. One landing craft was disabled and drifted with a damaged rudder close to Santa Madonne in Alinda Bay, where she was hit by Bofors and anti-tank guns from the southern shore and set on fire. The flames spread, detonating the ammunition on board. Those who were able escaped overboard and struggled to reach the coast 200 yards away. The remnants of the battalion gathered on the eastern slope of Vedetta until ordered by Major von Saldern to advance via Val Camere (south of Clidi) towards Rachi to link up with the Fallschirmjäger. While descending the southern face of Point 192, some of the troops were unsuccessfully engaged by British 25-pounders from the area of San Giovanni. Another, more accurate, barrage scattered those already in the built-up area below the height. Shells also fell among small groups as they advanced towards Villa Belleni.
Following the failure of Kampfgruppe Dörr to reach Palma Bay the previous day, III./Gren.Rgt.440 also benefited from the diversion resulting from the presence of the British MTBs, before coming under heavy artillery fire while trying to land at Appetici. Only 9. Kompanie succeeded in getting ashore and at 6.30 a.m. joined up with the Küstenjäger on the eastern slope. About thirty men of 10. and 11. Kompanie also landed north of Grifo Bay, where they were incorporated into II./Gren.Rgt.16. Having lost one engine, and prevented by rough seas from reaching shore, the remaining landing craft returned to Kalymnos, shipping water and with the occupants bailing with their steel helmets in order to stay afloat.
The unfavourable weather conditions delayed a proposed pre-dawn parachute assault until 6.45 a.m., when 15./4.Rgt. “Brandenburg” and about forty men of I. Fallschirmjäger-Rgt.2 were dropped west of Rachi. As opposed to the previous day, the Ju 52s arrived over the island individually, so that each in turn became the focus of attention for AA gunners. The paratroopers suffered heavy losses. At least one stick was dropped at such a low altitude that none of the parachutes opened in time. Others were blown towards Point 81, on the lower south-eastern slopes of Quirico. Marsland Gander was again one of the many spectators:
our machine guns chattered away furiously. Bofors guns joined in, and one of the slow troop carriers, hit fair and square, went flaming down into Alinda Bay, a horrifying spectacle, with one solitary parachute visible dragging behind it the doll-like figure still attached. Another Ju flying lower and lower in distress dropped all its parachutists into the water where the silken chutes lingered for a short time like water lilies. Once again, however, it seems certain that a large number of the paratroopers did land safely, and went to reinforce their comrades.4
Ground fire accounted for at least two Ju 52s of II./T.G.4. One aircraft (640187) had just dropped its paratroopers when it was shot down into the sea; all the crew were rescued. Unteroffizier Andreas Hutter was the air-gunner on board another aircraft (6799/G6+FP). For Hutter, who had taken part in the previous day’s missions, this was his sixty-fourth operational flight:
Flight control told us that German soldiers had already taken the intended drop-off point (past Alinda Bay). Therefore we flew over Alinda Bay. In doing s
o, the first plane was hit and went down burning into the sea. Our machine was shot at too and badly damaged and as a result the radio message ordering the paratroopers to go was not released so they didn’t jump. Due to heavy damage, our machine had to make an emergency landing in the sea about 2 km from the coast at Palma Bay.
The twelve paratroopers were still in the plane and unfortunately had no life jackets as they were wearing their parachutes. The plane sank very quickly. Of 5 in the crew, 4 managed to get out together with several paratroopers. One crew member died while still in the plane. We lost each other due to heavy seas …
I tried to inflate the rubber dinghy but couldn’t as it had been completely riddled with bullets and therefore I was unable to help the paratroopers. I had to save myself by swimming for about 2 to 3 hours (although I had a life jacket I was also wearing full uniform and shoes!) and only just managed to reach the coast where Italian soldiers captured me and handed me over to the English.5
The pilot, Feldwebel Günther Voigt; observer, Unteroffizier Max Ehrig, and wireless operator, Unteroffizier Viktor Langos all survived to be rescued by their own side. The flight engineer, Unteroffizier Friedrich Meyerdirks, was fatally wounded and remained inside the aircraft.6 It is not known how many paratroopers managed to escape. Hutter’s parents in Austria were advised that their son was missing in action (see Appendix 5); they did not learn that he was still alive until much later. According to Marsland Gander, the Luftwaffe suffered a further loss:
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