One seaplane came boldly down into Alinda Bay and attempted to alight, as if the island were already in German hands. It met such a torrent of fire that it sank immediately.7
On Appetici, a concerted effort by the Küstenjäger and 9./Gren.Rgt.440 saw all four guns of the battery and a number of British and Italians captured at 11.00 a.m. Lieutenant Ted Johnson, on the north-west slope of the summit, was informed of the situation and soon afterwards experienced substantial rifle and machine-gun fire:
Eventually word came to abandon the feature. My first intimation that all was not under control was when I saw men running down through the trees from the summit towards me, shouting that they were being closely followed by the enemy … I got the impression that they were running for their lives and in doing so were causing panic to those of us whom they passed. It became obvious that my company HQ and 15 platoon had been driven off the summit and that this was the reason that I too was to abandon the hillside. This was done in some confusion and was certainly not a planned and disciplined withdrawal. Sergeant Fitzgerald, my platoon sergeant, and I gathered our platoon together again at the bottom of Appetici on the edge of Leros village [Platanos] and once again made our way back to our old position above Pandeli Bay, reorganised into a company of two platoons and waited for our next assignment.8
Lieutenant A. Woods, OC 15 Platoon, and Fusilier Roberts, Johnson’s runner, were taken prisoner. Lieutenant Armstrong, a South African in command of 14 Platoon, was wounded and later evacuated to Egypt. Earlier, Johnson’s platoon had also lost Fusilier James McMaster, as recalled by former Lance Corporal, Walter Pancott:
My sergeant [John Caldwell] was shot by a sniper; that left me and my gunner [McMaster] in the sangar. A mortar bomb came over, landed at his feet and blew him to bits. I got shrapnel in the leg.9
Eventually, German soldiers arrived at the position:
I had nowhere to hide or go, so I rubbed blood on my face and head and played dead … the gunner was a terrible sight. I heard one German say, ‘Drei Mann kaput’. I was glad when I heard them going away. My leg was getting very sore, so I had to stay put.10
Lance Corporal Pancott was later taken prisoner. The loss of Appetici caused considerable difficulties for ‘B’ Company of the Faughs, whose area at Pandeli, south of the feature, was now overlooked and dominated by the enemy. There were a number of casualties from mortar fire, and communications were frequently disrupted due to a damaged wireless set and breaks in the landline.
At 12.20 p.m., P.L. 899 at Blefuti Bay came under machine-gun fire, causing casualties and prompting a call for assistance. The position was reinforced later in the afternoon by Italian forces, who used automatic weapons and the battery 76mm guns against the Germans on Vedetta and Clidi.
At 1.15 p.m., 7./Gren.Rgt.16, in conjunction with 6./Gren.Rgt.16, moved against Point 111, between Clidi and Quirico. 6. Kompanie cleared the south side of the feature, following which both Kompanien turned south. Along the way, there was much close-quarter fighting as pockets of resistance were encountered in gardens along the waterfront. Shortly before 3.00 p.m., III. Zug met up with the Fallschirmjäger at San Nicola, and the latter was placed under the command of II. Gren.Rgt.16. During the afternoon there were further clashes along the southern shore of Alinda between British troops and elements of both II./Gren Rgt.16 and III./Gren.Rgt.440.
There was also much activity in the vicinity of Point 320. According to the after-action report of II./Lw.-Jäger-Rgt.22, at dawn firing alerted the battalion’s 7. Kompanie, atop the height, to a British breakthrough south of their position in the area occupied by the Pionierzug of II./Gren.Rgt.65:
The enemy was overwhelmed in close combat, the scene cleared and the position was held.11
Between 7.30 a.m. and 8.00 a.m. the area was again shelled, as British troops attempted another assault. Once more, they were beaten back with grenades and small arms fire. 7. Kompanie was relieved by the Pioniere later that morning. In the afternoon, Hauptmann Gawlich and fifty-two men of II./Lw.-Jäger-Rgt.22 took over, with orders to hold out under all circumstances.
There was more fighting just south-west of Clidi, apparently after troops of HQ Company of the Buffs were sent to secure Point 184 (Quirico). Certainly, Quirico fell to German forces during the day, prompting an unsuccessful attempt by part of ‘C’ Company of the Buffs to recapture the feature that evening. Lieutenant Geoffrey Hart, then in command of both 13 and 15 Platoons, recalled:
Late in the day, I was ordered to prepare my platoon and 15 Platoon for a night attack soon after dark on Quirico, which was about 1,000 yards forward [east] of “C” Company. We had no opportunity for a daylight reconnaissance and no information as to enemy strength, but I was told parachutists had established themselves on the feature; this was a high, steep hill.
The attack was more like a fighting patrol. First find out what was up there and then go in. We advanced to the near summit, found barbed wire which I and my sergeant [Nolan] cut and made a gap. We located one slit trench and the area of another. Since we had planned to go in from our right (the German left flank) and sweep across the position, we silenced the first slit trench and were watching out for the one 100–150 yards half-left. We had not identified a third on our right, and were subjected to considerable machine gun fire from this direction. Possibly, we had not gone far enough right although I think we were probably unaware how far Quirico stretched back to the south-east, as the Germans who shot us up were more to the rear rather than to the right. Both I and my sergeant were hit and I rolled back down the hill, fortunately in cover from gunfire. We were the only casualties. Sergeant Nolan was not seriously wounded and stayed with the platoon for a while. Basically, I took no further part as I was wounded in the thigh and leg.
After rolling and crawling down the hill, I reached the road and found the CO’s driver who took me in a vehicle to battalion headquarters. I reported as much as I could about the German position and suggested that another officer be sent up as the attack was, in my view, quite a possible venture. The CO, I learnt afterwards, preferred to wait until daylight and put the whole of “C” Company into the attack with other supporting fire.12
In the early hours SBS and Y, T1 and T2 Patrols of the LRDG had come under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Iggulden, and were redeployed to just north of the Buffs ‘C’ Company positions on Mount Condrida. Personnel were largely inactive during the day. Towards dusk Captain Ashley Greenwood went with Major Jellicoe and an SBS patrol and recovered two jeeps and stores from their former position just west of Germano. Captain Charles Saxton led T1 Patrol on a house-clearing operation and took one German prisoner. Another patrol under SBS Sergeant Workman was tasked with protecting anti-tank guns at Gurna Bay and to aid the morale of Italians stationed there.
At the end of day two, German forces held Appetici and had established a pocket around Alinda, from the coast at Vedetta, south-west past Clidi to Quirico and south-east to Germano, Rachi and towards Krithoni. However, an attempt during the afternoon to take Pandeli castle had failed in the face of Allied artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire. Neither had Kampfgruppe von Saldern linked up with the Küstenjäger and 9./Gren.Rgt.440 at Appetici, which was a crucial if Alinda Bay was to be secured for the landing of heavy weapons. Like the British, the Germans were also experiencing serious difficulties maintaining wireless contact.
In the north, British forces had been pushed back, leaving Clidi battery in German hands. Lieutenant Colonel Iggulden was instructed by Brigadier Tilney to retake Clidi that night, and to be prepared to move south the following day and secure the northern slopes of Rachi. In fact, Iggulden had made up his own mind to restore the situation at Clidi, and since communication problems prevented him from maintaining contact with the brigadier, intended to proceed at dawn on the 14th. In the meantime ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies of the Buffs were withdrawn from their positions, the former to seize Clidi, and the latter to counterattack at Quirico. Accordingly, Captain Denniff and Y Patrol too
k over from ‘B’ Company at Partheni that evening, and during the night the remainder of LRDG and SBS replaced ‘C’ Company on the Condrida feature. ‘D’ Company was ordered to move south to the central area.
At Germano, 17 Platoon of the Faughs remained in position until about 8.00 p.m., when, under orders from Battalion Heaquarters, Sergeant O’Connell withdrew the men through ‘B’ Company of the Royal West Kents. The enemy chose this moment to attack, causing the platoon to leave without their wounded.
Meanwhile, the Faughs’ 16 Platoon had been placed under command of Captain E.P. (Percy) Flood OC ‘B’ Company. During the day the platoon commander, Lieutenant Prior, was wounded. He was replaced by Lieutenant S.A. (Arthur) Stokes, a South African on secondment to the British Army and attached to HQ Company of the Faughs. During the afternoon Stokes led an attack in which an estimated twenty Germans were killed and wounded. Among the casualties was an officer carrying a case containing plans of attack, including aerial photographs. Earlier in the day, the LRDG in the area of Point 256 (Marcello) had also acquired maps, an aerial photo and personnel details of 5./Gren.Rgt.65.13
For Brigadier Tilney the loss of Appetici represented as much of a threat to Meraviglia as did the German occupation of Rachi. In the morning, he had therefore issued instructions for Lieutenant Colonel French and Lieutenant Colonel S.A.F.S. Egerton, commanding the King’s Own, to prepare for a night attack on Appetici. As he was familiar with the terrain, the CO of the Faughs was asked to coordinate the plan. When French later announced his intention to lead the attack, Tilney was astonished:
Colonel French stated that it was on account of his knowledge and Colonel Egerton’s ignorance of the ground. Since there was complete command from [Meraviglia] of the ground over which the approach march and attack were to be made and Colonel Egerton had had at least two hours in which to study and discuss it with Colonel French, it seemed surprising that Colonel Egerton had not himself resisted this unusual procedure. The latter had not got into touch with me, nor could he be found either at his H.Qs or with his coy. commanders at the R.V. with Col. French for orders. Consequently, I was forced to accept Col. French’s leadership of Col. Egerton’s battalion for the attack. I therefore approved Col. French’s plan and was present at his orders …14
Lieutenant Robert (Austin) Ardill of the Royal Irish Fusiliers had previously commanded the battalion Anti-Tank Platoon on Appetici. He was asked by his CO to provide a brief plan of attack based on his knowledge of the area. Later, he was again summoned to Battalion Headquarters where he was required to address an ‘O’ Group:
The Rendezvous was at … 2300 hours … I went over the plan and refreshed the various Company Commanders with their orders, objectives and rendezvous. At 11 o’c pm we moved off. At the last minute, and much to my surprise, Colonel French said to me, “I will come with you, but you are in command”. The simple plan was a Company North, a Company South and my Company in centre, with a pincer movement on the [gun] emplacements.15
The King’s Own provided all three companies, each with a guide from the Faughs. Slightly below and west of Battery Lago are several windmills. This was the start line. It was intended to clear the feature shortly after moonrise. ‘A’ Company at the forefront of the assault would secure the searchlight and gun positions. ‘D’ Company was to follow up on the left and clear the tunnel system beneath the battery. HQ Company would form a semi-circle behind the attacking companies and prevent enemy forces from escaping. Before dawn, ‘A’ and ‘D’ Companies were to withdraw to ‘the Anchor’ so as to be available for further offensive operations towards Rachi, leaving HQ Company to organise and hold the position.
According to some accounts, ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies of the Faughs were to have been attached to the King’s Own, but ‘B’ Company could not be extracted from Pandeli and was instead replaced by ‘D’ Company of the King’s Own, while ‘C’ Company was withdrawn in response to reports of a German attack on Meraviglia from Rachi Ridge. In fact, ‘C’ Company was neither given a warning order for the move to Appetici nor informed about the suspected enemy assault and spent an uninterrupted night in its own defensive positions. Tilney later stated that he tried to recall part of the attacking force. Certainly, HQ Company of the King’s Own was redeployed, leaving just ‘A’ and ‘D’ Companies to continue. According to the LRDG Intelligence officer, Second Lieutenant Pav Pavlides:
At approx 2200 hrs enemy parachutists on GACHI [sic: RACHI] attacked main Fortress HQ Posn (mt MERAVIGLIA) from NW using 3”Mortar. Attach [sic] developed and seemed sufficiently threatening to the Fortress Commander to warrant alteration of plans. 1O [sic: IO] A Sqn LRDG with a runner were despatched to Col. French ordering him to call off attack on APPETICI and to hasten back to area ‘Charing Cross’ in order to launch from there a counter attack Northwards. Col. French was contacted at the head of the attacking column, about 150 ft below the summit of APPETICI. Col. French decided that having reached that far unobserved he had achieved the element of surprise for an attack but could not hope to turn the whole force back without being fired on from above, so decided to send back HQ Coy, which was low down and continue the attack with the rest, hastening back as soon as he had mopped the enemy up. Fighting began a few minutes later.16
In the event, Fortress Headquarters was not attacked. But during the night a Kompanie of I./Fallschirmjäger-Rgt.2, reinforced by troops of II./Gren.Rgt.16, was ordered to take Point 101, on the western edge of the Meraviglia feature, which may account for the panic within the British camp.17 At 3.27 a.m. and 4.29 a.m. on the 14th, the Germans intercepted two identical plain language transmissions from the same station:
All radio messages destroyed. No code. Everything destroyed. Radio station continues working.18
It is likely that the source of the signal was Naval Headquarters on Meraviglia, whose Staff may have overreacted in the belief that they were about to be overrun. Thereafter the signal officer, Lieutenant Alan Phipps, RN, had to rely on an already congested army network for communications.
Allied aircrew continued to suffer losses in the day. Patrolling Messerschmitt Bf 109s outclassed the less-manoeuvrable Beaufighters and Mitchells whose ineffectual presence went virtually unnoticed by those on the ground.19 With the island beyond the range of Allied single-engine fighters, it meant that none could be employed in an infantry support role, or to escort bombers on daylight missions, while night bombing was impractical due to the size of Leros and the proximity of friendly and enemy forces. An effort was made to reduce the scale of German air attack with Allied bombers carrying out night raids against airfields in Rhodes and Kos. However, deteriorating weather conditions had prevented Mediterranean Air Command from mounting large-scale operations over Greece, where the majority of enemy bombers operating against Leros were based. On the 13th, winds rising to gale force also disrupted German air cover and delayed the arrival of further troops on both sides, including British reinforcements from Samos requested by Brigadier Tilney. Just ‘A’ Company of the Royal West Kents embarked on MMS 103, but valuable time was lost when another island was wrongly identified as Leros. When the mistake was realised it was too late to continue due to risk of interception in daylight. Accordingly, the ship’s captain was forced to lie up in Turkish waters until another attempt could be made the following night.
10
Day Three
Sunday, 14 November 1943
During the night of 13–14 November, HM ships Faulknor, Beaufort and Pindos, now critically short of fuel, were able to depart following the arrival in the area of Echo and Belvoir. The latter unit arrived off Alinda Bay at 12.35 a.m. on the 14th to provide fire support for the proposed British assault on Appetici. At 12.45 a.m., HMS Echo commenced bombardment of the feature. Belvoir opened fire shortly afterwards. Within ten minutes, ninety-eight rounds were expended following which both vessels departed. The ground attack went in one and a half hours later, at approximately 2.30 a.m. It was an especially dark and windy night, which ben
efited and, to a degree, hindered the attackers. The enemy might not have been able to see or hear their approach, but conditions were hardly ideal for the King’s Own. Because of the featureless terrain it can be difficult even in daylight to determine exactly where one is on Appetici’s slopes. In common with much of the island, the landscape is extremely rugged, rocky and covered with Greek spiny spurge, a dense, thorny, low-lying plant that snares the unwary in a clinging embrace. Negotiating this natural obstacle can be a slow, frustrating and painful experience. It is worst when the weather deteriorates, as it did on the night of 13–14 November. The exposed slopes offer no shelter from the elements and one soon becomes disorientated. Lieutenant Colonel Maurice French and his force had all of this to contend with and more: the men were unfamiliar with the area, tired after two days of activity and hardly enthusiastic about attacking a resolute enemy. Lieutenant Austin Ardill recalled:
Having survived the Naval attack, my Company got safely into position for the final assault. To the absolute amazement of my King’s Own, I ordered ‘fix bayonets’. I actually had to explain why and what bayonets were for, apart from opening cans of Bully Beef. We did then ‘fix bayonets’ and I led the central attack on the gun emplacements. We took our objective with not too much difficulty … The Germans counter attacked, from where the Northern King’s Own Company should have been, with heavy machine gun and rifle fire. Colonel French who had been reasonably close by me all the way, was firing from the shoulder when he was caught in the heavy fire and fell mortally wounded. I was not seriously wounded in a conflict which turned out to be almost a solo effort. We were eventually obliged to dis-engage, not having any support to mop up. The King’s Own had disappeared. I had my batman, only. As we made our way back we picked up some King’s Own troops in disarray. They didn’t know me and I was not very interested in them. Their Officers had disappeared. Their two [sic] Companies, supposed to have formed the pincer movement had vanished, failed in their mission and didn’t re-appear.1
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