Churchill's Folly

by Rogers, Anthony; Jellicoe, Lord;

  At 5.50 a.m., Penn and Aldenham arrived off the north-east point of Leros, far too late to have any effect on the latest German landing. Off Pandeli Bay, the destroyers came under fire from an Italian-manned shore gun and Penn was hit on the starboard side, 6ft above the waterline. Daylight brought an increased threat of enemy attack and at dawn both ships departed for Turk Buku.

  By now, all German units on Leros had been placed under the command of Major von Saldern. Before dawn, there was a major assault by the Germans along the northern face of Meraviglia. At about 5.15 a.m., Tarleton was informed that Norris was dead and his platoon had been driven back towards the Anchor. Moreover, the enemy had reached the commanding south-eastern spur of Meraviglia.

  Lieutenant Colonel C.W.M. Ritchie was atop the height:

  A number of shots came from the direction of LEROS town [Platanos] … but there were still no signs of any movement onto MERIVIGLIA [sic]. This firing did not last long.2

  Soon, more shots were heard:

  Going down to investigate I saw 6 Germans about 200 yds away moving up the hill towards us. Just then a grenade or 2” mortar bomb landed among them causing loud shrieks and checking their advance. Telling Capts WOOD and GIBBON to hang on as best they could, I went back to Fortress HQ to personally report the situation to Tilney and try to get more men to thicken up the alarmingly weak defences.

  From the area of the LRDG HQ I pointed out the apparent direction of the enemy attack up the Southern spur. I was told to hang on at all costs and that an attack by 200 Italians or other troops would be put in astride the road from ANCHOR to LEROS. For various reasons, however, this attack unfortunately never materialised.3

  In an effort to counter the enemy threat, Tarleton immediately re-deployed Rickcord’s Platoon. He also telephoned Fortress Headquarters with a situation report, only to be told by the brigade Intelligence officer that there was no cause for concern, as an operation was already underway to clear the ridge. (At some point during the morning, Tilney had sent for 160 men gathered at Lakki to help defend Meraviglia.) Tarleton asked to speak to the brigadier and suggested that, in view of developments, ‘D’ Company’s task be changed. But Tilney refused to alter his plan. Tarleton recalled:

  From now onwards fire from the dominating spur of MERAVIGLIA increased and movement in the assembly area was becoming difficult as automatics were brought to bear on the road to PORTOLAGO [Lakki]. There were no signs on MERAVIGLIA of any clearing-up operations. The whole security of the assembly area depended on the dominating ridge being denied to the enemy. To move “D” Coy. away from the position it occupied at this stage, however, would have allowed the enemy, either by infiltrating down the ridge or by an attack from APPETICI, to occupy the ANCHOR road junction and cut off MERAVIGLIA from PORTOLAGO.4

  Meanwhile, Rickcord and his men pressed on in the face of constant enemy fire. Eventually, a route was found west of the Anchor that enabled the leading elements to get within 250 yards of the German positions on the summit.

  For Lieutenant John Browne at nearby Krithoni, the battle might have been 100 miles away. But when he surveyed his surroundings that morning there was no escaping the tragedy brought about by the previous day’s events:

  The rocky landscape was splattered with bomb craters and all kinds of military rubbish, and the sea breeze polluted by smells of cordite and decay. No amount of sunshine and sparkling sea could relieve such a place of its bleak sadness. The road was deserted. No one was working in the fields. The only living thing to be seen was a donkey browsing in a group of cactus plants …

  Among the litter in the garden were some small bottles of tomato juice, and, just inside the door, some packets of Italian army biscuits. When I went to give Chuter some there was no response. His attitude was peaceful, and there had been no sound or sign of death. A regular soldier, 27 or 28 years old, he had been serving overseas for at least 5 years, cut off from family and friends, patiently enduring the hardships and uncertainties of army life, and earning the respect of his comrades.

  I said to Mountford, “We might as well let him sleep.” – not knowing whether he had already guessed the truth.5

  While Browne and Mountford awaited their fate below the northern slopes of Meraviglia, the remainder of ‘C’ Company reassembled on the south side. During the night, there had been an attempt to gather at the Anchor scattered personnel of the company. A composite platoon was formed under Captain Eddie Newbald and directed to take up a defensive position behind that of ‘D’ Company. At about the same time, a message was received by Captain C.M. Bernard instructing ‘D’ Company not to move and requesting the company commander, Major Anthony J.M. Flint, to call Fortress Headquarters. The information was dispatched to Flint, but never reached him. Neither was Tarleton kept informed. Unaware of the change of plan, Tarleton and Flint left by jeep at about 7.00 a.m. to reconnoitre the ground for ‘D’ Company’s attack. With daylight, the Luftwaffe had returned and the vehicle made an easy target. Cannon shells and machine-gun bullets thudded into the ground closeby, making further progress impossible. The jeep was abandoned. At the same time there was increased firing on the eastern heights of Meraviglia and aircraft were seen wheeling and diving over the south-eastern slopes. Fearing a major assault on the Anchor, Tarleton decided to return with his party on foot.

  In fact, the focus of attention was Meraviglia. Atop the feature, Ritchie had rounded up two Royal Signals officers, Captain Ramsay and Lieutenant E.B. Horton, and with half a dozen men taken up positions in and around the battery command post. Under constant machine-gun and sniper fire from the castle area 1,000 yards away, the party watched and waited. Half an hour passed before the first Germans appeared over the top of the ridge. Ritchie fired and the group – about twelve strong – went to ground. Two Germans were then seen about 130 yards from Ritchie’s position:

  Taking the regulation aim for a walking target I fired at the leader who crumpled up with a loud “plop”. His companion stopped for a fatal moment to look at his fallen comrade so I quickly shot him. Throwing his arms in the air he went over backwards just like a famous picture from the Spanish Civil War.6

  Earlier, Colonel Guy Prendergast had ventured from LRDG Headquarters to find out for himself what was happening outside:

  I found the top of the feature a very uncomfortable spot. It was under fire from the Castello feature and was also being mortared from the direction of Santa Marina. There were at least 6 Stukas permanently overhead looking for a suitable target to attack, and periodically Ju 88s would come over in formation and drop anti-personnel bombs on the feature. I lay for some time in a bombed and abandoned Italian ack ack position and saw Germans ascending the feature from the direction of Vromolito [this may have been the same force encountered by Ritchie]. We exchanged a few shots and I then went down to the main HQ and told the Brig that in my opinion it was essential immediately to stage a counter attack on these troops to push them off the Meraviglia feature. He told me to return to my own HQ and he would see what could be done about collecting the necessary troops for this counter attack.

  At about 0800 hrs Brig Tilney with one of his Staff Officers came to the LRDG HQ cave and said that he was unable to stage this counter attack, and was proposing immediately to evacuate his HQ from the Meraviglia cave, and that I must move mine similarly. He decided to try to reassume control of the battle from Portolargo [sic]. By this time the Meraviglia feature was certainly becoming a most unpleasant place on which to live. The bombing on it from Stukas and Ju 88s, which were able to come as low as they liked, as all the Italian ack ack guns had by then run out of ammunition, was incessant, and heavy mortar fire was also spattering the feature. I told the LRDG HQ personnel to destroy all wireless sets and make their way to a certain house in Portolargo [sic] which we all knew …7

  LRDG Headquarters was situated on the east side of the feature under Lieutenant Peter A. Mold:

  I was about to take a small party on recce round the corner when Col Prendergast ar
rived with the news that the enemy had occupied the Italian battery position on the top of the hill and that HQ intended to evacuate and that if we did not move quickly we would be cut off. I gave orders for every man to take water bottle and a tin of food, his arms and as much ammunition as possible. Colonel Prendergast then said that the RV was to be the “Turnbull House” Portolago, I thought at the time this was a suicidal decision, Portolago being under continuous heavy bombing. However, we destroyed all equipment etc in our area and made off down the hill under fire.8

  To prevent their being captured and compromised, secret ciphers were also destroyed. At 8.25 a.m. the Germans intercepted a signal from Fortress Headquarters to General Headquarters (GHQ) in Cairo. It advised that the situation was critical; enemy forces supported by Stukas and machine-gun fire were reinforcing the Leros peninsula, and defensive positions on Meraviglia had been neutralised leaving troops demoralised and facing a hopeless situation. When the message was translated and relayed to Kampfgruppe Müller, it was duplicated in leaflet form with additional words of encouragement from the German commander: ‘Now let’s finish them off!’9 Copies were then dropped over German positions by Arado floatplanes. Müller knew he was close to victory. The source of the signal, apparently sent in plain language, is a mystery. But for the Germans, it was an unexpected and welcome bonus and exactly what was required to boost the morale of their own forces, not least the Fallschirmjäger, who were dispirited following a series of defensive actions.

  Before Fortress Headquarters was evacuated, Major H.E. Scott, OC HQ Company of the Royal West Kents, received a telephone message from Tilney ordering ‘D’ Company to attack north along the Porta Vecchia–Platanos road with the intention of pushing the enemy back into the sea. A written message was sent to the OC of ‘D’ Company, but there is no record of it reaching its destination. In any event, Tilney himself arrived soon after and reaffirmed the order, to the consternation of the company 2 i/c, Captain P.R.H. Turner, for any movement along the road was met with an immediate response from the Germans on the commanding heights.

  At about 8.30 a.m., Tarleton arrived back at the Anchor to a scene of disarray. The entire area was under fire from Meraviglia and troops had been dive-bombed, albeit without sustaining casualties. During ongoing air attacks against the battery on Mount Vigla, many bombs fell short and landed among what was left of ‘C’ Company, whose positions were also subjected to small arms and mortar fire. To the north-west, the AA Platoon was still attempting to reach the top of Meraviglia, with supporting fire provided by the battalion’s mortars. Through the dust and smoke, German snipers could be seen moving among the boulders and scrub on Meraviglia’s slopes. They were engaged by troops posted as local defence for Battalion Headquarters, which had relocated to a house some 300 yards to the north-west of the Anchor’s telephone exchange. With movement becoming increasingly difficult, ‘C’ Company, together with 18 Platoon ‘D’ Company, was repositioned slightly more to the west.

  Tarleton was not informed about Tilney’s earlier visit nor did he realise that Fortress Headquarters had been evacuated or that ‘D’ Company had been re-tasked. Neither was he aware of any orders already given to Captain Turner. The brigadier, who had remained in the vicinity rather than proceeding to Lakki as originally planned, sought out Tarleton later in the morning and updated him on developments. The battalion commander was dismayed to learn about the brigadier’s latest intentions for ‘D’ Company:

  The coy. was to fight its way through LEROS VILLAGE [Platanos] and join up with the BUFFS, who were to attack south-east towards ALINDA BAY, having been joined by HQ Coy. and “C” Coy. 2/R.W.K., who were to proceed up the west of the island for that purpose.

  It was explained to the Brigadier that the HQ Coy. available strength at that moment was the Mortar Pl. and a few men of 6 pl., i.e. about 45 in all, 2 pl. [sic] being committed on MERAVIGLIA, and that “C” Coy. mustered about 23 very tired men …

  “D” Coy. could not attempt an attack up the LEROS VILLAGE road with any change [sic] of success whatsoever whilst the slopes of MERAVIGLIA and APPETICI were held by the enemy. At this moment telephone communication was established with Col, [sic] PRENDERGAST, who was still either at FORTRESS HQ or the HQ of the L.R.D.G. nearby.10

  The interruption, which saved ‘D’ Company from almost certain annihilation, resulted from an encounter between Major Ben Barrington of the Royal Irish Fusiliers and evacuees from LRDG Headquarters. Lieutenant Mold’s account continues:

  At the double crested feature immediately below Meraviglia, I found myself with Sgt [Wilfred] Hughes and I paused to have a look round, only to be challenged by Major Barrington RIF with a rifle for evacuating the hill. Fortunately Col Prendergast then joined us and explained the situation, and ordered me to proceed to Portolago to try and gather our chaps together with Capt [C.H.B.] Croucher who was already on his way.11

  Prendergast recalled:

  I passed a wounded RIF officer [Barrington] who asked me why we were pushing off. I told him that these were the Brig’s orders, and sat down with him to discuss the situation. It seemed to us that if Bde HQ did in fact evacuate its cave at Meraviglia, leaving all its wireless sets behind, it would be virtually impossible for the Brig to continue to control the battle.

  I therefore decided to go back to the main HQ cave and see what could be done about moving the wireless sets to Portolargo [sic]. I took with me Sgt Hughes, the LRDG Signal Sgt. When we got back to the cave, dodging bombs all the way, I found Capt Rochford RIF, one signalman and a few very shaken Italians in the cave. The signalman said that he still had contact with the Buffs and with the RWK, and also with a set in Portolargo [sic]. I therefore spoke on the R/T to these three stations, and was fortunately able to find the Brig on one of them. He told me to remain in the main HQ cave and to run the battle to the best of my ability until he should return and again set up his HQ there.12

  While Tilney and Prendergast were discussing events on Meraviglia, Tarleton noticed some men doubling south-west from ‘D’ Company’s location. He alerted Major Shaw, who was nearby. The 2 i/c left, saying ‘I’ll fix it’. Possibly, the movement was ‘D’ Company forming up for the attack under Captain Turner (who would have been acting on Tilney’s orders independently and of whose instructions neither Tarleton nor Shaw were aware). Arriving at ‘D’ Company’s rear area, Major Shaw tried to determine what was happening. He looked around a wall, was hit by small arms fire in the thigh and forearm, and died soon afterwards: a tragic and unnecessary waste of life.

  On Meraviglia, Ritchie was in contact with the enemy throughout the morning. Soon after his initial skirmish, he was fired upon by two Germans:

  They were not very determined however, for after I had fired a few shots from my revolver and thrown some small Italian grenades at them (which all fell short) they disappeared out of sight down the hill. No sooner had they gone than Captain BOOTH and two men bolted from the tunnel exit of [number 4 gun] position … saying that [they] had run out of ammunition. (This seemed strange as I had not heard a single shot come from them although [they were] only 30 yds from me). Just after this the Marine “Capitano” of the damaged Italian battery emerged from his underground “refugio”, made a dash to [number 4 gun] position … and shouted back “There are only two Germans. Come quickly”.

  Lt Alan PHIPPS (RN) who had just joined me, carrying an enormous Webley automatic, asked if he could go and help. I told him he could, but to be careful. Telling Capt RAMSAY to join him, they ran to [number 4 gun] position … and together with the Italian they engaged the two Germans with pistols and grenades. I could not see what actually happened but very shortly afterwards the “Capitano” limped back with a hand almost blown off at the wrist and a leg badly wounded by a grenade. RAMSAY returned a minute later to say that the two Germans had withdrawn down the hill but that Lt PHIPPS had been killed by a burst of SMG in his chest.13

  Capitano Werther Cacciatori, manning one of the gun positions, recalled that mor
tar fire and air attacks had reduced his force from two dozen or so to eight British and six or seven Italians. After firing the last remaining shells towards the enemy at almost point blank range, he and his men continued to defend the post with automatic weapons:

  Out of ammunition, we threw our last hand grenades. Number 4 gun was captured, but we re-took it in hand-to-hand combat. My faithful and heroic Cavezzale was always at my side. Driven back again, we took refuge in the emplacement of Number 1 Battery. With my Beretta pistol, I fired at six paratroopers advancing with sub-machine guns. I admired their officer who, after my every shot, popped up and renewed his firing, smiling remorselessly. Suddenly, I fell: I was blinded! I touched my temple; the wound was not deep. With my other hand I wiped away the blood so I could see again. It would not have happened if I had my helmet, but a metal splinter had knocked it off my head a few minutes earlier. I got up again and continued shooting; that captain still looking at me and still smiling! An explosion left me dazed. Next to me, Cavezzale grabbed his rifle with fixed bayonet and suddenly disappeared from view.14

  The sight of the wounded Cacciatori was altogether too much for Pietro Cavezzale. It is alleged that an Italian burial party later found his corpse beneath that of a German with the Italian’s bayonet embedded in his chest. As for Cacciatori: