Lee Kuan Yew: The Man and His Ideas

by Han Fook Kwang

  … Over a period of several months, at luncheons, cocktail parties, dinner parties and other social occasions, the UK Commission officials dropped hints to Lim Chin Siong and his friends, and even generally to businessmen and sharebrokers, both local and British, giving everyone the impression that they considered Lim and his friends reasonable and sensible people. Slowly Lim and his friends were led to believe that if they were to obtain power by constitutional means, so long as the military bases were left untouched, the British would be quite happy to let them run this island.

  Lim was putting on his best act. He was pretending to Lord Selkirk [the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia] and his officials that he and his friends like Fong Swee Suan were just like Toh Chin Chye and myself. They were also PAP non-communist socialists, only they were in the more radical wing of the PAP.

  Selkirk and his officials had no doubts that Lim was the most important open-front communist leader. But they pretended to believe Lim’s act, that he was a genuine non-communist socialist. The British went out of their way to be nice to Lim and his friends, encouraging them to believe that there was no constitutional difficulty to their taking over the present government or forming the next one.

  On the other hand, the British pressed us as the Singapore government to curb and contain the subversive activities of Lim and his friends. We were therefore puzzled when we found that Lim and his friends were absolutely confident that they could take over and run the government. We could not understand how they came to believe this when on the other hand we were being pressed to take action against these same people. It was only after the Anson by-election, two days before the motion of confidence in the Assembly, when we found that Lim Chin Siong and his friends were in conference with the UK Commissioner at Eden Hall, that it dawned on us that this was a deep ruse which had been going on for some time.

  So the British led Lim and the communists to believe that they could take power.

  So long as Lim and his friends believed that they could not assume power without getting into trouble, they would play it quietly and not give trouble to the Singapore government, particularly a PAP left-wing government. So long as they did not attack the Singapore government, the British could not get the government to go out of its way to suppress Lim and his communist friends. So the British led Lim and the communists to believe that they could take power. Once Lim and the communists believed this they became bold. First they pressed us to change our policy. We refused, and then came the attack by the communists on the PAP.

  Lim and Fong said they went to tea at Lord Selkirk’s residence for social friendliness. Unfortunately, Woodhull later admitted that they went to see Lord Selkirk “to clarify the situation”.

  … What the British wanted to achieve was to get the communists to come out into the open on their own, attack the PAP and be purged in retaliation. Lim Chin Siong, the communist open-front leader, was helped by Woodhull and James Puthucheary, and also by sympathisers like Francis Wong, editor of the Sunday Mail. Francis Wong was also testing the ground at the UK Commission and having confidential discussions over lunch with UK Commission officials.

  By June they all became convinced by the British that constitutional rights were open to them and that they could assume power. The green light had been given. They could out-left the PAP. In this way, they blundered into their conflict with the PAP.

  The British have great experience in dealing with such delicate situations. Whatever embarrassment our exposure caused them, they have said absolutely nothing, and thereby saved themselves further embarrassment.

  If Lee was so against the communists, why did he allow himself to join hands with them? In this radio speech on October 2, 1961, he explained how he and his non-communist colleagues drifted into the company of the communists, who were also embarked on an anti-colonial struggle. But he knew that, sooner or later, he would have to part ways with them. He also believed that the open argument was the best way to persuade Singaporeans to the non-communist way.

  Clowns and crooks

  There were the mild and feeble political parties, like the Progressive Party, the Labour Party [Labour Front], and a whole host of funny ones. Clowns and crooks passed off as leaders of the people.

  You may ask: If the communists are such a danger to our society, why did we work with Lim Chin Siong and his communist friends in one anti-colonial united front? This and other questions have to be answered. However uncomfortable the truth may be to me and my colleagues, you must know it.

  I have told you how in 1953 we came to make our first communist contact with Laniaz. That was a time when the British, in fighting the communist insurrection, also suppressed all nationalists who attacked them. The result was that all those who were anti-British either kept quiet, or quietly threw in their lot with the communists underground to down the British.

  So in the open constitutional arena there were no lawful parties of any significance, with people fit or willing to lead the anti-colonial fight. There were the mild and feeble political parties, like the Progressive Party, the Labour Party [Labour Front], and a whole host of funny ones. Clowns and crooks passed off as leaders of the people. Emotionally, we felt more sympathetic with the communists who were sacrificing their life and limb to down the British and get them out of the country than with these comic and crooked men.

  Laniaz himself did not originally start off as a communist. He started as a nationalist. Slowly over the years he drifted more and more with the men who were fiercely fighting the British. They happened to be communists, and he joined them. In this same way we also drifted into the same communist company as Laniaz had done. Laniaz was anti-British as strongly as we were. We knew he wanted to establish an independent communist Malaya, and he knew we wanted to establish an independent democratic Malaya. But neither of our two different objectives would ever come to anything as long as the British were here. First we had to get rid of the British to get independence. That was a common objective.

  We came to the conclusion that we had better forget the differences between our ultimate objectives and work together for our immediate common objective, the destruction of the British. Whether you wanted a democratic Malaya or a communist Malaya, you had first to get rid of the British.

  We were quite clear as to what we wanted – an independent, democratic, socialist Malaya, which by democratic means could bring about a more just and equal society. On the other hand, they wanted a communist Malaya.

  This broad anti-colonial united front was an inevitable phase in the history of our struggle for freedom. Before India got her independence, there was a time when Nehru and the Communist Party of India formed a united front against the British to fight for independence. At a time when the colonial ruler made no distinction between the communists and the non-communists who opposed him, it was only logical and indeed inevitable that both the communists and the non-communists should come together to achieve their common objective.

  But we never forgot that once the British were out of the way, there would be trouble between us and the communists as to what kind of Malaya we wanted to have in place of the old British colonial Malaya. We were quite clear as to what we wanted – an independent, democratic, socialist Malaya, which by democratic means could bring about a more just and equal society. On the other hand, they wanted a communist Malaya. This is what the communists mean when they say “seeking concord whilst maintaining differences”. They know the difference between our ultimate objective and theirs. But they say let us not argue about these differences, let us seek concord on the common objective of fixing the British, and on that we were agreed.

  Vested interest

  We have now fallen out because we have disagreed on our next objective. We want merger and independence. The communists do not. They have a vested interest in continuing the anti-colonial struggle so that under cover of anti-colonialism they can advance communism. They want the anti-colonial struggle to go on and on, meanwhile using Singapor
e as a base from which to undermine Malaya.

  The second question that you may ask is: now that we all know Lim and his friends are up to no good, why do we not take immediate steps to deal sternly with them?

  The answer is: because if we take immediate steps to deal sternly with them, we shall lose the open argument of who is right and who is wrong. This is a battle for the minds of the people, for the people’s support for what we believe is right for the country.

  We must convince you, the people, that what we propose, independence through merger with the Federation, is in your best interests; that the communist aim to frustrate immediate merger is only for their own communist selfish advantage, and that deliberate prolonging of the anti-colonial struggle in Singapore, to use Singapore as a base from which to undermine the Federation, will bring trouble to all of us.

  To take immediate action is to lose to the communists in the battle for the people’s support. Singapore is a multiracial city with four major language groups – the Chinese-speaking, Malay-speaking, Tamil-speaking and the English-speaking. The Malay-speaking, Tamil-speaking and English-speaking groups are quite certain that Lim Chin Siong and his communist friends are up to no good, and consider that they should be put away and not allowed to do mischief. But we have to convince the Chinese-speaking not only that Lim and his friends are communists, working under instructions from the communist underground, but also that what they are doing is not good for all of us in Singapore.

  We must carry the opinion of all the people, including the Chinese-educated, with us. To do this we must bear in mind two things. The first is that to take stern action against the communists while Singapore is still a semi-colony with ultimate power still vested in the British would be to open ourselves to smear and misrepresentation that we are just stooges of the British and have acted to preserve British interests.

  Proxies see Selkirk

  British power is supreme in Singapore. The sovereignty of Singapore is still vested in the British. In the last resort, it is they who have the final say on what happens to Singapore.

  We know, and the communists also know, that in the last resort the British must take action on their own to protect their military and other interests. The communists fear this and for that reason their proxies went to see Lord Selkirk, the UK Commissioner, in Woodhull’s own words, “to clarify the situation”.

  The last government under Tun Lim Yew Hock took massive action against the communists. The government failed in the eyes of the people. They failed not because they had taken action against the communists, but because their action was deliberately misconstrued to the people by the communists as having been done under instigation by the British. As a result, the government lost out.

  The second thing we have to bear in mind is this. It is unwise to take stern immediate action against subversion in the unions, cultural organisations, old boys’ associations and even in the universities’ student clubs, because the action will be very largely against the Chinese-educated who have penetrated the leadership in these unions and associations.

  Unless there is a clear distinction made between the communists and the non-communists amongst the Chinese-educated we would merely create resentment against the government and sympathy for the cause of those detained.

  To purge the communists we have to be careful that we make it clear that we are not purging the Chinese-educated. This is a trap into which we must never fall.

  An important distinction

  We must therefore make a clear distinction between the Chinese-educated and the communists. As Fong Swee Suan, Chan Chiaw Thor, Woodhull, Devan Nair and James Puthucheary have stated in their letter to me, nearly all communists in Malaya are Chinese-educated. But not all Chinese-educated people are communists. To purge the communists we have to be careful that we make it clear that we are not purging the Chinese-educated. This is a trap into which we must never fall.

  The last government fell into the communist trap of allowing themselves to be presented as anti-Chinese culture and Chinese education. When they purged the communist student leaders to immobilise the handful who were responsible for the “stay-in” strike, they had to flush out of Chinese High School and Chung Cheng High School thousands of non-communist Chinese-educated students. The Labour Front government helped the communists to convince the people that the government had purged Chinese education. We cannot afford to make this same mistake.

  We must give the Chinese-educated a fair and equal place in our society and convince them that their best interests lie with the nationalist and democratic side.

  Hence the vital importance of getting a constitutional guarantee on local autonomy on education which will enable the Chinese to carry on their education from primary school to Nanyang University; otherwise the communists will make trouble over this to prevent merger.

  Our conflict is with the communists, most of whom are in the Chinese-educated world. But this does not mean we quarrel with the Chinese-educated, for that is exactly what the communists want us to do.

  Fair and equal place

  Our duty is to bring the various linguistic groups together to build up a united, tolerant society in which all the races and all the language groups will live in peace. We must give the Chinese-educated a fair and equal place in our society and convince them that their best interests lie with the nationalist and democratic side.

  So in spite of all the misunderstanding the communists and their supporters are trying to create amongst genuine and sincere Chinese educationists over the recent proposed change in the Chinese middle schools from the present six-year system of three years for junior middle and three years for senior middle, to a system with four years for Secondary School Certificate plus two years for post school certificate, we have been patient and always open to reason. In this way, we prevent the communists from making people believe that we are anti-Chinese education and carry with us the support of the neutrals who form the bulk of the people in the Chinese-educated world.

  Why was Lee Kuan Yew so determined to make Singapore part of Malaysia, and why was the Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman so apprehensive of the idea? What made the latter change his mind? Lee answered these thorny questions in this speech at the Royal Society of International Affairs in London in May 1962, in which he also spoke about the communist threat in Singapore.

  What does Malaysia mean to us?

  The alternatives are so unpleasant as to be quite unthinkable, and, because they are so unpleasant, I have not the slightest doubt that Malaysia will succeed.

  Malaysia – what does it mean to us? What does it mean to you? What does it mean to the outside world? To us, who do not want to see Singapore and Malaya slowly engulfed and eroded away by the communists, it is an absolute must. The alternatives are so unpleasant as to be quite unthinkable, and, because they are so unpleasant, I have not the slightest doubt that Malaysia will succeed.

  When the federation of these five territories or some grouping was first suggested by Mr Malcolm MacDonald many years ago it was welcomed by people who were then considered weak, reactionary stooge elements of British colonialism. Red-blooded people like myself and the communists scoffed at this fanciful plot to try and delay the political advance against the British colonial system in Malaya and Singapore. Well, that was more than a decade ago, and times have changed. In that time several things happened. First of all, Communist China emerged as a real force in the whole area. Secondly, the fringes of Southeast Asia became more and more unstable – Indonesia, Vietnam, even Burma. Thirdly, within the last decade the realities of power politics came home to the young nationalists of Southeast Asia; and it came home vividly with the Sino-Indian border conflict. There was the Bandung Conference, and the warm afterglow of fraternity and solidarity of Afro-Asia – just because we were Afro-Asians – vanished; the reality of power was brought home. I think anybody who has not been to the area for ten years and gone back, the one marked difference they would find between the 1940s an
d the 1960s is the fact that in those ten years everybody graduated into first-class Scouts – no longer tenderfoots. One has not just joined the Boy Scouts, one has found out about pathfinding, and how it is necessary to have a good compass.

  Now, why am I now solidly in favour of Malaysia? I have spent the last three weeks talking to a few people whose names and repute carry weight in the Afro-Asian world, and in the non-communist world generally, to convince them that this is no longer a British plot, that this is our scheme, amended and somewhat different, but nationalist and not colonialist. I think it would be useful if I were to tell you how it began, what the position is now, what I think will happen in the immediate future, and what I think the long-term prospects are.

  Officially, Malaysia began when the Tunku, the prime minister of the Federation of Malaya, came down to Singapore to make a speech to some foreign correspondents in May of last year, and he said he was all in favour of closer economic and political association between Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories; a fateful pronouncement, because for the first time he acknowledged that he had to have economic and political association with Singapore. Since 1955, when he was somewhat aghast at the boisterousness of the people in Singapore, his policy has been one of systematic isolation and the cutting of all ties between Singapore and the Federation in the fond belief that the British could look after Singapore.

  Since 1955, when he was somewhat aghast at the boisterousness of the people in Singapore, his policy has been one of systematic isolation and the cutting of all ties between Singapore and the Federation in the fond belief that the British could look after Singapore.

  Persuading the Tunku