Empire of the Sikhs

by Patwant Singh

  Another outstanding governor of Kashmir under Ranjit Singh was Hari Singh Nalwa. Like Ranjit Singh he was born in Gujranwala and lost his father at an early age, at seven. His grandfather and father had fought alongside the Maharaja’s father and grandfather, Sukerchakia chiefs Mahan Singh and Charat Singh. He had distinguished himself as a soldier time and again, at the siege of Kasur in 1807, Multan in 1810 and 1818 and Kashmir in 1819. He was a no-nonsense man, a strict disciplinarian and considered at times to be too harsh. Yet he was a spiritualist, a reformer and a man with strong social concerns who constructed gurdwaras at Kathi Darwaza, Srinagar, Matan and Baramula, places that had been visited by Guru Hargobind. He did away with all the restrictions which the Afghans had imposed on Kashmiri pandits regarding worship, dress and various customs, freed Hindus who had been made to convert to Islam to return to their original religion and abolished bega, forced unpaid service by villagers to government officials. He encouraged the cultivation of saffron by reducing the government share in its production and enforced correct weights and measures. He accorded priority to the government’s humanitarian responsibilities, especially during the famine of 1820-22, when at a time of complete economic, social and political chaos he geared the entire administrative machinery to a rescue operation.

  Like Ranjit Singh, Hari Singh Nalwa has attracted adverse judgements from a number of historians. Syad Muhammad Latif, while acknowledging him as a good soldier, calls him a failure as an administrator and a tyrant. According to Henry T. Prinsep, Nalwa was removed from his post as governor because he was ‘obnoxious to the inhabitants of Kashmir’. William Moorcroft accuses all Sikhs of looking on Kashmiris as little better than cattle.

  What such comments from both contemporaries and later historians show, if not a deep-seated reluctance to give credit to the Sikhs or even a form of anti-Sikhism, is surely this, that it is rare to find accurate accounts of eventful times. The charges against Hari Singh Nalwa have been repeated among the voluminous commentary on Ranjit Singh – failure as an administrator, tyranny and much else, without any factual evidence. Who are we to believe when we are also told by a contemporary how much the Kashmiris benefited under Sikh rule in Kashmir? ‘Before Ranjit Singh took possession of the valley, her trade routes were not safe and the costly shawls were often looted en route by the robbers. The Maharaja made special arrangements to safeguard the goods of the traders … In case of any loss of goods in transit, the traders were compensated. The trade routes were made safe to the extent that highway robberies became a thing of the past … The longest trade route was from Lahore to Petersburg via Kashmir.’35

  Ranjit Singh devoted much attention to the shawl-making industry and helped promote this trade more than did any other foreign power. Shawl-weaving came to account for almost one-third of Kashmir’s revenue. Some years later Russian shawl dealers started to visit Kashmir, although shawls intended for export to Russia had hitherto usually been dispatched via Kabul and Herat.

  Ranjit Singh’s agenda after Kashmir included the trans-Himalayan region of Ladakh, with its borders touching Kashmir, Baltistan and Tibet – a 30,000-square-mile tableland at a height of 14,000 feet, surrounded by mountain ranges 26,000 to 28,000 feet high. Its Buddhist population was of Mongolian descent, while its neighbour Baltistan, with its capital at Iskardu, was ruled by a Muslim prince, Ahmed Shah. Ranjit’s governor of Jammu, the Dogra Gulab Singh, also had his eyes on Ladakh. An obsessively ambitious man, he annexed it in 1834 with Ranjit Singh’s consent. Since the latter was a ruler few men in their right mind would cross, Gulab Singh stayed subservient to him during his lifetime, but after his death the wily Dogra was to show his true colours.

  More importantly, Peshawar, the last major symbol of Afghan rule in northern India, was also very much on Ranjit Singh’s agenda; but before that a number of lesser foreign territories throughout the Derajat belt had to be brought under Sikh rule. These included Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, Leiah, Mankera and Bannu. While the first two and the last lay west of the River Indus, the remaining two were located east of it. This entire region north-west of the Indus, whether part of Peshawar province or outside it, was of great importance to anyone with designs on the strategically important city of Peshawar located almost next to the Khyber Pass. So a year after annexing Kashmir, in 1820, Ranjit Singh personally led an expedition to Dera Ghazi Khan and invested this dependency of Kabul. It was a valuable acquisition since it brought Sikh forces nearer the route that Central Asians and Afghans had customarily taken into India on their way to its other rich regions and nearer realization of the Sikhs’ aim of cutting it off altogether.

  In the following year the busy trade centre of Dera Ismail Khan was annexed, and then, when the key fort of Mankera fell, its Afghan governor was made a feudatory of the Sikhs. After the capture of Leiah towards the end of the same year Ranjit Singh had the arid 1,650 square miles of Bannu district in his sights. Its annexation, accomplished in 1825, consolidated the hold of the Sikhs on this area west of the Indus inhabited by the most turbulent people who harboured a fierce hatred of Hindus and Sikhs. It was first made a tributary of the Dera Ismail Khan region before being brought under the direct control of Lahore in 1836. The warlike tribes of this volatile region – the Pathans, Baluchis, Sials, Awans, Saiyads, Qureshis and others – have lived by their own laws and codes of conduct for centuries. In establishing his sway over these formidable people, Ranjit Singh achieved a solution that has eluded the dominant powers of this part of the world in our own time, for whom the lawlessness of the area causes such grave problems.

  Before the prized city of Peshawar was brought under Sikh control many more possessions of the Afghans and other regional chieftains were taken over: Kohat, Manzai, Rawalpindi, Bhera, Jhang, Kangra, Kasur, Waziristan – the land of the Waziri Pathans – and a number of others. Finally it was the turn of Peshawar.

  Peshawar was perhaps the most strategically vital city in India at that time. It had been used as the gateway into the Indian subcontinent over the centuries by the Lodhis, Mughals, Durranis, Nadir Shah of Persia and many others. The name of this historic city has many variants. The Chinese pilgrim Hieun Tsang referred to it in the seventh century as Po-lu-sha-pu-lo, while the eleventh-century Muslim historian A.D. Alberuni called it Parshawar and sometimes Purshur. The Mughal emperor Babur referred to it as Parashawar, which was the name Akbar, too, preferred, although Akbar’s court historian Abul Fazl used the name Peshawar (frontier town) as well. The original name of the city was Poshapura, among the many other names it was given. It became the seat of Gandharan art and culture around the middle of the first millennium BC and an important fountainhead of the Buddhist faith, despite the alien environment in which it found itself. Several historians hold the view that Peshawar was a part of the Kushan Empire (first to third centuries AD).

  In keeping with its critical strategic importance, the conquest of Peshawar demanded all of Ranjit Singh’s tenacity and military skills. The first attack on it was launched from Attock in 1818 by his favourite general Hari Singh Nalwa. It was currently in the hands of the Barakzais, the powerful Afghan chiefs who had dispossessed the Durranis of it. The Barakzais, who had found it easy to defeat the Durranis, met their match in the combined Sikh forces which first occupied Peshawar on 20 November 1818. While its governor Yar Mohammad Khan Barakzai fled, the city’s citizens raised a tribute of 25,000 rupees and offered it to Ranjit Singh for its protection. He in turn appointed Jahan Dad Khan, former governor of Attock, to administer Peshawar. It was Ranjit Singh’s frequent practice as his conquests multiplied to levy a yearly tribute on his fallen foes, instead of a policy of permanent occupation. He broke with this policy only if tribute was not paid on time or if the tributary tried to double-cross him. Since he treated his defeated adversaries fairly, he did not take well to any attempt to disregard agreements arrived at.

  This, in fact, is what happened in the case of Peshawar. No sooner had Ranjit Singh left for Lahore after appointing Jahan D
ad Khan as governor when Yar Mohammad Khan returned to expel the latter. Because of his other priorities in the north, it took Ranjit Singh several years to address the situation, which he finally did on 14 March 1823, the opportunity being provided by the Afghans themselves. Muhammad Azim Khan, former governor of Kashmir, was now prime minister in Kabul, and he had no love lost for Ranjit Singh. He decided to assemble a formidable force to put an end to Ranjit Singh’s spectacular career and advanced from Kabul towards Peshawar, to be met by the Sikh army at Nowshera.

  As the Gazetteer of the Peshawar District, based on first-hand data, states: ‘The Pathans fought with desperate valour, but could not make head against the superior numbers and discipline of the Sikhs; frequently rallying, however, upon some low hills adjacent, they bore down bravely upon the enemy, who began to waver towards evening, but regained their advantage when Ranjit Singh, seizing a standard, himself led them to victory. The last stand was made at sunset by a party of 200 Yusafzai, who fell gallantly fighting. In this action 10,000 Pathans are said to have been slain.’36

  After the Battle of Nowshera, a victorious Ranjit Singh once again rode into Peshawar and with his customary liberality made Yar Muhammad Khan his tributary governor of Peshawar. The defeated prime minister of Afghanistan, Azim Khan, a broken man, unable to deal with the humiliation of this defeat, died soon afterwards.

  The permanent Sikh occupation of Peshawar, however, was still years away. It was not until 1834 that the Sikhs brought it directly under the control of the Lahore Durbar. In the intervening years the Afghan rulers made repeated attempts to re-establish Kabul’s suzerainty over the city, but Ranjit Singh always foiled them. In 1834, feeling it was time to take direct charge of Peshawar, he chose an able and trusted man to annex it, General Hari Singh Nalwa, who has been called ‘the Murat of the Khalsa’ – after Napoleon’s brother-in-law and outstanding marshal of the French army. With a force of 9,000 men, Hari Singh crossed the Indus and took up an unexpected position to the west of Peshawar. His moves unnerved the Barakzai Sardars, who fled and left the city to the Sikhs. In 1835 the Afghans under Dost Mohammad made an unsuccessful attempt to retake Peshawar, but it remained a part of the Sikh kingdom with Hari Singh Nalwa in charge of it with a force of 10,000 men.

  Nalwa, like Murat, was known as a general’s general, and living up to his reputation he soon initiated a project to build a fort at Jamrud, which dominates the entrance to the Khyber Pass. Within a year of its construction in 1836, the resentful Kabul regime, furious at the audacity of the Sikhs even to think of building a fort in their territory, overlooking the traditional route they had taken into India for centuries, mounted an attack against it with a large force. They opened up with their guns on the walls of the fort and were about to begin an assault when Hari Singh, who had held back until the enemy advanced, suddenly fell upon them with his customary vigour, broke their ranks without much loss and put them to flight.37

  Soon, however, with the arrival of Afghan reinforcements the ebb and flow of battle resumed with intensity. The outcome was in favour of the Sikhs but at a terrible cost – the death of Hari Singh Nalwa. Badly wounded, this great warrior died the same night. His contribution to upholding the valour of the Khalsa is reflected to this day in the inscription still to be seen on the inner gateway of the Bala Hisar or High Fort of Peshawar:

  Victory to Purakh [the Supreme Being]. Through grace of Sri Akal. Under the liberal government of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh Bahadur over the region of Peshawar, in the year [Vikram Samvat] 1891 [AD 1834].38

  4

  Campaigns, Conquests and Consolidation

  The truly enlightened ones

  Are those who neither incite fear in others

  Nor fear anyone themselves.

  GURU GRANTH SAHIB, Slok, 16, p. 1427

  Many writers have been at pains to give credit for some of Ranjit Singh’s dazzling military victories to the European officers serving under him. But in fact, these officers were recruited only from 1822, and much before that many campaigns using forces made up of Sikhs and other citizens of Punjab had been fought, especially against the Afghans, battle-tested and bloodied fighters steeped for generations in a tradition of relentless armed conflict. Ranjit Singh was used to winning victories and calling the shots unaided well before the year 1822 in which Jean-François Allard and Jean-Baptiste Ventura arrived in Lahore.

  He was in no doubt over the exceptional fighting qualities of the Sikhs and their courage and commitment on the battlefield, against the British or any other adversaries. But he was also aware of the need for other inputs and that his armies lacked modern weapons which the British and other Western powers had in plenty. He had been well aware since his secret nocturnal visit to General Lake’s camp on the Beas during the British campaign against the Marathas in 1803 that his forces’ effectiveness could be considerably enhanced with newer and more advanced methods of training and a stronger sense of discipline and order. He hired foreign military instructors from early in his reign, mostly from within the subcontinent, including Anglo-Indians. The end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 released a ready supply of European professional soldiers, and a number of these entered the Maharaja’s service from the 1820s as officers, those who had served under Napoleon being especially selected. He endlessly grilled those he knew could contribute towards the efficiency of his armies, since he had no problems with learning from others.

  He was not to be taken in by smooth and facile statements and reviewed with the utmost care the pedigree of those who sought to enter his service, and even after they had effectively answered his barrage of questions he had them investigated still more thoroughly. When Allard and Ventura appeared before him, he had heard that they had both served in Napoleon’s army, but to satisfy himself still further he had them checked out by his own men to eliminate the danger of moles. When he was convinced of their integrity, Allard was given a responsible position with the Sikh cavalry and Ventura with the infantry.

  Jean-François Allard, a Frenchman with an impressive background, had fought in Naples, Spain and Portugal before joining Napoleon’s Imperial Guard. Starting with the command of a company of a hundred men, Allard rose to be the senior general in Ranjit Singh’s cavalry. Jean-Baptiste Ventura, an Italian, had an equally sound record and had served in Napoleon’s army under Joachim Murat, Marshal of France. After Waterloo he had served in Turkey and Egypt, and when he met Allard in Tehran they both decided to go to India. A few years younger than Allard, Ventura was a colourful character; married to a Muslim woman, he kept a sizeable harem and had a roving eye. After serving with distinction for seventeen years he died in Peshawar of a heart attack in 1839. Ranjit Singh, who was himself seriously ill at the time, was not told of his death as it was feared it might prove too much for him because of the extent of his affection and regard for Allard. Ventura served on after Ranjit Singh’s death and retired in 1843. During his career with the Lahore Darbar he fought against the Afghans in 1823, in Kangra in 1828 and at Peshawar in 1832, also being appointed, successively, governor of Derajat and Lahore.

  Two other generals who served Ranjit Singh with distinction were Paolo di Batolomeo Avitabile and Claude-Auguste Court. Both, like Allard and Ventura, had served in Napoleon’s army. Avitabile joined the Sikh army in 1826 and Court in 1827. Avitabile, over six feet tall and inclined to stoutness, spoke fluent Persian, Hindustani, French and Italian. Further to his other appointments, he was made governor of Wazirabad in 1829 and of Peshawar in 1837. Court, a short, plump, well-dressed man with a pockmarked face, trained the Gurkhas serving in the Sikh army and provided major impetus to the development of the artillery. Figures vary regarding how many Europeans served in Ranjit Singh’s army, although the number of forty-two is generally agreed upon. Of these twelve were Frenchmen, four Italians, four Germans, three Americans, two Spaniards, one Russian, one Scot, three Englishmen, seven Anglo-Indians, and there were five others.

  After a period of induction during which they familiarized
themselves with all aspects of the Sikh army, Ranjit Singh gave Allard and Ventura sweeping authority to organize new units, advise on the appointment of new officers and introduce French drill and training throughout the regular army. The change to the Fauj-i-ain, using French terminology and words of command, with beat of drum, in place of the existing system modelled on the British, took more than a decade to accomplish. The steady increase in the strength of the Sikh army’s infantry and cavalry up to and beyond Ranjit Singh’s death can be substantially attributed to the impetus provided by these two. Another change they brought about was a restructuring of the Fauj-i-ain introducing the larger unit of the brigade.

  Together with Avitabile, Allard and Ventura created the ‘Royal Army’, the Fauj-i-khas, which became known as ‘the French Legion’, containing units of all three main branches of the army. In two years its infantry strength was four battalions and two cavalry regiments, with a smaller artillery corps under a Muslim officer; it eventually attained a total strength approaching 6,000 men.1 Whereas the effectiveness of Allard’s cavalry is a matter of some debate, especially after Allard’s death in 1839, the infantry component of the Royal Army went from strength to strength, seasoned by the actions at Naushehra (1823), Peshawar (1837-9), Kulu and Mandi (1841) and reaching a pinnacle of performance in the First Sikh War (1845-6).

  Although Court was given the task of developing the regular artillery soon after his entry into the Maharaja’s service in 1827, it took four years and Governor-General Bentinck’s artillery demonstration at the Ropar meeting of 1831 to bring home the full scale of reform that was needed. Court followed his French compatriots in introducing French gun drill and words of command, at the same time training the artillerymen with a French manual he translated into Persian. He greatly increased the scale of production of guns at the Sikh foundries and taught the ordnance workmen how to cast shells and make fuses. At Ranjit Singh’s death in 1839 the regular artillery possessed some 192 field pieces (compared with roughly a hundred in 1826), not counting guns in fortresses and in the hands of the jagirdars. By the outbreak of the First Sikh War six years later this figure was to double, although a number of these guns were old pieces taken from fortresses and refurbished.