When the King Took Flight

by Timothy Tackett

  Then, abruptly, almost as rapidly as they had begun, the various panics evaporated. Urgent messages from the "invasion sites" themselves soon made it clear that no foreign troops had appeared or that if they had appeared, they had now "retreated." The National Assembly took steps to denounce the stories as unfounded. Yet the rumors also encountered skepticism from some local administrators. Significantly, all the invasion fears had begun in areas little touched or untouched by the Great Fear of 1789. But once the rumors arrived in regions that had experienced the violence and anarchy of the previous panic, they were frequently greeted with disbelief. In Chateau-Thierry, for example, a town that had been profoundly shaken by the Great Fear, district leaders concluded that the announced invasion was so inherently incredible that the story must have been an enemy fabrication, a plot to disrupt the nation. Not only did they refuse to pass on the rumor, but they set out to investigate the source of the falsehood.35 Particularly among the elites, the memory of the widespread violence and anarchy of that earlier encounter with imaginary enemies seems to have acted like an inoculation against ensuing panics.

  The Enemy Within

  Everywhere in France, even in regions where no panics had occurred, the king's sudden disappearance provoked fears of possible invasion. But the crisis also aroused fears of internal enemies, secretly plotting against the Revolution. A conspiratorial view of the world was hardly unique to the Revolutionary period. For centuries people had attributed grain shortages to the concealed maneuvers of various groups of scoundrels out to make a profit or to take their revenge for wrongs previously suffered. Despite the appearance of new modes of analysis, based on rational "scientific" explanationlinking famine, for example, to meteorological conditions or to poor transportation-a great many people continued to relate all that went wrong in the world to the willful actions of individuals operating through plots and conspiracies.36 Even to the more enlightened members of provincial society, such a hypothesis seemed by no means impossible in the context of the Revolution. Patriots knew only too well that the transformations wrought since 1789 had excited the bitter opposition of two groups, in particular: the nobility and the clergy.

  Although a small group of liberal nobles had early thrown in their lot with the Revolution, the great majority were anything but pleased by the course of events. Unhappy with the National Assembly's attack on their feudal rights and privileges, they were even more angered by the suppression of the very status of "noble" in June 1790. In their racial view of society, the idea that one could legislate the nobility out of existence seemed absurd, as though-in the words of a baron-one could change an oak tree into a pine by a simple decree.37 To be sure, after the summer of 1789 most provincial nobles remained cautious, watching their language and retiring to their chateaus or townhouses, where they hoped to ride out the storm. But a few were unable to hold their tongues, taunting the local patriots, rejecting the very existence of a National Assembly or of the "rights of man," and predicting that the recent changes would never last. When they gathered among themselves for social occasions and commiseration, they were even less restrained in their condescending remarks about the Revolution and the Revolutionaries and in their angry prophecies of catastrophe for both. Such predictions, born of impotent rage and frustration, were invariably overheard by servants and neighbors. Duly embroidered and passed on to the community, such talk could be transformed into proof of conspiracy.

  The conspiracy interpretation was all the more credible in that everyone knew of the armies of emigres gathering across the Rhine, counterrevolutionaries who had fled France and were dedicated to ending the Revolution. With the advantages of hindsight, it seems clear that such armies, manned with large numbers of noble officers but very few common soldiers, posed little real danger to the nation. But for patriots in the spring of 1791, the reality of the threat was much more difficult to assess. It was hard to believe that men who had always wielded so much power in society would now suddenly cease influencing events. Many were convinced that the emigre leaders, the count d'Artois and the prince de Conde, were secretly lining up support among provincial nobles." In the months before Varennes, a citizen in Picardy told the National Assembly of groups of nobles gathering at a nearby chateau, and of his conviction that "plots were being hatched" among "men with the evil intention of starting a counterrevolution." In southern Lorraine, there were reports of another "known counterrevolutionary schemer who was moving from chateau to chateau" to organize the local nobility and "overthrow the constitution." A letter from Provence claimed proof of a vast network organized in every region of the country by emigre nobles, an "aristocratic, chivalrous, Jesuitical association" sworn to obey the count d'Artois.39 Whether real conspiracies existed in any of these cases is difficult to know. But such letters revealed the widespread conviction in the spring of 1791 that whole segments of the provincial nobility were engaged in counterrevolutionary activities.

  And such fears were intensified by the religious crisis brewing in France since the beginning of 1791. By the spring of that year al most half of the parish clergymen in the country had refused to swear the loyalty oath in the words specified by the National Assembly, and orders were issued for the replacement of the "refractory" priests. In strongly refractory areas like western France or the peripheral zones of the east and south, many leaders felt themselves threatened and under siege. Wherever there were significant clusters of oath refusals, administrators were tempted to see collusion and hidden conspiracies, perhaps initiated by the refractory bishops, now living abroad and closely tied to the emigres. Already in May department directors in Laon, northeast of Paris, had become obsessed with the "critical situation" created in their region by the oath crisis. There was no doubt in their minds that the clerical refusals were linked to "centers of sedition and plotting, both inside and outside the kingdom.""

  Thus, when news of the king's flight broke, patriots throughout much of the country already assumed the existence of internal conspiracies dedicated to the destruction of the Revolution and undoubtedly linked to foreign enemies. "The disappearance of the royal family," wrote the leaders of one town, "excited a general movement of indignation against the enemies of the public good. The audacious statements of some, the emigration of others, the refusal of the oath by clergymen, all are indicative of a criminal conspiracy."" The real problem for administrators-the problem that would beset the Revolutionaries for years to come-was how they should respond to such threats. And here they were deeply torn. On the one hand, most officials were committed to the concept of equal justice and the rule of law, for nobles and clergymen as for everyone else. Such ideals were, after all, part and parcel of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. As men of substance themselves, the officials remembered only too clearly the chaos and disorder of the first summer of the Revolution, and they were anxious that accused "suspects" should be dealt with by the courts and not by mobs. Their directives in June and July 1791 were filled with admonishments on the need to preserve law and order. Officials in Auch, for example, urged everyone to show "a perfect submission to the laws. Citizens! now we must decide whether we can truly be free or whether we will be fettered with the new chains of anar- chy."42

  On the other hand, the very values of equal justice and the rule of law were dependent on the continued existence of the new constitution, and the administrators were aware of the threat posed by the king's departure and the perceived conspiracies to the survival of the Revolution. Were there not emergency situations in which the defense of the nation justified repressive actions that would normally be illegal; when, as Charles Lameth had put it, "It was better to commit a momentary injustice than to see the loss of the state"? In this context, the Assembly's instructions on taking all necessary steps for "the maintenance of law and order and the defense of the nation" were particularly ambiguous and elastic. They could easily be interpreted as a veritable blank check for repressive action.43

  Local officials, moreover, were
not acting in a vacuum. They had always to take into account the opinions of the people they were supposed to administer and whose suspicions and penchant for violence were only too well known. Two groups, in particular, pushed local leaders toward more repressive measures in the days after June 21: the urban masses and the national guards. In numerous communities, news of the king's flight and his arrest in Varennes set off spontaneous outbreaks of popular violence against local nobles and clergyman.44 Sometimes the authorities acted immediately to redirect such emotions. The notables of Cahors were unusually creative in this respect, organizing a special "federation" ceremony-perhaps advancing plans already afoot for the July 14 celebration. There were marching guardsmen, bands, patriotic speeches by the constitutional clergy, rousing renditions of "ca ira!" and a solemn oath pronounced by all men and women to be faithful to the nation and the laws. In Strasbourg a veritable public charivari was organized with straw effigies of Bouille and his subordinates, Klinglin and Heyman, carried through the streets in a cart and subsequently burned in the central square before the cheering population.41

  But for many officials, acquiescence to popular pressure seemed the better part of valor. Administrators in Brittany were particularly articulate in their description of the dilemma. "The unrest and resentment of the people has reached an extreme degree," they wrote in late June. "In the midst of this agitation, it is impossible for reason alone to be heard. We must soothe and accommodate such passions if we are to prevent them from falling out of control ... and maintain our favor in public opinion, without which it would be impossible to govern."46

  [To view this image, refer to the print version of this title.]

  Conspirators in the Kings Flight Burned in Effigy in Strasbourg, June 25, 1.791.

  Perhaps no single issue aroused greater apprehension among the common people than the control of the town fortress. The keys to such strongholds were held by local military commanders who were themselves invariably nobles. The treason of General Bouille and his entire staff had intensified suspicion against all such officers. In Strasbourg, in Verdun, in Dunkerque, in La Rochelle-in virtually every fortress city up and down the coast and along the frontierscivilian administrators were compelled by popular demand to take control of the local citadels. As the town fathers in Cambrai explained, "the people consider priests and nobles to have been the authors of the king's abduction." Officials thus felt compelled to seize control of city defenses, "since, in the present state of things, it would be dangerous to oppose public opinion, which is an essential element of patriotism."47

  Pressure for various forms of extralegal action also came from the national guards. Throughout the country, as we have seen, the mobilization of the local militia was among the first measures taken when administrators received word of the king's flight. The National Assembly had decreed that lists be drawn up of guardsmen prepared to go to war if the country should be invaded, and almost everywhere men rushed to enroll with extraordinary enthusiasm. In Lyon more than eight hundred new recruits were welcomed from the city alone; in La Rochelle "spontaneous meetings of citizens by street or by neighborhood determined the formation of six new companies." Even in the small southern village of Cuxac, peasant guardsmen were said to be "burning with the desire to save the nation.""

  Most of the guards were strongly committed to the goals of the Revolution. They had vowed to preserve the constitution against all its enemies, and the experience of Varennes strengthened their suspicions of aristocrats and refractory clergymen. Several units quickly expelled all nobles from participation, since "prudence and the safety of the state prevent us from confiding troops to individuals whose interests are opposed to those of the Revolution."49 Moreover, if they were to perform their functions properly and obtain the status they felt they deserved, these newly minted militiamen would obviously require arms and ammunition. The guardsmen's vigorous search for muskets and powder would have the advantage not only of disarming counterrevolutionaries, but also of placing more weapons in patriot hands.50 Almost everywhere in the days after June 21, the guardsmen formed the shock troops of repression in the provinces."

  Between Law and Expediency

  Responding to popular pressures and adapting the National Assembly's blank check to do everything necessary for the defense of the nation, administrators throughout the country took a range of measures against the "enemies within." Many of these measures were both illegal and in violation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. But the crisis appeared so unprecedented and the danger of conspiracy so real that officials resolved to take "all necessary and appropriate measures to thwart the treacherous plots of the enemies of society."52

  Thus, almost everywhere local officials began opening and reading letters sent through the post office-despite repeated decrees on the "inviolability" of the mail.53 The council of one small town in Lorraine carefully explained its reasoning: "Our internal and external enemies will not fail to do everything possible to achieve their infernal designs against the nation. Thus, it will perhaps be prudent, without revealing any family secrets, to scrupulously examine in the post office any correspondence that might seem suspicious."54 In practice, the definition of suspicious correspondence varied greatly from one town to another. Some officials examined all letters addressed to or from foreign countries. Elsewhere they focused on mail sent from refractory bishops or received by any "suspect" noble or clergyman. Most of the letters so examined were unrevealing, despite the patriots' best efforts to read conspiracy into inane family chatter. Large quantities piled up in the archives of the Assembly's Committee on Research, never delivered, and as little enlightening to the deputies in 1791 as to historians today. But occasionally the opened letters had major consequences for individuals. A seemingly innocent note from an emigre noble to his business agent near Orleans-a certain Monsieur Petit-intercepted and revealed to the public, led to the near lynching of the agent and his lengthy incarceration in the town jail. "At every minute," wrote the terrified Petit, "I seem to hear the mobs crying out for a victim."55

  Many officials also sanctioned the illegal arrest of travelers. Broadly interpreting the Assembly's interdiction on individuals crossing frontiers, administrators began stopping unknown travelers wherever they were found, especially those who appeared to be nobles or who had unlikely dress or strange speech or who seemed a bit nervous. It was clearly not the moment to leave on a trip, and the National Assembly was flooded with appeals from unfortunate people who found themselves imprisoned in the midst of the crisis, sometimes for weeks on end, denied the right of habeas corpus guaranteed by the constitution. In Cahors guardsmen fell upon two Belgian businessmen with obvious foreign accents on their way to Italy. The townsmen justified the arrest in terms of their fear of "an impending invasion of foreign troops. To save the constitution from destruction . . . we felt the need for extraordinary precautions." In any case, the two were still in jail in the middle of August, bitterly lamenting their fate. Elsewhere authorities summarily arrested a down-and-out clarinet player, a physician from the royal stables on his way to Brussels, and a suspicious count "prowling" through town and "suspected by everyone." 51

  Usually, however, provincial patriots were less worried about outsiders passing through than about local inhabitants who had already aroused mistrust for their opposition to the Revolution. All over France, teams of officials and national guardsmen rushed to scrutinize nearby chateaus and religious houses staffed by clergymen who had refused the oath. They searched for evidence of secret meetings of counterrevolutionaries. They looked also for arms and munitions, arms that might be used against the Revolution and that, in any case, were badly needed by the patriots themselves.

  For the first time in many provincial towns the term suspect entered widely into the administrative vocabulary. But what it was that aroused distrust, what it was that indicated "suspect inten- tions"-as officials in Montpellier put it-was often far from clear. In many cases, suspicion seems to have arisen from specific sta
tements made by individuals, either sometime in the past or immediately after Varennes, words that classified them in the minds of their neighbors as "citizens notorious for their antirevolutionary principles." A woman in Meaux was incarcerated for an "aristocratic out burst" during a dinner with friends several months earlier. A priest near Verdun was arrested for publicly musing that "it would not have been a disaster if the king had escaped"-words taken entirely out of context, according to the "suspect" in question. Two refractory priests were nearly hanged by an angry crowd in Vendome for insulting a prorevolutionary clergyman. Unfortunately, officials were unable to save a noble in Brest from popular revenge for his mocking depiction of a Revolutionary ceremony with "obscene graffiti" on the walls of a cabaret. Soon after news of the king's disappearance arrived, the noble was murdered and his head paraded through the streets on a pikes'

  Elsewhere, individuals had attracted mistrust because of known links to emigrants or because they themselves had expressed a desire to leave France. We have seen the sad predicament of Monsieur Petit when his correspondence with an emigre was intercepted. A young man named Boubert was tracked down and arrested after asking a relative for money to finance his emigration.58 More common, no doubt, were the fears aroused by the reputed secret gatherings of nobles and clergymen in local chateaus. Reports of "hidden conclaves of aristocrats and refractories" in Saint-Denis, just north of Paris, prompted district authorities to search a nobleman's home at two in the morning. The nobleman claimed that the visitors had come only to celebrate Pentecost, and in fact the inspection turned up neither arms nor mysterious strangers. A similar search of a chateau near Chaumont-en-Vexin-where a noble family was surprised in the midst of a game of whist-turned up nine antiquated hunting guns and a souvenir pike from the battle of Fontenoy, all duly confiscated for the arsenals of the nation.59