Life and Death in Shanghai
Page 64
Party officials claim that eventually a new economic structure will emerge in China. It will include joint ventures using foreign capital and technology and Chinese labor, state-owned industries relying more on market forces than on rigid planning from Beijing, and small-scale private enterprises. The new system is what Deng Xiaoping and his team proudly call “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
The implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms has not gone unopposed. The old guard who had spent a lifetime in the Party viewed Deng’s policy as a betrayal of Marxist principles and the Communist revolution. Others opposed him because the reform measures threatened their position and privileges. At times, the attempts to undermine Deng’s efforts went beyond mere criticism. Despite this uncertain climate, Deng Xiaoping pressed on tenaciously to achieve his goals.
Since the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982, he has successfully persuaded a million middle-ranking Party officials to retire on attractive terms. And through rectification campaigns within the Party, he has weeded out the most recalcitrant officials at the base level. Since the beginning of 1985, he has changed the leadership of several ministries of the State Council and appointed younger men as governors and Party secretaries in twenty-six of the twenty-nine provinces and autonomous regions. In August 1985, he even achieved the difficult task of restructuring the military command and removing from active duty the generals who were among his severest critics. During a series of meetings of the Party Congress and Central Committee in September 1985, he brought about the “voluntary” retirement of aged Party leaders in the top echelon of power and replaced them with younger Party officials loyal to his reform policy.
However, though the Maoist leaders have been routed, Deng Xiaoping and his team now face opposition from another quarter. These critics differ from the Maoists in that they support the idea of economic reform and do not wish to topple Deng Xiaoping. But they are alarmed by the numerous problems the reform effort has created. They think China’s door has been opened too wide and the relaxation of central control has gone too far. They would like to see China admit foreign capital, technical know-how, and equipment without admitting Western ideas and customs. They are especially concerned about the influence of such Western concepts as democracy and sexual freedom, which they fear will threaten the monolithic rule of the Party and undermine the moral standards of Chinese society. These men, including several well-known Marxist theorists, constitute a formidable section of the Party hierarchy and are headed by Chen Yun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and a veteran Party leader with an impeccable reputation for honesty and dedication. They watch Deng Xiaoping closely and offer ideological arguments to make sure the reformists do not stray too far from the narrow path of socialism. To them, Deng’s economic reform is a necessary evil rather than a desirable step towards progress.
Since the beginning of 1986, it has become increasingly obvious that the omnipresent problem faced by the reformist leaders is covert resistance from entrenched Party bureaucrats who are often uneducated and highly suspicious of, if not hostile to, the technocrats installed in administrative posts by the reformists. In many instances, their interference and harassment have rendered it impossible for the newly appointed men to carry out their work. To overcome this obstacle, Deng Xiaoping and his team called for political reform to free administrative posts from Party control. Their plan was not to change the political system but merely to modify its operation. Furthermore, as a concession to the people, Deng wanted to allow more than one Party-nominated candidate as well as a few acceptable non-Party independents to run in local elections.
Though these tame reform proposals fell far short of the people’s expectations, they were vigorously opposed by the dogmatists, who saw in Deng’s plan a threat to the supremacy of the Communist Party. At a Central Committee meeting in September 1986, Deng Xiaoping was forced to retreat from his position on political reform in order to be allowed to proceed with his economic policy. The only official document to emerge from the Central Committee meeting was one sponsored by the dogmatists calling for the establishment of “socialist spiritual civilization” to counter the influence of capitalism. Armed with this document, the dogmatists made further discussion of political reform taboo and banned a number of publications, as well as the work of certain professors and writers. As news of the fierce debate at the Central Committee meeting leaked out, there was talk of a new Anti-Rightist Campaign against the intellectuals, and even a rumor of an impending coup against Deng Xiaoping. Such, briefly, was the political situation in China immediately before the student demonstrations in thirteen major Chinese cities during December 1986.
Seventy percent of China’s population are young people under thirty-five years of age. The university students, numbering fewer than two million in a nation of one billion people, are the elite of the elite. While they have long been impatient with the rigid control of their lives by insensitive and arbitrary Party bureaucrats, the setback at the Central Committee meeting and the measures subsequently taken against their professors and other intellectuals were the immediate causes of their discontent. It was to express their anger and frustration that the students took to the streets demanding freedom and democracy.
Certainly the students’ demands went a lot further than the reforms envisaged by Deng Xiaoping. The demonstrations lasted four weeks, during which time the reformist leaders remained silent. The police acted with restraint, trying to prevent disturbances rather than punishing the students. The dogmatists, however, reacted shrilly, making accusations against “spies of the Kuomintang” and criticizing foreign broadcasting stations for inciting the students. Only after the students had returned to their campuses did the People’s Daily, the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, come out with a lead article blaming the demonstrations on the influence of “bourgeois liberalism” and claiming that the Party’s ideological work had been inadequate. From this, one can expect a new, intensified political indoctrination program for university students. The young people will have to reaffirm their faith in the leadership of the Party and in Marxism. As for the professors and educators, some will be made scapegoats, others will have to engage in self-criticism. All will be silenced.
In China, intellectuals are not free and independent as they are in the West. They are state employees, like everybody else who has a job. Those occupying distinguished positions have sponsors in the Party leadership. It is entirely understandable that among Deng’s supporters in the Party leadership are men who believe a fundamental change in the political system essential to achieve modernization. It is also reasonable to assume that the well-educated middle-aged Party leaders, waiting so patiently for so long in the wings of the political arena, are getting restless.
In the fall of 1987, the Thirteenth Party Congress will be held to elect a new Central Committee and Politburo. From now on, the struggle between the reformists and the dogmatists will no doubt intensify. If younger leaders emerge to advocate more revolutionary changes in the political system than Deng Xiaoping is ready to accept, Deng may be forced to side with the dogmatists. However, Deng Xiaoping and the other main actors on China’s political stage are old men in their eighties and late seventies. In a few years, they will fade from the scene. The fate of China in the 1990s will be decided by a new generation of leaders who may or may not be able to sustain the authoritarian rule of the Communist Party and at the same time achieve economic progress.
Constant change is an integral part of the Communist philosophy. The Chinese Communist Party leaders expect the people to rush headlong into whatever experiment they wish to carry out, whether liberalization or collectivization. For the whole thirty-eight years of Communist rule, the Party’s policy has swung like a pendulum from left to right and back again without cease. Unless there is a change in the political system, China’s road to the future will always be full of twists and turns. There will be uncertainty and sacrifices. And there will be factional
struggles for power. But Communist China today is different in one important aspect. She is no longer isolated and ostracized from civilized international society. World opinion and the China policy of major powers that are the source of foreign investment and trade, such as the United States, can and do influence the course of events in China. The abrupt crumbling of the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign in 1984 and the restraint displayed by the police towards the recent student demonstrators are instances proving that the Party leaders are conscious of China’s image in the eyes of the world and are anxious to project a good one. Those wishing for stability and moderation in China may have their voices heard.
Washington, D.C.
January 1987
Index
Addis, Sir John, 527–29, 531–32
American Graduate School of International Management, 299
Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957), 16, 20, 25, 27, 29, 89, 200, 228, 236, 238, 297, 499
Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign (1984), 544
Antonioni, Michelangelo, 458–59
Australia, 32, 35, 363
“Back-door” system, 365, 371–72, 376, 390, 396
Bank of China, 377, 534
Beijing, 167, 206, 335, 467–72, 474
Buddhist Research Institute, 293
Canada, 306–7
Chen Boda, 304–5
Chen Yi, 5, 267, 457
Chen Yun, 463, 541
Cheng Meiping, 3, 4, 29–36, 44, 51, 56, 59, 60, 61, 68, 82, 87, 93–95, 98–99, 101, 109, 112, 113, 115–16, 243, 343–46, 357, 358, 360–61, 363, 367–69, 383–87, 394, 397–99, 403–4, 420–22, 423, 427, 438–41, 442, 444, 448, 477–78, 487–88, 490–96, 520–22, 535, 539
Cheng Yanqiu, 428
Chinese Communist Party, 23–24, 25, 90, 198, 199–200, 279, 283–84, 296–98;
Congresses: Seventh, 208;
Eighth, 50;
Ninth, 207, 267–68, 269, 273, 276, 304, 337;
Tenth, 417, 518;
Eleventh, 485–86;
Twelfth, 540;
Thirteenth, 543
Communist Youth League, 105, 116
Confucius, 81, 437–38, 458
Constitutional Reform Movement, 88
Democracy Wall (1978–79), 253
Democratic League, 228
Deng Xiaoping, 38, 54, 374, 417, 428–29, 438, 458, 459–60, 463, 465, 467, 471, 472, 485, 487, 499, 522, 523–24, 527, 539, 540–43
Du Fu, 267
Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries Campaign (1955), 16, 198
Fabian Socialists, 105
Federation of Women, 496, 514–15, 517–20, 533
Fighting for Shanghai (film), 280
Formation of Rural Cooperatives Movement (1955), 16
Four Modernizations Program, 459–60, 469, 517, 518, 519
Gang of Four, 173, 174, 285, 298, 481–92 passim, 523–24
Great Britain, 117, 160–62, 165–68, 235–38, 349–50
Great Leap Forward Campaign (1958–60), 38, 50, 54, 55, 166, 236, 292, 297, 465
Han (director of Shanghai Public Security Bureau), 492–94, 502
Han Suyin, 531
He Long, 489
Hong Kong, 6, 48–49, 101, 102, 105, 239, 461, 503, 510–11
Hong Kong–Shanghai Banking Corporation, 5, 364
Hua Guofeng, 471, 472, 474–75, 481–82, 485, 486–87, 499, 518, 522
Huang, Henry, 23–25, 28
Huang, Winnie, 22–29
Huang Zuolin, 280–85
Imperial Chemical Industries, 5
Jardines, 5
Jia Wu Naval Battle (film), 524
Jiang Qing, 34–35, 38–39, 54, 58, 98–99, 173, 181, 182, 207, 237, 240, 267, 281, 337, 339, 374, 428, 437–38, 457, 459, 463, 465, 467, 468, 470–71, 474, 475, 481–82, 484–86
Karnow, Stanley, 531
Kuomintang, 5, 16, 23–24, 42, 44, 49, 119, 128, 150, 165–66, 227–30, 264–65, 280, 286–88, 290–99 passim
Land Reform Movement (1950–52), 16, 88, 283
Lao Li, 446–48, 487–88, 523, 528–29, 531–33, 538
Laozi, 267
Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom Campaign (1956), 25, 253
Li Bo, 267
Li Zhen, 48–60 passim
Liberation Army Daily, 286
Lin Biao, 38, 39, 86, 149, 175–76, 181, 182, 207, 219, 221, 237, 240, 267–68, 271, 273–74, 290, 305–6, 333, 336–37, 358, 396, 400–401, 413, 428, 432
Lin Fengmian, 26, 72
Lin Liguo, 271
Little Sword Society, 425
Liu Shaoqi, 38, 53, 54, 208–9, 222–27, 231, 233, 239–41, 261, 274, 281, 290, 305, 336–37, 463, 489, 492
London School of Economics, 104
Lu, Empress, 468
Luo Ruiqing, 303
Ma Lianliang, 428
Ma Tianshui, 174, 475
Mao Yuanxin, 460, 465, 470
Mao Zedong, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 21, 23–25, 35, 37–39, 45, 46, 49, 50, 53, 58–59, 62, 63, 86, 89, 110, 126–27, 174–75, 181, 182, 187, 203–4, 206–9, 218, 220, 222–24, 233, 234, 236, 240, 255, 259, 267, 276, 285, 286, 298, 303, 305–7, 315, 316, 335, 347, 374, 401, 413, 428, 437–38, 457, 463, 465, 470–71, 474–76, 479, 485–86, 499, 518, 522, 539
Works: Collected Works, 96, 135, 142, 213, 264, 410, 411;
“Fire Cannonballs at the Headquarters,” 38;
Little Red Book, 17, 96, 125, 135, 145, 146, 156, 185, 210, 218, 220, 244, 246, 249, 268, 295, 335–36;
“On the Dictatorship of the People’s Democracy,” 150;
“On the Internal Contradiction of the People,” 246;
“The Strategy of China’s Revolutionary War,” 291
Marx, Karl, 84, 104
Meiping. See Cheng Meiping
Military Control Commission, 181–93
passim, 220, 280, 284
Nixon, Richard M., 305, 337–38, 347–48, 430
Opium War, 14, 117
Peng Dehuai, 303, 489
People’s Art Theater, 280, 284, 428
People’s Bank, 65–66, 461
People’s Daily, 97, 218, 259, 286
Political Consultative Conference, 50, 51, 55, 157, 515–16
Qi Baishi, 72
Qing Dynasty, 90, 281
Qing Ming festival, 468–69
Qinghua University, 206
Red Flag (magazine), 286
Red Guard News, 112
Red Guards, 58–122
passim, 171, 173–76, 206, 270–71, 364, 374–75, 394–95, 397–98, 426, 412–14, 415, 470, 475
Reform through Labor Camps, 127, 133
Residents’ Committees, 378–82, 397,399–401, 468, 471–72, 474, 481–82, 483–84, 496
Revolutionaries, 104–22
passim, 173–76, 269, 270–71, 397–98, 417, 475
Shanghai, 3–4, 23–24, 50, 62–63, 86, 94, 99–100, 125–26, 192–93, 195, 270–71, 277, 281, 349–50, 359–60, 366–67, 370, 387–94, 398, 425–26, 430, 456–57, 483, 488, 516, 523–26, 533–34
Shanghai Aluminum Company, 67
Shanghai Athletics Association, 367–68, 373, 383–86, 421
Shanghai Conservatory of Music, 48, 49, 53–60
passim, 360
Shanghai Film Studio, 6, 32–34, 112, 115–16, 360, 367–69, 386, 398, 421, 467, 490–91, 494–95
Shanghai Foreign Language Institute, 89, 412, 473, 497–98
Shanghai Liberation Daily, 96, 138, 174, 175, 259, 303, 304, 458, 466, 467, 513, 522
Shanghai municipal government, 4, 52, 85–86, 94, 98, 100, 113, 114–15, 171, 173–74, 273, 349, 461, 475, 524
Shanghai Museum, 76, 505–13 passim
Shanghai Public Security Bureau, 174, 180, 231, 337, 358, 359, 360, 361, 364, 487–89, 492–94, 497, 500–503, 521–22, 529–30
Shanghai Workers Revolutionary Headquarters, 173, 460
Shell International Petroleum Company, 5–6, 7, 9–10, 12, 19, 21–22, 27, 29, 42–43, 55, 69, 89, 117, 118–20, 126, 158–59, 232–33, 235–37, 281–84, 291, 349, 426�
��27, 436, 522, 537
Snow, Edgar, 306
Socialization of Capitalist Enterprises Campaign (1956), 39
Soviet Union, 47, 54, 495, 524
Sun Weishi, 428
Sun Yatsen, 516
Sun Yatsen Memorial, 293–95, 298–99
Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Campaign (1950), 16
Taiwan, 117, 165–66, 290, 305, 347, 348
Tang Yin, 512
Tangshan earthquake, 473–74
Tao Yuanming, 72
Thought Reform Movement (1951), 24, 49
Three and Five Antis Movement (1953), 49
Tilanqiao prison, 193–201, 243–45, 303–4
Tongji University, 23, 397, 398, 404
United Nations, 117, 305, 333
United States, 49, 117, 165–66, 199–200, 305–7, 337–38, 348, 363, 496–97, 500–501, 538, 544
Vietnam, 338, 522–23
Voice of America, 496–97, 499
Wan Li, 417
Wang Dongxing, 486
Wang Hongweng, 173, 460–61, 463
Wanli, Emperor, 167
Workers’ and Peasants’ Propaganda Teams, 206–7, 210, 220, 221–22, 231, 348, 368