Republic (Barnes & Noble Classics Series)

by Plato

  But we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if only possible, is assuredly for the best.

  We have.

  And now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would be for the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult, is not impossible.

  Very good.

  And so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject, but more remains to be discussed; how and by what studies and pursuits will the saviours of the constitution be created, and at what ages are they to apply themselves to their several studies?

  d

  Certainly.

  I omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women, and the procreation of children, and the appointment of the rulers, because I knew that the perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was difficult of attainment; but that piece of cleverness was not of much service to me, for I had to discuss them all the same. The women and children are now disposed of, but the other question of the rulers must be investigated from the very beginning. We were saying, as you will remember, that they were to be lovers of their country,ez tried by the test of pleasures and pains, and neither in hardships, nor in dangers, nor at any other critical moment were to lose their patriotism—he was to be rejected who failed, but he who always came forth pure, like gold tried in the refiner’s fire, was to be made a ruler, and to receive honors and rewards in life and after death. This was the sort of thing which was being said, and then the argument turned aside and veiled its face; not liking to stir the question which has now arisen.

  e

  503

  b

  I perfectly remember, he said.

  Yes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding the bold word; but now let me dare to say—that the perfect guardian must be a philosopher.23

  Yes, he said, let that be affirmed.

  And do not suppose that there will be many of them;24 for the gifts which were deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together; they are mostly found in shreds and patches.

  What do you mean? he said.

  c

  You are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, memory, sagac ity, cleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and that persons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and magnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a peaceful and settled manner; they are driven any way by their impulses, and all solid principle goes out of them.

  Very true, he said.

  On the other hand, those steadfast natures which can better be depended upon, which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are equally immovable when there is anything to be learned; they are always in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual toil.

  d

  Quite true.

  And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to whom the higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in any office or command.

  Certainly, he said.

  And will they be a class which is rarely found?

  Yes, indeed.

  Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labors and dangers and pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of probation which we did not mention—he must be exercised also in many kinds of knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of all, or will faint under them, as in any other studies and exercises.

  e

  504

  Yes, he said, you are quite right in testing them. But what do you mean by the highest of all knowledge?

  You may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts; and distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom?

  Indeed, he said, if I had forgotten, I should not deserve to hear more.

  And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of them?

  To what do you refer?

  We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see them in their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way, at the end of which they would appear;25 but that we could add on a popular exposition of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded. And you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so the inquiry was continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate manner; whether you were satisfied or not, it is for you to say.

  b

  Yes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair measure of truth.

  But, my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in any degree falls short of the whole truth is not fair measure; for nothing imperfect is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented and think that they need search no further.

  c

  Not an uncommon case when people are indolent.

  Yes, I said; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the State and of the laws.

  True.

  The guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer circuit, and toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach the highest knowledge of all which, as we were just now saying, is his proper calling.

  d

  What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this—higher than justice and the other virtues?

  Yes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the outline merely, as at present—nothing short of the most finished picture should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains, in order that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost clearness, how ridiculous that we should not think the highest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy!

  e

  A right noble thought; but do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking you what is this highest knowledge?

  Nay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the answer many times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I rather think, you are disposed to be troublesome; for you have often been told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this.26 You can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little; and, without which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess the good? or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness?

  505

  b

  Assuredly not.

  You are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good,27 but the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge?

  Yes.

  And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by knowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good?

  How ridiculous!

  Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it—for the good they define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them when they use the term “good”—this is of course ridiculous.

  c

  Most true, he said.

  And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good.

  Certainly.

  And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same? True.

  d

  There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this question is involved.

  There can be none.

  Further, do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to seem to be what is just and honorable without the reality; but no one is satisfied with the appearance of good—the reality is what they seek; in the case of the good, appearance is despised by everyone.

  Very true, he said.

  Of this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his actio
ns, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever good there is in other things—of a principle such and so great as this ought the best men in our State, to whom everything is intrusted, to be in the darkness of ignorance?

  e

  506

  Certainly not, he said.

  I am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the just are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and I suspect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them.

  That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours.

  And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge, our State will be perfectly ordered?

  b

  Of course, he replied; but I wish that you would tell me whether you conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or different from either?

  Aye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you would not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters.

  True, Socrates; but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of others, and never telling his own.

  c

  Well, but has anyone a right to say positively what he does not know?

  Not, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no right to do that: but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.

  And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the road?

  Very true.

  And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when others will tell you of brightness and beauty?

  d

  Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal; if you will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied.

  Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who is likest him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to hear—otherwise, not.

  e

  By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our debt for the account of the parent.

  I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the account of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only; take, however, this latter by way of interest,fa and at the same time have a care that I do not render a false account, although I have no intention of deceiving you.

  507

  Yes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed.

  Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at many other times.

  What?

  b

  The old story, that there is many a beautiful and many a good, and so of other things which we describe and define; to all of them the term “many” is implied.

  True, he said.

  And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term “many” is applied there is an absolute; for they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each.

  Very true.

  The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen.

  Exactly.

  And what is the organ with which we see the visible things?

  c

  The sight, he said.

  And with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive the other objects of sense?

  True.

  But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?28

  No, I never have, he said.

  Then reflect: has the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard?

  d

  Nothing of the sort.

  No, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other senses—you would not say that any of them requires such an addition?

  Certainly not.

  But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no seeing or being seen?

  How do you mean?

  Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to see; color being also present in them, still unless there be a third nature specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eves will see nothing and the colors will be invisible.

  e

  Of what nature are you speaking?

  Of that which you term light, I replied.

  True, he said.

  Noble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature; for light is their bond, and light is no ignoble thing?

  508

  Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble.

  And which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of this element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the visible to appear?

  You mean the sun, as you and all mankind say.

  May not the relation of sight to this deityfb be described as follows?

  How?

  Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?

  b

  No.

  Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?

  By far the most like.

  And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed from the sun?29

  Exactly.

  Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognized by sight?

  True, he said.

  And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in his own likeness,fc to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind. 30

  c

  Will you be a little more explicit? he said.

  Why, you know, I said, that the eyes, when a person directs them toward objects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the moon and stars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind; they seem to have no clearness of vision in them?

  Very true.

  But when they are directed toward objects on which the sun shines, they see clearly and there is sight in them?

  d

  Certainly.

  And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with intelligence; but when turned toward the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence?

  Just so.

  Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the idea of good, and this you will deem to be the cause of science, and of truth in so far as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance, light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honor yet higher.

  e

  509

  What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the author of sciencef
d and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you surely cannot mean to say that pleasure is the good?

  God forbid, I replied; but may I ask you to consider the image in another point of view?

  In what point of view?

  b

  You would say, would you not? that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generation?

  Certainly.

  In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.

  Glaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness: By the light of heaven, how amazing!31

  c

  Yes, I said, and the exaggeration may be set down to you; for you made me utter my fancies.

  And pray continue to utter them; at any rate let us hear if there is anything more to be said about the similitude of the sun.

  Yes, I said, there is a great deal more.

  Then omit nothing, however slight.

  I will do my best, I said; but I should think that a great deal will have to be omitted.

  I hope not, he said.

  You have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling powers, and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible. I do not say heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing upon the namefe May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind?

  d

  I have.

  Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images.32 And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like: Do you understand?