Republic (Barnes & Noble Classics Series)

by Plato

  4 ( 1.332c) if we asked him what due or proper thing is given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to us?: Analogies comparing justice—whether in everyday moral choices made by individuals, as here, or in the authority exercised by political leaders, as at 1.340d ft.—to various arts and skills (technai in Greek—for example, of the doctor, helmsman, and musician) are central to Republic’s analysis of justice. The implications of these analogies are considerable, as are the effects. One important effect is to suggest a link between “justice” and knowledge, or expertise, which enables one to distinguish between appearance (seeming) and reality (being), as at 1.334c-335b and 1.339d-341a. These suggestions set the stage for Socrates’ subsequent arguments that “justice” in the individual results from the rule of the soul’s rational (that is, knowledgeable) principle over “spirit” and “appetites” (book 4), and that justice in the state can be realized only when the rulers are “philosophers” (books 5-7).

  5 (1.334a) a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer: Several epic poems composed in dactylic hexameter, including Iliad and Odyssey, were attributed to “Homer” in antiquity. Iliad is set at and around Troy (a non-Greek city in Asia Minor) in the tenth year of the legendary war between the Greeks and the Trojans; Odyssey relates the homecoming of Odysseus to the island of Ithaca in the tenth year after the Greek victory at Troy. Unlike Plato’s interlocutors, modern scholars (with a few exceptions) tend to view Iliad and Odyssey as products of centuries of oral story-telling and poetic improvisation, rather than creations of a single individual (that is, “Homer”). Iliad and Odyssey, in more or less the forms that they now have, became widely known throughout Greece during the latter half (650-500 B.C.E.) of the archaic period, and Athenians in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E. revered them as key cultural landmarks. Several Platonic dialogues, including Republic and lon, attest to the contemporary popularity of the Homeric epics, which were widely performed by “rhapsodes” and subjected to analysis and interpretation by professional critics. It is worth noting how Plato has his interlocutors speak of Homer (and other poets) in the present tense, as if they were still alive.

  6 (1.335b) in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?: The Greek literally reads “in regard to the excellence (aretê) of dogs, or of horses....” Aretê, from which the adjective aristos (“best”) is derived, is the condition or quality that makes a given thing or individual “good.” When used in general terms of human beings, it commonly refers to moral excellence as well as other qualities or factors (such as intelligence, courage in battle, self-restraint, piety, physical attractiveness, birth, wealth) that would make a man stand out among—and be “better” than—his fellow citizens. Aretê, then, is sometimes translated as “virtue” (see below at 1.348c), but in typical usage its range of meaning is generally broader than that of the English word “virtue.”

  7 (1.336a) Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban: Periander was tyrant of Corinth (c.625-585 B.C.E.). The Macedonian king named Perdiccas to whom Socrates refers here is probably Perdiccas II (c.450-413 B.C.E.). Xerxes was the king of Persia (d.465 B.C.E.) who led the invasion of Greece in the late 480s B.C.E. Ismenias the Theban is possibly the Ismenias who, in 395 B.C.E., took gold from the Persians in exchange for his help in fomenting war between the Thebans and the Spartans. Since the “dramatic date” of Republic is necessarily earlier than 395, Socrates’ reference to this Ismenias constitutes a (presumably deliberate) anachronism.

  8 (1.338c)justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger: Thrasymachus’ definition relies on a term (that is, to sumpheron—“interest” or “advantage”) that he expressly precluded Socrates from using at 1.336c-d. Nonetheless, that justice is advantageous to the just person is a concept that Socrates, along with Glaucon and Adeimantus, will develop, although along lines wholly different from those in Thrasymachus’ mind.

  9 (1.338d) have you never heard that forms of government differ—there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?: As he draws attention to the ways in which the ruling authority of a community is responsible for determining what constitutes acceptable (that is, “just”) behavior on the part of its inhabitants, Thrasymachus shifts the focus of the conversation from the “just” behavior of ordinary individuals to the “just” exercise of political power. From this point on, the investigation moves back and forth between the two points of focus. It can be argued that these two kinds of “justice” are fundamentally different. Yet Socrates will eventually define justice as a condition of the soul that is responsible for all kinds of “just” behavior, whether in private dealings or in the exercise of political power (4.442d-443e), and the conflation that begins here anticipates his formulation.

  10 (1.341d) every art has an interest?: The way in which Socrates, here and elsewhere, conflates the practitioner of a given skill or craft (for example, a doctor) with the technê itself (for example, medicine) is noteworthy.

  11 (1.343b) and you further imagine that the rulers of States, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night: Thrasymachus’ contemptuous dismissal of Socrates’ view of leadership looks ahead to the metaphor developed in books 2-5 that likens the guardians of the ideal city-state, as leaders and protectors, to shepherds and their dogs—see, for example, 5.451c.

  12 (1.343d) the unjust man has always more and the just less: The phrase pleon echein—in Greek, literally “to have more”—recurs throughout the first two books of Republic to describe (1) the self-aggrandizing behavior of the unjust man, who feels no scruple about competing with others (and harming them, if need be) in order to get all that he wants, and (2) the advantages that such aggressively self-seeking behavior is thought to bring. Compare 1.349b: “Does the just man try to gain any advantage [pleon echein] over the just?,” 2.359c: “then we shall discover... the just and unjust man to be proceeding along the same road, following their interest [dia pleonexian],” and 2.362b: “and at every contest, whether in public or private, [the unjust man] gets the better [pleonektein] of his antagonists.” Thrasymachus’ glamorization of the pursuit of personal advantage and power (pleonexia) has much in common with Callicles’ argument concerning the “law of nature” in Gorgias 482c-486d as well as with the argument of Antiphon’s “On Truth.” Although Thrasymachus’ praise of injustice is surely meant to seem at first blush outrageous and “sophistic” in character, Plato’s interlocutors invite us to believe that his ideas, for all the arresting frankness of their expression, are really in accordance with mainstream values. See Glaucon at 2.358c: “I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinning in my ears,” Adeimantus at 2.367: “I dare say that Thrasymachus and others . . . ,” and, more generally, Socrates at 6.493a: “all those mercenary individuals, whom the many call Sophists... do, in fact, teach nothing but the opinion of the many.” Compare Gorgias 492d.

  13 (1.344a) the happiest of men: Compare “happy and blessed” at the end of 1.344b just below. “Happy” and “blessed” are both translations for the adjective eudaimon; “happiness” and “blessedness” are interchangeably used to translate the noun eudaimonia, which literally refers to the state of having a favorable guardian spirit (daimon) presiding over one’s life. The “happiness” that is Republic’s focus is thus not mere temporary joy or delight; it is, rather, long-term (that is, lifelong) fulfillment and contentment.

  14 (1.344e) Is the attempt to determine the way of man’s life so small a matter in your eyes—to determine how life may be passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage?: This is the first of several passages in Republic in which Socrates or another speaker accentuates the profound significance of the issues under discussion. Compare, for example, 1.347e, 2.367c-d, 5.450b, and 10.608b.

  15 (1.345a) even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play: The Greek literally reads “even if one lets it [that is, injustice] go and d
oes not prevent it from doing what it wants.” This sentence marks the beginning of Socrates’ effort, which he sustains throughout Republic, to disassociate “happiness” and personal “profit” from the satisfaction of appetites and desires—that is, “doing what one wants.”

  16 (1.347a) no one is willing to govern ... without remuneration: This important idea is developed in book 7, especially at 7.519c-521b and 7.540b.

  17 (1.348c-d) And would you call justice vice? No, I would rather say sublime simplicity. Then would you call injustice malignity?: For the broad range of meaning of aretê (translated in the text surrounding this passage as “virtue”), see note 6 on 1.335b. The word translated here as “vice,” kakia, has a similarly broad range of meaning and refers to the condition or quality that makes a given thing or individual “base” (kakos), including (for human beings) ugliness, poverty, and lowliness in social station, as well as moral defect. When Thrasymachus identifies injustice with aretê in the exchange that immediately follows, he asserts in essence that the self-aggrandizement he has associated with injustice makes one stand out and be “better.” The assertion is bold, since justice is typically conceived of as one of the chief “virtues” (aretai), but hardly nonsensical, given Thrasymachus’ view of the material advantages of injustice.

  18 (1.352a) And is not injustice equallyfatal when existing in a single person... making him an enemy to himself and the just?: This statement and the discussion leading up to it look ahead to the analysis in books 4, 8, and 9 of injustice and its effects on the individual’s soul.

  19 (1.352d) Would you not say that a horse has some end?: The word ergon in Greek, rendered here as “end,” is perhaps better translated as “function.” This question and the analysis it introduces reinforce a concept already introduced at 1.346a-b, that every thing (or person) has a single function (ergon). Both passages anticipate the crucial organizational principle of the ideal city-state-that is, the mandate that every citizen should have one and only one occupation (2.370a-b)—which becomes the foundation for the conceptions of justice in the individual as well as the community that are advanced in books 4, 8, and 9.

  20 (1.353b) And has not the eye an excellence?: Once again, “excellence” is aretê in Greek; see note 6 on 1.335b.

  21 (1.353d) and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil?: The notions that the human soul (psyche in Greek) has a function—that is, to live—and that it fulfills that function well, producing a “good” and “happy” life by virtue of its excellence (aretê), are fundamental to Republic. Although we are not meant to be satisfied with the case Socrates makes in this passage for justice as the “excellence” that enables the soul to fulfill its function (see 1.354a-c, below), the formulations he develops in this passage preview the argument he will make at length, especially in books 4, 8, and 9.

  22 (1.354b) Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours: Socrates’ observation about the unsatisfactory nature of the discussion so far (his ironic comment at 2.368b notwithstanding) directs attention to the problem of definition. The advantages of and happiness brought by justice (or injustice) cannot be properly assessed before justice and injustice are defined. Compare the end of Protagoras (361c).

  Book 2

  1 (2.357a-b) do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust?: The differences between seeming and being, appearance and reality, are central to Republic (especially books 6 and 7), and Plato does not miss an opportunity to draw attention to them. Compare Glaucon’s question here with 1.334c-335b and 1.339d-341a.

  2 (2.358e) They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil; but that the evil is greater than the good: Glaucon’s summary of the (purportedly) common understanding of justice and injustice, especially the sentiment that suffering injustice is far worse than doing injustice, parallels in several aspects the views that Plato attributes to Polus and Callicles in Gorgias. Although Glaucon and later Adeimantus raise many important points concerning the ambiguities of popular moral values, their representations of “what most people think”—and of the moral messages of poetic works—are tendentious, and they provide the basis for Socrates’ claim in book 6 that it is “the many” who are in fact responsible for the corruption of young people. See 6.492d-494a and 1.344c.

  3 (2.360c) a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever anyone thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust: Glaucon here inverts the maxim commonly attributed to Socrates that “no one does wrong willingly.” Compare Socrates at 3.413a and also Adeimantus at 2.366c-d, who adds that even someone who appreciates that justice is best will not be “angry with the unjust... because he also knows that men are not just of their own free will.”

  4 (2.362c) and out of his gains he can benefit his friends, and harm his enemies: By identifying the gain over antagonists (that is, pleonexia) as the phenomenon that enables one to “help friends and hurt enemies,” Glaucon makes an explicit connection between Thrasymachus’ boldly expressed defense of injustice (as pleonexia) and the traditional conception of justice as “helping friends and hurting enemies” that Polemarchus articulates at the beginning of book 1. See note 12 on 1.343d.

  5 (2.365d) secret brotherhoods and political clubs: Brotherhoods (literally, “conspiracies”) and political clubs flourished in Athens in the late fifth century B.C.E.; their members typically included men from aristocratic families who were disenchanted with the institutions and practices of democracy.

  6 (2.365d) professors of rhetoric: Several dialogues by Plato, notably Gorgias, Phaedrus, and Protagoras, are concerned with the teaching of rhetoric by professional (and at times highly paid) instructors. Plato sometimes distinguishes such “professors of rhetoric” from “sophists”; sometimes he does not (for example, in Protagoras).

  7 (2.366c) men are not just of their own free will: See note 3 on 2.360c.

  8 (2.367a) but everyone would have been his own watchman: The word for “watchman” in Greek is phylax, also translated as “guardian.” Adeimantus’ use of the word here anticipates the attention that will be given in books 2-7 to the “guardians” in the ideal state. Compare the equally pointed use of phylax at 8.549b and 3.413e.

  9 (2.367e) I had always admired the natural ability of Glaucon and Adeimantus: The Greek word physis, when used in reference to human beings, describes their natural and innate abilities, dispositions, and talents. Throughout the rest of Republic, Socrates will repeatedly emphasize the importance of physis, which, he asserts, varies considerably from individual to individual. (See, for example, 2.370b, where he and Adeimantus agree that “we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations.”) This view of physis, which has its roots in traditional aristocratic ideology and its assumptions about the innate superiority of the “well-born,” has enormous implications for the political philosophy advanced in Republic.

  10 (2.369a) I propose... that we inquire into the nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them: The assumptions that the same conditions give rise to “justice” in the community and in the individual and that, as a consequence, the “justice” of an individual is completely comparable to that of a city-state, are crucial to Socrates’ argument, and they are never challenged by his interlocutors. Compare 4.442d for another reassertion that “justice” in community is identical to that in the individual, and also 4.435d-e and 8.544d for the assumption that the traits of a given community or people are determined by the characters of its individual members.

  11 (2.369b) Can any other origin of a State be imagined?: Theories about the origins of human society abounded in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E.; compare, for example, Protagoras 320c-323a.

  12 (2.370b)
we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations: This is a crucial assumption and formulation in Republic; see note 9 on 2.367e.

  13 (2.370c) when one man does one thing which is natural to him and does it at the right time, and leaves other things: This is another crucial formulation, which is anticipated by the argument at 1.353b—d concerning the unique functions of eyes, ears, etc.

  14 (2.371c) In well-ordered States [salesmen] are commonly those who are the weakest in bodily strength, and therefore of little use for any other purpose: Plato has Socrates reflect typical Athenian prejudices about the inferior character and abilities of merchants and laborers. Compare 6.495d-e and 9.590c.

  15 (2.372a) Probably in the dealings of these citizens with one another: Adeimantus’ inference about where to “locate” justice in the ideal community is borne out in the discussion at 4.432d-434a.

  16 (2.372e) But if you wish also to see a State at fever-heat, I have no objection: Despite Socrates’ reservations concerning the “fevered” and “unhealthy” condition of a city that provides for more than its citizens’ most basic needs, the refinements Glaucon asks for are in fact crucial to Socrates’ conceptual izations of the ideal city-state and thus of justice itself, since they enable him to posit the need in the “fevered” city for a force of specialized warriors—that is, the guardians (2.374d), whose education and way of life become a principal focus of Republic.

  17 (2.374c) But is war an art so easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman [that is, a farmer], or shoemaker, or other artisan [?]: Greek city-states, including Athens, did not have professional standing armies during the archaic and classical periods. Rather, citizens were called up for service at times of need, and even the elite warriors of Sparta had interests aside from their military duties, insofar as they were landown ers and therefore “farmers.” Although the Peloponnesian War brought about a marked increase in the number of mercenary soldiers and began a trend toward military professionalism, relatively few men in Plato’s day were full-time professional soldiers. The army of “guardians” that Socrates envisions would have been unprecedented.