Tobruk 1941

by Chester Wilmot

  4 Mounted on a light tank chassis, these were more spectacular than effective. They threw out spurts of flame thirty feet long and nine feet high, but were very vulnerable to fire from the Boyes anti-tank rifle. The enemy soon stopped using them.

  5 The 2/48th had 52 casualties in this attack. One officer and 14 men were killed or died of wounds; three officers and 34 other ranks were wounded.

  6 R. W. Hobson.

  CHAPTER 12

  ROMMEL CHANGES HIS TUNE

  AT midnight on May 6th a destroyer slipped into Tobruk harbour and the captain went ashore. From Navy H.Q. on the waterfront he telephoned General Morshead and said that he had a Most Secret dispatch from G.H.Q., Cairo, which he could hand only to the general himself. ‘Would you deliver it to my “G.1.”, Colonel Lloyd?’ asked Morshead. ‘Very well,’ said the captain. ‘Can he come down at once? I can’t afford to stay too long.’

  An hour later back at Fortress H.Q. Morshead broke the seals on the double envelopes and drew out a copy of an enemy radio message which G.H.Q. had intercepted. It was from the German Supreme Command in the Mediterranean – to Rommel. It had been sent on May 3rd in reply to his reports on the first two days of the Salient Battle.

  When he received it, Rommel – the vain and arrogant conqueror of Cyrenaica – must have raged. It was a most severe reprimand for his conduct of the campaign and for what his superiors regarded as reckless wastage of his forces. It said that he had gone too far and too fast; that casualties on the scale of the 1700 he had suffered in the past two days were excessive and could not be supported; that he was not to attack Tobruk again, nor to advance into Egypt except for purposes of reconnaissance; and that he was to hold his present positions at Tobruk and on the frontier, conserve his forces, and make no further attacks.

  For Rommel it was a ‘rocket’; for Morshead it was a relief, determined and confident though he was that his Fortress could and would be held. Only that afternoon there had been a small skirmish in the Salient between some of the 2/1st Pioneers and the Germans. It had shown that the enemy was there in great strength. The Australians were holding only a hastily improvised line without adequate protection of wire or minefields. In the words of Lloyd, ‘Until we got this “intercept”, it was a mystery to us why Rommel wasn’t coming on.’

  The revelation in this message that the Germans had suffered 1700 casualties in the first two days was Morshead’s first definite information as to the casualties his own troops had inflicted. Most of these 1700 were Germans, for the Italians played a very minor part in the attack. Axis casualties for the three days must have been about 2000, for in the 18th Brigade’s counter-attack on the night of May 3rd–4th the enemy had over 100 casualties in Post R7 alone, according to a captured diary. By contrast, the garrison’s losses were only 797 – including 59 killed, 355 wounded and 383 missing. In the three weeks since the siege began the Axis forces must have had nearly 5000 casualties, for more than 1800 had been taken prisoner. In that period, also, about a quarter of Rommel’s German tanks and very nearly half his aircraft had been destroyed or badly damaged at Tobruk and on the frontier.

  With the start of the Russian campaign only seven weeks away, Hitler could not spare enough men, tanks or aircraft for Rommel to continue losses at this rate – especially as the British Navy and the R.A.F. were sinking an increasingly large proportion of the supply ships running the narrows from Sicily to Tripoli, and had made Benghazi virtually useless as a port. Sound as this policy of restraint might have been for the German Supreme Command, however, it appeared to Rommel merely the result of stupidity in high places; the decision of headquarters’ blockheads, who, through jealousy, timidity or lack of faith, were robbing him of the victory that was within his grasp.

  To his major-generals, von Ravenstein, Summerman and Neumann-Silkow, he railed against the decision, and declared that when he got the chance he would take Tobruk no matter what happened. He would show the Supreme Command the stupidity of its caution. But meantime frustration roused his fury, and the capture of Tobruk became an obsession. Von Ravenstein and others warned him that he would only dissipate his strength trying to take it and that the real threat was from the frontier, but Rommel would not listen. The whole conduct of his campaign in the next six months was governed by his determination to build up the forces necessary to take Tobruk. For him the issue was personal. He saw himself as the potential conqueror of Egypt and the Canal, and here he was, baulked on the threshold of triumph by this impudent garrison. Yet his Supreme Command would not let him make another attempt with what strength he had, nor would it give him sufficient reinforcements to make the capture a certainty.

  When he received this reprimand, Rommel was still convinced that he could take Tobruk, if only he were allowed to go on. But his generals, and especially von Ravenstein, who had commanded the May attack and knew the strength of the defences and the tenacity of the garrison, thought otherwise. He realized it was not a single problem. There were two other vital factors – the vulnerability of the long Axis supply line, and the growing strength of the British forces on the frontier. These factors were almost as important in relation to the holding of Tobruk after the first month as were the strength and spirit of the garrison itself.

  Throughout 1941 North Africa was very much a subsidiary front for Hitler. By June he had more than 150 German divisions opposing Russia, but he could still spare only two for Rommel, and in the next six months the Afrika Korps received little reinforcement. It may be that Hitler – and Rommel – thought that two German and seven Italian divisions would be able to fight their way through to Suez; both of them had consistently underestimated the fighting worth of the British forces. But it is more likely that in 1941 Rommel was not expected to conquer Egypt; that his primary job was to tie up as large a British force as possible in the Western Desert and to keep the North African front open until Russia had been dealt with and the Germans were ready to strike at Suez from the north as well.

  In the face of attacks by the British Navy and the R.A.F., however, the Axis Supreme Command had a hard job in even maintaining Rommel’s strength at its April level. The C.-in-C., Mediterranean, Admiral Cunningham, later stated that in the six months from May to October the Navy, the Fleet Air Arm and the R.A.F. sank one out of every three ships plying between Sicily and Tripoli. Not all these were laden with cargo when they were sunk, but, quite apart from actual sinkings, the attacks disorganized and slowed up the trans-Mediterranean traffic so much that it is doubtful whether Rommel received even two-thirds of the supplies consigned to him during this period.

  With the Navy’s ships and Malta’s planes hounding them, Axis convoys on the Tripoli run had a bad time. Between May and November there was not a week without a successful air or naval attack on enemy shipping in the Central Mediterranean. Nevertheless the Tripoli route was far less expensive in Axis ships than was the run from Italy to Bengazi. The R.A.F. made it extremely difficult for the enemy to use this port. In the 242 days that Tobruk was besieged the R.A.F. bombed Bengazi 133 times – not counting nightly nuisance raids by one or two planes. British prisoners, who had been forced to work on the wharves there and who escaped in October, reported that the attacks were so accurate that only small ships were brought into the harbour and these seldom remained there at night.

  A description of this bombing was found in the captured diary of a German officer of the 5th Tank Regiment who wrote in August:

  During the night the usual air attack, as vigorous as ever, too. The English are becoming so bold that when caught in our searchlights they switch on their navigation lights and go straight for their targets. . . . Despite all the terrific barrage, not a single Englishman has been brought down yet. . . . The quays have been so blasted that the handling of cargo has become very difficult.

  Some Axis shipping was saved by using Tripoli instead of Bengazi, but this wasted petrol and oil, since supplies landed there had to be hauled 900 miles by road or transport plane to Tobruk. This traffi
c used up so much of Rommel’s petrol that what he had left for offensive operations in the Western Desert was seriously restricted. One important result was that whereas the R.A.F. regularly bombed Axis ports, bases and supply lines from Naples to Bardia, and from Sicily to Crete, Rommel never had enough petrol to engage in sustained ‘strategic bombing’ of corresponding objectives in Egypt. Throughout the eight months that Tobruk was besieged the R.A.F. – in addition to the raids on Bengazi – made 76 on Tripoli. By contrast, the enemy made only 22 attacks on Alexandria and 21 on the Suez Canal ports. This meant that the British forces in Egypt could build up supplies almost without interruption, although nearly a hundred fighter aircraft, still in the crates in which they had been shipped, were destroyed in one disastrous raid on the Canal Zone.

  Our holding of Tobruk had an important effect on the balance of air power. Rommel’s planes were so busy bombing it that they were used comparatively little for bombing British airfields, bases and supply lines in Egypt. If Rommel had been free to direct against Egypt the bombers that he had to keep pounding at Tobruk, the development of British strength in the desert would have been much slower. As it was, while that went on almost uninterrupted by enemy air attack, the R.A.F. struck at Axis dromes and bases between the frontier and Bengazi almost every day. (R.A.F. communiqués from April 10th to November 18th – when the British drive to relieve Tobruk began – reported more than 350 of these attacks in addition to those on Bengazi itself. In this time the enemy made more than 800 bombing raids on Tobruk, but less than 100 on British bases and dromes in Egypt.)

  Captured German diaries and prisoners’ reports showed that while the loss of so much cargo was serious enough, the dislocation of supply planning was even more serious. To make sure of obtaining vital cargoes, such as spare parts for aircraft and tanks, Rommel ran an air ferry with JU52s and gliders from Crete and Derna. The JU52s could carry well over a ton and tow two gliders each carrying a ton. But he could not bring in enough this way to make up for the losses at sea. The certainty of getting vital supplies through by this means lasted only until September when British long-range Beaufighters arrived in Egypt. After this the air ferry was always in danger of interception either in flight or on the airfields near Derna, for the Beaufighter had almost double the range of the R.A.F.’s single-engined fighters.

  Before these naval and air attacks could materially affect the Axis supply position, the Tobruk garrison and Wavell’s forces in Egypt’s Western Desert had to pass through a most critical month – from mid-April to mid-May. In April the balance of striking power was definitely with Rommel, and he could have gone on at least to Matruh if it had not been for Tobruk. However, the two successful attacks on Tripoli convoys on April 14th and 21st and Tobruk’s toll of German tanks and aircraft in the first three weeks of the siege left the Axis forces in Libya weaker in mid-May than they had been in mid-April, though they were still very much stronger than the combined British forces in Tobruk and Egypt. At the beginning of May the Western Desert Force Commander (Lieutenant-General Beresford Peirse) had in the frontier area the 11th Hussars (armoured cars), one very weak brigade from the veteran 7th Armoured Division with about fifty tanks, the 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, the armoured division’s Support Group, one brigade of Guards (motorized infantry) and several regiments of field, anti-tank and A.A. artillery. His only reserves were two Australian brigades (the 21st and 25th) at Matruh, an untried Indian Division at Baguish, and a Polish brigade near Alexandria.

  In May, as in April, the British continued to challenge Rommel by offensive action on the frontier. As we have seen, even before the end of April they had forced him to turn from the attack on Tobruk and secure his frontier flanks by retaking Sollum and Halfaya Pass.

  With the enemy holding these gateways into Libya, the British forces on the frontier had too few tanks to do much to help Tobruk at the beginning of May. Nevertheless on May 2nd a mixed column outflanked the German positions near Sollum, struck north, shot up everything it encountered and cut the Bardia road fifty miles behind the forward Axis positions. This daring diversion did not cause much material damage, but it evidently gave Rommel a shock, for he moved additional tanks from Tobruk to the frontier.

  This altered the balance of tank strength there very much in the enemy’s favour, but it did not curtail British activity, for Gott, the forward commander, counteracted the German advantage by bold use of mobile detachments of all arms. These became known as ‘Jock’ columns after their originator, Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Jock’ Campbell, who then commanded the 4th R.H.A., and later won the V.C. at Sidi Rezegh. Fearless and dynamic Campbell revelled in this kind of mechanized guerrilla warfare. He organized swift-moving, hard-hitting columns containing cruiser tanks, armoured cars and carriers, 25-pounders, anti-tank and ack-ack guns, and some motorized infantry. Their strength varied between 500 and 2000 men, but they relied on speed and fire-power, not on numbers. Their main tasks were to strike at enemy supply lines and harass his flank and rear.

  This harassing was valuable, but bolder and stronger action was necessary to stop the enemy from increasing his pressure on Tobruk. Wavell could not be sure that Rommel would obey the orders of the German Supreme Command, and there was the further possibility that the intercepted message was a deliberate blind.

  Fortunately when they were most needed, a shipment of about fifty ‘I’ tanks and cruisers arrived from Britain. These had been destined for Greece, but that campaign was over and in the second week of May they were hurried to the desert. With this new strength Wavell ordered Beresford Peirse to attack on the frontier before Rommel’s tank regiments had recovered from their mauling at Tobruk. The plan was to drive the enemy from Halfaya and Sollum and make such a strong show of force that he might be induced to withdraw west of Tobruk. Meantime its garrison was to make a strong demonstration so as to induce Rommel to keep the bulk of his forces in that area.

  Unfortunately, Morshead was given very little warning. The letter advising him of the plan and of his role took five days to reach Tobruk from Mersa Matruh. He received it on the night of the 13th and the British attack was to begin at dawn on the 15th. Despite the short notice, the garrison acted at once1 in the Salient sector. Its deception succeeded admirably. Reconnaissance aircraft on the morning of the 15th reported enemy tanks and vehicles concentrating west of the Tobruk perimeter. On May 15th–17th there was considerable fighting at Tobruk, but the Germans on the frontier remained too strong. Rommel had taken his orders seriously, and in the previous fortnight some of his best German infantry had prepared formidable defensive positions at Halfaya, Sollum and Capuzzo.

  Even so, the British succeeded in capturing Halfaya and Sollum, and reached Capuzzo but could not hold it. The German tanks and anti-tank guns proved unexpectedly strong. Inland on the desert flank the British tanks were driven back, and the infantry on the coast had to withdraw from Capuzzo and Sollum. More than thirty British tanks were lost, but Halfaya was a valuable gain because Rommel could not afford to leave the British there. He had to divert considerable forces from Tobruk before he retook the pass on May 27th. Meanwhile, Morshead gained breathing space. To make sure of holding Halfaya in future, Rommel set his troops to build stronger defences there, and on the frontier and at Capuzzo. Holding this area, however, depended much less on these fixed defences than on the balance of mobile striking power2 on the exposed desert flank.

  In the earlier campaign against the Italians, the British had clear superiority in tanks, and the ‘I’ tank had proved almost invulnerable. Some had been temporarily disabled with damaged tracks or jammed turrets, but none had ever been penetrated by anti-tank shells. Believing that German guns would be equally ineffective, Matildas had led the attack on Halfaya Pass on May 15th. There two days later I saw two ‘I’ tanks surrounded by British tank crews, gazing wide-eyed at a clean, round, 2-inch hole straight through the 3-inch armour on the front of each tank. The holes had been made by shells from the new German 50 mm anti-tank g
un. They had done little damage inside, for their force had been spent in penetrating the armour. But there were the holes, and out through those holes that day fizzled the Tobruk garrison’s hope of relief by the British forces then available.

  It was not until mid-June that the British were strong enough to risk another attempt to relieve Tobruk. By then more than 150 new tanks had arrived and the 7th Armoured Division, instead of one weak brigade, had two reasonably strong brigades (the 4th and 7th) with about 230 tanks. The 4th Indian Division, which had fought so well at Sidi Barrani and Keren, was back from Eritrea. The R.A.F., reinforced by new aircraft from Britain and by half a dozen splendid South African squadrons from Abyssinia, was stronger than ever.

  The plan now was for infantry and ‘I’ tanks to over-run the frontier defences by direct attack, while about a hundred cruiser tanks by-passed the enemy defences and dealt with the German armour west of Capuzzo. (The ‘I’ tanks were from the 4th, and the cruisers from the 7th Armoured Brigade. The British and Indian infantry used were part of the 4th Indian Division.) If these moves succeeded, the relieving forces would then drive west to Tobruk and the garrison would fight its way out to meet them. At Western Desert Force H.Q. confidence reigned; those clean, round holes in the ‘I’ tanks at Halfaya in mid-May had been forgotten. In Tobruk hopes ran even higher, for the garrison had so much more at stake. Rumour carried the numbers of British tanks to astronomical figures, and the troops had Rommel on the run and their Alexandria leave planned long before the battle opened. The 18th Brigade got ready to lead the break-out. Every man waited eagerly for news from the frontier.

  At first the news was good. On June 15th the British attacked all Rommel’s frontier positions. At the coastal end (Halfaya Pass), and at the desert end (Point 208, five miles west of Capuzzo) the attacks failed. But in the centre, British and Indian infantry, supported by ‘I’ tanks, broke right through, seized Capuzzo and stopped four German counter-attacks during the afternoon. Bardia was in danger, and the battle hung in the balance at the end of the first day. Whichever side could concentrate armoured forces strong enough to control the open desert flank would gain the battle.