Jefferson Davis, American

by William J. Cooper

  Although Davis has often been faulted for this departmental structure, it had nothing intrinsically wrong with it. The fundamental arrangement was logical, though arguments can be made about the appropriateness of particular borders. The arrangement did have one severe drawback, however. Departmental boundary lines could hamper coordination and cooperation if neighboring commanders disagreed on military plans or had poor personal or professional relationships. Davis usually did not extend commands geographically or formally place one general in overall command. Instead, he relied on normal authority of rank and on common commitment to the cause. He refused to consider that form could affect substance.67

  With his experience in the army and as secretary of war, it seems that Davis would have routinely extended command boundaries. Yet he did not. He did not see the problem so many of his critics have highlighted. Most important, he believed commitment to the cause would override bureaucratic boundaries and personal feelings. As he wrote Bragg about Smith, “he has taken every position without indicating the least tendency to question its advantage to himself, without complaint when his prospects for distinction were remote, and with alacrity when dangers and hardships were to be met.” The president described Smith as he perceived Bragg, as a patriot in his own image. He evinced no doubt: “Upon your cordial cooperation I can, therefore, confidently rely.”68

  At the outset Bragg and Smith initiated harmonious relations and agreed upon a common strategy. Meeting in Chattanooga on July 31, they concurred on a plan to do precisely what Davis had three days earlier pressed upon Smith. After Smith and Bragg combined, the president wanted them “to crush Buells column and advance to the recovery of Tennessee and the occupation of Kentucky.” Because Bragg was still awaiting his artillery and wagon trains, Smith would move first against the Federal detachment holding Cumberland Gap. Having eliminated that potential threat to the rear of a Confederate thrust into Kentucky, he would return to Bragg, whereupon the two would march north, attempt to cut off Buell, and at the least relieve Nashville before crossing into Kentucky.69

  But it was not to be. Almost from the moment he left Chattanooga, Smith began to think about Kentucky. Identifying Cumberland Gap as a time-consuming nuisance, he suggested to Bragg that he bypass it and strike out for Lexington in the center of Kentucky’s rich Bluegrass region. Bragg was dubious, for he needed Smith’s numbers to defeat Buell, and he also told his fellow commander that he could not yet support a northward advance. But he did not order Smith to return. On his own, Smith could not resist the lure of Kentucky. He had thought about it for too long, eager for the glory, though anxious about the task. On August 14 his troops turned toward Lexington. Having given up the initiative to a junior general, Bragg could only react. Two weeks later he started north, paralleling Smith’s track but some 100 miles to the west. Because Buell fell back so quickly, making Nashville unattainable, Bragg kept on toward Kentucky, with his lead elements in the state before September 10.

  As his armies entered Maryland and Kentucky, Jefferson Davis was acutely aware of the relationship between military events and politics. Although Maryland had never seceded and Lee had no thought of occupation, it was a slave state and thousands of Marylanders fought in Confederate gray. Davis certainly wished for a political return. In his aborted attempt to join Lee, he had as a traveling companion Enoch L. Lowe, a former governor of Maryland, now pro-Confederate and a voluntary exile in Richmond. Although Lowe had no formal position, both Davis and Lee clearly hoped that he could help the Confederate army with civilian affairs in his native state. Lowe continued on from Warrenton, and did meet with Lee in Maryland, but military events soon nullified his mission.70

  Unlike Maryland, Kentucky had been admitted to the Confederacy and its senators and representatives sat in the Confederate Congress, even though the Union had occupied the state since Sidney Johnston’s withdrawal. Eager to reverse that circumstance, Davis emphasized to Bragg and Smith the importance of popular support by Kentuckians for the Confederate army. To that end they tried to make sure Kentucky officers accompanied the Confederate troops, especially John C. Breckinridge, former vice president and presidential candidate, now a major general in the Confederate army. Breckinridge was ordered from Louisiana to join Bragg, though he did not arrive in time. While Davis and his generals desired both public backing and recruits for the army, they also realized that a serious commitment by sympathetic Kentuckians would require evidence that the Confederates intended more than a temporary stay in their state. The presence with Bragg of Richard Hawes, the Confederate governor of Kentucky, who had been in Richmond conferring with Davis and the state’s congressional delegation and who carried with him a substantial sum of Confederate money, underscored the political aspirations of the president.71

  President Davis sent specific instructions on politics to his commanders, directing them to issue proclamations spelling out their intentions and the goals of the Confederate government. Because from the start the United States had refused to negotiate and had striven to subjugate the Confederate States and its people, he emphasized that the Confederacy waged war solely in self-defense, having “no design of conquest.” It even still adhered to the policy of free navigation on all western rivers, Davis asserted, leaving unnoted that the Union now controlled most of them. That this “relentless” enemy had devastated “our homes” and “our fields,” Davis further noted, forced the Confederates to transfer “the seat of war” in order to demonstrate that “if such a war is to continue its consequences shall fall on those who persist in their refusal to make peace.” He concluded that the people of Kentucky and Maryland should insist that the United States desist, and if the response was negative, then exercise their sovereignty by agreeing to a separate peace treaty with the Confederacy.72

  But Davis’s high hopes were dashed. At first Lee moved easily through western Maryland, an area of little pro-Confederate sentiment and few slaves. Neither the Confederate side nor Lee’s army experienced any popular rush. Lee was, to be sure, delighted to be feeding and provisioning his army on the northern side of the Potomac, but his ambition to go forward into Pennsylvania was foiled. Once more against Lee, General McClellan was slowly following the Army of Northern Virginia, unaware of his opponent’s intentions until the gods of war favored the Federal commander: a misplaced copy of Lee’s orders containing troop dispositions and planned movements fell into his hands. With this information McClellan pushed more aggressively, forcing Lee to regroup his dispersed units. On September 17, along Antietam Creek near the village of Sharpsburg, the two armies fought viciously, the bloodiest single day of the entire war, with some 23,000 casualties. Although Lee held his own tactically despite being heavily outnumbered, the brutal struggle had enormous strategic repercussions. Lee could no longer maintain his forces north of the Potomac, and by September 20 had safely recrossed the river.

  Confederate fortunes fared no better in Kentucky. Initially the Confederate offensive met and even exceeded expectations, thrilling President Davis. Smith marched rapidly, brushed aside all opposition, and took Lexington on September 2. Roughly 100 miles to the west, Bragg also experienced exhilarating success. Outpacing Buell, he placed his army in central Kentucky between Buell and the great Union base at Louisville. But the Confederates failed to maintain their momentum, chiefly because the voluntary command structure broke down completely and indecision plagued the two commanders.73

  With a numerically superior Buell in his front, Bragg rightly decided Smith should join him to fight the great battle for Kentucky. But when Bragg urged Smith to effect the combination, Smith responded that he could not leave the Bluegrass region exposed. Bragg never did issue an order; of course, if he had, Smith might have chosen not to obey, on the technical ground that Bragg was just another department commander. This was not a scenario that Jefferson Davis had envisioned—generals not cooperating, with the senior unwilling to command and the junior refusing to heed a call.

  Cooperation never materializ
ed, and Bragg even lost control of his own force. To get closer to Smith, Bragg moved eastward, permitting an unopposed Buell to secure Louisville. Still, no Confederate junction took place, for Smith’s units were scattered. With their military alignment verging on disarray, the two generals turned to politics. Both men journeyed to Frankfort, the state capital, where they oversaw the formal inauguration of Hawes as governor, in hopes it would rally pro-Confederate Kentuckians.

  In Frankfort, Bragg learned that a reinforced Buell was already in the Bluegrass. At that moment Bragg’s authority seemed to dissolve. Trying to devise a plan to strike Buell, he could not even get the senior general in his own army, Leonidas Polk, to carry out his instructions. In addition, Polk persuaded other top commanders to follow him. Spread-out troops and fragmented information led to the confusion that dominated Bragg’s decisions. Finally, on October 8, several divisions under Polk almost stumbled into what became the Battle of Perryville. The Federals were also poorly handled, and a bloody tactical stalemate resulted. Yet the strategic outcome was profound, with Bragg concluding he must return to Tennessee.

  Although both offensives failed, their aftermaths were quite different. Not just the technical commander of his army, Lee overwhelmingly commanded the allegiance of his officers and men. Moreover, the commander in chief fully backed him, never faulting him for the failure of the Maryland campaign. The Army of Tennessee was a different story. Although Braxton Bragg was the authorized commander and enjoyed presidential support, he did not have the trust of all his officers, particularly those most senior.

  After the retreat into Tennessee the strife so apparent in Kentucky reached literally into Jefferson Davis’s office. Smith dispatched a private messenger to Richmond to convey his judgment that Bragg’s ineptness lost the Kentucky campaign. Further, he requested that he never again serve under Bragg, and if any blame for the failure were placed on him, he wanted to be relieved. Finally, he requested permission to come to the capital and personally present his case to the president. Polk, who had done much to hurt and little to help his commanding general, tried to get other generals to call for Bragg’s removal. He made negative and even untruthful statements about Bragg, going so far as to say Bragg had lost his mind. All the while he boasted that had he been in charge, the Kentucky operation would have been a glorious success.

  Bitterly disappointed at the outcome in Kentucky, and realizing that no army could function amid this swirling backbiting and recrimination, Davis ordered the three generals to Richmond for individual conferences. Smith and Polk repeated what they had been saying, with the latter asserting that Bragg had lost the confidence of his generals. Bragg related his version, did not acknowledge any personal blame, and volunteered for reassignment, should the president think it for the best. After listening to each man, Davis made a calamitous decision. He continued Bragg in command of the Army of Tennessee; he left Polk in that army and promoted him to lieutenant general; he retained Smith as commander of his department, also promoted him to lieutenant general, and told him to cooperate with Bragg. In sum, he made no changes at all.74

  In a letter to General Smith, Davis extolled the patriotism of all three, emphasizing that Bragg had never denigrated Smith. Moreover, Bragg “evinced the most self denying temper in relation to his future position.” Once again, the president permitted his perception of commitment to influence his judgment about effectiveness. He acknowledged that Bragg was not perfect, then followed with “all [generals] have their defects.” He went on to explain he did not have a ready replacement, spelling out the situations of the other four full generals. Just as before Kentucky, when the commander in chief had denied Bragg’s request to reorganize his officer corps, he now, in a much more troubling time, refused to do so himself. The Kentucky campaign dramatically demonstrated the disharmony afflicting the most important field army in the heartland of the nation. For all the right reasons a ruthless, even a pragmatic, commander in chief would have instituted dramatic changes that included transfers, promotions of junior officers, and perhaps dismissals. Although fundamental overhaul was needed, for emotional and practical reasons Jefferson Davis stood fast. The cancer he did not even attempt to excise was left to grow more virulent.75

  President Davis’s frustration about the outcomes in Kentucky and Maryland was matched by his disappointment at results on the diplomatic front. Richmond was convinced that the British people supported the Confederate cause. Summertime battlefield successes buoyed hope for European intervention—either through mediation or outright recognition—which would substantively aid the Confederacy, even secure independence. Both James Mason in London and John Slidell in Paris legitimately expressed optimism that Britain and France were finally heading toward involvement, even though the Lincoln administration had made clear its adamant opposition to such action.76

  Although Confederate diplomats pressed for recognition, claiming they had established a government and a nation, the British and French governments responded from self-interest. Napoleon III was a willing listener to entreaties from Slidell, who enjoyed direct access to the court. The cotton shortage caused by the blockade hurt French industry, but more important, Napoleon’s imperial ambitions had propelled him to full-scale intervention in Mexico. That venture made him receptive to Confederate offers of cotton and alliance, for the United States vehemently opposed the new French presence in North America. Napoleon’s ambition led to perhaps the greatest Confederate diplomatic success, the Erlanger loan; in Europe a French banking house sold for the Confederacy bonds secured by cotton. In all, £1.75 million were raised and used for Confederate military purchases. Napoleon also advocated some form of European intercession in the American war, but would not act unilaterally. With the British navy ruling the seas, the French required British agreement before undertaking any substantive initiative.

  The British situation was more complicated. Although the British continued to proclaim neutrality and after February 1862 had denied James Mason even unofficial meetings with government ministers, influential elements in both Parliament and the cabinet did favor moving toward involvement. The disruption of cotton imports had an adverse economic effect on the textile districts. Besides, Britain could not look with disinterest upon a weakened United States; in addition, there was a powerful humanitarian concern to stop the awful bloodletting before it led to anarchy, including the horrible possibility of race war. Yet other influential voices emphasized the difficulties inherent in any operation, not the least of these being the Lincoln administration’s warning that British intervention would mean war. During the summer and autumn of 1862 leaders engaged in serious discussions about the proper course, often in secret cabinet meetings, and for a time it seemed the outcome would favor the Confederacy. In early October, Chancellor of the Exchequer William Gladstone made a public speech that included the famous lines: “We may have our own opinions about slavery, we may be for or against the South; but there is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made what is more than either—they have made a nation.”

  Despite those ringing words, prevailing opinion in British governmental circles demanded undisputed battlefield evidence of the Confederacy’s ability to win. Second Manassas signaled affirmatively, but Lee’s reverse north of the Potomac along with Bragg’s retreat from Kentucky dampened interventionist desires. Even Secretary of State Benjamin’s claim that the Maryland campaign proved the Union could not destroy the Confederacy did not lessen the impact of Lee’s failure. Then, in the aftermath of Antietam, when Abraham Lincoln made emancipation a Union war aim, it became exceedingly difficult for Britain to assume any pro-Confederate stance. Finally, in November, the cabinet decided against taking any active step aimed at ending the American conflict. This was not necessarily a permanent decision, for events on the battlefield could still spark reconsideration.

  For Davis, however, the British decision meant that the Confeder
acy continued to stand alone. He complained that alleged European neutrality had in fact injured the Confederate States. “It is manifest that the course of action adopted by Europe, while based on an apparent refusal to determine the question, or to side with either party, was in point of fact,” he asserted to Congress, “an actual decision against our rights and in favor of the groundless pretensions of the United States.” In his view, Britain and France had wrongly refused “to treat us as an independent Government.” In spite of these unjustifiable setbacks, Davis still exhibited public confidence, proclaiming that his country’s “just place in the family of nations cannot long be withheld.…”77

  From the spring on through 1862, while Jefferson Davis wrestled with affairs of state, the war also became intensely personal for him. Not only did Varina and the children become temporary refugees, Davis Bend also felt the shock of war. Brother Joseph reported that the fall of New Orleans along with a rising Mississippi was forcing him to remove from the Bend some of his and Jefferson’s stock and slaves, in his language always “people.” Attempting to find an appropriate site for relocation, Joseph was staying with Owen B. Cox, a former overseer who lived near Clinton just west of Jackson and valiantly aided his old employer in this troubled time.78

  Summer witnessed no improvement. Joseph rebuked the overseers still on the brothers’ plantations as “worthless rascals,” who had not prevented looting by slaves. Then an outbreak of measles among Brierfield slaves slowed and even precluded additional removal. A Yankee raiding party made a call at Brierfield and Hurricane, carrying off slaves, horses, and equipment. In addition, raiders plundered both homes and burned the Hurricane mansion to the ground, the flames visible from Vicksburg. For unknown reasons they spared Jefferson’s vandalized home from the torch.