Jefferson Davis, American

by William J. Cooper

  By late autumn Johnston had recovered and on November 12 he reported to the War Department for duty. Although he and his commander in chief had certainly experienced differences, Davis still believed Johnston to be “a good Soldier.” He did not classify Johnston with Beauregard on either intellectual or moral grounds. Moreover, numerous appeals for Johnston from prominent westerners arrived in Richmond. Johnston was the obvious choice for what was called the Department of the West, not quite a replication of Sidney Johnston’s Department No. 2 because it stopped at the Mississippi River. In his new assignment, Joseph Johnston would oversee Smith, Bragg, and Pemberton, and he would have responsibility for defending the two major Federal targets, middle Tennessee and Vicksburg.95

  Johnston’s orders were specific and inclusive. His geographic “command” was spelled out in detail. He was also directed to establish his headquarters at Chattanooga or wherever he thought would “best secure facilities for ready communication with the troops within the limits of his command.” Finally, he was given complete authority to “repair in person to any part of said command whenever his presence may for the time be necessary or desirable.”96

  Despite the straightforward language in this order, Johnston perceived ambiguity and want of clarity. With the Department of the West, Davis was attempting to construct a theater command of the type that would become so popular in World War II. But Johnston, like most Civil War generals, could not envision commanding without actually leading troops in the field. He felt Bragg had the preferable job, though he was Bragg’s commanding officer. Further, Johnston could not contemplate assuming authority without relieving the commander on the spot, an act unthinkable to him. In addition, the three departmental commanders would still report directly to the War Department without having to go through Johnston’s headquarters. Johnston interpreted this as bypassing him, though that was not the key. As much as anything else, this arrangement had to do with staff requirements; Richmond could handle so much more than Johnston’s headquarters. Besides, the telegraph should enable all participants in any decision to remain in close communication. Still, Johnston, who craved certainty, saw himself surrounded by uncertainty.97

  Uneasy in this new position, Johnston fretted that he had been given an assignment that could only end in failure and his blemished reputation. Upon reaching Chattanooga, he wrote to his friend Senator Louis Wigfall, “Nobody ever assumed a command under more unfavorable circumstances.” Little more than a week later he chorused, “A great mistake has been made in the arrangement of my command.” Johnston’s recovery from his wound at Wigfall’s home in Richmond had placed him in the orbit of anti-Davis politicians. Entering the Confederacy as a staunch supporter of Davis, the Texas senator for reasons not entirely clear became an inveterate opponent. Politicians like Wigfall saw Johnston as an ally, perhaps a pawn, in the campaign against Davis. They surely fed the general’s inclination to distrust his commander in chief, to see him as petty and self-serving. This proclivity, plus Johnston’s natural disposition to protect himself by exercising extreme professional caution, almost ensured that he would take little initiative, and certainly no risks. Davis at this point, however, retained confidence in Johnston’s military ability. He certainly did not think he had given Johnston an empty assignment.98

  Johnston had another fundamental reservation about his job, and this time in a military sense he was undoubtedly right. He believed strongly that a proper defense of the Mississippi River demanded placing Holmes and Pemberton in a unified command. In his view, the importance of that unity far outweighed bringing Bragg and Pemberton together, for he considered them too far apart ever realistically to help each other. But though Johnston was militarily correct about interconnection on the Mississippi, he never reflected on the possibilities within his command. He never ruminated about how the transfer in the summer of most of Bragg’s army from Mississippi to Tennessee might affect either a mobile defense or reinforcement for a quick strike.

  Even before Johnston left Richmond, he suggested to Secretary Randolph that the Department of the West combined the wrong departments. Randolph listened empathetically, for he agreed and assured the general that he had tried unsuccessfully to persuade the president. Davis remained adamant about Holmes’s retaining an independent command, though he definitely wanted Holmes to cooperate with Pemberton and Johnston. The reasons for Davis’s insistence that the Trans-Mississippi stay separate were fundamentally political. He believed it essential that citizens west of the Mississippi entertain no doubts about the government’s determination to defend them. To Davis, that meant an army and an independent commander in place, even though he realized that Federal penetration of the river would level a terrible blow against his cause. Given the dilemma he confronted, he put his faith in an almost abstract notion of cooperation, relying on Johnston, Pemberton, and Holmes to find a solution to his conundrum.99

  The disagreement between Davis and Randolph over the Trans-Mississippi led to the secretary’s resignation. Over time Randolph had grown increasingly dissatisfied with his role. Davis wanted a war minister he could respect and with whom he could discuss policy matters, large and small. Yet he never delegated substantial authority to Randolph or any other secretary. He wanted all major and myriad minor decisions cleared with him before any directives left the War Department. He did not even always consult the secretary, whom he would on occasion bypass by sending instructions directly through General Cooper.

  After numerous discussions with the president on the value of the armies in Arkansas and Mississippi acting together, Randolph in late October authorized Holmes to cross the river. He received a stinging remonstrance. Upon reading the message, Davis said he had in mind only “co-intelligent action,” and he thought any departure of Holmes from Arkansas, even if temporary, “would have a disastrous effect.” Without an endorsement, Randolph sent this communication on to Holmes to become part of his instructions. On November 14 Davis informed the secretary that he should always go through “the established channel.” When Randolph asked for clarification, Davis stipulated matters that must come before him, including “the removal of an army, the transfer of a Genl.… the assignment of general officers,” and finally, anything “material to the public defense.” Pointing to the “usage” and “advantages” of “free conference,” Davis made clear that while he welcomed discussion, he did not countenance the secretary’s giving orders. The next day Randolph brusquely responded: “Conceiving that I can no longer be useful in the War Department I hereby resign my commission as Secretary of War.” Davis’s immediate reply was equally curt: “As you have thus without notice and in terms excluding inquiry retired from the post of a constitutional adviser of the Executive of the Confederacy, nothing remains but to give you this formal notice of the acceptance of your resignation.”100

  The president acted quickly to replace him. This time there would be no interim appointment. Davis wanted another Virginian, specifically James A. Seddon, a Richmond lawyer and a planter in nearby Goochland County, who had been influential in the Virginia Democratic party since the 1840s. Although he had no experience with anything military, Seddon readily accepted. And he was a popular choice. Even the hypercritical Richmond Examiner called his appointment “a fortunate event.” Laboring long hours, the cadaverous-looking Seddon learned quickly and worked effectively with Davis. He would hold the post for more than two years, longer than any other man. On western matters, Seddon’s arrival signaled no attempt to change policy, for he shared Davis and Randolph’s view of the importance of the western theater and was an enthusiastic supporter of Joseph Johnston.101

  As Seddon settled in at the War Department and Johnston traveled to Chattanooga, Davis decided he must make a western trip. He knew he was setting up a new organization with a new commanding general who doubted its efficacy. Additionally, he wanted to visit Bragg’s army to assess firsthand esprit de corps and preparedness. Finally, he believed he needed to heed calls from his own part of the
country indicating that only his presence could restore morale and reinvigorate commitment to the Confederate cause. Davis wanted to show the people in the heartland that their government and their president cared about them. Thus, despite the prospect of renewed conflict between Lee and the Federal army along the Rappahannock, only fifty miles from the capital, Davis prepared for a lengthy but, in his mind, essential journey.

  On December 9, accompanied by two aides and a servant, he left Richmond by train. Rolling through southwest Virginia into Knoxville, where he made a few remarks, the presidential party reached Chattanooga on the evening of the eleventh. The next morning, with a band playing “Bonnie Blue Flag,” the presidential train, colors flying, departed early and arrived that evening at Murfreesboro, Bragg’s headquarters and only thirty miles south of Nashville.

  The thirteenth was an active day. Accompanied by Bragg and Johnston, the president reviewed troops and briefly addressed the soldiers, expressing his complete confidence in their devotion and ability. He also visited with many officers at his quarters. One recalled the occasion: “He was quite agreeable and gentlemanly in manner, and on the whole I was rather favorably impressed by him.” In this personal inspection of the Army of Tennessee, Davis found it in “fine spirits and well supplied.” Davis was confident it could halt any Federal advance, though lacking the strength to take Nashville.102

  Davis was no imperial traveler. An observer noted that “his dress was plain and unassuming and his baggage was limited to a single leather valise, with the initials ‘J.D.’ marked upon the side.” This eyewitness described “a man rather above the middle stature; of slight but well proportioned figure,” with handsome features. A sprinkling of gray in his hair along with gray whiskers and “graceful manners” added dignity. An “expression of good humor” dominated his countenance as he spoke in a “voice soft and persuasive, yet distinct and full toned.…”103

  Davis’s party, including General Johnston, left Murfreesboro at 6 a.m. on Sunday, the fourteenth, for Chattanooga, and ultimately Mississippi. In East Tennessee he got the welcome news of Robert E. Lee’s smashing triumph at Fredericksburg. Late the following afternoon he started toward his home state, passed through Atlanta and Montgomery, where he spent a day, and on to Jackson, arriving without fanfare on December 19. Next morning he boarded a train for Vicksburg, but along the way stopped for a short visit to Fleetwood and his own property before moving on. In Vicksburg, he examined defensive works and reviewed troops. Then he turned back to Jackson and on up to North Mississippi to confer with Pemberton, who was celebrating the great Confederate success at Holly Springs on the twentieth, which destroyed Grant’s supply base and caused the Union general to abandon his overland thrust toward Vicksburg. Once again Davis reviewed troops before returning to Jackson and Christmas dinner with a niece.104

  From Tennessee to Mississippi, the main topic of discussion between the president and his commander in the Department of the West concerned proper steps for the defense of the two states. Davis told the army bearing its name that Tennessee must be held at all costs and at the same time that he considered Mississippi critical—so critical that he personally ordered a division from Bragg to reinforce Pemberton. During their journey, Johnston pressed Davis to order Holmes east of the river. The general believed 40,000 troops essential to secure Vicksburg, yet he had but half that number. Davis did not disagree, and on December 22 he penned a long letter to Holmes emphasizing the grave situation confronting the Confederates. If Vicksburg fell, the Confederacy would be sundered and the Trans-Mississippi cut off from the rest of the country. He called for help, but still permitted Holmes to decide if he could do so and yet protect his command. When Davis showed Johnston the letter, the general was upset that the president had not directed Holmes to cross the river. He was convinced that only the timely arrival of Holmes could guarantee the safety of Vicksburg. He had even been trying to get Senator Wigfall to press Secretary Seddon to see that Holmes received unequivocal orders to join Pemberton.105

  Holmes responded by telling Davis he would obey any order, but because the president had left the final decision in his hands, he could not reinforce Pemberton. He had so few troops; they were widely scattered; and he was dealing with at least two different serious Federal threats. If he went to Pemberton’s aid, he told Davis without exaggeration, Arkansas would be left unprotected and could easily fall. Moreover, in his opinion, distance and road conditions made rapid movement impossible. Replying, Davis said that if Holmes had correctly assessed his situation, which he surely had, then he had acted properly to remain in Arkansas.106

  A major problem resulted from the small size of Holmes’s force. He had only 10,000 men spread over much of the state, no more than half the number Davis and Johnston thought available. Numbers posed a problem everywhere: Bragg had around 45,000 and faced a stronger enemy; Smith could add only some 10,000; Pemberton was outnumbered by more than two to one; Holmes likewise faced a considerably stronger foe. There were simply not enough Confederate soldiers to guarantee the safety of all threatened points, and for military and political reasons Davis deemed Tennessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas all critical. Success confronting such complex problems and enormous odds would require the most resolute and daring leadership.

  While on this tiring journey and dealing with such momentous matters, Davis found time to write his wife. He informed her of his safe arrival in Tennessee and apprised her of his view of the Army of Tennessee as well as reports about public opinion. He did not neglect family matters, however. “Kiss my dear Children for their loving Father,” he told Varina, “they can little realize how much I miss them.” Every child he encountered reminded him of his own, “but none can equal their charms.…” As for “my long worshipped Winnie,” he drew on Robert Burns: “She is na my ain Lassie / Though fair the lassie be for well ken I my ain lassie / By the kind love in her eye.”107

  Responding, Varina tried to comfort her husband. Although she reported on Fredericksburg and other public matters, she focused on the children. Maggie often spoke of her absent father; Jeff, “full of fun,” had learned to whistle “Dixie”; Joe asked about him and “talked of pappas letter.” As for baby Billy, “To night I was dressing for dinner, and Billy was sitting on the floor … and my skirt tilted him over—He got so mad he fought me, and would not be taken up.”

  Varina made clear she understood the enormous pressure bearing down on him. “I am now, as heretofore oppressed with a sense of my own inability to say anything which will either distract your mind, or lighten your troubles, but be assured if I cannot participate I always remember that your heavy responsibilities and overtaxed mind prevent you in every act of life from doing that which your heart would indicate.” She implored, “take care of yourself, and try to look forward to peace and rest with the children.…” Sheconcluded with a pledge: “remember that there is one person who should success not be given you in unstinted measure, would only be the more devotedly your wife.”108

  While his wife offered private solace, Davis displayed public optimism. During his lengthy journey he made a number of short speeches, but just before leaving Mississippi he gave one longer address, in Jackson. Accepting an invitation from legislators, Davis on December 26 spoke for ninety minutes to a packed House chamber in the Capitol. He began, as he had on so many occasions before 1861, by identifying himself with those he had always striven to serve, the people of Mississippi. He told his listeners that even though in his current station he tried to make “no distinction between the various parts of the country,” he had to acknowledge that “my heart has always beat more warmly for Mississippi.” Now all Confederates, he professed, were involved in a great war with an enemy of “malignant ferocity” bent on destroying every vestige of liberty. He presented the issue as simple and fundamental: “will you be slaves … will you renounce the exercise of those rights with which you were born and which were transmitted to you by your fathers?” He knew the answer of Mississippians, “t
hat their interests, even life itself, should be willingly laid down on the altar of their country.” Praising sons of Mississippi already in uniform, he called on all others to “devote themselves to the noblest cause in which man can be engaged.”

  Davis declared the defense of the state crucial. To lead that effort he had appointed two men to defend “the land of my affections,” lauding Pemberton and Johnston as accomplished generals whose “capacity and resolution” would protect Mississippi. Asserting that he wanted to carry the war to the home fields of the enemy, the president admitted he lacked the power to do so. Even so, he declared that in the past year the Confederates had vastly improved their capacity to wage war. He was confident that the support of the people would enable the Confederate cause to prevail. He had no doubt that the magnificent people of Mississippi would rise to this occasion and secure their independence.109

  After his speech, Davis and Johnston went back to Vicksburg for two days. On the twenty-eighth, Davis returned to Jackson. He departed for Mobile the next day. On that same day, Pemberton repulsed General Sherman’s river-based assault on Vicksburg. In mid-afternoon on December 30, Davis’s train chugged into the Alabama port. Once again he reviewed troops, and in the evening from the balcony of his hotel spoke to a crowd composed mostly of soldiers. Celebrating the heroism of Confederate troops, “an army of heroes,” he proclaimed they could never be conquered. “Independence” or “domination of the Yankees” was at stake, and he was sure about the outcome. That the Confederates had turned back both Grant and Sherman in Mississippi fueled his optimism. Closing, he said that “the welfare of the people was the sole motive which actuated him…,” and vowed always to give “the utmost of his energies” to securing their liberty.110