The Battle of Waterloo: Europe in the Balance

by Rupert Matthews

  At least one thing was not bothering the Prussians. Grouchy had delayed leaving Gembloux until he knew where the main Prussian army had gone to. As a consequence he was unlikely to reach Wavre until later in the afternoon.

  Bülow’s advance was at first speeded up by Gneisenau’s decision to send the baggage train to Louvain. With no wagons in his column, Bülow could give priority to his cannon when it came to bridges or good roads, and hurry his infantry and cavalry forward over the open fields with speed. That speed soon slowed to a crawl.

  The roads were entirely unsurfaced and after heavy rain had turned to mud. Pounded and stirred by thousands of hooves and booted feet, the mud fairly quickly turned into a quagmire of liquid goo that sucked at feet, pulled off boots and trapped horses while making the progress of artillery impossible. Time and again, pioneers had to come up to cut brushwood to lay over the mud so that artillery could pass. Elsewhere the fields gave way to dense woods, forcing the marching men either to return to the roads or take circuitous routes around the woods. It was all taking time, a great deal of time.

  Marshal Blücher urges an artillery crew to hurry along the road to Waterloo on the morning of 18 June. The cross-country roads from Wavre to Waterloo were of poor quality and many had degenerated into mud after the heavy rains of the previous day.

  The occasional sighting of French light cavalry patrols caused even more delays. Bülow feared an ambush, and if caught strung out on the march he would have suffered a massacre. Time and again he had to halt his forward units in a defensive position to allow the rear units to catch up.

  The defence of Wavre

  Back at Wavre, things were still running less than smoothly. The III Corps of Thielmann had been ordered to be the last to leave Wavre. At about 3 pm Thielmann received reports from his scouts to the south that a large column of French soldiers was approaching. Grouchy had caught up with the Prussians. Having learned of the poor state of the roads he was expected to take, Thielmann was just as worried about being caught in ambush as Bülow. He halted his men and put them into defensive positions around Wavre, at the same time sending messages to Blücher asking for orders.

  The messenger arrived at 3.30 pm just as Blücher and Gneisenau had arrived on a hill near Lasne from which they could get a distant view of the Waterloo battlefield some kilometres to the west. They studied the scene through telescopes: they could see the smoke caused by artillery fire and the movement of larger masses of men. Although they did not know it, they were watching Wellington’s reorganization after defeating d’Erlon’s attack and Ney’s assault on La Haye Sainte.

  It was clear that a major battle was taking place, and that Wellington was managing to hold his own so far. Blücher wanted to steer Bülow’s men directly west so that they would arrive on Wellington’s left flank and give him support against Napoleon’s assault. Gneisenau disagreed. He suggested sending Bülow south-west so that he would arrive behind Napoleon’s right flank, cutting his line of retreat and falling on the rear of the French army. Such a plan would, if it succeeded, guarantee a total victory by crushing Napoleon. However, it ran the risk that Napoleon might manage to ambush the Prussians as they were on the march by falling on their exposed right flank.

  After some discussion, Blücher and Gneisenau decided to direct Bülow south-west, while Zieten’s I Corps would go west. This meant that the first Prussians on the scene would attack Napoleon’s rear right flank, while those arriving later would go to the direct aid of Wellington.

  Blücher sent off his orders, including instructions back to Wavre that Thielmann was to hold Wavre no matter what the cost in men. After the despatch riders had gone, Blücher turned to Gneisenau and said ‘It does not matter if Thielmann and all his men are killed, so long as they stop Grouchy from joining Napoleon.’

  At Wavre, Thielmann was attacked at 4 pm. Thielmann had placed a strong advance guard south of the town in the hamlet of Aisemont. An attack of French infantry with artillery support soon drove the Prussians out of Aisemont and by about 4.30 pm the French had control of the south bank of the river Dyle.

  Grouchy himself then came up and studied Thielmann’s defences. He decided that Wavre was too strongly held to be taken without suffering heavy casualties. He kept some infantry in front of Wavre, together with some artillery to keep Thielmann’s attention focused there, then sent infantry and cavalry to march to the flanks to try to find another way over the river.

  At this crucial point Thielmann discovered that one of his four brigades had marched off to the west. The message he had sent to halt had gone astray, so General von Borcke had marched off with 7,000 of Thielmann’s 22,000 men to go to Waterloo.

  Grouchy, too, had received disturbing news. At 4 pm he received Napoleon’s orders telling him to march to join the emperor before the Prussians arrived to support Wellington. By this time he was engaged against Thielmann and feared that if he pulled back, the Prussian would attack his outnumbered and retreating men. It would make more sense to make it look as if he intended to continue attacking Wavre.

  Grouchy therefore allocated the task of continuing to mount attacks on Thielmann to Vandamme’s III Corps of 16,000 men. Gérard’s IV Corps of 15,000 men would meanwhile turn west and march through St Lambert to attack where he estimated the bulk of the Prussian army would be disorganized by marching along poor quality roads. It took him sometime to get Gérard’s men off the road north and turned west. Gérard had got only as far as Bierges when he was shot and badly wounded. His troops pushed on without him, however, but made slow progress.

  Blücher plans attack

  Meanwhile, Blücher had at 4 pm received a message from Müffling in which he gave them a detailed account of the battle so far and how things looked from Wellington’s ridge. Until this point, Blücher had been intending to await the arrival of Bülow’s entire IV Corps before attacking. The troops that had come up were hiding in a wood 1.5 km to the east of Plancenoit, facing the right flank of Lobau’s corps. Having read Muffling’s message, however, Blücher decided to attack at once. At 4.30 pm Bülow received orders to seize Plancenoit in order to outflank Lobau on the south, then to march straight on west for another 1.5 km to reach the main road south of Napoleon and cut off his line of retreat. Blücher was intending then to attack Lobau with Pirch’s II Corps as soon as it arrived, while sending Zieten’s I Corps to join up with Wellington.

  It took a few minutes for Bülow to prepare his troops. Then he led his artillery out of the wood and opened fire with the salvo that surprised Lobau.

  Chapter 11

  ‘Up Guards and at them’

  Wellington’s orders to the British Guards at the Battle of Waterloo.

  The arrival of the Prussians completely changed the Battle of Waterloo. Napoleon was no longer seeking to defeat Wellington before turning on the Prussians the following day. He now had to face both his enemies at once. Time was running out for the French.

  Lobau’s first reaction to the arrival of the Prussians was to send a messenger to Napoleon to announce the news. At the same time he realized that there was a wide gap between the Prussians’ right flank and Wellington’s left. Into this gap Lobau pushed his cavalry, followed by infantry who barricaded themselves into the handful of houses overlooking the Smohain stream. He also realized that the village of Plancenoit to the south commanded the main Brussels road. He sent his infantry reserves into the village.

  As more and more Prussians emerged into sight, Lobau reduced his frontage so as to increase the depth of his formations and concentrated around Plancenoit, leaving only a screen to link his main force to Napoleon’s right at the Smohain stream. Lobau was confident he could hold his own against Bülow’s corps, but he had to assume that more Prussians were on the way and that he might soon be in difficulties.

  Attack on La Haye Sainte

  Back on the main battlefield, Napoleon scanned Wellington’s ridge. He saw units being r
epositioned and correctly deduced that Wellington was shifting regiments around to try to plug gaps. His eye fell on the farm of La Haye Sainte. If that fell to the French it would clear the way for a new assault on the weakest part of Wellington’s centre. Napoleon sent Ney to take the farmhouse with those units of d’Erlon’s corps that had reformed.

  The French attack on La Haye Sainte in the early evening. The farmhouse is on the left, the sandpit on the right. The outbuildings are wreathed in smoke and barely visible. Wellington’s position on the hill behind has been brought forward by the artist, in reality he was several hundred yards away.

  The Hanoverians in La Haye Sainte saw three divisions marching against them, preceded by a heavy artillery barrage that smashed holes in the walls. Baring’s main problem, however, was a lack of ammunition. A man was sent running up the slope to Baring’s senior, General Baron Ompteda. But after all the fighting on the ridge, Ompteda was short of ammunition himself. He sent off for ammunition from the rear, but for whatever reason it never arrived.

  After an hour Baring’s Hanoverians ran out of ammunition. They fell back on their bayonets, while some men threw stones and tiles down on the French from the roof. After attempting a last stand in the farmhouse, Baring and his surviving men retreated back up the slope to join Ompteda. Many of Baring’s men were unfit for further duty due to wounds and were sent off to the medical teams working in the rear. Baring did a quick count. Of the 400 men he had had at dawn, only 42 now stood beside him.

  The farmhouse had fallen. French artillery was brought up fire up at Wellington’s centre at close range, while a final assault to smash its way to Brussels was drawn up.

  Wellington redeploys his troops

  These moves made it clear to Wellington that Napoleon was once again going to try to penetrate his centre. He had expected Napoleon to use his skills at manoeuvring, but this had not happened. Wellington decided to take the risk of weakening his flanks to strengthen his centre. The 3rd Dutch Division had been placed more than 1.5 km to the west to keep open Wellington’s line of retreat. Those 6,000 men were now moved to the centre, as were the 2,000 light cavalry of Vivian and Vandeleur who had been out on the far left.

  An immediate result of these changes came at the eastern end of the battlefield. Count Durutte, commanding the 4th Division of d’Erlon’s corps, had not been heavily engaged so far – having acted as a flank guard during the great advance earlier. Now he saw the movement to the British centre and took the opportunity to attack Papelotte overlooking the dip of the Smohain stream. Sending forward infantry under cover of an artillery barrage, Durutte captured Papelotte without much difficulty and began barricading the buildings.

  Further south, Lobau was holding his own. He was, however, losing men and watched with some alarm as more Prussians came marching out of the woods. These were the lead units of Pirch’s II Corps, which meant that Lobau was now seriously outnumbered. He sent to Napoleon, announcing he could not hold Plancenoit much longer. Napoleon responded at 6.40pm by sending to Plancenoit his Young Guard. This was the most junior division in the Imperial Guard, but it still contained 4,200 veterans. The arrival of the Young Guard stabilized the position and pushed the Prussians back.

  At La Haye Sainte, the advanced French artillery and infantry were having a devastating effect on the centre of Wellington’s position. Ney had brought up several regiments of heavy cavalry, who forced the defenders to form square. Into these dense formations the French gunners were pouring a torrent of fire. The Inniskillings were down to 218 men, having started the day with 700 while the 1st Nassau Regiment had lost 70 per cent of their men while the 5th Netherlanders had lost more than 90 per cent of its men and its colours. The surviving officers of the British 30th Foot were so worried that they cut their regimental colours from their poles, handed them to a sergeant and told him to head to the rear, find a horse and be ready to flee to the safety of the Royal Navy.

  Ney, watching these events unfold, decided that the time had come to crush Wellington. He sent a message to Napoleon requesting extra men with which to win the battle. Ney’s message arrived just after Napoleon learned that his Young Guard had been pushed out of Plancenoit by new Prussian reinforcements. Prussian artillery were beginning to send occasional balls over the main road, threatening Napoleon’s line of retreat.

  Napoleon snapped back at Ney’s messenger ‘Men? Where does he expect me to get them? Does he think I can make them?’

  Old Guard retake Plancenoit

  Instead, Napoleon ordered two battalions of his Old Guard – the elite of the elite – to recapture Plancenoit. Napoleon ordered that his Guard should not fire their muskets but must use their bayonets. He fully understood the morale effect that these older veterans in their towering bearskins hats and elaborate uniforms would have on the Prussians. The Old Guard was composed only of men over the age of 35 who had 10 years’ experience and had fought in at least three battles. They were trained in advanced fighting techniques and given the very finest equipment. Moreover, the Guard battalions each had 200 more men than a normal battalion.

  The Old Guard did not disappoint. They deployed into line and marched on Plancenoit with their drums beating. After some desultory resistance, the Prussians turned and fled. In all 14 Prussian battalions fled in front of two from the Old Guard, tumbling back in confusion. Spurred on by this success, the Young Guard charged forward and completed the rout of the Prussians. Bülow and Pirch were back where they had started.

  With his right flank and line of retreat now secure, Napoleon could pay attention to Wellington again. At about 7.15pm Napoleon received two messages. The first came from Lobau. He had seen columns of men to the south-east and identified them as being Grouchy’s French. With Grouchy attacking Blücher’s rear the Prussians would be unable to interfere any further. The second was brought by Ney himself who emphasized the shattered state of Wellington’s centre.

  Fresh French assault

  Newly galvanized, Napoleon threw himself into the final destruction of Wellington’s army. He allocated Ney five battalions of the Old and Middle Guard, with orders to attack in column up the slope to the left of La Haye Sainte, where the defences were seen to be weakest. Accompanying them were the horse artillery of the Guard. Napoleon sent orders to Reille that he was to send any of his men not committed at Hougoumont to act as a flank guard on the Guard’s left. D’Erlon was to attack up the slope to the right of La Haye Sainte. Heavy cavalry were to bring up the rear, ready to charge forward to exploit the gap that was going to be opened up by the Guard infantry.

  The grand battery again roared out its hail of balls and shell to deluge the survivors on Wellington’s ridge with a new onslaught of death. Under cover of the cannon fire, the Guard advanced with drums beating and flags waving. On battlefields across Europe the advance of the Guard had heralded inevitable victory. Enemies had fled at the mere sight of the bearskins on the march. Morale in the French army soared and there was a general movement forward.

  Wellington, however, had not been idle. He had seen the smoke over Plancenoit and guessed it meant that Blücher was arriving. Leaving only a few Dutch troops to watch the French at Papelotte, Wellington abandoned his left and drew those troops to his centre. The Brunswickers were similarly moved from the right to the centre.

  Senior commanders were not immune: the Prince of Orange was hurt, de Lancey was mortally wounded and Wellington’s staff was reduced to just a single officer – Captain Shaw.

  As the five battalions of the Middle Guard marched forward, Napoleon rode up to salute them as they passed. The three battalions of the Old Guard stayed beside their emperor to act as a mobile reserve while Ney rode at the head of the attacking columns.

  Ney divided his force into two. The 1/3rd and 4th Grenadiers went straight up the hill just west of La Haye Sainte, while the 2/3rd Chasseurs and both battalions of the 4th Chasseurs inclined slightly to the west so that a gap op
ened up between the two columns. Halfway up the slope, Ney’s horse was shot dead so the marshal continued on foot.

  The first column reached the crest of the ridge where they met what was left of the British 30th, 33rd, 69th and 73rd infantry regiments. Those redcoats were being pushed back when out of the smoke there came galloping the horse artillery of Chassé’s Dutch 3rd Division. They unlimbered and poured into the 1/3rd Grenadiers a salvo of deadly canister shot at almost point blank range. More than 100 French went down in that first blast, and more when the second salvo was fired.

  British and Dutch resistance

  Hidden behind the artillery smoke the 6,000 infantry of the Dutch 3rd Division had formed up in several dense columns, then fixed bayonets. Now they came storming out of the smoke, screaming defiance and plunged into the decimated ranks of the 1/3rd Grenadiers – and caught the 4th Grenadiers as they were deploying to meet them. The 1/3rd Grenadiers fell back in disorder, while the 4th Grenadiers also fell back but in good order, managing to hold the Dutch off.

  Meanwhile the other column of the Guard had also crested the ridge. The 2/3rd Chasseurs came up first and saw ahead of them nothing but empty fields with some cavalry wheeling in the distance. Wellington, who was nearby on his horse, shouted ‘Up, Guards and at them,’ at which the British Foot Guards sprang to their feet and poured a devastating volley into the Chasseurs. The guards had been lying down among the standing rye to try to avoid the French cannon fire. Their sudden appearance, as much as their musketry, halted the French.