The Generals
Page 56
Bremer believed he outranked him: L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (Simon & Schuster, 2006), 186.
“I’m not going to do it”: Sanchez, Wiser in Battle, 361.
“Some observers feel”: Jeffrey White, “Eyewitness Perspectives Assessing Progress in Iraq: Security and Extremism,” in Knights, ed., Operation Iraqi Freedom and the New Iraq, 125.
“The efforts of 1-124” . . . “having learned nothing”: Army intelligence officer who asked not to be identified, e-mail message to author, December 27, 2010.
“In the summer of ’03”: “Interview with LTC Russell Godsil,” Operational Leadership Experiences, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2009, 8.
An Army intelligence expert later estimated: Maj. Gen. George Fay, investigating officer, “AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade,” U.S. Army, August 2004, 37.
“bark like a dog”: Ricks, Fiasco, 292. Several other quotations in this section are from that book.
he was contemplating relieving: Sanchez, Wiser in Battle, 274.
In a privately circulated essay: John Cushman, “An Added Input to the Profession of Arms Discussion,” privately circulated essay, June 11, 2011, 1.
“When Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez”: Andrew Bacevich, “A Modern Major General,” New Left Review, September–October 2004, 1.
“You all have betrayed me”: Sanchez, Wiser in Battle, 435.
“Boy, am I glad to be leaving”: Sanchez, Wiser in Battle, 397–98.
“Perhaps most unforgivably” . . . “answer is that simple”: Douglas Pryer, The Fight for the High Ground: The U.S. Army and Interrogation Training During Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003–April 2004 (CGSC Foundation Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2009), 7, 49, 121.
Franks made news in 2008: Brian Ross, ABC World News, January 17, 2008.
“I speak to you today”: “Sanchez Delivers Democratic Party Weekly Address,” Small Wars Journal, November 27, 2007.
In 2011, Sanchez announced: Josh Lederman, “Lone Democrat Drops Out of Senate Race in Texas,” The Hill, December 16, 2011.
“The troops were good”: This and the following quotations are from a series of e-mail exchanges between the author and Robert Killebrew, 2007–2011.
“A system of officer education”: Huba Wass de Czege, “How to Change an Army,” Military Review, November 1984, accessed online.
That is the way it always goes: I am indebted to Robert Killebrew for the observations in these three sentences.
“One of the reasons we were able”: Sean MacFarland, “U.S. Army Leader Development: Past, Present and Future,” in Cultivating Army Leaders: Historical Perspectives, the Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2010 Military History Symposium (U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2011), 226.
In 2005, a RAND Corporation study: Margaret Harrell, Harry Thie, Peter Schirmer, and Kevin Brancato, “Developing and Using Army General Officers,” in Matthews, ed., The Future of the Army Profession, 563.
“If the behavior does not change”: George Reed, “Toxic Leadership,” Military Review, July–August 2004, 71.
a study done at the Army War College: Jones, “Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate.”
“I was with Nate”: Conrad Crane, interview by author, December 14, 2011.
“In person, the ruggedly handsome commander”: Vivian Gembara, Drowning in the Desert: A JAG’s Search for Justice in Iraq (Zenith, 2008), 71.
“With a heavy dose of fear”: Dexter Filkins, “A Region Inflamed: Tough New Tactics by U.S. Tighten Grip on Iraq Towns,” New York Times, December 7, 2003, 18.
“The simple, somewhat barbaric truth”: Nathan Sassaman, Warrior King: The Triumph and Betrayal of an American Commander in Iraq (St. Martin’s, 2008), 99.
“I neither trusted nor respected him”: Sassaman, Warrior King, 117.
“Screw brigade” . . . “I couldn’t do that”: Sassaman, Warrior King, 160–61.
“First Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment”: Gembara, Drowning in the Desert, 284.
This time Gen. Odierno gave Sassaman: Ricks, The Gamble, 108–9.
29. GEORGE CASEY: TRYING BUT TREADING WATER
“oblivious to the inefficacy”: Ricks, The Gamble, 25.
“Because the Army won’t change itself”: Ricks, The Gamble, 12.
“The potential second- and third-order effects”: Ricks, Fiasco, 418.
“By and large”: Francis “Bing” West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (Random House, 2009), 107.
“There was no downtime”: Jim Frederick, Black Hearts: One Platoon’s Descent Into Madness in Iraq’s Triangle of Death (Harmony, 2010), 185.
“shitbags” who constantly “fucked up”: Frederick, Black Hearts, 109.
“I did everything by the book”: Frederick, Black Hearts, 205–6.
Cushman faulted the chain of command: John Cushman, “Chain of Command Performance of Duty, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, 2005–06: A Case Study Offered to the Center for the Army Professional Ethic,” unpublished paper, June 2, 2011, 1, 30.
there were fifty insurgent attacks: Seth Jones, Hunting in the Shadows: The Search for al Qa’ida Since 9/11 (W. W. Norton, 2012), 247.
“Jack, I just came out of Iraq”: Ricks, The Gamble, 82.
“I didn’t see that at the time”: This and other quotations from Casey in this and following paragraphs are from author interview with Gen. George Casey, October 13, 2008.
“I respected General Casey”: Cheney, In My Time, 439.
30. DAVID PETRAEUS: AN OUTLIER MOVES IN, THEN LEAVES
“Not a single general has been removed”: Ricks, The Gamble, 99.
“We feel—the Chiefs feel”: Bob Woodward, The War Within (Simon & Schuster, 2008), 371.
“I always felt that as a professional”: George Casey, interview by author, October 13, 2008.
“It is not possible to fire all former Baathists”: David Petraeus, “Lessons of the Iraq War and Its Aftermath,” in Knights, ed., Operation Iraqi Freedom and the New Iraq, 225.
“By the beginning of the surge”: Peter Mansoor, “The Softer Side of War,” Foreign Affairs, January–February 2011, accessed online.
“Our mindset was not to kill”: Quoted in Armor, July–August 2008.
“I don’t think it was something”: Ricks, The Gamble, 202.
“he basically inherited a strategic void”: Philip Zelikow, interview by author, April 2007.
“almost an excruciating period”: Quotations from Petraeus in this paragraph and the following one are from an interview by the author, October 15, 2008.
“I think he had one shot”: U.S. Army colonel in Iraq who asked not to be identified, interview by author, June 30, 2007.
“We were really an orphan headquarters”: Christopher Koontz, ed., Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan, 2003–2005 (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2008), 42, 47, 49.
the number of reported security problems: Joseph Collins, Understanding War in Afghanistan (National Defense University Press, 2011), 72.
The turning point in the war: Army Lt. Gen. (Ret.) David Barno, interview by author, February 28, 2012. Barno commanded in Afghanistan in 2004–5. See also Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (W. W. Norton, 2009), 245–46.
a number of incidents: Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 257.
its officials grew unhappy: David Isby, Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires: A New History of the Borderlands (Pegasus, 2010), 284.
“The replacement of McKiernan”: Lt. Col. Donald Drechler and retired Army Col. Charles Allen, “Why Senior Military Leade
rs Fail,” Armed Forces Journal, July/August 2009.
“You have ten commanders”: Barno, interview by author, February 28, 2012.
“America’s generals have failed”: This and subsequent quotations are from Yingling, “A Failure of Generalship.”
“which,” Nagl recalled: Nagl, interview by author, October 3, 2011.
“I believe in our generals”: This account and the quotations from Gen. Hammond are from Greg Jaffe, “Critiques of Iraq War Reveal Rifts Among Army Officers,” Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2007, 1.
he gave Yingling a mediocre performance evaluation: Yingling, e-mail messages to author, January 31 and February 1, 2012.
“I think we’ve got great general officers”: The account of Gen. Cody’s exchanges with captains at Fort Knox is from Fred Kaplan, “Challenging the Generals,” New York Times, August 26, 2007, accessed online.
“guilty of three important failures”: Paul Yingling, “The Evolution of American Civil-Military Relations,” lecture at George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, May 4, 2011, 11–12.
“I would say most of the current GO”: Maj. Neil Smith, e-mail message to author, January 2011.
“They have somewhat abdicated their role”: “Interview with Col. (Ret.) Dale Eikmeier,” Operational Leadership Experiences, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 10, 2011, 11.
“With Gates, it is not to destroy people”: James Mattis, interview by author, August 12, 2009.
Dempsey stated early in 2012: “A Conversation with General Martin Dempsey,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 1, 2012. Transcript accessed online.
“We’re going to go back”: Chinn was quoted in Michelle Tan, “Training Gets a Reboot,” Army Times, April 16, 2012, accessed online.
EPILOGUE: RESTORING AMERICAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP
“Generals are, or should be”: Cohen, Supreme Command, 215.
“For a number of my officers”: Army officer who asked not to be identified, e-mail messages to author, 2011.
“rings loudly of institutionalizing mediocrity”: Brig. Gen. Mark Arnold, “Don’t Promote Mediocrity,” Armed Forces Journal, May 2012, accessed online.
“In 1914 every army of all the belligerent powers”: Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” RUSI Journal, March 1974, 6–7.
“Accountability provides the motivation”: Jones, “Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate,” 25.
“the first thing that a commander”: Jones and Ancell, eds., Four-Star Leadership, 13.
“There’s no way to tell”: Donn Starry, interview by Charles Cavanaugh Jr., October 1985, in Sorley, ed., Press On!, 1221.
A 2011 study at Harvard’s Kennedy School: Sayce Falk and Sasha Rogers, “Junior Office Military Retention: Challenges and Opportunities,” Policy Analysis Exercise, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 2011, 2–4 of executive summary and 1, 11, 13, 19.
“will have minimal impact”: Michelle Tan, “Army Looks to Make MSAF More Random,” Army Times, October 10, 2011, 25.
“We don’t educate [our officers]”: Barak Salmoni, Jessica Hart, Renny McPherson, and Aidan Kirby Winn, “Growing Strategic Leaders for Future Conflict,” Parameters, Spring 2010, 77.
“It is depressing how so many”: Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, 155.
“In the absence of orders and guidance”: Petraeus, in videotaped interview at WashingtonPost.com, February 9, 2010.
“Intellectuals are most valued”: Yingling, e-mail message to author, April 14, 2011.
In 1969, there were 398 military veterans: Jennifer Manning, “Membership of the 112th Congress: A Profile,” Congressional Research Service, August 4, 2011, 7–8.
INDEX
The page numbers in this index refer to the printed version of this book. To find the corresponding locations in the text of this digital version, please use the “search” function on your e-reader. Note that not all terms may be searchable.
Page numbers in italics refer to the map.
Abizaid, John, 414, 416
Abrams, Creighton, 5, 316, 319–20, 330, 342, 343, 447, 520n
and rebuilding of post-Vietnam Army, 335–37
Abrams tank, 339
Abu Ghraib scandal, 414–15, 418, 427
Acheson, Dean, 189, 486n, 496n, 497n
on MacArthur, 192
Afghan war, 11, 12, 18, 117, 272, 335, 337, 343, 349, 361, 421, 430, 444, 445
civil-military divide in, 399–401, 404
as Iraq war side show, 438–39
NATO in, 439
Obama Administration and, 439
Operation Anaconda in, 399–400
Pakistan’s opposition to, 439
relief policy in, 439–40
risk aversion in, 449
Tora Bora battle in, 398–99, 403
turning point in, 439
turnover in U.S. commanders in, 440–41
Agnew, James, 504n, 506n
Air Force, U.S., 12, 35, 209, 215, 222, 338
command traditions in, 13
post–Korean War expansion of, 206–7, 208
Alexander, Clifford, 350
Alexander, Harold, 56, 66, 78, 85, 90, 91
Allen, Charles, 531n
Allen, Fred, 163
Allen, John, 440
Allen, Leven, 133
Allen, Robert, 480n
Allen, Terry, Jr., 251
Allen, Terry de la Mesa, 3, 7, 8, 10, 37, 73–80, 101, 151, 241, 247, 455, 479n, 506n
as combat leader, 75
DePuy’s correspondence with, 250–51
drinking of, 74–75
Marshall and, 74, 79
military career of, 73–74
nature of generalship and, 73
Patton and, 75, 78
relieved of division command, 77–79
in Sicily campaign, 76–77
teamwork attempted by, 75–76
on Time cover, 77
Almond, Edward, 125, 132, 150, 157, 171, 182, 185, 188, 489n, 490n, 491n, 496n
Chosin campaign and, 136, 139, 141–42, 143, 149, 155–56, 163
Smith’s distrust of, 184–85
al-Qaeda, 399, 415, 437
Alsop, Joseph, 104, 259, 484n, 507n
Ambrose, Stephen, 479n
Americal Division, see 23rd Infantry “Americal” Division, U.S.
American Institute of Philanthropy, 418
American Revolution, 22, 238
Anaconda, Operation, 399–400
Ancell, R. Manning, 485n, 507n, 532n
Anderson, David, 507n, 513n, 514n, 515n
Angers, Trent, 514n
Anzio landings, 68–71, 132, 381
Apache attack helicopter, 339
appeasement policy, 29
Appleman, Roy, 146, 156, 170, 488n, 489n, 490n, 493n, 494n, 496n
Appy, Christian, 507n, 508n, 513n, 514n, 517n
Ardennes, Battle of the, 93
Armed Forces & Society, 174
Armitage, Richard, 411
Army, U.S.:
accountability tradition of, 462
all-volunteer, 362
careerism in, 359
and careers of innovators, 460–61
Chaplain Corps of, 341
civilian leadership and, 447–50
Command and General Staff College of, 209, 211, 235, 266, 277, 341, 346, 354–55, 356, 358–59, 390–91
command traditions of, 12–13
corporate culture of, 203–5, 235–36, 359–60
Delta Force of, 340
drug problem in, 326, 327–29, 332
&
nbsp; dysfunctional effect of Vietnam War on, 330–32
inability to admit mistakes in, 283–84
Information Age and, 385, 389, 451, 455
institutionalized mediocrity in, 449–50
lack of leadership education in, 419–21
lack of professionalism in, 280–81
McCarthy’s attack on, 206
micromanagement and, 210, 211–12, 359–61
mutinous insubordination in, 326–27, 329
My Lai and failure of leadership in, 309–10
nuclear weapons and role of, 206–7, 209
officer corps report of, 311–14
peacetime draft and, 210
Pentomic Army reorganization of, 208–9, 219
personnel policy of, 454–56
in post–Gulf War era, see Army, U.S., post–Gulf War era
in post–Korean War era, 206–14
post-9/11 study of, 455–56
in post–Spanish-American War era, 19
in post-Vietnam era, see Army, U.S., post-Vietnam
promotions in, 9
race problem in, 327, 332
Ranger School of, 356
relief policy and, see relief, relief policy
and retirement of talented officers, 453–54
rotation policy of, see rotation policy
SAMS of, see School of Advanced Military Studies
selection of officers in, 458–59
Special Warfare School of, 209
Spector on breakdown of, 294
“360–degree” evaluations in, 454–55
Viet Cong’s exploitation of, 280–84
Vietnam War and decline of, 317–19
Vietnam War failure of, 260–66
World War II growth of, 15, 35–36
Yingling’s critique of, 441–44
Army, U.S., post–Gulf War era, 388–96
all-volunteer, 393
critiques of, 388–89
deprofessionalization of, 390–92
drawdown in, 390
Information Age and, 385, 389
micromanagement in, 390–92
outsourcing to private sector in, 390
peace dividend and, 389
relief policy of, 392–93