Athene's Prophecy (Gaius Claudius Scaevola Trilogy)
Page 17
"That's fairly standard stuff," the General frowned.
"I can't see any reason to be different . . ." Gaius began to protest.
"Good!" the General interrupted. "Your problem is that sometimes you are just too imaginative. Tried and tested is just what you need, most of the time. You're right to go for the weakest opponent first, but do it quickly, before the other works out what you're up to. Defeat that, then march towards the other. If the enemy splits, divide him with a single force, then concentrate your attack on what you think will be his weakest force."
"Suppose," Gaius said, "they decide to attack? They've already encircled me."
"The other way of looking at it is that you've already punched a hole through their lines, and they have two forces who can't communicate with each other, and who can't coordinate such an attack. In any case, when you first looked at this problem, you split your forces and went out to meet them, without adequate communication, so presumably you think you can defeat them, and half of your forces can at least hold out against all of theirs."
"What do you mean, half of my forces can hold out?"
"They can always regroup into one unit while you're marching," the older General said, "and not only that, they could have sent disinformation to get you to split, intending to knock you out half at a time."
"But . . ." Gaius was about to protest.
"No buts," the older General wagged his finger at him. "Not everything you hear will be true. As for your complaint, if they attack on both sides, form a square and let them pound away. They will find it most expensive to attack a properly set defensive square. And anyway, you are crediting the opponent with his best option. Most of the time they don't take them, and again, if they do, they were always going to be good enough to give you a problem, which is all the more reason for you to take your optimum strategy. If your opponent is brilliant, marching out between them gives you your best chance if you must march, while if he is substandard it gives you the chance to wipe the field with him, at minimum cost."
"I see," Gaius nodded.
"Do you?" the General smiled. "You wish to alter your second marching orders?"
"I can't see why . . ." Gaius started, then paused. He must be wrong, but where. "Perhaps . . ."
"Never give an order starting with perhaps!"
"I was thinking to myself," Gaius replied tartly, then suddenly felt silly. "I'm sorry," he said. "I march my legion to the south of the river, and to the south of the enemy so that I can meet them where they have no room to retreat, and they cannot manoeuvre in depth."
"Better," the General nodded. "You're getting the idea. Think in terms of warring on a square. The east is his zone, where he came from. In this case the north is fairly inaccessible, and as you rightly noted, the river acts as a barrier. Your base is from the west, so who controls the south?"
"I do, because I've marched out in that direction."
"No, you are trying to. You've probably got the idea to some extent, but spell it out. Your marching objective is to march towards the south west of him, or even the south, or even better still, the south south east if you can do that without his knowing. Then the enemy has no easy line of retreat, and if you can get into position before he finds out what you are doing, you have half won before you even start fighting."
"How can that matter? There're no natural advantages."
"Think about it from the point of view of a foot soldier who really wishes he was back with his family. He's marching forward, thinking of loot, then a major force appears from his left rear. Why? What he thinks is you are trying to cut him off from his family, so he goes into the fight with half his mind thinking of ways to get out of there.
"If you can deploy before the enemy commander can set his forces properly, you have a further advantage. By simply sitting there you give him a problem. He has to give up on his primary objective, and decide whether to enter battle with no hope of retreat, or try to find a way past you. He can't attack the village, even though there are hardly any forces between him and it, because he opens his rear to an undefended attack. If your primary objective was to protect the village, you have achieved that before any fighting commences."
"I suppose," Gaius said, in a flat tone, "although he could stand and fight with most of his forces, and attack the village with a small part of his force. I can't stop him."
"If he splits some of his force, as you say, they are either infantry of cavalry. What do you do if they're infantry?"
"Chase them with cavalry," Gaius nodded.
"If they're only a small squad, they'll be cut to pieces," the General said. "If they're a major infantry force, either you clean out that which stands against you, or you were always so outnumbered you were never going to succeed. What do you do if they send cavalry?"
"I . . . suppose I have to send cavalry as well," Gaius frowned.
"No, you don't," the General said. "Let the defensive walls about the village buy you time. Unsupported cavalry can't do much about them. Send your cavalry into the rear of his infantry, and support the attack with infantry. If you attack quickly, his best troops are going to be the last to join battle, because they're up the front. There may well be a full flight before they get to engage. If he launches some sort of attack against you at this point, better still, because he will have committed himself before he is ready. Use some infantry to defend the first attack, while striking hard elsewhere, and against most barbarians, they'll offer their backs. And even if they fight like fiends, so what? They always would have. You may argue this set-up is artificial, and you'd be correct. It is, but that's not the point. What I am trying to get you to recognize is that you can achieve considerable advantage merely by directing where you march. Looking at it the other way, suppose you were the enemy, which way would you march, and why?"
"Me, I would direct my force in a line half-way between the villages, then when I was in between, attack whichever one I thought was easiest."
"See," the General smiled. "You do that because if they have to defend two villages, they have to split their forces, so you pick them off singly. You achieve that because your line of approach is not directed at either. The straight line between two points may well be the shortest line, but it is not often the best line of attack. The more ambiguity in the enemy's mind, the better. Think about this, and we'll try again tomorrow."
* * *
"For the purposes of this exercise," the General smiled, "you are here with five cohorts of infantry, and a well-organized enemy is seen here coming towards you. His infantry outnumber yours three to one, and he also has archers and six hundred cavalry troops, neither of which you have. Your move."
Gaius stared at the board. This was almost the reverse of the situation at Alesia, except that on the right of the approaching enemy there were woods on the valley floor and halfway up the rise. "I march my men to the top of this hill here and fortify," Gaius replied.
"The enemy arrive and open up with archers."
"We adopt the testudo formation," Gaius replied.
"Their cavalry charges, and while you lose some men, they fail to penetrate, they appear to get badly mauled, so they retreat, seemingly to lick their wounds."
"What is their infantry doing?"
"They have formed lines," the General smiled, "and are now marching up towards you. You fight for about two hours, but despite their numbers, with your superior drill you hold out. Eventually, the back starts to falter, and before long, they start to retreat."
"I send three cohorts after them," Gaius frowned. What was the problem? "The other two follow with a view to flanking the enemy if they . . ."
"The enemy start running."
"We chase."
"The enemy cavalry comes out of the woods and cuts your men to pieces," the General stared at Gaius, challenging him to contradict. "Meanwhile the enemy infantry turn and fight with renewed vigour. This was a trap and you should be massacred."
Gaius stared back. This was unfair! He was riggi
ng the situation.
"What did you do wrong?" the General asked.
"Obviously I didn't know where the cavalry was, or I wouldn't . . ."
"You didn't ask where they were," the General said. "You were outnumbered, and many of their forces were missing."
"You didn't tell me where they were," Gaius protested. "You said I had to take the initiative and . . ."
"You didn't ask," the General repeated. "The lesson here is, before you start charging off impulsively, always check that you can account for everything you know about. You were in an ideal defensive position, and that was good. Don't give it up unless you are sure why you're giving it up. Yes, I know much of the advice you're getting is contradictory, but the real trick is, how do you read the situation? Always ask yourself, what are you giving up? In this case, it was the defence against cavalry, because they don't charge up hills very well, so where is the cavalry? If you can't account for it, hold your advantage. Remember, you're still outnumbered, and pursuing a fleeing enemy is a job best left to cavalry which, as you may note, you don't have."
Chapter 17
The war games continued. At first Gaius became discouraged. No matter how well he thought he was doing, there seemed to be an interminable number of points he had forgotten, and, after a while, he felt that he was also losing unfairly, because the General was making up situations that worked because he knew what Gaius had done, and then found the optimum response, after the fact. Eventually he muttered something like that to the General, who laughed.
"Of course I'm doing what no opponent would do," the General said. "This isn't about winning a board game. It's about improving your ability."
Perhaps it was working, for eventually he felt his mistakes were becoming fewer, and, more importantly, less important. Then the General confirmed this, and congratulated him on becoming much better. At the same time, lessons continued. He had to read and understand all the major works of Aristotle, and read some of the major Greek plays. And throughout all this, the local legionnaires ensured his weapons skills were maintained, and his physical fitness kept high.
"Tribunes and Legates don't personally fight," the old man advised, "or at least they don't unless something is going very very wrong. But you seem to have a bit of flair with some of these weapons, so it doesn't hurt to get a lot of practice. It helps command."
"How?" Gaius asked in a disbelieving tone.
"You want the men to follow," the old man said. "The centurion and his cane'll see they do what they're told, but if the men respect you, they'll go a lot further than where the threat of getting their arses whipped will drive them. Same with marching. You may be on a horse but even so, if they know you're doing what you have to do, and they know you're fit, they'll do their best not to let on they're tiring. Remember Julius. His troops did the impossible for him because they recognized he was doing the impossible himself. So, get fit, and learn to shoot the bow better."
"I'm trying," Gaius replied.
"Now," the older man stood up so he could look down on Gaius, "time for a revision. Let's see how much you've learned. We shall start with Pharsalus. You be Pompey, and you must defeat Caesar."
"And I'm not allowed to do that at Dyrrachium?"
"No," the older man smiled. "Mind you, when Caesar's men started fleeing, that was the time to put the issue to rest. That was the time for Pompey to give chase and clean up, particularly since he held the superior cavalry. Why do you think he didn't?"
"Presumably he was afraid of a Caesar counter-attack," Gaius said, remembering one of his failed exercises, "although that doesn't seem likely."
"Couldn't happen," the old man said. "Caesar's men attacked a fortified position, they fought well, then they began to flee. You can't organize an ambush with fleeing soldiers, so an ambush had to be prepared. That meant Caesar planned to flee. That wasn't Caesar."
"Caesar hasn't used his cavalry," Gaius pointed out.
"True, but cavalry was Pompey's strength, and Caesar's weakness. Yes, Caesar may turn and fight, but Pompey has more men, far more cavalry, and having defended fortified positions, they'll be fresher. If Caesar has hidden cavalry, Pompey's cavalry will deal with them and have plenty of cavalry to spare, bearing in mind Caesar's men won't be in line. No, Pompey messed up.
"However, as Pompey, you marched to Pharsalus, and have another chance. Your infantry outnumber Caesar's two to one, your cavalry nearly seven to one, but Caesar's infantry are of much higher quality. You arrive to find Caesar's men camped on the plain, and you secure your men on the prominent rise. Caesar marches towards you, you form your lines on the hill slopes, but then Caesar sees your advantage of terrain, and retreats. He camps three to four mile away, with the Enipeus River on his left. A day passes, and Caesar does not attack. Your move."
"The consensus of opinion is that Pompey should have stayed put," Gaius replied.
"It is your opinion I seek!"
"I think Pompey has to attack," Gaius said. "The defensive strategy failed at Dyrrachium through not following it up. I have pursued Caesar, so I have to fight."
"Very thoughtful, but you're still stuck on the hill," the old man remarked caustically.
"What I do next depends on the geography," Gaius said. "Using your analogy of the strategic square, the river forms a northern barrier, Caesar controls the west, my hills control the east, so if there's room, I set up observers on the hill and march to the south of Caesar."
"Why?"
"My strength is in cavalry and in numbers. If I do what Pompey did and march straight out, I have to launch a frontal attack, which plays into Caesar's hands if he has the best troops, or try to flank him on the left. I know Caesar kept six reserve cohorts hidden at an oblique angle to defend against a flanking attack but . . ."
"Fight your battle!" the older man spat.
"I know Caesar is my enemy," Gaius retorted, "and I know he will keep reserves for a secondary move. With the river, there's only one side that can come from. That's not . . ."
"That's good!" the older man nodded. "Knowing what your enemy is likely to do is fine. Dealing with what he did is not."
"Anyway," Gaius said, "I believe Caesar's big advantage is the river on his left flank. Most other commentators think this was Pompey's advantage, but it severely hinders Pompey's ability to rapidly deploy cavalry, and his cavalry is at a disadvantage with the men having to fight on their right. I aim to face Caesar with the river largely at his back."
"Why?"
"I can deploy cavalry either side," Gaius replied, "but more importantly I can form a line longer than Caesar is happy with, and retain a third of my infantry behind the line. I can approach, and decide at which points I shall try to punch a hole, and send my reserves at those points. I use my numerical superiority to cover for lack of experience, and choose where to attack, depending on Caesar's deployment."
"Then outline your deployment."
"As I said, a long line, retaining a third of my infantry, which is about two legions, in reserve. I take the first two cohorts from these and with the archers I form an oblique line behind the left flank, together with a thousand cavalry. This is to defend against the known cavalry Caesar has, on the assumption he will try to outflank me there."
"And what makes you think Caesar's cavalry will attack here?"
"Caesar originally chose to protect his left flank with a river," Gaius replied, as if this were obvious, "so it's a clue. Of course I don't know, but I think it is reasonable to defend against the obvious. I also ensure there are reserves available to deal an attack on the right."
"If Caesar thinks you'll defend only at the obvious point, the surprise attack will prevail."
"Yes, but I intend to attack," Gaius protested. "Exactly where depends on Caesar's deployment, but I am not intending to defend. If he follows me, his line will be too thin, so I can use my reserves at a concentrated point. If he doesn't, I can attack both his flanks."
"Fair enough, but remember this. If your marching ha
s got a quality opponent into an inferior position, he has to make a guess at your deployment and do something unexpected. In an inferior position, with inferior numbers, he either does something unexpected, or he loses."
"Won't work," Gaius shrugged. "My observation point on the hill will see this and signal to me . . ."
"See how useful it was leaving observers on a hill? You're improving! Now, back to your deployment."
"There's not much more," a sheepish Gaius admitted. "The remaining parts of each legion I order to stand behind each flank, to be sent where it is needed."
"So battle is about to start. What do you do?"
"When I see how Caesar deploys, I select the point of attack."
"Suppose he leads a concentrated attack on the centre?"
"I hold through the centre, if necessary deploying some reserves. I then try to encircle on both flanks, using the horns of the bull formation. I watch what happens, and send at least half my infantry reserves to the side that looks more like penetrating."
"Why not send all your reserves? They're going to have a holiday?"
"No, but I need spare men in case Caesar is really trying something else. It's also useful to have men capable of turning back any part of the line that's thinking of quitting."
"Your cavalry's your strong point," the older man mused, "but you haven't used it."
"I wait until the battle is well underway, then deploy two thirds of it around the right flank. The aim is to use the numerical superiority of my infantry to at least engage all of Caesar's infantry, and try to make Caesar deploy his reserves before I use my cavalry. If my infantry's going well, or at least holding it's own, this could provide the critical thrust to break up the enemy."
"I see," the older man said, after a moment's thought.
"Well?" Gaius asked.
"Who knows what will happen in battle?" the older man said. "In the end, experience, morale, fate, all sorts of things influence the outcome. I rather suspect you're influenced by what happened, but that deployment gives you a fair chance. You know what actually happened?"