Science of Good and Evil
Page 8
Still more realistic simulations include the “Many Person Dilemma,” in which one player interacts with multiple other players. Of particular interest to the study of ethical theory is the “Tit-for-Tat” strategy in which you start off cooperating and then do whatever the other player does. Although Tit-for-Tat resembles the Golden Rule, it more closely models the Old Testament “Eye for an Eye” morality than it does the idealistic New Testament strategy of turning the other cheek. Jesus, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King heroically employed an unalloyed New Testament ethic and all paid with their lives (receiving what is called the “sucker’s payoff” in game theory). Turning the other cheek only works if the opposition is inherently benevolent or has chosen a purely cooperative game strategy. In most cases, defections creep in often enough to make a purely Gandhian morality ineffective, even dangerous. On the optimistic side, the more experience the players have with one another—that is, the better they know each other—the more cooperation dominates as the preferred strategy. This is why the scenario of informal and noncodified rules of conduct developed within small communities so accurately describes how morality evolved—knowing all the other players in the game leads to the evolution of cooperation.40
The Prisoner’s Dilemma model has been applied to everything from cold war strategies to marital conflict. It turns out that in both computer simulations and real-world experiments, not only is being a cooperator better than being a defector, but being a real cooperator is better than being a fake cooperator because being genuine about cooperating more readily convinces others of the genuineness of the action. And action backed by good intentions pays off in bigger dividends for all individuals in the group (and for the group as a whole in relation to other groups). So, tipping a stranger makes you feel good because it really is a good thing to do, for the recipient, for yourself, and for the group.
Human Moral Universals: The Transcendency of Morality and Universality of Moral Sentiments
In his great philosophical work An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, David Hume speculated on the universal nature of human morality: “The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it.”41 Is there a moral sentiment common to all humans? Are there moral universals?
In anthropology, human universals “comprise those features of culture, society, language, behavior, and psyche for which there are no known exceptions to their existence in all ethnographically or historically recorded human societies.”42 Common and well-known universals include tools, myths and legends, sex roles, social groups, aggression, gestures, grammar, and emotions. There are general universals, such as social status and emotional expressions, and specific universals within broader universals, such as kinship statuses and facial expressions like the smile, frown, or eyebrow flash. Since cultures vary dramatically, the supposition made about “universals” is that there is an evolutionary and biological basis behind them (or, at the very least, that they are not strictly culturally determined). As such, we can presume that there is a genetic predisposition for these traits to be expressed within their respective cultures, and that these cultures, despite their considerable diversity, nurture these genetically predisposed natures in a consistent fashion.
For an analysis of universals we turn to anthropology, because it is this science that documents the diversity of ways that humans live and illuminates so clearly which traits are universal and which traits are not. “Universals exist, they are numerous, and they engage matters unquestionably of anthropological concern,” explains anthropologist Donald E. Brown, who has arguably done more work on human universals than anyone in his field. “Universals can be explained, and their ramified effects on human affairs can be traced. But universals comprise a heterogenous set—cultural, social, linguistic, individual, unrestricted, implicational, etc.—a set that may defy any single overarching explanation. If, however, a single source for universals had to be sought, human nature would be the place to look.”43 Culture matters, of course, but not in some token fashion tossed off by sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists to display proper political correctness, rather as wholly integrated and fully interdigitated with nature such that you cannot speak of one without the other. This interactionism is the only reasonable position to take on the so-called (and artificial) nature-nurture debate, despite the limitations most anthropologists have set on understanding this interaction. As Brown notes in castigating his fellow anthropologists: “these interactions can only be properly explored if there are ways to distinguish nature from culture, and I submit that there is little if anything in the way of an established and valid method in anthropology for doing this. Typically, anthropologists simply do not concern themselves with this problem, because they assume (in accordance with other propositions) that what humans do, unless it is ‘obviously’ natural, is essentially cultural.”44
In his comprehensive study of human universals, Brown compiled a list of 373. From these I count 202 (54 percent) moral and religious universals, which I list in appendix 2 along with parenthetical notes explaining what I think the relationship is between the universal trait and morality or religion. (I include religious universals because in my theory on the origins of morality, religion and morality were inseparable in their coevolution.) Although some traits are more obviously related to morality and religion than others, in general it is strikingly clear just how much of what we do has some bearing on our state of being as social organisms in interaction with others of our kind. We are moral animals, and these moral universals belong to the species and are thus transcendent of the individual members of that species.
The expression of human moral behavior is a product of internal psychological traits related to morality, and external social states related to moral behavioral control. Going through the list of moral and religious universals in appendix 2, the sheer number is indicative of their undeniable role in human biological and cultural evolution. Some moral psychological traits (or sentiments) include: affection expressed and felt (necessary for altruism and cooperation to be reinforced); attachment (necessary for bonding, friendship, pro-social behavior); coyness display (courtship, moral manipulation); crying (sometimes expression of grief, moral pain); emotions (necessary for moral sense); empathy (necessary for moral sense); envy (moral trait); fears (generate much religious and moral behavior); generosity admired (reward for cooperative and altruistic behavior); incest between mother and son unthinkable or tabooed (obvious evolutionary moral trait); judging others (foundation of moral approval/disapproval); mourning (expression of grief, part of symbolic moral reasoning); pride (a moral sense); self-control (moral assessment and judgment); sexual jealousy (foundation of major moral relations and tensions); sexual modesty (foundation of major moral relations and tensions); and shame (moral sense), to name just a few.
Going through the list again, this time picking out moral behavioral control mechanisms universal to human cultures, we are again awed by their numbers and importance. Some moral behavioral control mechanisms include: age statuses (vital element in social hierarchy, dominance, respect for elder’s wisdom); coalitions (foundation of social and group morality); collective identities (basis of xenophobia, group selection); conflict, consultation to deal with (resolution of moral problems); conflict, means of dealing with (resolution of moral problems); conflict, mediation of (foundation of much of moral behavior); corporate (perpetual) statuses (moral ranking of groups); customary greetings (part of conflict prevention and resolution); dominancelsubmission (foundation of hierarchical social primate species); etiquette (enhances social relations); family (or household) (the most basic social and moral unit); food sharing (form of cooperation and altruism); gift giving (reward for cooperative and altruistic behavior); government (social morality); group living (social morality); groups that are not based on family (necessary for higher moral reasoning an
d blind altruism); inheritance rules (reduces conflict within families and communities); institutions (organized coactivities) (religion); kin groups (foundation of kin selection/altruism and basic social group); law (rights and obligations) (foundation of social harmony); law (rules of membership) (foundation of social harmony); males engage in more coalitional violence (gender differences in moral behavior); marriage (moral rules of foundational relationship); murder proscribed (moral judgment necessary in communities); oligarchy (de facto) (group social control); property (foundation of moral reasoning and judgment); reciprocal exchanges (of labor, goods, or services) (reciprocal altruism); redress of wrongs (moral conflict resolution); sanctions (social moral control); sanctions for crimes against the collectivity (social moral control); sanctions include removal from the social unit (social moral control); taboos (moral and social control); tabooed foods (element in moral and social control); tabooed utterances (communication of moral and social control); and violence, some forms of proscribed (moral and social control), to name just a few.
Finally, we began this chapter with the Golden Rule, a moral guideline found in all cultures that represents the very foundation of universal morality. Of the list of human moral universals, here are the traits that contribute to a behavioral expression of the Golden Rule: cooperation (part of altruism); cooperative labor (part of kin, reciprocal, and blind altruism); customary greetings (part of conflict prevention and resolution); empathy (necessary for moral sense); fairness (equity); food sharing (form of cooperation and altruism); generosity admired (reward for cooperative and altruistic behavior); gestures (signs of recognition of others, conciliatory behavior); gift giving (reward for cooperative and altruistic behavior); good and bad distinguished (necessary for moral judgment); hospitality (enhances social relations); inheritance rules (reduces conflict within families and communities); insulting (communication of moral approval/disapproval); intention (part of moral reasoning and judgment); interpolation (part of moral reasoning and judgment); interpreting behavior (necessary for moral judgment); judging others (foundation of moral approval/disapproval); making comparisons (necessary for moral judgments); moral sentiments (the foundation of all morality); moral sentiments, limited effective range of (parameters of moral foundation); planning for future (foundation for moral judgment); pride (a moral sense); promise (moral relations); reciprocal exchanges (of labor, goods, or services) (reciprocal altruism); reciprocity, negative (revenge, retaliation) (reduces reciprocal altruism); reciprocity, positive (enhances reciprocal altruism); redress of wrongs (moral conflict resolution); shame (moral sense); turn taking (conflict prevention).
The Nature of Human Moral Nature
Humans are, by nature, moral and immoral, good and evil, altruistic and selfish, cooperative and competitive, peaceful and bellicose, virtuous and nonvirtuous. Such moral traits vary between individuals and within and between groups. Some people and populations are more or less moral and immoral than other people and populations, but all people have the potential for all the moral traits. (Whether the evolution of such moral and immoral traits was inevitable is an important and interesting question, but it is an ancillary one to my analysis here.) Most people most of the time in most circumstances are good and do the right thing for themselves and for others. But some people some of the time in some circumstances are bad and do the wrong thing for themselves and for others.
The codification of moral principles out of the psychology of moral traits evolved as a form of social control to ensure the survival of individuals within groups and the survival of human groups themselves. Religion was the first social institution to canonize moral principles, but morality need not be the exclusive domain of religion. Religions succeeded in identifying the human universal moral and immoral thoughts and behaviors most appropriate for accentuating amity and attenuating enmity. But we can improve on the ethical systems developed thousands of years ago by people of agricultural societies whose moral codes are surely open to change. As we transition from kin and reciprocal altruism to species altruism and bioaltruism, and as religion continues to give ground to science, we need a new ethic for an Age of Science, a new morality that not only incorporates the findings of science, but applies scientific thinking and the methods of science to tackling moral problems and resolving moral dilemmas. We have done well thus far, but we can do better.
3
WHY WE ARE IMMORAL: WAR, VIOLENCE, AND THE IGNOBLE SAVAGE WITHIN
If you wish for peace, understand war.
—B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 1967
In Rob Reiner’s 1992 film A Few Good Men, Jack Nicholson’s character—battle-hardened marine Colonel Nathan R. Jessup—is being cross-examined by Tom Cruise’s naive rookie navy lawyer, Lieutenant Daniel Kaffee. Kaffee is defending two marines accused of killing a fellow soldier named Santiago at Guantanamo base in Cuba. He thinks Jessup ordered a “code red,” an off-the-books command to rough up a lazy marine trainee in need of discipline, and that matters got tragically out of hand. Kaffee wants answers to specific questions about the incident. Jessup wants to lecture him on the meaning of freedom and the need to defend it, explaining: “Son, we live in a world that has walls. And those walls have to be guarded by men with guns. I have a greater responsibility than you can possibly fathom.”
Jessup complains that he does not have the luxury to ignore the fact that Santiago’s death ultimately saved lives by generating greater discipline, and that Kaffee does not really want the truth because “deep down, in places you don’t talk about at parties, you want me on that wall. You need me on that wall.” Disgusted that he should even have to bother with such elucidations, Jessup concludes: “I have neither the time nor the inclination to explain myself to a man who rises and sleeps under the blanket of the very freedom I provide, then questions the manner in which I provide it. I’d prefer you just said thank you and went on your way.”1
The simple observation that we live in a world with walls—and have for the past 6,000 years of recorded history—implies that those walls are needed. The constitutions of states cannot completely alter the constitution of humanity. Is that constitution an evil one, and thus good walls will always be needed to make good neighbors? Or are we constitutionally good, but corrupted by evil circumstances and environments?
The Problem of Evil
A philosophical conundrum that has plagued theologians and moral philosophers is known as the “problem of evil.” The Greek philosopher Epicurus, in his Aphorisms, stated it as early as 300 B.C.:
The gods can either take away evil from the world and will not, or, being willing to do so cannot; or they neither can nor will, or lastly, they are both able and willing. If they have the will to remove evil and cannot, then they are not omnipotent. If they can, but will not, then they are not benevolent. If they are neither able nor willing, then they are neither omnipotent nor benevolent. Lastly, if they are both able and willing to annihilate evil, how does it exist?2
Here is a simpler way to state the problem. The following three conditions are incompatible:
God is Omnipotent
God is Omnibenevolent
Evil Exists
If God is all-powerful, can He not prevent evil from existing? If God is all good, should He not prevent evil from existing? If evil exists, then either God is not all powerful or not all good. The eighteenth-century English poet Alexander Pope poetically phrased a solution to the problem a different way in An Essay on Man:
All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee;
All Chance, Direction, which thou canst not see;
All Discord, Harmony, not understood;
All partial Evil, universal Good:
And, spite of Pride, in erring Reason’s spite,
One truth is clear, “Whatever IS is RIGHT.”3
To explain away the problem of evil, believers often invoke the final clause in a modified version—read “God’s will” for “Whatever is.” We heard it in the wake of the December 1997 shootings of
eight teenagers in a Kentucky high school, when the local minister declared that it was “God’s will” that his own son was spared a bullet. On the flip side of evil, Kenny McCaughey, father of the famed McCaughey septuplets, thanked God for the good health of the babies and their mother, and said it was “God’s will” that they have seven children: “I’m just confident the Lord’s going to handle this. He’s brought them this far and I think he’s going to carry it through.” The McCaugheys were offered a standard “selective abortion” option to reduce the number of babies and thus guarantee the health of the remaining fetuses and mother, but they declined, explaining that as God-fearing Christians they were strong abortion opponents. “That’s just the way we all feel about it. It’s going to be. If for some reason he decides to change it, that’s his will.”4
There is an obvious inconsistency here. God did not will the conception and birth of the McCaugheys’ seven children; modern medical technology did. If whatever is, is right, then Bobbi McCaughey’s infertility was also God’s will, along with His active intervention in generating the appropriate number of viable eggs in the in-vitro procedure. Why is it morally acceptable to alter God’s will of infertility through the intervention of modern medicine and technology, but not to opt for selective abortion through the same modern medical techniques? If Mrs. McCaughey had died because of complications of childbirth, would it still be God’s will? Would we not have been bombarded in the media by fertility technology Luddites for the hubris of modern medicine in trying to change what is “natural”? “Scientists should not play God,” we are told.5