A Majority of Scountrels - Don Berry

by Don Berry

  The spring hunt of Jedediah Smith’s detachment turned out to be more in the nature of an exploration than a hunt. We have mentioned briefly the mythical geography of the transmontane West, and that one of the few consistent features was a variously named river flowing from the great lake to the Pacific Ocean. Smith was to lay this ghost at last, for he set out directly into the barren lands north and west of Great Salt Lake, probably with a company of around thirty men.

  His itinerary is not definitely known, nor any events of the exploration. From rumors Peter Skene Ogden picked up from the Indians, it would seem that Smith crossed the Promontory Mountains and skirted the northern edge of the lake. How far around its edge he went there is no way of knowing; but far enough to convince him there was no beaver to be had. He tumed back toward the Snake, beaverless and hungry. The Indians reported to Ogden in June that

  the Americans

  had made an attempt to reach [beaver ground south of the lake] . . . but starvation had driven them back and they had crossed over from the entrance of Bruneau’s River to the North side of the South Branch if in quest of Beaver they will find none and animals very scarce—when last seen they were destitute of both and were killing their Horses.

  This American party was doubtless one detachment of the Bear River winterees, and possibly led by Smith. This spring of 1826 another famous event occurred; and again we can be fairly certain of the event, but have to guess at the participants. The Great Salt Lake was coasted by four trappers in a bullboat, names unknown. At various times Black Harris claimed to have done it; Jim Clyman, Henry Fraeb (almost always spelled and pronounced Frapp), and Louis Vasquez (Vaskiss) have also been given credit. It may have been any or all of these, and there is not sufficient evidence to get excited about proving anybody’s particular claim. Take your choice. Their purpose was to discover both the extent of this huge body of water and its outlet. According to a later commentary, they did not discover the outlet, but discovered the place they thought it might be. (If this uncertainty seems strange, remember that the mouth of the Columbia River itself was missed by numerous navigators, including the entirely competent George Vancouver. Geographical observation from water is a good deal more tenuous than we are wont to believe from our armchairs.)

  As the spring wore on, the various bodies of trappers began to drift back toward Cache Valley, which had been agreed upon as the place of summer rendezvous. By July they were all there, awaiting the arrival of General Ashley with the supply train, lying to each other, graining pelts, and listening to some very interesting rumors that shortly proved out true.

  In the meantime Ashley had departed from St. Louis on March 8, with a supply caravan consisting of twenty-five men and possibly including Bill Sublette. Presumably he followed roughly the same route as he had the year before; it was proving out pretty well, and by now the techniques of overland travel had been thoroughly worked out.

  Let James P. Beckwourth tell of the arrival (a little breathless, perhaps; he has just beaten off 500 Blackfeet):

  The absent parties began to arrive, one after the other, at the rendezvous. Shortly after, General Ashley and Mr Sublet came in, accompanied with three hundred pack mules, well laden with goods and all things necessary for the mountaineers and the Indian trade. It may well be supposed that the arrival of such a vast amount of luxuries from the East did not pass off without a general celebration. Mirth, songs, dancling, shouting, trading, running, jumping, singing, racing, target-shooting, yarns, frolic, with all sorts of extravagances that white men or Indians could invent, were freely indulged in. The unpacking of the medicine water contributed not a little to the heightening of our festivities.

  We had been informed by Harris, previous to the arrival of the general, that General Ashley had sold out his interest in the mountains to Mr. Sublet, embracing all his properties and possessions there. He now intended to return to St. Louis, to enjoy the fortune he had amassed by so much toil and suffering, and in which he had so largely shared in person.

  And that was a fact. General William H. Ashley was quitting the mountains, having finally discovered how to make the fur trade yield a profit.

  PART TWO

  SMITH JACKSON & SUBLETTE 1826-1830

  CHAPTER 9

  'That I will not furnish any other company”

  THE document of sale between Ashley and the new firm hasn’t been preserved—unless perhaps in a St. Louis attic—which is unfortunate, since it would have saved a good deal of printer’s ink. Speculation about its terms has been a popular; indoor sport of students of the trade, and estimates have ranged up to $30,000, payable in beaver at $5/ lb.

  Ashley himself (in a letter to B. Pratte & Co., which will be discussed in more detail below) said that he

  placed under the direction of three young men . . . my remaining stock of merchandize, amounting altogether to about sixteen thousand dollars which (after deducting therefrom five thousand dollars which I paid Mr Smith on a dissolution of Partnership with him) they promised to pay me in Beaver fur delivered in that country at three dollars per pound.1

  Or, alternatively, they could deliver the fur to Ashley, who would then transport it to St. Louis for $1.12% /1b., and deposit the net proceeds (after this deduction for transportation) in discharge of the debt.

  This, then, indicates a total indebtedness to Ashley of $11,000. About $3,000 was paid on the spot, presumably on the same terms of beaver at $3 (say ten or twelve packs). Smith Jackson & Sublette gave Ashley a note for the balance.2

  The total proceeds of the fall ’25 and the spring '26 hunts amounted to 123 packs, which Ashley then took back to St. Louis. James P. Beckwourth notes his parting address:

  "Mountaineers and friends! When I first came to the mountains, I came a poor man. You, by your indefatigable exertions, toils, and privations, have procured, me an independent fortune. With ordinary prudence in the management of what I have accumulated, I shall never want for anything. For this, my friends, I feel myself under great obligations to you. Many of you have served with me personally, and I shall always be proud to testify to the fidelity with which you have stood by me through all danger, and the friendly and brotherly feeling which you have ever, one and all, evinced toward me. For these faithful and devoted services I wish you to accept my thanks; the gratitude that I express to you springs from my heart, and will ever retain a lively hold on my feelings.

  ` "My friends! I am now about to leave you, to take up my abode in St. Louis. Whenever any of you return thither, your first duty must be to call at my house, to talk over the scenes of peril we have encountered, and partake of the best cheer my table can more you. "I now wash my hands of the toils of the Rocky Mountains. Farewell, mountaineers and friends! May God bless you all!"

  We were all sorry to part with the general.

  Along with the 123 packs of beaver, Ashley took back home a document which has survived, and one worth more to him than the fur: the Articles of Agreements "made and entered into this 18th day of July 1826 by and between William H. Ashley of the first part and Jedediah S. Smith David E. Jackson and Wm. L. Sublett trading under the firm Smith Jackson & Sublett of the second part . . ."

  The purport of the Articles is an arrangement for Ashley to supply goods to the new firm:

  . . . at or near the west end of the little lake of Bear river a watter of the pacific ocean . . . [it isn’t] . . .on or before the iirst day of July 1827 without some unavoidable occurrence should prevent, but as it is uncertain whether the situation of said Smith Jackson & Subletts business will justify the proposed purchase of Merchandise . . . it is understood and agreed that [they] shall send an Express to said Ashley to reach him in St. Louis on or before the first day of March next . . . the amount of merchandise to be delivered. . . shall not be less than. Seven Thousand dollars nor more than fifteen thousand and if it is in the power of said party of the second part to make further payment in part or in whole . . . that they will do so.

  The final paragraph of th
is document isthe most interesting, in view of later happenings. This is the binding clause:

  . . . and it is understood and agreed between the two said parties that so long as the said Ashley continues to furnish said Smith Jackson & Sublett with Merchandise as aforesaid That he will furnish no other company or Individual with Merchandise other than those who may be in his immediate service.

  In effect, this arrangement would mean that every trapper in the mountains—whether formally attached to Smith Jackson & Sublette or not—would be dependent on the new company for his supplies. As has been pointed out, the new system of trapping meant that the control of supplies coming into the mountains was virtually synonymous with control of the trade. This would put the new firm on a very good footing, indeed, since it would give it a near monopoly on the American mountain trade. In order to evade this, an unattached trapper would have to make his own arrangements for supplies, delivered—far too much trouble, danger, and expense.

  Or so it would seem. But a man does well to look long and closely at a document of that kind, particularly when drawn up by a man like Genl. Win., H. Ashley. 3

  ***

  The general arrived in St. Louis the last week of September, 1826, with 123 packs of beaver—roughly 12,000 pounds —roughly $60,000 at St. Louis prices. Figuring his cost at $3 a pound plus $1 a pound transportation, this gives him an estimated net return of about $12,000 or $,1 a pound. Combined with the hundred-pack return of the previous year, this set Ashley back on his feet financially and laid a very satisfactory foundation for progress. He was, in short, in a position to supply the merchandise) to Smith Jackson & Sublette on his own hook, or possibly with the aid of his backers, Wahrendorif & Tracy, if he wanted someone to share the risk. However, he did not choose to do this, and he was certainly not content with the "ordinary, prudent management" of what he had accumulated.

  One of the first calls Ashley made after his return to St. Louis was on General Pratte, of Bernard Pratte & Co. This firm (sometimes known as Berthold, Pratte & Chouteau, or simply the French Fur Company) was an association of some of the most powerful and formidable businessmen in St. Louis; a dangerous source of possible competition in the mountain trade. Ashley shrewdly sought to close the barn door before the horse had even glanced in that direction. He had a long talk with Pratte, and a few days later—October 14—made a formal proposition to the firm, offering them a half interest in his new business (which he later suggested would be called Wm. Ashley & Company). The new business, however, was somewhat more extensive than one would expect from his agreement with Smith Jackson & Sublette:

  I contemplate [he wrote Pratte & Company] sending an expidition across the R Mountains the ensuing Spring for the purpose of trading fur and trapping Beaver, and from a conversation had with Genl. B Pratte a few days since, I am induced to propose to you an equal participation in the adventure . . .[There follows an account of his arrangement with Smith Jackson & Sublette, part of which. was previously quoted].

  It is also understood between the said Smith Jackson & Sublett, and myself, that provided they order the goods as last mentioned, that I will not furnish any other company in that country with merchandize, except such as I may employ on my own acct

  The following are the prices . . .

  The statement that he intended trapping beaver as well as supplying the new firm might well have been a manner of speaking, except that his intention is made perfectly clear in the closing paragraphs of the letter:

  The expidition which I propose sending in the Spring will consist of about forty Men one hundred and twenty mules & horses, the Merchandize &c necessary to supply them for twelye months and that to be furnished Messrs Smith Jackson & Sublett, all of which must be purchased for cash on the best of terms. .

  So the general intended to have two strings to his bow after all. Once in the mountains, his supply party would become a trapping brigade, entering into direct competition with Smith Jackson & Sublette; the latter firm being under the formidable disadvantage of having to purchse their goods from the competition. It is most probable that the phrase "those who may be in his immediate service" in the Articles of Agreement was understood by Smith and his partners as referring to the personnel of Ashley’s supply party; such is distinctly the impression given when read in context. But the loophole is plain, after the fact, and the general is offering Berthold, Pratte & Chouteau the chance to crawl through with him.

  What he intends to accomplish by the partnership with Pratte becomes clearer as the negotiations go on. The next February—l827—he amplified his proposal by making attractive terms for the division of profit; proposing to furnish horses at $25 and mules at $55; suggesting that he himself be paid a salary of $250 a month, etc. This letter also contains: Messers. B. Pratte & Co. will not suffer any person trading for them at Taus or other place or places, directly or indirectly to interfere with the business of the proposed concern in any way whatever—or allow them to persue a similar business in the same section of the country.

  The logic of this restriction is plain enough; he is trying to prevent Pratte from doing to him what he is doing to SJ&S. But why the specific mention of Taos?

  I think—and it is a matter of personal opinion—Ashley was trying to meet a direct and specific threat to his control of the mountain business, in the person of Etienne Provost. This conjecture is based on the following reasoning:

  There were at this time only a handful of men who knew enough about the mountain geography to operate effectively there. Smith Jackson & Sublette certainly did, but it would seem Ashley, had them under sufficient control through the provisions of the Articles of Agreement. Andrew Henry was probably another, but he was completely out of the trade and there was little or no chance he would try to re-enter it.

  Which leaves Etienne Provost as virtually the only man in the country who was capable of giving Ashley serious trouble. Provost had been working the southern reaches of the Rockies out of Taos, probably for four years. His knowledge of the geography of the Green River and the Colorado was probably more extensive than that of any other trapper, and he was certainly familiar with the Bear River-Cache Valley-Salt Lake area, which was proving out so rich. Through the inclusion among his trappers of some of the early HBC deserters, he had at least a secondhand knowledge of the Flathead and northern Snake Country.

  Provost was now a loner, his partnership with LeClerc having dissolved in some unknown way.4 After Rendezvous 1826, when Ashley sold out to Smith Jackson & Sublette, Provost returned to St. Louis, where he applied for some kind of position with Berthold, Pratte & Chouteau.

  When Ashley put his original proposal to the St. Louis oflice of B. Pratte & Company, the partners there wrote Berthold, who was at Fort Lookout, and apparently included some mention of Provost's application. Berthold replied that he 'dare not advise" concerning Ashley's proposition, but that

  it seems to me that it would be well for us to assure ourselves of Provost, who is the soul of the hunters of the mountains....Even if it was only to hinder the meeting between him and the Robidoux I would say. . . he should be made sure of, unless you have other plans.

  (The Robidoux brothers were another enterprising bunch, and this is clearly enough designed to keep a good man out of the competition’s hands.)

  This note was written two months before Ashley’s letter mentioning Taos; and in the interim B. Pratte & Company had assured themselves of Provost. He was on the payroll and apparently going to be working out of his old base, Taos. By the time of Ashley's second letter he must have been— getting worried. The express from the mountains was due by March 1 and as yet he hadn’t been able to swing B. Pratte & Company to his side. Still, they had not refused him either. Onthe last day of February Ashley reiterated the points he had made concerning the agreement and stated that "should Genl. Pratte exceede to these propositions, it will be necessary immediately to enter into articles of agreement? Immediately indeed; the express from Smith Jackson & Sublette was due, quite l
iterally, tomorrow. Ashley had to know where he stood.

  This brings up two other puzzling points. Why did Berthold, Pratte & Chouteau stall so long—over four months—before giving Ashley a definite answer? (Their letters are equivocal in the extreme, vaguely saying it would be better to wait until all the partners were back in St. Louis-Chouteau was in Philadelphia, Berthold at Fort Lookout, and Pratte at St. Louis—where they could accomplish more in conversation than through masses of orrespondence.) And why did Berthold, a senior partner, say that he "dare not advise anything about the project with Ashley?

  These facts are pertinent: During the fall of 1826, while Ashley was desperately trying to arrange a partnership, B. Pratte & Company was engaged in secret negotiations of considerably greater scope. They were about to become the Western Department of the titan: John Jacob Astor’s relentlessly growing American Fur Company.

  Astor had been putting insistent, if gentle, pressure on the companies of the Missouri for a long time. As early as 1811 an attempt had been made on behalf of Astor to buy into the reorganizing Missouri Fur Company; which was flatly rejected by the local operators, who wanted control to remain in St. Louis. Then the failure of the Astoria enterprise caused him to pull in his horns for some time. In February, 1823, Astor had taken in the small firm of Stone, Bostwick & Company, which acted as his Western Department and operated out of St. Louis. The agreement between them ran for three and one-half years, or until the fall of 1826. It was not then renewed. Instead, private negotiations began between Astor and Pratte.

  This was what American Fur had wanted for years: an association with one of the old St. Louis houses, and one of the strongest. The advantage for B. Pratte & Company lay in having the incalculable power of American Fur behind them; and it was power they would need. Ashley’s successes—though much exaggerated by report—had been attracting a good deal of attention in St. Louis, and a lively competition seemed to be shaping up between several of the local concerns. Though it had not yet begun in actuality, a mass drive to the mountains was clearly in the making.