Peter G. Tsouras

by Rising Sun Victorious: An Alternate History of the Pacific War

  Plans for an all-out aerial assault were made, their only short-term option. Recognizing the problems of maintenance and pilot fatigue inherent in such a long flight, the Imperial General Staff ordered an advanced air base begun at Buin, New Georgia. In the meantime, Kawaguchi would transport his forces to the anchorage at Faisi on Shortland Island closer to their final destination, while the army and navy worked out a plan of operation.

  For the next week, weather permitting, Japanese planes made a concerted effort to suppress Henderson Field with little success. The marine aircraft, reinforced by army P-400 fighters (the inferior export version of the P-39 Aircobra), as well as orphan Wildcats and SBDs from the Enterprise, were warned of the approaching attackers through the coast-watcher system in the Solomons and their own radar. They took a heavy toll of the bombers and their escorts. On August 30 the Japanese tried a fighter sweep, sending eighteen of their best carrier fighter pilots. The Zeros were very effective against the low flying army P-400s, shooting down four of the seven, but the F4F Wildcats shot down half the Zeros while losing two of their own. A bombing attack later in the day diverted to attack the destroyer-transport Calhoun in the sound sinking her. The day ended with more aircraft arriving at Henderson to reinforce the marine and army planes, now dubbed the Cactus Air Force.

  The following day, Saratoga was torpedoed while protecting the supply line to Guadalcanal. Damage to its propulsion system was serious and the ship was sent to the West Coast, out of the fight. Along with her went Adm. Jack Fletcher. With Saratoga homeward bound, the U.S. carrier force in the South Pacific was reduced to Wasp until Hornet could arrive.

  General Kawaguchi assembled five full battalions, nearly 6,500 fighting troops, at Faisi; this comprised all three battalions of the 124th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Infantry, and the Kumo Battalion. The remaining two battalions of the 4th Infantry were on the way. The 17th Army had also redirected the 2nd (Sendai) Infantry Division to be the primary attack force. Kawaguchi was ordered to transport his infantry and land them west of the marine perimeter, near Tassafaronga, then proceed to establish artillery positions on the Matanikau River.

  The problem of how to get the troops to the island with Henderson still operational was partially solved by the institution of what became known as the Tokyo Express. Japanese destroyers, loaded with some 150 soldiers and forty tons of supplies, were fast enough to run to the island, drop their passengers, deliver a brief bombardment of the airfield, and race north to get out of the danger zone. Its most serious drawback was the inability to transport heavy equipment, such as artillery and tanks. The navy designated two seaplane carriers, Nisshin and Chitose, to provide that capability.

  Kawaguchi's move began auspiciously on September 4. Led by the light cruiser Sendai, eleven destroyers landed Kawaguchi and nearly 1,000 troops at Tassafaronga before proceeding east to bombard the airfield. Instead, the Japanese found the destroyer-transports Little and Gregory running a patrol line northwest of Lunga Point. Armed with only 4-inch guns, the two U.S. ships were overwhelmed by the Japanese and sunk. The following day the Cactus Air Force gained a small measure of revenge when they sighted, attacked, and scattered a large barge convoy carrying troops to the island. But over the next seven days, Kawaguchi's force landed safely, with only two destroyers damaged on the return trips.

  On the American side, Vandegrift established his defensive perimeter in a semicircle around Lunga Point, using the 1st Marines to the east and the 5th Marines to the west, each with a battalion in reserve. To the south, facing dense jungle, he set a series of strongpoints manned by raiders, paratroopers, engineers, and pioneers. The 3rd Defense Battalion had its coastal guns trained out to sea. In reserve, Vandegrift had the 2nd Marines; its third battalion was transported to the Lunga Point perimeter on September 10, but the other two battalions stayed on Tulagi. A second grass airstrip, called Fighter One, was established a mile to the east of Henderson, allowing better disbursement of planes and supplies, but the strip was difficult to keep unflooded. His defensive situation, however, was more serious than just limited manpower and limited supply. The daily bombardments and bombing, as well as the unhealthy environment, were debilitating his troops. Over 900 men were down with malaria, with more falling sick every day.

  At higher levels, doubt was settling in, especially with Ghormley. All available intelligence indicated a massive Japanese buildup of ships, planes, and troops moving toward Guadalcanal. To counter the threat, Ghormley had a single marine division at the end of a tenuous supply line, two carriers to support and protect the beachhead, and no other resources available. The army pushed to have the island evacuated and the resources transferred to the Southwest Pacific effort, as demanded by General MacArthur, but the navy held firm. Despite the pessimism, Ghormley and his superiors were well aware of the propaganda issue involved with the island battle: Guadalcanal had become a symbol of the Allied turnaround in the Pacific War. Success would be an enormous benefit to the war effort; conversely, failure would be disastrous, especially if the marines were lost.

  On September 7, however, Ghormley did take an overdue step. He created Task Force 64, a collection of cruisers and destroyers under Rear Adm. Norman Scott, to help protect and counter the nightly Japanese naval activity off the island. In addition, more aircraft, this time from the damaged Saratoga, reinforced the marines' airpower. On September 11 he sent Turner to visit Vandegrift to get the marines' firsthand assessment of the situation. Vandegrift was adamant about his ability to hold the island and its airfields, even in the face of Ghormley's stated inability to support him fully. He told Turner, however, that without better supply and more troops, all he could do was hold on to what he had; he could not advance any farther. He wanted his missing regiment, the 7th Marines. Turner agreed to try to get them.

  Natives had been reporting Japanese to the west of the perimeter, some 200 to 300 of them. Vandegrift, deciding he needed more information, assigned Col. Merritt “Red Mike” Edson, of the 1 st Raider Battalion, to make a landing near Tas-safaronga to reconnoiter. Edson combined the depleted 1 st Parachute Battalion with his raiders to build up to 850 troops. On September 12 they boarded the destroyer-transports McKean and Manley, plus two smaller boats. Just as they were embarking, natives appeared with a new assessment of Japanese strength, placing it at 2,000 to 3,000. Edson discounted the new reports as native exaggeration.

  His landing was initially unopposed, and the marines found ample evidence of recent landings, including stacks of food and other stores, plus two antitank guns. Probing farther inland, the raiders ran into a battalion of Japanese from the 4th Infantry who had landed the night before. A sharp firefight ensued, with the Japanese reinforced by troops from a second battalion, also landed the previous night. Edson's men lost their radio and went into a defensive position near the coast. Using T-shirts, they spelled out HELP on the beach, which was soon spotted by a roving SBD. Supported by air attack and bombardment from destroyers, the raiders were successfully evacuated but suffered some fifty casualties.

  Both sides felt good about the raid. Edson returned with valuable information from the documents he captured. Vandegrift now knew approximately how many Japanese he faced— well over 6,000 troops of the 35th Brigade. In addition, U.S. bombardment of the area destroyed a substantial amount of Japanese supplies. Kawaguchi felt pleased because the marines had been repulsed.

  With the new information, Vandegrift brought the 2nd Marines' 2nd Battalion over from Tulagi and renewed his request for the 7th Marines. He sent the two battalions of the 2nd Marines westward, to take up positions on the Matanikau River. Holding this line, he believed would keep Japanese artillery, except for their largest guns, out of range of Henderson Field.

  On Espiritu Santo, Turner loaded up the newly arrived 7th Marines and, with Wasp and Hornet in support, sailed for Guadalcanal. On September 15, however, the reinforcement convoy ran into a Japanese submarine. Commander Takaichi Kinashi's 1-19 maneuvered to within 1,
000 yards of Wasp and fired six torpedoes. Three hit the carrier and detonated the gasoline storage tanks and the forward bomb magazine. The destroyer O 'Brien and the battleship North Carolina were also hit in Kinashi's incredible salvo. Thirty minutes later, fires still raging, Wasp was abandoned and sunk with American torpedoes. With his air support cut in half and his sole battleship requiring major repairs, Turner turned back, not willing to risk further damage to his depleted escort forces.

  Over the next few days, patrols from Kawaguchi's Brigade and the 2nd Marines clashed west of the Matanikau. The fire-fights, aided substantially by close support from the marine aircraft, were inconclusive, except to show Vandegrift that the Matanikau was currently as far west as he could push with the limited troop strength he had. He called for another attempt to get the 7th to the island.

  Kawaguchi, stung by the air attacks, called for an increased effort to put Henderson out of commission. Naval personnel at Rabaul put together a reinforcement convoy, built around Nis-shin and Chitose, to carry 150mm guns to Kawaguchi—these would be able to reach Henderson Field from the area the Japanese held. The six escorting destroyers also carried the first troops from the Sendai Division. The Imperial Navy General Staff also upgraded their bombardment plans. Offshore bombardment by destroyers was having very limited effect; bigger guns were needed. The first suggestion was heavy cruisers, but other staff members argued for battleships and their fourteen-inch guns. Both plans were approved. A total of five bombardment vessels—three heavy cruisers and two battleships—were sent south, along with the reinforcements.

  Ghormley reluctantly approved the second attempt to land the 7th Marines. He had a single carrier group for support, but intelligence indicated the Japanese carriers were not in the immediate area. Turner sent Scott's Task Force 64 ahead of the reinforcement convoy to sweep the Slot free of Japanese ships and interdict additional Japanese reinforcements. Scott's TF 64 consisted of the heavy cruisers San Francisco and Salt Lake City, the light cruisers Helena and Boise, and the destroyers Farenholt, Duncan, Laffey, Buchanan, and McCalla. He prowled south of Guadalcanal by day for several days, awaiting word of Japanese intruders. Meanwhile, at Espiritu Santo, the 7th Marines embarked again. On September 21 a B-l7 spotted the Japanese reinforcement convoy heading south. Unfortunately, none of the U.S. scouting aircraft spotted the Japanese cruisers or battleships, which had lagged behind the smaller ships due to a problem with a battleship's engineering plant.

  Near midnight, Scott had his ships in line off Cape Esperance. The destroyers Farenholt, Laffey, and Duncan led the cruisers, followed by the two remaining destroyers. Helena had the latest and most modern radar set, but much of the information provided by radar was lost in the undisciplined radio communications between the ships. In hindsight, Scott should have had his flag on the ship with the best intelligence capability, rather than on San Francisco.

  At approximately 2330 hours, Helena's radar picked up five ships, coming straight toward them. This was the cruiser bombardment force, commanded by Rear Adm. Aritomo Goto, consisting of the heavy cruisers Aoba, Furataka, and Kinugasa, flanked by the destroyers Fubuki and Hatsuyuki. A column shift of 180 degrees was ordered and mishandled by TF 64, leaving the lead destroyers out of the column. While he sorted out his ships, the enemy sailed closer, apparently unaware of the U.S. ships directly in front of them. Finally, at 2346 hours, crossing the Japanese line with all ships, the U.S. line opened fire.

  The deluge of 8-inch and 6-inch shells shocked the Japanese—there had been no U.S. naval opposition to the Japanese navy since Mikawa's victory.3 The unexpected fire pounded Goto's flagship Aoba, killing the admiral. The Japanese didn't respond for a few minutes, which should have been fatal to the entire force; but Scott, unsure of the situation and aware his destroyers were in the line of fire, ordered a short cease-fire to make certain the targets weren't American. Aoba careened out of the Japanese line in full retreat, on fire with all turrets out of action, but Furataka and Kinugasa protected her well, concentrating their fire on San Francisco. Several hits killed Scott and most of his staff, and started major fires on the U.S. flagship. The Japanese traded blows with the Americans and launched torpedoes to cover their withdrawal. The U.S. cruisers turned away when the torpedoes were spotted, but the light cruiser Boise was hit by the salvo, severely damaging it. In a side action, the U.S. destroyers inundated the Fubuki with shells and left her sinking. The initial stages of the battle were a complete American success—the Japanese were driven off with severe damage, leaving the United States in control of the nighttime waters off Guadalcanal for the first time since August 9.

  Command of TF 64 now fell to Capt. Ernest Small of Salt Lake City. With two cruisers damaged, he chose not to chase the fleeing Japanese but to collect his ships and assess the damage. San Francisco's crew fought hard to save their ship and had started to succeed when Helena's radar contacted a new group of ships, including two “large” ships, heading toward them. Small moved to intercept the new group with Farenholt and Duncan leading Salt Lake City and Helena, trailed by Laffey. The destroyer McCalla, slightly damaged in the shootout with Fubuki, stayed with the wounded U.S. cruisers as they made their way slowly back to the Lunga Point anchorage.

  The second Japanese group was the battleship bombardment force, commanded by Vice Adm. Takeo Kurita. He had trailed far enough behind to miss the fireworks that had pounded Goto. His ships were in three lines, with his two battleships, Kongo and Haruna, flanked by three destroyers on either side. His first inkling of trouble came from the retiring Furataka, which reported U.S. warships in the Slot. The unexpected news stunned the admiral as much as the opening salvos must have Goto, and for a few minutes his force continued its approach. As Kurita made up his mind to retire and reassess the new situation, his flanking destroyers spotted the U.S. column across their path. The Japanese turned to retire but the battle was upon them.

  Kurita's force was being tracked on Helena's radar, and at about 4,000 yards Small decided to open the dance. Laffey fired star shells just as the two battleships illuminated the lead destroyers with searchlights. The shock of confronting battleships was hammered home as both ships fired their broadsides at Farenholt and Duncan. One 14-inch shell detonated the Duncan's forward magazine, and the resulting explosion broke the destroyer in half. Farenholt was luckier, but only marginally—the 1,500-pound shells shattered the smaller ship and left her on fire and sinking. The sacrifice of his destroyers gave Small a chance to strike back. Both cruisers fired on Haruna, exploding one 5-inch secondary position, but the big battleship's heavy armor shrugged off most of the other hits.

  The return fire was deadly. Small died when Salt Lake City's bridge was hit. Both forward turrets were destroyed and only a quick flooding of the forward magazine saved the ship from a massive explosion. Helena was hit harder, losing all power. Kurita, however, didn't follow up his devastating fire, continuing his course to retire. His flanking destroyers sent a salvo of torpedoes toward the American ships to cover the retirement; two disemboweled the drifting Helena and she sank quickly.

  The following morning, planes from Henderson found the damaged Aoba and an escorting destroyer and sank both, exacting a measure of revenge for the previous night's slaughter. Salt Lake City was able to limp back to the anchorage but no farther, as her battle damage finally overcame the crew's ability to keep her afloat. The Battle of Cape Esperance had started with a significant victory for the United States, the first time the navy went toe-to-toe with the Japanese and came out ahead. The brush with Kurita, however, turned the victory into a hard defeat. Scott had gone into battle with nine ships; now only the destroyer Laffey was battle ready. San Francisco and Boise would have to head home for major repairs. Over 700 U.S. sailors had died.

  The impact of the battle was immediate. At Espiritu Santo, Ghormley, confidence again shaken by the loss of Scott and TF 64, ordered Turner to abort the reinforcement run. Once again the 7th Marines would not be joining their division. Worse, the bat
tle rekindled the question of Guadalcanal's future. The loss of eight ships stretched current resources almost to the breaking point. No one in the South Pacific or Washington doubted that the United States would soon be able to “outmatériel” their Japanese opponents, but the future wasn't going to arm or feed the marines on Guadalcanal at that moment.

  While the Americans began rearguing their commitment to Guadalcanal, the Japanese were also rethinking their position. The clash off Cape Esperance had cost them Aoba and two valuable destroyers, along with the cruiser Furataka damaged enough to be sent home for major repairs. Damage to Haruna was minimal, but the repercussions of the surprise and Kurita's precipitous withdrawal created an atmosphere of contention that stymied progress for a full day. The 10,000 troops of the Sendai Division were ready for transport to the island which was now more complicated with active U.S. interference at night. More naval forces were allocated reluctantly. Transport plans were made and set in motion.

  Critical to the success of these plans was a convoy of six fast transport vessels, each with its own landing craft and effective antiaircraft protection. The vessels would carry over 4,500 of the Sendai troops along with 100mm and 150mm guns and ammunition, the 1st Independent Tank Company (with ten Model 97 light tanks), and provisions. The remaining troops, equipment, and supplies would be delivered by normal Tokyo Express destroyer runs over a ten-day period. To protect the convoys and suppress U.S. air activity, another bombardment force was put together, this time with the battleships Hiei and Kirishima. This attack would be followed with more bombardments as necessary.