Peter G. Tsouras

by Rising Sun Victorious: An Alternate History of the Pacific War

  Turner looked over at General “Howlin' Mad” Smith, and continued “One man in this room tonight served in the trenches of World War One. An incomplete peace after that war meant that he and the sons of his buddies had to fight another war a generation later. We can only pray that the recent peace will not end in a bigger, bloodier, perhaps atomic, war with Imperial Japan in 1965. Thank you.”

  The Reality

  The coup attempt by Japanese forces unwilling to surrender was thwarted by Imperial forces loyal to Emperor Hirohito, and the Japanese government succeeded in effecting a formal surrender before the home islands were invaded. Occupation forces on Kyushu were stunned by the scale of the defenses found at the precise locations where the invasion was scheduled to take place. The U.S. military government eventually disposed of 12,735 Japanese aircraft.

  On October 9-10, 1945, Typhoon Louise struck Okinawa. Luckily, Operation Majestic had been canceled months earlier. There was considerably less assault shipping on hand than if the invasion of Kyushu had been imminent, and “only” 145 vessels were sunk or damaged so severely that they were beyond salvage.

  Bibliography

  Asada, Sadao, “The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender—A Reconsideration,” Pacific Historical Review 67, November 1998.

  Bartholomew, Charles A., Captain, USN, Mud, Muscle and Miracles: Marine Salvage in the United States Navy (Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., 1990).

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  Bland Larry 1. (ed.), George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue (George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, 1996).

  Brown, Anthony Cave, Bodyguard of Lies, vol. 2 (Harper & Row, New York, 1975).

  Buell, Thomas B., The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1987).

  The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, vol. 1: Reports of General MacArthur (General Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command, Pacific, Tokyo, 1950).

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  Cline, Ray S., Washington Command Post: The Operations Division (Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1954).

  Coakley, Robert W, and Leighton, Richard M., The War Department: Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1944 (Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1968).

  Coox, Alvin D, “Japanese Military Intelligence in the Pacific: Its Non-Revolutionary Nature,” in The Intelligence Revolution: A Historical Perspective (Office of Air Force History, Washington, D.C., 1991).

  , “Needless Fear: The Compromise of U.S. Plans to Invade Japan in 1945,” Journal of Military History, April 2000.

  Drea, Edward J., MacArthur's Ultra: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-45 (University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1992).

  Dyer, George Carroll, Vice Admiral, USN, The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner (U.S. Navy Department, Washington, D.C, 1972).

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  Gallicchio, Marc, “After Nagasaki: General Marshall's Plan for Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Japan,” Prologue 23, Winter 1991.

  Giangreco, D. M., “Operation Downfall: The Devil Was in the Details,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1995.

  , “The Truth About Kamikazes,” Naval History, May-June 1997.

  , “Casualty Projections for the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications,” Journal of Military History, July 1997.

  Hattendorf, John B.; Simpson, B. Michael, III; and Wadleigh, John R., Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the Naval War College (Naval War College Press, Newport, Rhode Island, 1984).

  Hattori, Colonel, The Complete History of the Greater East Asia War (500th Military Intelligence Group, Tokyo, 1954).

  Huber, Thomas M., Pastel: Deception in the Invasion of Japan (Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 1988).

  Inoguchi, Rikihei, Captain, UN, and Nakajima, Tadashi, Commander, UN, The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1958).

  Interrogations of Japanese Officials, vol. 2 (United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Tokyo, 1946).

  “The Japanese System of Defense Call-up,” Military Research Bulletin,no. 19, 18 July 1945.

  Kendrick, Douglas B., Brigadier General, USA, Medical Department,United States Army: Blood Program in World War II (Office of the Surgeon General, Washington, DC, 1964).

  Morison, Samuel Eliot, Rear Admiral, USN, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 12: Leyte, June 1944–January 1945 (Little, Brown, Boston, 1958).

  , History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 13, The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas, 1944–1945 (Little, Brown, Boston, 1959).

  , History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 14: Victory in the Pacific, 1945 (Little, Brown, Boston, 1960).

  , The Two Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (Little, Brown, Boston, 1958).

  Oil in Japan's War: Report of the Oil and Chemical Division, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Pacific (United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Tokyo, 1946).

  O'Neill, Richard, Suicide Squads: Axis and Allied Special Attack Weapons of World War II, Their Development and Their Missions (Ballantine Books, New York, 1984).

  Potter, E.B., Nimitz (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1976).

  Roland, Buford, Lieutenant Commander, USNR, and Boyd, William B., Lieutenant, USNR, U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World War II (U.S. Navy Department, Washington, DC, 1955).

  Sakai, Saburo; Caidin, Martin; and Saito, Fred, Samurai (Bantam Books, New York, 1978).

  Sherrod, Robert, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II (Presidio Press, Bonita, 1980).

  Stanton, Shelby L., Order of Battle, U.S. Army, World War II (Presidio Press, Novate, 1984).

  Walker, Lewis M., Commander, USNR, “Deception Plan for Operation Olympic,” Parameters, Spring 1995.

  Notes

  1. Vice Admiral George Carroll Dyer, USN, The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner (U.S. Navy Department, Washington, DC, 1972), 1109.

  2. John B. Hattendorf, B. Michael Simpson III, and John R. Wadleigh, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the Naval War College (Naval War College Press, Newport, Rhode Island, 1984), 329.

  3. Dyer, op.cit., 1118–19.

  4. Ibid., 1117.

  5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the invasion of Kyushu (Operation Olympic, later Majestic) as X-Day, December 1, 1945, and the invasion of Honshu (Operation Coronet) as Y-Day, March 1, 1946.

  6. Thomas B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1987), 417–18.

  7. Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, USN, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 12: Leyte, June 1944–January 1945 (Little, Brown, Boston, 1958), 300–306,339–49,354–60, 366–68, 380–85.

  8. M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, in the series The United States Army in World War II (hereafter USAWWII) (Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1954), 8–9. See also Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, USN, The Two Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (Little, Brown, Boston, 1958), 422–23.

  9. Cannon, op.cit., 306.

  10. Ibid., 294–305.

  11. Shelby L. Stanton, Order of Battle. U.S. Army, World War II (Presidio Press, Novate, 1984), 112–13.

  12. Cannon, op.cit. 92–94, 99–102.

  13. Ibid, 306–308.

  14. Ibid, 365–67.

  15. Operations of U.S. aircraft as recent as the Gulf War's “Scud hunt” illustrat
e that this is generally not as easy as some presume it to be.

  16. Hattori Takushiro gives the number of Japanese airfields on the home islands, including those under construction and ninety-five concealed airfields, at 325. Figures from the July 13, 1945, “Central Agreement Concerning Air Attacks,” between the Japanese army and navy in vol. 4 of Colonel Hattori's The Complete History of the Greater East Asia War (500th Military Intelligence Group, Tokyo, 1954), 165. Translated from Hattori's Daitoa Senso zenshi, 4 vols. (Masu Shobo, Tokyo, 1953).

  17. Ibid., vol. 4, 234. Hattori states that the blow destroyed fifty-eight navy and two army aircraft on the ground. Smoke and decoys prevented an accurate U.S. assessment, and Morison calls it “indeterminate” in History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 14: Victory in the Pacific, 1945 (Little, Brown, Boston, 1960), 100.

  18. Oil in Japan's War: Report of the Oil and Chemical Division, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Pacific [hereafter USSBS] (Tokyo, 1946), 87–89; and Hattori, op.cit., vol. 4, 165.

  19. See Captain Rikihei Inoguchi, UN, and Commander Tadashi Nakajima, UN, The Divine Wind: Japan s Kamikaze Force in World War II (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1958), 81–82, for an examination of high-grade decoy production and employment at an austere facility. The quality of dummy aircraft construction varied considerably from location to location, but even simple constructions of straw and fabric were effective since pilots under fire in speeding fighters had little time to closely examine aircraft on the ground.

  20. U.S. estimates in May 1945 that 6,700 aircraft could be made available in stages, grew to only 7,200 by the time of the surrender. This number, however, turned out to be short by some 3,300 in light of the armada of 10,500 planes the enemy planned to expend in stages during the opening phases of the invasion operations—most as kamikazes. After the war, occupation authorities discovered that the number of military aircraft actually available in the home islands was over 12,700. See MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase, vol. 1: Supplement, Reports of General MacArthur (General Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command, Pacific, Tokyo, 1950), 136; and Hattori, op.cit., vol. 4, 174.

  21. Aid., vol. 4, 191. Transports had always been a high priority for suicide aircraft but did not become the main focus of Japanese planning until the spring and summer of 1945. See Interrogations of Japanese Officials, vol. 2 (USSBS Naval Analysis Division, Tokyo, 1946), Admiral Soemu Toyoda, 318; Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, 504.

  22. Inoguchi and Nakajima, op.cit., 25–26.

  23. Saburo Sakai with Martin Caidin and Fred Saito, Samurai (Bantam Books, New York, 1978), 254–56, 263.

  24. Inoguchi and Nakajima, op.cit. 58–59, Sakai, op.cit. 294–95.

  25. From Jack Moore, in D. M. Giangreco, “The Truth About Kamikazes,” Naval History, May–June 1997, 28.

  26. COMINCH P-0011, Anti-Suicide Action Summary, August 21, 1945, 20.

  27. Lieutenant Commander Buford Roland, USNR, and Lieutenant William B. Boyd, USNR, U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World War II (U.S. Navy Department, Washington, DC, 1955), 245–47.

  28. Aid., 267-68.

  29. Anti-Suicide Action Summary, 21. See also Confidential Information Bulletin no. 29, Anti-Aircraft Action Summary, World War II (COMINCH, October 1945) for an overview of gun, ammunition, and fire control development.

  30. Inoguchi, op.cit., 85–91.

  31. From a March 25, 1945, combat report of the Fletcher Class destroyer USS Kimberly, DD-521, excerpted in Richard O'Neill's Suicide Squads: Axis and Allied Special Attack Weapons of World War II, Their Development and Their Missions (Ballantine Books, New York, 1984), 164–65.

  32. A miniature radio device that automatically exploded projectiles when they passed close to their targets.

  33. Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, USN, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 13: The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas, 1944–1945 (Little, Brown, Boston, 1959), 58.

  34. A useful window to the thinking of some senior members of Nimitz's staff can be found in Joint Staff Study, OLYMPIC, Naval and Amphibious Operations, CINCPAC, 5, produced under the direction of Admiral Forrest Sherman, Deputy Chief of Staff, COMINCH. Updated through at least July 8, 1945, it echoes the intelligence reports referred to in this comment and states that attacks by U.S. forces “will have served to reduce the enemy air force to a relatively low state” by the projected November 1 invasion. However, the assessment in Staff Study, Operations, CORONET, General Headquarters USAFP, August 15, 1945, demonstrates a detailed understanding of Japanese plans for employment of kamikaze aircraft.

  35. Oil in Japan's War. USSBS, 40–41.

  36. Interrogations of Japanese Officials, vol. 2, USSBS. Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, 508.

  37. Oil in Japan s War, USSBS, 68, 88.

  38. Hattori, op.cit. vol. 4, 166.

  39. Joint Staff Study, OLYMPIC, Naval and Amphibious Operations, CINCPAC, May 1945, Annex 1 to Appendix C, June 18, 1945; and Staff Study, Operations, OLYMPIC, General Headquarters USAFP, April 23, 1945, 13 and map 8.

  40. Ibid., Joint Staff Study, Olympic.

  41. See CINCPAC map “Appendix 35, Provisional Layout of Fighter Defense,” in Report on Operation “OLYMPIC” and Japanese Counter-Measures, part 4, Appendices by the British Combined Observers (Pacific), Combined Operations Headquarters, August 1, 1946.

  42. Bemis M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, vol. 5: Victory and Occupation (Historical Branch, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1968), 187, 671; and Robert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II (Presidio Press, Bonita, 1980), 385–86. Marine ground support sorties at Okinawa amounted only to 704 of the 4,841 launched between April 7 and May 3, as protection of the escort carriers and the landing/support areas from kamikazes remained the top priority.

  43. See “Amendment No. 1 to G-2 Estimate of Enemy Situation with Respect to Kyushu,” G-2, AFPAC, July 19, 1945, in The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific vol. I: Reports of General MacArthur (General Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command, Pacific, Tokyo, 1950), 414–18; and Edward J. Drea, MacArthur's Ultra: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942–45 (University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1992), 202–25.

  44. A comprehensive and insightful treatment of this subject was produced by Alvin D. Coox shortly before his death. See “Needless Fear: The Compromise of U.S. Plans to Invade Japan in 1945,” Journal of Military History, April 2000,411–38.

  45. Ibid.; see also Hattori, op.cit., vol. 4, 185–87; and Coox, “Japanese Military Intelligence in the Pacific: Its Non-Revolutionary Nature,” in The Intelligence Revolution: A Historical Perspective (Office of Air Force History, Washington, DC, 1991), 200.

  46. Hattori, op.cit., vol. 4, 171–74, 183, 191.

  47. See CINCPAC map “Appendix 36, Radar Build Up,” in Report on Operation “OLYMPIC “ and Japanese Counter-Measures, part 4.

  48.There are no circumstances in which Admiral Turner would even mention, let alone address in detail, U.S. codebreaking of Japanese radio transmissions other than to use the very general term “communications intelligence,” which includes a variety of methods for divining an enemy's intentions. See Drea, op.cit.

  49. The H designation stands for hospital. These were tank landing ships converted to serve as forward medical and evacuation facilities.

  50. Brigadier General Douglas B. Kendrick, USA, Medical Department. United States Army: Blood Program in World War II (Office of the Surgeon General, Washington, D.C., 1964), 639–41.

  51. Ibid., 633–39.

  52. Thomas M. Huber, Pastel: Deception in the Invasion of Japan (Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 1988).

  53. Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, vol. 2 (Harper & Row, New York, 1975), especially 900 and 904.

  54. “The Japanese System of Defense Call-up,” Military Research Bulletin, no. 19, July 18, 1945, 1–3; and “Amendment No. 1 to G-2 Estimate of En
emy Situation with Respect to Kyushu,” G-2, AFPAC, July 29, 1945.

  55. Admiral Nimitz was also worried that the strain of extended combat operations might be taking a toll on senior 5th Fleet commanders. For Nimitz's worries about fatigue, see Buell, op.cit., 391–93. Whether or not such fears were justified biographer E. B. Potter states categorically in Nimitz (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1976), 456, that they were the cause of the reliefs.

  56. D. M. Giangreco, “Operation Downfall: The Devil Was in the Details,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1995, 86–94.

  57. Commander Lewis M. Walker, USNR, “Deception Plan for Operation OLYMPIC,” Parameters, Spring 1995, 116–57, for all references from “400 ships” through the following paragraph.

  58. Hattori, op.cit., vol. 4, 124; Frank and Shaw, op.cit., 51, 107.

  59. Walker, op.cit., 116–117.

  *60. “Bugeye” is a fictitious name.

  61. On October 9, 1945, a typhoon packing 140 mph winds struck Okinawa. This key staging area would have been expanded to capacity by that date if the war had not ended in September. Even at this late date, the area was still crammed with aircraft and assault shipping—much of which was destroyed. U.S. analysts at the scene matter-of-factly reported that the storm would have caused up to a forty-five-day delay in the invasion of Kyushu. For a review of the damage see Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, USN, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 15: Supplement and General Index (Little, Brown, Boston, 1962), 14–17.

  62. Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, The War Department:Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–1944 In USAWWII (Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1968), 551–62; and Cannon, op.cit., 6-7, 34, 38, 276.

  63. Staff Study, Operations, CORONET, General Headquarters USAFP, August 15, 1945, Annex 4, Basic Logistic Plan, Appendix H.

  64. Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, in USAWWII (Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1954), 348.

  65. Captain Charles A. Bartholomew, USN, Mud, Muscle and Miracles: Marine Salvage in the United States Navy (Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 1990), 449–51.