The New York Times Book of World War II, 1939-1945

by The New York Times

  A man extremely close to de Gaulle and ardently devoted to his cause says things like this are not “the real de Gaulle” but represent a conscientious and still rather graceless effort to live up to the new position in which he finds himself.

  This may well be true. For the general is certainly not by nature a “glad-hander.” Routine physical ceremonies seem to oppress him. But more and more he has become oppressed with what he concedes to a sense of duty—the duty of representing the people of France in and out of Hitler’s clutches. In essence, however, he remains stubborn and uncompromising. Even his critics allow that he is wholeheartedly sincere, that his motives are from his own viewpoint the best.

  A standard gibe at de Gaulle, and one whose origin has been attributed to a very high official, charges him with trying to be both a latter-day Clemen-ceau and a latter-day Joan of Arc, while actually he is unsuited to be either.

  De Gaullist sympathizers retort that the general seeks to be neither and that the Joan of Arc parallel in particular is bunk. The fact remains that there is a strong strain of mysticism in de Gaulle which is evident in almost every speech and every piece of correspondence.

  When Harold Macmillan and Robert D. Murphy, respectively for Britain and the United States, had the rather embarrassing task of formally notifying the general that an armistice with Italy had been concluded without the Committee of National Liberation being informed, Macmillan hopefully suggested that “as a military man you will surely understand.”

  “You forget,” said de Gaulle, “that I hold the political destinies of France in my hand.”

  Whether he holds these destinies as custodian or as molder remains the big question. Taking a leaf from the general’s own tendency to deal in figures of speech—he loves poetry and can quote Racine and Chateaubriand in great gobs—his adherents say he is like a glass vessel taking on the color of the liquid poured into it. That liquid, they say, is the living sentiment produced by the quick and precious heartbeat of France.

  Anti-de Gaullists counter that the figure is put backward—that France is a glass into which the general is trying to pour the color of his own ambition and his own personality.

  How will this son of the “petite nobilité,” who in 1940 was criticized as being a Fascist and is now being criticized as being Communist, sit with the leaders of the post-war Allied world?

  Assuming that Winston Churchill stills speaks for Britain there is much more likelihood of bringing about political harmony between Britain and France than personal harmony between Churchill and de Gaulle. In every way the two men grate on each other, though each is big enough to acknowledge the basic sincerity of the other when each praises the ideals and aspirations of the other’s country.

  While he headed the French National Committee in London de Gaulle frequently visited 10 Downing Street. Mr. Churchill once told him in French as poor as de Gaulle’s English would have been, “You may be France—but you’re not all France.” De Gaulle returned to his headquarters in Carlton Gardens pale and pent up. He strode by the sentry and disappeared into his private office.

  But later he learned to suppress his anger or at least to control it to his own advantage. At the time of the North African invasion only the faintest inkling trickled to his ears. Finally on a Sunday morning in November he was confronted with the reality of the presence of Allied troops.

  So the general went to 10 Downing Street again, and according to a member of his staff at the time he “took a leaf out of Churchill’s book and pretended to be angry when he wasn’t.” As a result, according to this version, he got British recognition and sovereignty of the Fighting French in Madagascar.

  All through his extremely trying period in London de Gaulle unquestionably learned more of the ways of statesmen and politicians. He was a good student. But probably his lowest moment was when just as he was about to leave for North Africa he was halted by a last-minute request—in fact a command—from General Dwight D. Eisenhower. He went to the English countryside and wrote sad and eloquent letters. Finally he was re-invited—or rather permitted—to come here.

  De Gaulle’s present political situation tends to obscure his really brilliant military record. Son of a college professor he went to St. Cyr and was both wounded and imprisoned during the First World War. He later served as aide de camp to Marshal Pétain, toward whom his present attitude is one of utter forgiveness. Ironically when in 1924 he wrote “La Discorde Chez’ Ennemi” it was Pétain who inscribed the preface, “The day will come when a grateful France will call upon him.”

  In the Thirties de Gaulle began to write about mechanized warfare. It was his intense conviction that the nation’s safety depended upon modern mechanization that built up his reputation before the fall of France. He was made a general on the battlefield on May 15, 1940. Three weeks later Reynaud summoned him to Paris and made him Under-Secretary of State for National Defense and War. De Gaulle did not know it, perhaps, but the political phase of his career had begun. That phase was thrust before the public when he made his speech at the BBC in London on June 18, 1940, and soon after when his reminder that “France has lost a battle, she has not lost the war” became a watchword which has retained its punch.

  Some think that de Gaulle’s troubles began when he refused to allow the Free French Forces to become a sort of “French Foreign Legion in the pay of the British.” At the same time he was largely in British power and the fiasco at Dakar did nothing to help his prestige.

  But de Gaulle survived. He is now riding his highest. He has claimed for the committee he heads sole authority to speak for France and no one has seriously contested his claim. But he is still subject to Allied military control. De Gaulle knows that and is concentrating on so solidifying his support within and without France as to make any such Allied interference ridiculous. He has said that going back to France will be just like going back to one’s slippers.

  DECEMBER 25, 1943

  NEW INVASION COMMANDER IN CHIEF

  GENERAL IS SHIFTED

  Choice of ‘Big 3’ Parley, He Has Montgomery as British Field Leader

  WILSON IS SUCCESSOR

  Mid-East Head Honored—Spaatz To Direct U.S. Air Strategy

  Special to The New York Times.

  HYDE PARK, N.Y., Dec. 24—President Roosevelt announced today the appointment of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to lead the invasion of Europe from the north and west, and from London came word that Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery of North African fame would head the British troops under General. Eisenhower to form a proved and hard-hitting team to lead the assault on Adolf Hitler’s “Fortress Europe.”

  The President’s announcement of General Eisenhower’s selection at the recent Teheran conference to lead the main attack against Germany also set to rest the old rumors regarding the probable appointment of Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, to that post.

  The President, in his radio report today on the recent conferences at Teheran and Cairo, also named Lieut. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz as commander of “the entire American strategic bombing force operating against Germany.”

  This was taken to mean that while General Eisenhower will confine his command to the mass attack on Europe from the north and west, General Spaatz’ command over all American strategic bombardment of Germany extends to operations against Germany from all neighboring bases.

  QUASHES MARSHALL RUMORS

  The President gave a vivid picture in his radio report of complete agreement between Prime Minister Churchill, Premier Stalin and himself regarding a detailed program for the annihilation of Germany by land and air from all directions.

  He also paid high tribute to General Marshall, presumably to set old rumors at rest. Some persons have argued that the position to be occupied by General Eisenhower is of greatest importance, but the official decision now revealed seems to give credence to the opinion that the most important position in the Army is that of Chief of Staff, just as Washington is the only place from which the whole global oper
ation can be commanded.

  “To the members of our armed forces, to their wives, mothers and fathers, I want to affirm the great faith and confidence that we have in General Marshall and Admiral King (Chief of Naval Operations), who direct all of our armed might throughout the world,” the President declared.

  THEIR MILITARY GENIUS STRESSED

  “Upon them,” he said, “falls the responsibility of planning the strategy; of determining where and when to fight. Both of these men have already gained high places in American history; places which will record in that history many evidences of their military genius that cannot be published today.”

  The announcement from London told not only of General Montgomery’s appointment to head the British invasion forces under General Eisenhower but also of Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson’s appointment to replace General Eisenhower as commander of the Mediterranean Theatre and Gen. Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander’s appointment to command all Allied forces in Italy.

  The Teheran military decision announced by the President proved as much as anything else that the American handling of the invasion of North Africa and of Italy had deeply impressed the United States allies. Those invasions may now be regarded as the testing phase of the main European invasion, since the American officers identified with their command have now received key positions in the final stage of the war, which is about to begin.

  General Eisenhower’s prestige with the Allied leaders has received frequent testimony, and it is almost axiomatic that General Montgomery is the best and most proven tactical field general the Allies, possess, just as General Eisenhower is the best strategical commander for big operations in the European theatre.

  They worked together in Africa and Italy and will now begin a new chapter of teamwork in the vaster task of invading Eurone at its most strongly defended positions.

  Likewise, General Spaatz was a product of the North African testing period, having directed American air operations in the Mediterranean under General Eisenhower. Air Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, a British air commander, stood between General Spaatz and General Eisenhower as air commander of all Allied air forces in the Mediterranean Theatre.

  General Wilson’s injection into the western Mediterranean picture is significant as suggesting the abandonment by the Allied chiefs at Teheran of plans for an Anglo-American invasion of the Balkans, an area that the Russians have been reported as wanting to act in militarily when the time comes.

  General Wilson, who established his reputation in this war during the early stages of the first British African campaign, has been commanding the Tenth British Army in the Middle East, which stood ready for a Balkan campaign if one was ordered.

  Of General Eisenhower, the President said:

  “His performances in Africa, Sicily and Italy have been brilliant.

  “He knows by practical and successful experience the way to coordinate air, sea and land power.

  All of these will be under his control.”

  To General Wilson, the President pledged that “our powerful ground, sea, and air forces in the vital Mediterranean area will stand by his side until every objective in that bitter theatre is attained.”

  DECEMBER 26, 1943

  POLISH FRONTIERS TEST ALLIED STATESMANSHIP

  Russian Claims Come Right Up Against Enunciated Principles, Including Those of Atlantic Charter

  STALIN’S PROPAGANDA CHANCE

  By EDWIN L. JAMES

  A Pole would put it this way: “It would be a travesty of justice if after an Allied victory in a war which started when Britain and France declared war on Germany because Hitler attacked Poland, Poland should come out of it worse off than if Hitler had been left to complete his designs.” The Pole would be referring, of course, to Moscow’s claims concerning the western borders of Russia, which means naturally the eastern frontiers of Poland.

  Moscow has made no official statement regarding the Polish frontiers. In most Polish quarters there is real fear that Russia is going to demand parts of what was Poland before 1939. It is recalled that in commenting on a statement that Stalin’s armies were so many miles from the Polish frontier, Ambassador Ouman-sky in a speech in Mexico City made a “correction” by giving a distance which indicated he, at least, regarded the line drawn by Germany and Russia in 1940 as the real Russian frontier. Recently, at the UNRRA meeting in Atlantic City, a Russian film was shown which pictured Lwow as “returning to the motherland.” The Poles regard Lwow as the oldest of Polish cities.

  In any event, the Poles draw the conclusion that their eastern frontiers are in danger. They are worried. Their worry is not decreased by the circumstance that in the conferences with the Russians the Americans and British have not discussed Russian frontiers, and they have noted the Russian statement that Russian frontiers are “inviolable,” which doesn’t mean much until one knows what it is that is inviolable.

  THE UKRAINIAN ISSUE

  Any consideration of the Polish frontier problem at once raises the issue of Polish Ukraine. In other words, Poles fear that the Russians will wish to incorporate that part of Poland, with a population of some 4,000,000, into the Soviet Union. The Russians have intimated that such was their desire; certainly they have not denied it was in all the discussions of the matter.

  Now Ukrainian nationalists, outside of Russia, preach much of the unity of the Ukraine. But these leaders, especially those in the United States, look toward a united Ukraine which would be neither Russian nor Polish—just Ukrainian. It is possible that if Russia—which is not expected—would entertain the idea of an independent Ukraine some Poles might not object to the Polish Ukraine being included in such a country, provided it was not a part of the U.S.S.R. But there is little likelihood of the fruition of any such plan.

  The Poles think they see some indications, such as talk of a common frontier between Russia and Czechoslovakia, of Moscow’s intention to try to take over Galicia, the richest part of Poland.

  In the absence of any definite declaration by Moscow the issue is difficult to draw clearly, but, to repeat, the Poles are worried about Russia’s intentions. They are afraid Moscow may choose the line the Russians held after Hitler and Stalin partitioned their country.

  WHERE POLISH HOPES LIE

  The Poles put their hopes in the United States and Britain. They are frank about some doubts of the official British attitude, and so their hopes turn particularly to the United States. They say they think the Atlantic Charter meant to guarantee the restoration of their country as it was before Hitler attacked them in 1939. They hope that the Washington Government when the time comes—and they think the time is near—may be able to bring cogent arguments to bear on Stalin. They would like to see a proposal put forward for the drawing of a line around undoubtedly Polish territory, with a provision for plebiscites in disputed territory. They have not as yet got much encouragement, but they are still hoping.

  The situation is rendered somewhat difficult by the fact that Moscow does not like the present Polish Government-in-Exile; in fact has broken off relations with it. However, over against that one might place the statement by President Benes of Czechoslovakia, made in Moscow the other day, that he hoped to see a treaty made between Russia and Poland along the lines of the pact of friendship and mutual protection which has been signed by Russia and Czechoslovakia. Benes is an experienced politician, and he must have had something to go on.

  IS STALIN ADAMANT?

  The Poles have no illusion about their future depending on what Stalin is willing to do or what he may be persuaded to do. They realize quite well that American and British armies are not going to fight the Russians over Poland. But they feel that the other United Nations can bring pressure to bear on Russia in their favor.

  No one can say today what merit lies in this idea. There are reports which tell of a different attitude in Russia in recent months. There are evidences that Stalin the nationalist is proud of the position he has won for Russia in this war, and there is a chance that after the
fighting is over he may wish to keep Russia in polite company. That might form the basis of an approach to him in behalf of Polish territoriality.

  An argument could be made that Russia would heighten her stature by not demanding Polish territory. That would give a picture of Russia which, if unexpected, might well reflect changes in the Russian outlook. While Stalin has never said what frontiers with Poland he desired, he has stated that he desired a “strong and independent Poland.” The question would be whether his conception of such a state would agree with that of the Poles, who wish their complete independence re-established in the territory they had before this was started.

  A MOST THORNY PROBLEM

  Sooner or later the Polish issue has got to be dealt with. It may or may not be the best time now to try to do it. The Russian armies are not yet on the soil of what was Poland. In other respects the war is far from over. Even when Germany is defeated Japan has got to be whipped. Stalin may or may not take part in the war against Japan. It is more likely that once Germany is defeated he will do so than that he will not. If for no other reason, the Russians will surely wish to be in on the peace settlement if and when Japan is beaten.

  One does not like to suggest that after a war fought for freedom there will be widespread trading of territorial advantages, but it does stand to reason that in the bargaining among victors, which has always taken place after a war and which will take place after this one, there may arise the opportunity to give Stalin concessions which might well weigh against any desires Russians may have with respect to territory that was Poland’s prior to Hitler’s invasion of that country.