Marine: A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit tcml-4

by Tom Clancy

  Following the end of the Vietnam war and the rough years of the 1970s, things began to become a bit more regular within the Marine afloat battalions. Redesignated as Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs), they now had a formal headquarters unit, which would then fill out its component parts from regular Marine units from around the Corps. Previously, the units just were thrown together for the duration of their cruise afloat. This move to a formal headquarters structure was more than just cosmetic; it meant that the Corps had begun to consider the MAUs one of their premier MAGTF organizations. Now they would become fully integrated MAGTFs under the command of a full Colonel (O-6), capable of a wider variety of tasks and missions. In fact, with the drawdown of Navy and Marine forces in the late 1970s during the Carter Administration, the compact MAUs aboard their ARGs quickly became the only U.S. military units that could begin to rapidly respond to a crisis around the world.

  The coming of the Reagan Administration in 1981 brought the MAUs the opportunity to prove themselves in combat. Initially, the results were decidedly mixed. On the plus side was Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada in October 1982. The 22nd MAU provided much of the combat muscle for that operation. Things unfortunately did not go so well for the 24th MAU. Two days before Urgent Fury hit the beaches of Grenada, while it was on "peacekeeping" duty in the war-torn city of Beirut, Lebanon, an Iranian driving a truck bomb wiped out much of the 24th's ground component. Over two hundred Marines were killed in the explosion, which occurred early on a Sunday morning. It today remains one of the worst disasters in U.S. military history, and had a variety of effects on the Marines and their MAUs.

  The Beirut disaster and problems in other operations began to show that the Marines had some problems in their combat doctrine. Much like their sister services, who had seen such difficulties following the Vietnam War, the Corps was beginning to experience some serious shortcomings in its ability to carry out even traditional missions like amphibious invasions and raids. Grenada, while successful, had been costly and poorly coordinated. Luckily, the solution to these shortcomings came in the form of a new senior Marine Corps leader, General Alfred M. Gray, who would eventually become the 29th Commandant in 1987. While he was the commander of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLANT), General Gray began his campaign to promote "warfighting" as the primary task of the Marine Corps in the 1980s and 1990s. Much like visionary thinkers in the other services, Gray helped promote the idea that combat was the core ability of the Marines (this earned him the nickname "the warfighter"). What made his effort unusual was that he felt it was not enough just to know how to shoot and blow things up. He urged Marines of all ranks, officer and enlisted, to apply intellectual power as a force multiplier for the Marine ethos. This began to pay immediate benefits. He also promoted the use of the word "expeditionary" to describe the inherent characteristics of Marine units of all sizes. In particular, he pushed renaming the MAUs as MEUs (the E obviously standing for "expeditionary"), to reflect the kinds of missions he wanted the Marine Corps to be ready for.

  Along with these intellectual developments, General Gray began to think about the kinds of units that the Marines had formed over the years, and just what kinds of missions each was capable of. One particular kind of mission which had come to be vital in the 1980s was special operations. The failed Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980 had forced all of the services to look at their capabilities in this area. Out of this came a 1983 study that examined what the Marine Corps would need to become a credible player in future low-intensity ("short-of-war") conflicts. Unlike the other services, there was no drive within the USMC to create new and separate special operations units. Instead, it was decided that regular units within the Corps would be given special training prior to a deployment. This would make them "special operations capable" (SOC) across a fixed range of missions and tasks.

  In 1984, Marine Corps Headquarters ordered FMFLANT (at the time commanded by General Gray) to put together a program to create a special-operations-capable Marine unit, and deploy it on an ARG for an overseas cruise of some six months duration. General Gray and then-Colonel James Myatt (who eventually rose to the rank of Major General and commanded the 1st Marine Division during Desert Storm), came up with a list of special missions and equipment that they wanted to put into the unit assembled. Along the way, Gray and Myatt made several key decisions. These included:

  • FMFLANT would modify one of the MEUs to produce a battalion-sized SOC-capable MAGTF that could carry out the special missions that they had in mind.

  • They made plans to establish a training and certification program to make sure that every unit would go through a standardized curriculum.

  • The actual unit, to be called a MEU (SOC), would be given an extra infusion of equipment and personnel to support its expanded mission.

  The units for the first MEU (SOC) were taken from a regular MEU, the 26th, preparing for a deployment to the Mediterranean. Personally selected to command the first MEU (SOC) deployment, Colonel Myatt took the 26th out for a six-month cruise in 1986.

  Now it should be said that this first MEU (SOC) cruise did not shake the world. The 26th did support the Navy carrier groups that were operating against Libya at the time, and these actions were generally successful. But more importantly, that first MEU (SOC) deployment brought home valuable lessons that were immediately applied to the next cruise, and all the others that followed. Even though actual combat eluded them for the next few years, MEU (SOC)s were nevertheless very active. First combat by a MEU (SOC) occurred on April 18th, 1989, when a strike force of Marines from the 22nd MEU (SOC), was tasked to take part in Operation Preying Mantis. Preying Mantis was a rapid response to the mining, several days earlier, of the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) by Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf. The operation was designed to take out several Iranian oil platforms that were being used as targeting bases for attacks against tankers coming down the Gulf. The 22nd, along with several surface-action groups (SAGs) of U.S. warships, was tasked to capture and then demolish the platforms, while aircraft from Carrier Air Wing Ten (CVW-10) embarked on USS Enterprise (CVN-65) provided cover against Iranian aircraft and ships. The results were startling. By the end of the day, the oil platforms had been destroyed, and most of the Iranian Navy had either been sunk or disabled. The MEU (SOC) lost one AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter with both of its crew, but it was an impressive combat debut for the new unit, and it went almost unnoticed by the world.

  Just fourteen months later, the MEU (SOC)s hit their stride, thanks to a rash of crisis situations that erupted in the summer and fall of 1990. The trouble started when a civil war in Liberia escalated. Initially, the 26th MEU (SOC) was sent to handle any possible evacuation of U.S. nationals and embassy personnel. It had been planned to relieve the 26th with the 22nd MEU (SOC), but the eruption of hostilities in the Persian Gulf in August meant that both units had to stay out to cover both problems. Eventually, the 22nd handled the evacuation, and the 26th went on to support operations in the Mediterranean. At the same time, the 13th MEU (SOC) from the West Coast was rapidly moving into position in the Persian Gulf, supporting maritime embargo operations and acting as a floating reserve for the 1st MEF in Saudi Arabia. Then, in December of 1990, with the eruption of the civil war in Somalia, heliborne Marines from the amphibious group in the Persian Gulf conducted an evacuation from the American embassy in Mogadishu.

  The period following Desert Storm has been a busy one for the MEU (SOC)s. In Somalia, Haiti, and now Bosnia, they have led the way for American efforts and forces. In the case of our pullout from Mogadishu, they have even covered our withdrawal from a dangerous and risky situation. Given their level of activity over the past ten years, it is amazing that it took the O'Grady rescue to bring them any sort of public notice. Despite the lack of public credit, the MEU (SOC) deployments are going along like clockwork. Originally, the MEU (SOC) effort was limited to just one such unit on each coast, but no more. Because of the desires of the regional CinCs to hav
e at least one of them available for any crisis that might arise, all the MEUs are being given SOC certification before they are deployed on cruise. The O'Grady rescue just highlights the many desirable qualities of these unique units, and provides a jumping off point for our own explorations of them. So follow us, and we'll show you how they work, and are put together.

  The MEU (SOC) Concept

  From early raids on British forts during the Revolutionary War to the embassy evacuations and rescues of today, when you have trouble that needs to be taken care of good and fast, you call the Marines. Every branch of the military has special operations forces, and these sometimes overlap. So how does a small and underfunded service like the Marine Corps justify such a capability, both from a financial as well as institutional point of view? The Marines' answer: a hybrid, dual-purpose special operations/amphibious unit, the MEU (SOC). To repeat, the MEU (SOC) is based upon the concept that given special training and equipment, regular units can be made capable of accomplishing both their normal duties and extraordinary missions. This notion runs contrary to the "snake-eater" tradition of the many special operations units around the world. For most of these, including the British Special Air Service (SAS), the U.S. Army Delta Force, and the German GSG-9, selection is limited to the physical and mental elite of a particular service. These are highly specialized units, lavishly expensive to create and operate, with a strong focus on hostage rescue and counter-insurgency warfare. Consequently, the leaders of their nations tend to view special operations units with the same kind of restraint and reserve they might have toward nuclear weapons. You only use them when you really need to, and when you do, you open yourself up to an extreme level of political risk. This is the reason why you see such limited use of special operations units, and why so many of them tend to hang around inside their compounds, practicing and waiting.

  As a matter of fact, several of the most significant and remarkable special operations missions in history did not involve actual, purpose-built special operations forces. During World War II, for example, the famous bombing mission on Tokyo by then-Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle and his raiders was accomplished by personnel and aircraft drawn from regular Army Air Corps bomber units. Thanks to several months of special training, as well as special modifications to their B-25 Mitchell bombers, they made history on April 18th, 1942, as the first force to bomb Japan during the war. Also in World War II, a regular British unit, given special training and equipment, was responsible for the less well known but equally valorous action at Pegasus Bridge on D-Day. On the night of June 5th/6th, 1944, a specially trained gliderborne unit, Company "D," drawn from the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry (the "Ox and Bucks") of the 6th Airborne Division, conducted a coup de main on a pair of vital bridges over the Orne River and Caen Canal. The tiny force, led by the charismatic Major John Howard, took the bridges and held them until relieved by British commandos coming inland on D-Day. Finally, there was the Entebbe Raid. A Palestinian terrorist group held a number of hostages from a hijacked French Airbus in a terminal at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda. The raid was designed to release and retrieve them. As soon as the crisis started, the Israeli Defense Force formed an ad hoc rescue force out of various regular paratroop units. On July 4th, 1976, after a long flight on a picked force of C-130 Hercules transports, the rescuers assaulted the terminal and freed the hostages with minimal losses — in the process killing most of the terrorists. Again, a clearly defined goal, supported by extremely strong leadership, led to success in a special operation by "pick up" units with special training. Such units, given the time and training, can achieve wonders. And because they are drawn from regular units, they are cheaper to run and less expensive to risk.

  The MEU (SOC) joins the responsiveness and professionalism of a task-specific special operations force with the costs and success records of specially trained, ad hoc special operations units. Composed of regular units from around the Marine Corps, the MEU (SOC) is a MAGTF based around a reinforced rifle battalion, with the special training and equipment that makes it capable of a limited number of special operations missions. One of the interesting characteristics of MEU (SOC)s is that they are not composed of the same units every time they go out on a cruise. Since they are formed from battalion landing teams (BLTs), medium Marine helicopter squadrons (HMMs), MEU service support groups (MSSGs), and ARGs, the various components can be mixed and matched as required. And since their special operations capability is layered on top of their existing conventional amphibious/heliborne capabilities, the MEU (SOC)s are actually quite a bargain for the taxpayers. Finally, and this may be the greatest benefit of all, they can be forward-deployed and based aboard their own ARG, requiring little or no approval from foreign governments or allies for their use. Given the frustrations that such foreign interference has caused in the past, this probably provides the American national command authorities all the justification required to continue operating and maintaining the seven MEU (SOC)s.

  History and Structure: The 26th MEU (SOC)

  The official emblem of the 26th MEU (SOC).

  Though the 26th was the first MEU (SOC) to go out on cruise in 1985—it was known then as a MAU (SOC) — the luck of the draw has not been kind to it…if luck means getting involved like other MEU (SOC)s in something flashy. Nevertheless, in the years since it first took the concept out for its first test, the 26th has done yeo-man work. Over the last decade, the 26th has supported evacuation operations from Liberia and been stationed off the coast of Somalia.

  Colonel James Battaglini on August 29th, 1995, as he prepared to lead the deployment of the 26th MEU (SOC) to the Mediterranean.

  JOHN D. GRESHAM

  As the 26th was headed into its training and workup cycle in the winter of 1994/95, it acquired a new commanding officer (CO) to act as its brain, father, and caretaker. The new CO, Colonel James R. Battaglini, is an imposing figure; his mere presence in a room, on a deck, or in a landing zone (LZ) is enough to tell you that the boss has arrived and is in charge. A tall, lean man with a hard look in his eyes, Colonel Battaglini loves his Marines more than almost anything else in his life. A native of Washington, D.C., a graduate of Mount Saint Mary's College, and a holder of two master's degrees (in management and national security studies), he can talk about the merits of satellite communications systems at one moment, and tell you his opinions of nonlethal weapons doctrine in the next. As he rose up the chain in the Corps, he commanded virtually every kind of Marine unit from a reconnaissance platoon to the 1st Battalion of the 8th Marine Regiment (1/8), during its 1991/92 deployment with the 22nd MEU (SOC). Along the way, he picked up a Bronze Star for valor in combat during Desert Storm. Backing up Colonel Battaglini is his senior enlisted advisor, Sergeant Major W. R. Creech, himself a veteran of over twenty years in the Corps.

  What Battaglini and Creech were putting together for a six-month Mediterranean cruise in 1995 was a team built of many interlocking components. Like all other deployed Marine forces, the MEU (SOC) is built along the classic MAGTF structure. And like all expeditionary units deployed by the Corps, it has ground, aviation, and logistical components. The essential parts of this structure are:

  • Command Element (CE)—This is a company-sized (28 officers, 186 enlisted) unit which provides the leadership, command, control, and communications for the entire MEU (SOC). The 26th MEU (SOC) CE is based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

  The organization of the 26th MEU (SOC). The three components (ground, air, and support) are standard to all Marine MAGTFs.

  JACK RYAN ENTERPRISES, LTD., BY LAURA ALPHER

  • Ground Combat Element (GCE)—The GCE is a reinforced battalion landing team (BLT—54 officers, 1,178 enlisted), designed to fit in the limited space aboard a three-ship ARG. For the 1995/96 26th MEU (SOC) deployment, the GCE was built around the 2nd BLT of the 6th Marine Regiment (2/6). This unit is part of the 2nd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

  • Aviation Combat Element (ACE)�
��A MEU (SOC) ACE is composed of a reinforced medium Marine helicopter squadron (HMM—55 officers, 263 enlisted), made up of a mix of CH-46 Sea Knights, CH-53E Super Stallions, AH-1W Cobras, UH-1N Iroquois, and AV-8B Harrier IIs. In addition, the MEU (SOC) can be reinforced with a land-based force of KC-130 Hercules airborne tankers. The 26th MEU (SOC)'s ACE is built around HMM-264, which is based at the Marine Corps Air Station at New River, North Carolina (adjacent to Camp Lejeune). The Harrier detachment is drawn from Marine Corps Attack Squadron 231 (VMA-231) at MACS Cherry Point, North Carolina.

  • Combat Service Support Element (CSSE)—The CSSE is a company-sized unit (13 officers, 234 enlisted), composed of a series of eight platoons covering areas such as supply, engineering, transport, maintenance, and medical services. The 26th MEU (SOC)'s CSSE is MEU Service Support Group 26 (MSSG-26), which is also based at Camp Lejeune.

  These four elements, the CE, GCE, ACE, and CSSE, make up an MEU (SOC) MAGTF like the 26th. In addition, each MEU (SOC) commander gets to tailor the unit's structure to match the planned mission and his own operational style. Frequently, these modifications and additions are based upon suggestions and lessons learned from the MEU (SOC)s ahead of them in the rotation schedule. For example, while the 26th was working up in the summer of 1995, they were taking to heart the lessons from the 22nd MEU (SOC), which had just returned, and Marty Berndt's 24th MEU (SOC), which was then on cruise out in the Mediterranean. Out of the 24th's experiences (such as the O'Grady rescue) came the suggestion that the 26th's ACE be enlarged with additional CH-53E Super Stallion and AH-1W Cobra helicopters, to support possible evacuation operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now let us take a look at each of the 26th MEU (SOC)'s individual complements and see what gives this little unit such a big bite.