The Downing Street Years, 1979-1990

by Margaret Thatcher

  Friday 30 April effectively marked the end of the beginning of our diplomatic and military campaign to regain the Falklands. The United States now came down clearly on our side. President Reagan told television correspondents that the Argentinians had resorted to armed aggression and that such aggression must not be allowed to succeed. Most important, the President also directed that the United States would respond positively to requests for military materiel. Unfortunately, they were not prepared to agree to place an embargo on imports from Argentina. However, the President’s announcements constituted a substantial moral boost to our position.

  It was on this day that the TEZ came into force. And although diplomatic and military affairs remained inextricably intertwined, it is fair to say that from now on it was the military rather than the diplomatic which increasingly commanded our attention. At that morning’s War Cabinet it was the Argentine aircraft carrier, the 25 de Mayo, which concerned us. She could cover 500 miles a day and her aircraft a further 500. Her escorts carried Exocet missiles, supplied by France in the 1970s. We were well aware that the Exocet threat should be taken seriously. It increased the danger which the Argentine carrier group posed to our ships and their supply lines. We therefore authorized an attack on the carrier, wherever she was, provided it was south of latitude 35 degrees and east of longitude 48, and outside the 12-mile limit of Argentine territorial waters. Such an attack would be based upon the right of self-defence and be within Article 51 of the UN Charter; in accordance with the notification which had been given on 23 April no further warning was required.[37]

  That evening I had to speak at a large rally in Stephen Hastings’s constituency at Milton Hall in Bedfordshire. Stephen and his predecessor Alan Lennox-Boyd spoke magnificently. I was given a wonderful reception. No one present had any doubt of the justice of our cause, nor that we would eventually win through. I felt proud and exhilarated: but I felt too an almost crushing burden of responsibility. I knew that the task force would enter the waters around the Falkland Islands the following day.

  CHAPTER VIII

  The Falklands: Victory

  The battle for the Falklands in May and June 1982

  From the beginning of May through to the recapture of the Falklands in mid-June military considerations loomed ever larger in my mind. But this did not mean that the pressure for negotiations eased — far from it. I was under an almost intolerable pressure to negotiate for the sake of negotiation and because so many politicians were desperately anxious to avoid the use of force — as if the Argentinians had not already used force by invading in the first place. At such a time almost everything and everyone seems to combine to deflect you from what you know has to be done.

  Yet I could never afford to ignore the diplomatic effort because on its successful conduct rested our hard-won position of UN Security Council support for Resolution 502 and, still more important, the degree of support we might receive from our allies, above all the United States. And all this time there was constant, nagging fear of the unknown. Would we have sufficient air cover? Where were the Argentine submarines? Would we be able to reach the military and diplomatic position required for a successful landing within that narrow time-frame set by the onset of intolerable winter weather in the South Atlantic?

  Over breakfast at Milton Hall I received a telephone call to say that our Vulcans had bombed the runway of Port Stanley airport. Our naval task force was also bombarding Argentine positions elsewhere on the Falklands. I was told that there had so far been no British casualties but it would still be many hours before the Vulcans — after their marathon flight involving five mid-air refuellings — would be back at Ascension Island. In fact they all returned safely. The refuelling seemed a stupendous feat at the time, although such is the way of things that later performances of this kind came almost to be taken for granted.

  That day the Argentine Air Force mounted a major attack on our ships. The Argentinians were in a position to send photographs to the outside world, which we were not. They claimed that many of our aeroplanes had been shot down but in that famous broadcast Brian Hanrahan, the excellent BBC correspondent, put the record straight when he reported: ‘I counted them all out and I counted them all back.’ It was a great relief. But we had no illusions about the significance of the heavy attack and the vital question it raised about the sufficiency of our air cover.

  The next day, Sunday, which I spent at Chequers, was one of great — though often misunderstood — significance for the outcome of the Falklands War. As often on Sundays during the crisis, the members of the War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff and officials came to Chequers for lunch and discussions. On this occasion there was a special matter on which I needed an urgent decision.

  I called together Willie Whitelaw, John Nott, Cecil Parkinson, Michael Havers, Terry Lewin, Admiral Fieldhouse and Sir Antony Acland, the Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office. (Francis Pym was in America.) Admiral Fieldhouse told us that one of our submarines, HMS Conqueror, had been shadowing the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano. The Belgrano was escorted by two destroyers. The cruiser itself had substantial fire power provided by 6 guns with a range of 13 miles and anti-aircraft missiles. We were advised that she might have been fitted with Exocet anti-ship missiles, and her two destroyer escorts were known to be carrying them. The whole group was sailing on the edge of the Exclusion Zone. We had received intelligence about the aggressive intentions of the Argentine fleet. There had been extensive air attacks on our ships the previous day and Admiral Woodward, in command of the task force, had every reason to believe that a full-scale attack was developing. The Argentine aircraft carrier, the 25 de Mayo, had been sighted some time earlier and we had agreed to change the rules of engagement to deal with the threat she posed. However, our submarine had lost contact with the carrier, which had slipped past it to the north. There was a strong possibility that Conqueror might also lose contact with the Belgrano group. Admiral Woodward had to come to a judgement about what to do with the Belgrano in the light of these circumstances. From all the information available, he concluded that the carrier and the Belgrano group were engaged in a classic pincer movement against the task force. It was clear to me what must be done to protect our forces, in the light of Admiral Woodward’s concern and Admiral Fieldhouse’s advice. We therefore decided that British forces should be able to attack any Argentine naval vessel on the same basis as agreed previously for the carrier.

  Later we approved reinforcements for the Falklands which would be taken there in the QE2. It surprised me a little that the need for reinforcements had not been clear sooner. I asked whether it was really necessary or advisable to use this great ship and to put so many people in it, but as soon as I was told that it was necessary to get them there in time I gave my agreement. I was always concerned that we would not have sufficient men and equipment when the time came for the final battle and I was repeatedly struck by the fact that even such highly qualified professionals as advised us often underestimated the requirements. We broke up still desperately worried that the aircraft carrier which could have done such damage to our vulnerable task force had not been found.

  The necessary order conveying the change of rules of engagement was sent from Northwood to HMS Conqueror at 1.30 p.m. In fact, it was not until after 5 p.m. that Conqueror reported that she had received the order. The Belgrano was torpedoed and sunk just before 8 o’clock that evening. Our submarine headed away as quickly as possible. Wrongly believing that they would be the next targets, the Belgrano’s escorts seem to have engaged in anti-submarine activities rather than rescuing its crew, some 321 of whom were lost — though initially the death toll was reported to be much higher. The ship’s poor state of battle readiness greatly increased the casualties. Back in London we knew that the Belgrano had been hit, but it was some hours before we knew that she had sunk.

  A large amount of malicious and misleading nonsense was circulated at the time and long afterwards about the reasons why we sank the Belgrano. Th
ese allegations have been demonstrated to be without foundation. The decision to sink the Belgrano was taken for strictly military not political reasons: the claim that we were trying to undermine a promising peace initiative from Peru will not bear scrutiny. Those of us who took the decision at Chequers did not at that time know anything about the Peruvian proposals, which in any case closely resembled the Haig plan rejected by the Argentinians only days before. There was a clear military threat which we could not responsibly ignore. Moreover, subsequent events more than justified what was done. As a result of the devastating loss of the Belgrano, the Argentine Navy — above all the carrier — went back to port and stayed there. Thereafter it posed no serious threat to the success of the task force, though of course we were not to know that this would be so at the time. The sinking of the Belgrano turned out to be one of the most decisive military actions of the war.

  However, the shocking loss of life caused us many problems because it provided a reason — or in some cases perhaps an excuse — for breaks in the ranks among the less committed of our allies: it also increased pressure on us at the UN. The Irish Government called for an immediate meeting of the Security Council, though after intense pressure from Tony Parsons and some from the UN Secretary-General, they were eventually persuaded to suspend their request — not, however, before the Irish Defence minister had described us as ‘the aggressor’. There was some wavering from the French and rather more from the West Germans, who pressed for a cease-fire and UN negotiations. Moreover, by the time of the sinking of the Belgrano, the diplomatic scene was already becoming more difficult and complicated.

  I have already mentioned the peace plan which the President of Peru had put to Al Haig and which he in turn had put to Francis Pym in Washington on 1 and 2 May, though we had no sight of it until later. With the sinking of the Belgrano, Mr Haig was once again bringing pressure to bear, urging on us diplomatic magnanimity and, expressing his belief that whatever the course of the military campaign there must be a negotiated outcome to avoid open-ended hostility and instability. To add to the confusion, the UN Secretary-General was now seeking to launch a peace initiative of his own, much to the irritation of Mr Haig.

  WEEK SIX

  Both military and diplomatic pressures now mounted. On Tuesday 4 May the destroyer HMS Sheffield was hit by an Argentine Exocet missile with devastating effects. The loss of the Sheffield was the result of a number of mishaps and mistakes, but it was a terrible demonstration of the risks our forces faced. The Sheffield was a relatively old ship, with outdated radar: it was transmitting via satellite to London moments before the missile struck, interfering with its capacity to detect the attack sufficiently in advance to throw up chaff as a decoy. Also the fire doors were open and, as we learnt from the raging fire that followed the missile impact, there was too much aluminium in the structure. Although the ship did not sink at first, it proved impossible due to the rough seas to bring it back home, as I had wished, and eventually she went down. At first I was told that there were 20 casualties: then 40.

  It was very difficult to know how to announce this sort of news. We would have liked to inform all next of kin first, and indeed sought to do so. But meanwhile the Argentinians would be putting out statements — some true, some false but all with a deliberate purpose — before we knew the real facts. As a result, wives and families spent some agonizing days and nights. That day we also lost one of our Harriers.

  By this stage Francis Pym had returned from the United States. We did not like the US/Peruvian proposals he brought with him and sought to have important changes made, above all to ensure that the wishes of the islanders were respected. Al Haig, however, would not accept our changes or pass them to the Peruvians because he believed that the Argentinians would reject them out of hand. I received a message from President Reagan urging us to make further compromise.

  On the morning of Wednesday 5 May I called first the War Cabinet and then the full Cabinet to consider the US/Peruvian proposals. Francis Pym believed that in view of the battle in the South Atlantic it would be damaging to reject what were in effect Al Haig’s proposals. Moreover, as I have noted, the countries of the European Community which had been very strong at first were beginning to weaken in their support. The sanctions which they had agreed were only for a month and there would be difficulty in getting everyone to approve their renewal.

  I was deeply unhappy about the US/Peruvian proposals. Cabinet did not like them much either. But we had to make some response. I wanted to ensure that any interim administration would consult the islanders and that their wishes should be respected in the long-term settlement. I also wanted South Georgia and the other Falklands dependencies to be outside the scope of the proposals. Cabinet was firm about these objectives. We agreed to seek changes to meet them and in this we were successful.

  I did not like this constant pressure to weaken our stance. I drafted a personal letter to President Reagan that revealed perhaps too much of my frustration, though I toned it down before it was sent. But I took comfort from the fact that I had never believed that the Argentine Junta would be prepared to withdraw on these or any other terms — and indeed the Argentinians turned down the US/Peruvian proposals. Attention now increasingly shifted to the proposals of the UN Secretary-General. The Argentinians sent their Foreign minister to New York. They hoped to capitalize on the sympathy they had gained as a result of the sinking of the Belgrano and their spirits had been lifted by the destruction of the Sheffield. There was no lack of candidates to suggest new ‘initiatives’ — not the least surprising or impractical of which was the suggestion of President López-Portillo that I should have a private meeting with General Galtieri in Mexico. But I was not going to sell out the islanders and I knew that the Argentine Junta could not withdraw and survive. Obviously there was little prospect of a diplomatic ‘breakthrough’, yet still the apparently endless negotiations continued.

  Tony Parsons defended Britain’s position at the UN with great force and brilliance. The Argentinians were clearly determined to get the maximum propaganda advantage in the new discussions sponsored by the UN Secretary-General. He warned Sr. Perez de Cuellar of our past experiences of trying to deal with the Junta. The Secretary-General could expect that agreements apparently satisfactory to Argentine representatives would then be disowned by the Junta and that the Argentinians were intent on establishing sovereignty as a precondition of any settlement.

  I was not prepared to hold up military progress for negotiations. We were all aware that we were coming to a critical period. If we were to land and repossess the islands it would have to be done some time between 16 and 30 May. We could not leave it later because of the weather. That meant that negotiations at the UN must be completed within ten days or so. If they were successful and our principles and minimum requirements were met, well and good. If not, or they were still dragging on, then — if the Chiefs of Staff so advised — we would have to go ahead.

  I had mixed feelings about the negotiations. I shared the desire to avoid a further bloody conflict. I spoke about this to Tony Parsons on the telephone on Saturday 8 May. I asked Tony to tell the Secretary-General that we would be pleased to welcome him in London. I went on:

  In the end you know we might have to go in. I say in the end — time is short. But I just feel deeply… first that our people there were living in self-determination and freedom before this started and one can’t hand them over to anything less. But secondly that it is going to be the most awful waste of young life if we really have to go and take those islands… I will do everything before the final decision has to be taken to see if we can uphold the rule of international law and the liberty and justice, in which I believe passionately for our people, to see if we can stop a final battle.

  However, as the negotiations with the Argentinians in Washington continued it became ever more evident that they were not prepared to make the concessions we required. They were determined to include South Georgia and the dependencies. They w
anted to deny the islanders any proper means of expressing their views during the interim period. They were pressing for the complete withdrawal of the British task force to its bases in the UK — which, now that the battle for the Falklands had begun, was of course even more unacceptable than it had been before. They also wanted to be able to move in their own people and acquire property so as to change the whole terms of the argument. It was clear that the negotiations would fail. We must ensure that when they did so the Argentinians did not manage to shift the blame on to us. Ideally, we should bring them to a definite conclusion before the landings took place. An ultimatum was obviously necessary.

  On Sunday afternoon at Chequers (9 May) our regular meeting reviewed the diplomatic and military scene. We discussed the state of the negotiations and where they might lead. There was also a politically sensitive military matter. Argentine civilian aircraft were flying over our supply lines and doubtless communicating their findings direct to their submarines. We had every right to act to stop this. But could we be sure that if we shot at a civilian aircraft it would turn out to be an Argentine one? The radar characteristics and the typical flight path of an aircraft on surveillance would help to identify those on such reconnaissance missions. But there was an obvious risk that something could go wrong. We also had to consider the possibility of a commando raid against Ascension Island and our forces there — unlikely perhaps, but potentially devastating.

  WEEK SEVEN

  We now had to stand firm against the pressure for making unacceptable compromises while avoiding the appearance of intransigence. Specific instructions went to Tony Parsons about our position on withdrawal distances, interim administration, the issue of immigration and the acquisition of property during the interim period and to ensure that the Argentinians did not get away with prejudging the issue on sovereignty: that was for the islanders to decide. There were detailed discussions on the constitutional position of a United Nations administration of the islands. Our view was that the UN representative could only administer the law, not change it. If he wished to do so he would have to act through the islands’ Legislative Council. We also continued to press for a United States military guarantee of the security of the islands — but with very limited success. The UN Secretary-General was somewhat taken aback by the firmness of our stance. But Tony Parsons impressed on him the basic facts of the dispute. It was not we who had committed the aggression, though we had made a number of major concessions. Any arrangement which appeared to reward Argentine aggression would simply not be accepted in Britain.