Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader

by Martin, Bradley K.

  The Wolgan Choson article said that the North Korean newer-model Scuds had been made broad enough in diameter to carry low-tech nuclear warheads of the type that could be achieved by countries just joining the club and unable yet to miniaturize. So the presence of the Scuds presumably pointed to a viable nuclear delivery system.

  The many good reasons for removing U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea finally persuaded President George H. W. Bush. Pyongyang mean-while had a number of apparent reasons to use the occasion to open up its relations with South Korea, as Seoul’s business interests hoped. The controversy over suspected nuclear weapons development had turned Kim Il-sung into the international bogeyman to replace Saddam Hussein for the time being. Even as Pyongyang desperately wished to normalize relations with Japan, Tokyo had made clear that normalization must await Pyongyang’s submission to international inspection of its nuclear facilities.

  North Korea evidently intended to announce it would comply but no sooner than necessary. It may have seemed to Pyongyang that its interest lay in distracting attention from the nuclear issue to buy time—perhaps for further development and concealment of-what already had been done—before permitting international inspections. Perhaps the leadership thought that taking a constructive approach to issues regarding the North-South relationship would provide just such a distraction. It was also a way to produce an accomplishment that could be cited in the upcoming April 15 celebration of Kim Il-sung’s eightieth birthday.

  For whatever combination of such reasons, members of the Northern delegation to a December premier-level meeting in Seoul said they had orders from no less than the Great Leader himself not to come back empty-handed.8 They even held out the possibility of a summit meeting between Kim Il-sung and South Korean President Roh Tae-woo. They went home bearing an agreement of “reconciliation, nonaggression, exchanges and cooperation” between North and South. Within a few days South Korea had traded cancellation of the 1992 Team Spirit exercise for North Korea’s agreement to permit IAEA inspection. On December 18, South Korean President Roh was able to announce that no nuclear weapons were in South Korea. The two Koreas then concluded an agreement pledging that neither side would have anything to do with nuclear weapons or the facilities for manufacturing them; each would permit inspections by the other to verify that. The North’s Supreme People’s Assembly finally ratified the IAEA safeguards agreement on April 9, 1992, and the international body the following month was able to send inspectors to start to find out just how sincere Pyongyang was about its no-nukes promise.9

  TWENTY-FIVE

  I Die, You Die

  Kim Jong-min was one of the higher-level defectors from North Korea. After rising to a rank equivalent to brigadier general during a career in the Ministry of Public Security, he had become a businessman as president of the Daeyang Trading Company. The company’s purpose—like that of some 150 other trading companies that had been set up in various units of the regime including the military since 1971—-was to raise foreign currency. Daeyang was assigned to acquire millions of dollars to help finance the 1989 youth festival. Kim went abroad on that mission in 1988. His efforts failed and, he told me, he believed he would be punished upon his return to North Korea. Thus he defected, via the Netherlands, to South Korea. In Seoul following his debriefing he was given a post at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies, researching and writing on North Korean political, economic and military matters.

  Kim showed up for our first talk in November 1993 looking the part of a businessman in a crisp, starched white shirt, a nice silk tie and a well-tailored blue suit. He wore a gold wrist-watch. He showed a facial resemblance to members of the Kim Il-sung family and, tantalizingly he called attention to that resemblance. “Don’t you think I look like Kim Jong-il?” he asked me, noting that the Jong of his own middle name was the same character as the Jong in Kim Jong-il’s name. He quickly denied any blood relationship, though, saying the resemblance was mere coincidence. He told me he had known Kim Jong-il while growing up, especially between 1957 and 1961; they had hung out together, along with other children of elite officials, although Kim Jong-il was several years older. Kim Jong-min’s father was an editor of Nodong Shinmun, the party daily he told me.

  Kim’s testimony was useful in helping me to understand the mindset of North Korean high officials at the time of the first nuclear weapons crisis. Ways of thinking in North Korea changed slowly and his remarks remained illuminating after the country’s nuclear weapons became, once again, the center of attention. Thus I offer much of our exchange in the following pages.

  Q. You keep joking about how your middle name is the same as Kim Jong-il’s and you look like him, but you say you’re not one of his brothers. I’m trying to figure out how a less-than-top official like your father, who wasn’t the top editor of Nodong Shinmun, could live in the neighborhood with Kim Il-sung and the rest of the top leadership, the people you mentioned earlier as your neighbors.

  KIM JONG-MIN: “My father was unofficially the most powerful guy on Nodong Shinmun despite his title. He was one of the most educated of the North Korean elite. In the end he had to go back to his home district because he had been part of the Korean elite under the Japanese occupation. He was a very prominent figure in the media, but he died in his home province. My father wrote editorials and critical essays. My middle name is just a coincidence. [He grinned.] I laughed because of the meaningful look you gave me. If I were the illegitimate son of Kim Il-sung I would have had no reason to defect. Under those circumstances I wouldn’t have feared punishment.”

  Q. How do you assess economic trends in North Korea?

  A. “South Korean and foreign analysts see the North Korean economy as being in bad shape. It is, but for thirty years the North Korean economy was based on juche. The end of the Cold War era has reduced trade among communist countries. But the economy can’t just collapse overnight, because North Koreans have existed this way for thirty years. In Western society the goal is to maintain the highest quality of life. But we could say that the goal of the North Korean economy is simply to survive despite the lowest possible living standards.

  “You can see how this way of thinking works out in practice by imagining a wartime crisis. Even if Western countries have better weapons technology, the North Korean military men were trained to overcome any hardships and disadvantages to win. Take the case of shooting a missile by pressing a button. Maybe in Western countries the order would come over a TV monitor. In North Korea they may relay the order with an ordinary phone call, but the result would be the same.

  The North Korean economy is not set up to help people lead extravagant lives but to put maximum resources into the military while merely sustaining life.

  “There are problems with the stores, more demand than supply. Department stores are not for show. You can buy things there. But to buy most of the products you need not just money but government coupons. Only shoes and a few other products can be bought freely with currency alone. Televisions and refrigerators are not for anyone to buy. You have to do something for the government. Then as a re-ward you get a coupon allowing you to buy one. Those coupons are only for merit, because they can’t satisfy the demand of everyone. But even if you have a coupon you may not be able to get the goods. Store employees tell relatives when things arrive. They get them first. Then, when everything is sold, even people with coupons can’t buy.”

  Q. What’s the shopping situation in the provinces?

  A. “Only certain places have department stores: Hamhung, Chongjin, Sinuiju, Wonsan—big cities and the larger towns. The government sets all the prices. They try to distribute the same products to all the department stores around the country, but of course Pyongyang is the capital and largest city so it gets more. The diversity is the same in the provinces, but the quality of goods and the quantities delivered differ. The better products are for Pyongyang, the older styles for the provinces.”

  Q. I didn’t see any livestock in 19
92. Is there no meat?

  A. “You probably couldn’t see the livestock because they are concentrated in specified areas. There are livestock, but not as many as in South Korea.”

  ***

  Q. When serious demonstrations break out in South Korea, do those in North Korea feel that the South Korean government will collapse?

  A. “There is probably no one in North Korea who thinks like that now. No matter how chaotic the situation may have been at Kwangju, that was a different time and place. There is no one today who believes that the South Korean government is on the verge of collapsing. Even as late as the mid-1970s, there were expectations that, with a good effort, the South Korean regime could be toppled. Now, however, because of the difference in economic power, no one feels like that.”

  Q. But is another war possible?

  A. “Considering the international political environment and North Korean internal problems, war in the near future seems almost impossible. But with one-man rule, strong feelings of nationalism are brought up. If there’s an irritation to that ideal, a war is possible.”

  Q. Is it the case that people may be questioning the system, or Kim Jong-il, but they still have total faith that the enemies are the United States and South Korea? A. “They believe the South Korean government maintains its system thanks to dependence on the Western systems. So they’re enemies because the ultimate goal is the unification of Korea.”

  ***

  Q. What are your thoughts on the nuclear weapons issue?

  A. “I don’t really know very well about South Korean and American policy but people may be pushing it a little early. People are underestimating North Korea too much. The South Korean people are not very interested in the nuclear issue or shocked about it, and are not quick to analyze its impact. They think it’s just a political move. But there’s more to it. I agree the United States is a strong country but it believes in its power too much. In my opinion, in a word, the big question is not whether North Korea develops nuclear facilities or not. There are other more important things. Even if they did develop some nuclear weapons, they could hide them and they wouldn’t admit to it. I assume North Korea specialists in the United States already can speculate regarding the limitations of North Korean nuclear weapons. But finding out about North Korean nuclear weapons is less important than trying to prevent mass production of nuclear weapons.

  “Isolating North Korea is not a very wise thing to do. I’m almost sure North Korea has developed one or two nuclear weapons. North Koreans don’t believe the United States is here for defensive reasons. They think the U.S. is here for aggression, especially an attack on the North. They say they are defending their country. I’ve learned from my experience—I was in the military about twenty years—that the number of people isn’t what’s most important. Most important in winning a war are high-tech weapons. They will pursue that principle forever. All this is in a way a defensive move. They believe to win a war you have to have the right equipment and facilities to fight off a nuclear attack. Without nuclear capability, no nation could win a war. With this intention they’ve been developing nuclear weapons for a very long time. To stick with socialist ideology they must have something to back them up—to be this stubborn despite the economic downfall.

  “I’m not a specialist who can tell you there is a nuclear weapon in North Korea. I’m just telling you this is the mentality in the North. So it’s very likely they have it. From all my experience serving in the military, I feel there are nuclear weapons in the North. Even if they did develop nuclear weapons, though, the size and quantity would be small. They’re developing these nuclear weapons not with the intention of going against the South but as a card to preserve their ideology versus South Korea. Post–Cold War they want the U.S. to take heed of their ideology and their existence. I believe the U.S. should be the one to help bring North Korea out of isolation.”

  Q. What is Kim Il-sung’s bottom line? What can Washington offer him?

  A. “We’re in a very tough situation right now. If the agreements with IAEA backfire, there will be a lot of conflict here in South Korea. Even if the UN Security Council forces sanctions, that won’t stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. If they force military sanctions upon North Korea, I’m sure there will be a second Korean War. Leaks regarding placement of Patriot missiles here, changing the South Korean helicopter model, visits by the CIA chief and so on—those won’t deter the North Koreans. That’s the wrong idea. All the talk regarding economic sanctions is useless because they already are planning for such sanctions. “North Korea can mine up to 50 tons of gold a year. Each ton is $15 million. Even if the United Nations forced economic sanctions on the nuclear issue, while it would be a problem for the North Korean economy, it wouldn’t be as big a problem as people think because they have so much gold.

  “The most important thing Kim Il-sung wishes for is improved U.S.–North Korean relations. He wants normalized relations with the U.S. The U.S. supported South Korea after the Korean War for ideological reasons, but there are other principles. To expect the North to submit to U.S. power is senseless. The basic principle behind North Korean ideology is nationalism. If the United States does not take heed of these nationalistic aspects, normalization will never occur. First Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il want their ideology to remain unaltered. Then they can talk about relations with the U.S. and South Korea. They want to have the same standing as the South Koreans. They’re raising these issues. I think they have other intentions. First, in this post–Cold War era they want their ideology to be known. They want it known that they still have a stronghold, unlike the other nations that faced downfall. Second, they want the U.S. to admit the existence of North Korean ideology and the stability of relations among the people in North Korea. They want to be acknowledged. I hope the U.S. understands these intentions.”

  Q. How can agreement be reached?

  A. “First, North Korea is a totalitarian country. They have other, very peculiar characteristics. There are a lot of characteristics I could talk about. But let me say that only the real specialists in North Korean issues should deal with the North Koreans, because it’s very delicate. Their political center is the party. They are going to stick to this, and the members of the party have a lot of influence. The most important thing is for the U.S. to stop showing favoritism to South Korea. The high South Korean officials when they go into a news conference say that the U.S. supports the policies of South Korea. But that is like setting a bomb. That is not advisable. Of course, they believe South Korea is a democratic society, so they can say whatever is true or they believe to be true. The North Koreans also know the U.S. is the most democratic nation in the whole world. If they did not acknowledge American democratic policies, the North Koreans would never have agreed to talks.

  “Hypothetically if Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il’s power declines, the U.S. should show that they could defect to the United States. Look at the case with South Korea. One former high official [Kim Chongwhi] wants to defect to the United States. It shows that the U.S. presents such an image of democracy that anyone in a difficult spot would want to defect to the U.S.”

  Q. If they were being forced out domestically, would they rather go into exile or bomb everyone?

  A. “At the moment they’d rather bomb everyone. I die, you die. Kim Il-sung feels he’s immortal. Even if everybody dies, he won’t die. This development of nuclear weapons started about thirty years ago with the intention to survive in case of a nuclear war. I believe Kim Il-sung is ready. Even if there is a nuclear attack he has a shelter ready. Even if he pushes the button he’ll survive.”

  Q. Is his bottom line to save his family, to make sure they can remain in powerful positions despite any external or internal threat?

  A. “I don’t believe in an internal threat. I don’t think Kim Il-sung feels a threat internally. Kim Il-sung considers his family very important, just as you think. But to Kim Il-sung the more important thing is to be able to live the
high-class life. That is more important than the family. In the U.S. you have the Bill Clinton scandals, but there is no comparison. In fact I don’t understand how the president of such a strong country as the United States should be scrutinized. Kim Il-sung has formed a regime in which he can do anything and no one can ever say anything about it. He can lead the expensive, extravagant life. For example, the food in Kim Il-sung’s mansions is planned two years ahead. He has the power to demand such high treatment. Each grain of rice that Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il eat is individually selected from a-whole heap of rice.”

  Q. Do you think the country has changed substantially since your defection in 1988?

  A. “Maybe, but the essence of the system could not wholly change.”

  Q. Is it possible for the regime of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il to reform North Korea?

  A. “It depends on what we mean by reform. But because of the essence of the social system, it is very hard for any real change to occur. For true political reform to occur there needs to be democracy. But democracy would threaten one-man rule in North Korea.”

  Q. Were you a totally loyal believer in Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il? If so, when and “why did you change?

  A. “For someone to survive in a country it’s necessary to follow the norms of the system. For forty years I followed the norms. But due to my occupation I traveled abroad often and saw discrepancies between reality and what I had been told—that foreign countries were corrupt, rotten. Altogether, the reasons for my defection in the end were: (1) North Korea was too undemocratic. (2) Economically it was not very rational. (3) I could see from neighboring countries that the system lowered the standard of living. In that society I was considered one of the higher officials. For higher officials it’s easy to adjust to the norm, be satisfied with the standard of living. But moving around brought about the change in my thinking.”