On August 20, the central committee of the Swiss Jewish Federation (SIG) met under Chairman Saly Mayer, who reported bleak news: a new wave of refugees, deportations from France, and appalling information on the conditions of Jews in the East. Rothmund appeared at the meeting, stating that in regard to the refugee question “the determining factor must be the interests of Switzerland, not those of individual persons or of foreign nations.” primary concerns were preservation of order and peace, employment opportunities and food supplies. Switzerland could not take in all the refugees from neighboring countries. “It is better that we take care of those who are here and try to keep them with us.”81
SIG committee members strongly opposed Rothmund’s restrictive policy. The rumors, the minutes stated, “were so horrific that one would prefer not to believe them even though at this point… one could no longer deny as impossible even the most horrific things.” Switzerland, it was decided, should not reject refugees.82 Having finally learned of the extermination of the Jews in the East, SIG thenceforth exerted every effort to save those who could be saved.
Just after that August SIG meeting, Dr. Gertrud Kurz, known as “the mother of the refugees” and director of the Christian peace Center, met with EJPD head and Federal Councilor von Steiger, dramatically detailing the plight of the refugees. Kurz stressed the Christian obligation to assist the persecuted and urged him to ameliorate restrictive policies. He immediately ordered a relaxation of the border policy to take “special cases”—a vague term—into account. This would become, in effect, a carte blanche for Swiss border officials to use discretion to let in any sympathetic persons.83 The new restrictive policy had lasted less than a month!
Moreover, some cantons were already tacitly refusing to follow federal regulations and accepting refugees at will. St. Gallen police commander paul Grüninger saved hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Jewish refugees by falsifying papers, for which he would be severely disciplined. Some border officials categorized almost all refugees as “emergency cases,” others warned of German police, and Swiss soldiers sometimes helped refugees climb over barbed wire.84
Border controls ran the gauntlet from passport checking bureaus at rail stations and highway border crossings to guard sheds at rural locations suitable for transit. Land mines, tank traps and explosives at bridges were in place to help defend against a German invasion. Barbed wire contributed to that effort as well as deterring illegal entries. It goes without saying that unchecked border crossings would have allowed free entry to Nazi subversives as well as innocent refugees, and the latter needed to be screened to determine whether they were legally acceptable as well as to determine whether they carried infectious diseases.
The oft-cited “lifeboat” characterization, which was later both taken out of context and made to appear as if it were the only Swiss response, appeared in Federal Councilor Eduard von Steiger’s speech in August 1942 to 8,000 young Swiss at the Youth Church of Zurich-Orlikon. It included the following:
Under certain conditions one must be absolutely hard and unyielding, one must endure insults and complaints and calumnies and yet be able to resist and not break…. When conflict arises between sentiment and reason, when the heart is willing but duty cries “halt,” then one begins to understand what it means to resist….Whoever commands a small lifeboat of limited capacity that is already quite full, and with an equally limited amount of provisions, while thousands of victims of a sunken ship scream to be saved, must appear hard when he cannot take everyone. And yet he is still humane when he warns early against false hopes and tries to save at least those he had taken in.85
The lifeboat analogy may have been inspired by the still-resonating tragedy, thirty years before, of the Titanic—the image of the broken dreams of fin-de-siècle Europe.
Von Steiger explained the spiritual anguish that the lifeboat captain feels when he must accept some and reject others who have an equal right to live. “Shall he take the women first, or the children, or the ailing, or the married couples, and say to himself: ‘perhaps the young and strong still have a chance to survive in spite of all dangers; but I have to make a choice!’”86 This was actually official policy at that time, i.e., children under 16, the elderly, and the sick were automatically granted asylum while able-bodied men were not. In view of Switzerland’s encirclement and the refusal of the Allies to accept refugees, it was an almost impossible task to distinguish between persons who could be accepted for permanent residence and those who had no other place to go. In mid-1942, it should be remembered, the Germans were still winning victories in russia and north Africa, and with their U-boats on the high seas. The outcome of the war was not clear.
Nevertheless, more room was always being made in the Swiss lifeboat. Pastor Paul Vogt originated the “free places” campaign in August 1942 in which private citizens welcomed refugees into their homes, particularly children, mothers with small children, the elderly, the handicapped and the ill. Participants provided free room and board or made monthly donations. Some protestant parishes subsidized institutional homes for Jewish refugees.87 The Swiss Committee for Aid to Children of Émigrés (SHEK) placed 2,000 children for the most part in private homes for stays of several months. Over 90% of refugee children were Jewish.88 The Swiss red Cross formed the Swiss Coalition for relief to Child War Victims, the members of which found families to host over 60,000 children during the war. The families volunteered to take children from German-occupied areas and keep them for three months.89
A raucous debate in the National Council took place in September of 1942. Von Steiger reported that 7,000 new refugees per year could be sustained, but that over 100,000 refugees attempting to cross the border from France might be expected. While the basis of the latter figure was not explained, the following was certain: “It has become almost impossible to pass refugees on. So far, in 1942, we were able to obtain only 30 entry visas from the United States (compared to 566 last year), 31 from brazil, and 5 from Argentina.”90 Illegal immigration threatened the spread of infectious diseases, food shortages (which were dependent on economic negotiations), security against dangerous elements and the labor market. One farmer plowing a field near a refugee camp reprimanded von Steiger for spending money on refugees but not on unemployed Swiss.91
Representatives of the various political parties set forth their positions in the debate, some supporting and some opposing current policy.92 Independent Walter Muschg suggested that the Federal Council should intervene with the governments “in Vichy and Washington, for the purpose of persuading these governments to make it possible for our Swiss refugees to cross the ocean and at least save their lives, and also, if possible, to initiate measures that would lead to a mass movement of refugees overseas.”93 Unfortunately, American policy precluded the implementation of this suggestion. Not unexpectedly, the major parties supported the position of the Federal Council as explained by von Steiger. Refugees should be accommodated to the extent possible, but there must be limits.
Despite the official rules, in September the police Section allowed 3,800 unauthorized refugees to remain, even though they had entered illegally. Despite checkpoints and barbed wire at selected places, the border remained by and large patrolled but open. Officials agreed that the churches would submit to the police lists of persons who were not to be turned back in event of border violations. The Swiss consulates in France, from which many refugees came, were authorized to issue a “C” visa (Visum “C”) to everyone on these lists so they could cross the border unhindered. The lists included as many as 800 persons, many of them prominent members of the community.94
On September 26, 1942, the police Section once again amplified its instructions to border officials. Refugees “are not political refugees solely by reasons of race.” The Swiss had traditionally granted asylum to persons fleeing persecution for political reasons. But there was no precedent for persons being persecuted on the basis of ethnic type or “race,” as in the Nazi innovation of distinguishing between Arya
ns and non-Aryans. The police Section’s order provided that French Jews were to be turned back “because they are in no danger in their own country,” a naïve proposition. However, “hardship cases” could enter, including the sick, pregnant women, persons over 65, children under 16 who were alone, and parents with such children.95 This meant that virtually the only persons who had no automatic right of entry were able-bodied adults without children—a sizable group to be sure, but one with the best chances of survival.
At that time the Swiss Legation in Vichy France protested against anti-Semitic measures, particularly the seizing of Jewish children from Swiss red Cross children’s homes, another Swiss humanitarian initiative. French authorities promised not to bother children under 16. Vichy leader Pierre Laval exclaimed to Swiss representative Walter Stucki: “Have you also come to lecture me about my measures against the Jews?”96 nonetheless, humanitarianism was balanced with a motive of self-preservation. Focus on the refugee question alone would obscure the fact that Switzerland was itself in very serious danger from Axis forces. Swiss commander-in-chief General Henri Guisan told the Swiss reformed pastors’ Association that he “fully understands the impulses of the heart that move us, but in the solution of this [refugee] question, too, concern for the security of our country must take the first place.”97
Few refugees left Switzerland on official convoys (largely through Vichy France) to Allied countries: The totals were 170 at the end of 1940, 1,201 in 1941, and 148 at the beginning of 1942. The United States took in 32 in 1940, 566 in 1941, and 30 in 1942. When Swiss diplomats asked Washington to raise its visa quota in October 1942, the American representative responded that “since pearl Harbor we had necessarily become very careful in our examination of each individual case; that there was no objection to taking persons because they were from Switzerland but that the examination of each case would determine whether that particular individual should be admitted.”98 Inquiries with the U.S. Legation Secretary in Bern about the emigration of stateless children produced only evasive replies. The United States government was focused on winning the war, the ultimate solution to the refugee issue.
At the end of 1942, the police Division once more ordered that foreigners seized in unlawful border crossings were to be expelled. Exceptions were to be made for military refugees. According to international law, such refugees included soldiers of any belligerent, including escaped prisoners of war and downed pilots. The majority of those were members of the Allied forces. Exceptions were also made for persons seeking political asylum, which included political leaders, writers, and activists. However, persons who only claimed membership in a political party or being a member of a “racial” group were to be excluded. Hardship cases, including lone children, parents with children under 6, the sick, elderly, and pregnant women were excepted. Further excepted were persons on “C” visas and other listed persons.99 The rules were tempered with considerable flexibility. To a large extent, the chances of getting through depended on how one presented oneself as well as on the sympathies of the official who was doing the interviewing.
By February 1943 Germany had suffered a disastrous military defeat at Stalingrad. The regime was in need of a quick, morale-boosting victory. That is one reason why in March, Swiss intelligence warned of an imminent German invasion of Switzerland—an attack which fortunately never materialized. The turn of the tide of war, combined withever-increasing rumors and reports of Nazi death camps, caused official refugee policy to be considerably relaxed. In a dramatic liberalization of policy, directives issued in September recognized “mortal danger” as a reason for granting asylum. Rothmund ordered Jews to be accepted in greater numbers, since “they are undoubtedly in exceptional danger.” border guards and the army allowed many to enter, and local residents helped refugees.100 Italy’s capitulation in September 1943 led to so much border pressure that Switzerland ordered that males over 16 be sent back. As persecutions of Jews in German-occupied Italy increased, Jewish refugees of all categories were admitted. Through the end of 1943, Switzerland took in 20,000 soldiers and 7,800 civilian refugees from Italy.101
After having pursued exclusionist policies toward refugees during the Depression and most of the war years, the United States finally created its War refugee board (WRB) in January 1944. In April, the WRB sent a representative to the American Legation in Switzerland. Federal police Department head Pilet-Golaz wrote bitterly of this “belated interest [by the United States] in the remaining members of the Jewish population of Central Europe.”102
Meanwhile, in March 1944, Germany occupied Hungary and began deporting its Jews to Auschwitz. The Federal Council decided to admit 14,000 Hungarian Jews, although it became impossible to get very many to Switzerland.103 Swiss diplomacy was, however, effective in preventing many deportations and saving thousands of lives. Specifically, as many as 62,000 Hungarian Jews were saved by Swiss Consul Carl Lutz, who served in Budapest during 1942–45.104 None other than Adolf Eichmann himself affirmed to Lutz Germany’s agreement that 8,000 Jews were under the protection of the Swiss government and would have safe transit to Switzerland. Lutz fraudulently issued certificates to almost eight times this number of Jews in a successful ruse to save their lives. Although the rescue efforts of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg have been far more widely publicized, Simon Wiesenthal writes that Swiss envoy Lutz actually led the cooperative effort of these and other neutrals to save a total of 100,000 Hungarian Jews.105 Swiss diplomacy was at the heart of successful efforts to stop the deportation of many Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz.106
In Switzerland itself, some Swiss consular employees allowed thousands of refugees to enter contrary to official regulations. Officials and soldiers helped refugees cross illegally, and border residents fed and sheltered them. There were also organized escape routes set up by Jewish and protestant groups.107 One such group was the Joint Committee on behalf of Evacuees, which was thought to be under Swiss government protection. A June 1944 report implied that the military courts “received the impression that ‘emigrant smuggling’ was taking place with Rothmund’s protection.”108
Rothmund told the American legation in Bern that he was “convinced that the news of Jewish extermination by the Gestapo was consistent with reality.”109 On July 12, 1944, Rothmund published new directives replacing those of December 29, 1942 (which were being enforced leniently) declaring that Jews were in mortal danger.110 The sentence “refugees on exclusively racial grounds are not political refugees” was conspicuously deleted. The new directive provided that admission shall be granted to “foreigners who for political or other reasons are truly in danger of losing life and limb and who have no way of avoiding this danger other than that of flight to Switzerland.” boys through age 16, girls through age 18, and other categories would also be admitted.111
The police Section immediately informed the SIG that all Jewish refugees would be admitted because they were now deemed to be in danger in all countries bordering Switzerland.112 Rothmund declared to customs officials: “As a general rule, Jews are to be considered as endangered.”113
In November 1944, Rothmund directed the Swiss Legation in Berlin to declare that Switzerland would accept the 1,300 Jews who survived a recent transport from Hungary. He ordered the legation to “intervene against deportation and to request food and clothing for all other Jews still remaining in Germany.” Rothmund attempted to pressure an official in the German Foreign Ministry to appeal to Gestapo chief Himmler, explaining:
That we are very much in earnest about saving the Jews who are still alive can be seen from the fact that, when our Legation in Budapest notified us that the Hungarian and German governments had agreed to allow 8,000 Hungarian Jews to travel to Switzerland, we answered by telegraph two days ago saying that in principle we were ready to admit them…. If we are now committing ourselves to such positive measures of assistance, surely we have a right to take a stand against further deportations.114
These were the same 8,000 Jews Germany had a
greed to release to Switzerland and whom the Swiss representative in Hungary, Carl Lutz, multiplied to close to 60,000 by issuing certificates declaring that all were under the protection of the Swiss government. Rail transports of many of these Hungarian Jews arrived in Switzerland—318 in August, and 1,552 in December.115 Far larger numbers of Jews remaining in Hungary were saved by the Swiss Consul’s actions, inasmuch as every Jew with a Swiss certificate was officially protected. Swiss diplomatic protection greatly alleviated, but could not completely halt, deportations and the murder of Jews in the chaotic conditions in Budapest.116
Meanwhile, during the fall of 1944, Switzerland took in 17,000 children and mothers from France and Italy, both countries where the Allies were advancing and the Nazis were retreating. In February 1945, the Swiss Federal Council itself attempted via diplomatic channels to stop the killing of Jews. Ex-Federal Councilor Musy led 1,200 Jews wrested from the Theresienstadt concentration camp to Switzerland by rail.117
A new “refugee” problem arose at the end of March 1945 when the police Section issued directives to stop the entry of Germans, particularly Nazis. For the last half decade the Swiss had prepared for a possible Nazi invasion. Now they were certainly not going to allow fleeing Nazi war criminals into the country, hidden within a tide of refugees. The Federal Council ordered parts of the border closed, although thousands, especially escaped foreign workers and prisoners of war, were still allowed to enter Switzerland.118
By May 1945, Switzerland was caring for 106,470 refugees and internees, including 46,470 military fugitives. Just before the armistice the total rose to 115,000.119
During the entire war, 295,381 persons were documented as finding refuge in Switzerland either for short or long periods of time. They included 103,869 military internees, 55,018 civilian refugees (“unlawful” entrants), 9,909 emigrants (lawful entrants), 251 political refugees (political, religious, and intellectual leaders), 59,785 children (who entered as refugees, or in organized groups for several months of recovery and then returned to their families), and 66,549 border refugees (short-term refugees who came across the border to avoid hostilities). Of the civilian Jews who found refuge, those without permission to enter totaled 21,858—a little less than half of such illegal entrants—and lawful Jewish emigrants totaled 6,654—over two-thirds of the lawful entrants.120
Swiss and the Nazis Page 28
