The Swiss Confederation expended 128 million Swiss francs for refugees within Switzerland for the period 1936–54. Private sources, including religious and political groups, contributed as much as 87 million francs more. There were countless anonymous acts of individual charity.121 During 1933–45, the 19,000-member Swiss Jewish community contributed almost 10 million francs to support emigrants and refugees.122
Refugee organizations traditionally assisted those in need according to religious, political or social affiliation, although Christian groups also supported Jewish refugees. Relief organizations included the Swiss Central office for refugee relief (Schweizerische Zentralstelle für Flüchtlingshilfe, or SZF); the VSIA, which, as described earlier, helped Jewish refugees; the Swiss Churches relief Committee for protestant refugees, with its “pennies for the refugees” collections; Caritas, which aided Catholic refugees; the Committee for the placement of refugee Intellectuals; the Social Democratic Swiss Workers Aid; the Crusaders for peace of Gertrud Kurz; and the relief organization for refugee Children.123
The Swiss Confederation also spent over 352 million francs from 1940 to 1950 on refugees abroad through the Swiss red Cross, the Inter National Committee of the red Cross, and Swiss charities. Private sources contributed over 631 million francs to such relief agencies.124
This account of Swiss refugee policy focuses on official documents collected in the Ludwig report, which traced the orders of a relatively small group of government policymakers. It does not tell the story of the Swiss nongovernmental humanitarian organizations or of the citizenry at large, which did not participate in and was often unaware of the refugee policies adopted by the government. These stories remain untold. Countless acts of generosity in those days were unrecorded and will never be divulged. Yet the history of the official refugee policy itself, the starting point for understanding what happened, has been so neglected and distorted that a close review of the original documents about refugee policy is warranted.
In the late 1990s, publications appeared in the United States criticizing Swiss wartime policies. A monograph published by the Los Angelesbased Simon Wiesenthal Center denounced Switzerland’s treatment of refugees who were admitted.125 none other than Simon Wiesenthal himself, the famed anti-Nazi hunter, was embarrassed by the study and denounced its author as “a historian by hobby.”126 The study in question sought to depict Switzerland as a place where refugees were relegated to slave labor, based on the fact that many refugee men were placed in work camps where they were assigned manual labor and slept on straw bedding. In fact, not only were refugees generally happy to have escaped the Nazis, but such experiences were also shared by a great part of the Swiss population. All Swiss adult males served in the militia army, and when on duty typically slept on straw, as did many poorer Swiss families.
Kurt Schonstein, an Austrian Jew who found refuge in Switzerland in 1938, recollected: “There was no difference in materials used, sanitary equipment or other facilities between the Swiss Army’s and refugees’ camps.” He added: “The soldiers ate somewhat but not much better. They had a hard life, and needed more calories. No refugee would have changed places with a Swiss soldier!”127 It is evident that Swiss soldiers made great sacrifices to defend their country and everyone within it, including the refugees, who had no such obligations. The influx of refugees varied with the war’s current crises and corresponding types of refugees—civilian and military, ethnic and political, male and female, children and adults. As a rule, refugee men either worked or pursued educational opportunities, while women and children resided in hotels set aside for refugees or in private homes.
The much-heralded report by the Bergier Commission—chaired by professor Jean-François Bergier—entitled Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era appeared in 1999. This report is an enigma which contains valuable information but appears to portray Switzerland in a negative light.
The Bergier report fails to present accounts by the large number of people who found refuge in Switzerland. The Commission had access to numerous letters from refugees collected by National Councilor François Loeb, which the report notes “rejected sweeping judgments of the camp system. Letters from Swiss citizens noted that the local population was also subject to many wartime restrictions, including mandatory labor and widespread shortages.” The report also states that it had available the refugee letters obtained by Ken Newman, who published them in a book.128 none of these documents of living history by actual refugees is made a part of, or even summarized in, the Bergier report. In fact, Bergier references these authentic refugee accounts only in a footnote.
Bergier seems to imply that “the army leadership saw every foreigner as a security risk”—not a bad idea for a country surrounded by Nazis. The report does concede: “In everyday life, the Swiss demonstrated solidarity with the refugees.” Many took them into their own households and made it possible for them to become part of the intellectual and cultural life.129
Not taking note of the dire straits of everyone in Switzerland during the war, Bergier observes that refugees from the white-collar classes found work requiring physical exertion to be difficult. When Swiss farmers chose the strongest men, it was “as if they were bidding at a slave auction.” but one might normally expect a farmer to choose those who looked stronger, or more able to do the work. Yet, the eyewitness record suggests that refugees in Switzerland were generally thankful to be there. The jobs to which refugees were assigned were necessary to free Swiss men to perform military service.130
The Bergier report concludes with the hypothetical question: What would have happened had Switzerland somehow prevented Germany from adopting the “J” stamp in 1938 or not closed the border in August 1942?131 In the context of the time, Switzerland was powerless to dictate policy to the Third Reich, then at the height of its power and menacing Swiss borders. In addition, Swiss policy to limit the flow of refugees cannot be judged fairly, many believe, except in its proper context, including the refusal of the United States, England, and the other democracies to accept refugees. One could just as well ask, what would have happened had the large democracies agreed to accept large numbers of refugees emigrating through Switzerland, or had Switzerland not placed every adult male under arms to protect every person, citizen or refugee, within its borders?
The Bergier report dramatically claims that 24,398 refugees were “turned away at the border” and “expelled during the war years.”132 Importantly, this figure reflects not the number of people, but the recorded number of times that persons, most of them anonymous, attempted access into Switzerland and were denied. That number is by no means the same as the total who ultimately were denied entry. Bergier made this blatant statistical blunder by counting multiple attempts as multiple persons, thereby greatly inflating the numbers. As recorded in many refugee accounts, a person might not be successful in entering Switzerland on the first or second try, but often was granted entry later. A sophisticated mathematical study by Prof. Jean-Christian Lambelet estimates the number of persons actually rejected at about 5,000.133
Moreover, the Bergier report’s figure of 24,398 rejections includes 9,703 named persons and 14,695 anonymous rejections, many of whom would have been military personnel, including escapees and deserters.134 needless to say, persons attempting to enter included not only legitimate refugees but also subversives, including Nazi spies and fifth columnists. It would be at the least naïve to suggest that Switzerland should not have policed her borders during World War II.
In contradiction to the Bergier thesis, it should be noted that at the critical time when the border was officially closed, the number of refugees admitted sharply increased.135 From August 1942 through fall 1943, 22,367 refugees were admitted, at a rate of 82% for each attempted entry.136 During the entire war, 51,129 “illegal” civilian refugees gained entry. On average, their chance of being legally admitted was 68% per attempt. Combining the acceptance rates of persons without prior permission who attempted once and those who attempt
ed twice, there was a 90% chance of being admitted!137 There were an additional 9,909 legal refugees, i.e., persons who were authorized to enter beforehand.138
The Bergier report states that 21,304 (42%) of all 51,129 illegal civilian refugees admitted during the war were Jewish. The proportion of Jews was almost certainly higher since Jews frequently did not identify their religion. In Europe at that time, they had good reason.139 Jews seeking sanctuary had no guarantee that Switzerland itself would not be invaded by Nazi Germany. In the second half of 1942, most refugees were probably Jewish. Between August and December, 7,899 refugees were admitted and 1,949 denied entry, for an acceptance rate of 80% per attempt. The acceptance rate for Jews was over 90% during this period.140
In his comprehensive critique of Bergier, professor Lambelet sharply distinguishes between officially stated policy and actual practice. The official policy was restrictive, sought to discourage more refugees than could be supported with limited Swiss resources and was in part driven by the restrictive policies of larger states. In practice, according to the best estimates from the records, any given refugee had a two-thirds probability of acceptance per attempted entry, and an 85% chance with multiple attempts. Jewish refugees were treated more generously than others. Subversives were a serious issue. Entries were also deterred or prevented by Axis forces at the border, which were a barrier to entry throughout the war. While Switzerland did not accept what she considered an uncontrollable influx, she opened her borders at the times when the need was greatest from a humanitarian perspective.141 As the reality of the Holocaust became known, her doors opened wider.
The most fundamental duty of any government is to protect its citizens. A small democratic country in a sea of tyranny, Switzerland made great sacrifices to protect herself militarily and to survive economically. By doing so, she successfully defended both her citizens and the refugees within her border from the ravages of war and the Holocaust. In judging Switzerland, it should be noted that most other European states failed utterly, or, at worst, actively abetted and aided the Nazis’ new order.
In prewar negotiations with Germany, Swiss officials went to great lengths to protect the rights of Swiss Jews. Before and during the war, Switzerland took in numerous refugees but would not and could not accept them all. For this, Switzerland has been greatly criticized. These same critics have been strangely silent on the far more restrictive policies of the large democracies, which could have readily accommodated large numbers of refugees. Switzerland’s restrictions on refugees did make exceptions for children, families with children, the sick and the elderly. Though able-bodied adults not automatically granted asylum had better chances of fending for themselves, many were nonetheless granted entry. Toward the end of the war, when credible evidence of the Nazi extermination program became firmly established, all Jews became eligible for automatic entry, and Swiss officials did their best to rescue foreign Jews.
Peter Munk, a Hungarian Jew rescued by Switzerland in 1944, would write a half-century later about those dark days:
At that time, every able-bodied Swiss was serving in the army, protecting the country… from the Nazi conquest. Theirs was thus the only country that, with enormous courage, consistently flaunted the directions of the all-powerful Nazi German neighbor not to take in Jewish refugees. Yet, at that time, the four million of this great nation resisted and saved thousands from Auschwitz.142
If other democracies had opened their far less threatened frontiers to persecuted Jews in numbers proportional to their populations, the Holocaust would not have consumed six million lives. A 1946 issue of the Atlantic Monthly put it in perspective: “America might have taken in 1,225,000 [Jews], since our population is 35 times that of Switzerland; actually, we did not take as many as Switzerland.”143
PART IV
ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSION
CHAPTER 10
THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENCIRCLEMENT
Switzerland spent the years 1941–45 virtually under siege. Encircled by the Axis powers, threatened with invasion and subjected to constant subversion, the Swiss Confederation endured. Based on German military archives as well as secret SS documents which came to light after the war’s end, this chapter traces 1941–45 through Nazi eyes.
While isolated in the shadow of the Third Reich, Switzerland was forced to play a dangerous balancing game. Swiss precision machine parts were in demand for German war production, but intricate Swiss devices used for military purposes were also smuggled to the Allies. Through control of transit routes along Switzerland’s border, Nazi agents were able to restrict secret exports to the Allies, if not completely stop them. Further, by clamping down on Swiss imports of coal and food, Germany could dictate terms of trade and demand deliveries of Swiss components. In return, Germany gave Switzerland just enough coal and foodstuffs to survive but insisted on paying for purchases with accounting credits issued by the Reichsbank. Germany also relied on Switzerland for hard currency, usually on a barter basis, to help pay for some essential metals and other raw materials she was forced to purchase from countries which would not accept Reichsmarks in the bidding war with the Allies. The Germans knew an invasion would almost certainly mean both the destruction of the Swiss industrial base and the end of access to the convertible currency highly useful to resource-poor Germany.
Switzerland was a visible holdout and resisted the Nazi negotiators at every opportunity. Moreover, the country continued to be a center for espionage and anti-Nazi propaganda, harboring enemies of the Reich. The Swiss press was, in German eyes, outrageous and fundamentally biased against National Socialism. However, Germany was confident that the Swiss plum would fall in due time. Then the fortunes of war started turning.
German intelligence constantly expressed exasperation at Swiss attitudes and the country’s ongoing preparations to resist invasion. To the Swiss, capitulation, or even accommodation beyond what was absolutely necessary to survive, was not an option. In its first regular intelligence report for 1941, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) included two Abwehr (Military Intelligence) reports on Switzerland. The first, under the heading “Efforts to Appear Neutral,” discussed measures the Swiss were taking to identify and neutralize any potential fifth column. The tone of continuing resistance was clear:
We have reports that [German] emigrants have been treated harshly in the past few months. Most of them have left. Those who still lived in Switzerland were being watched closely. We have been told that the hearts of the majority of the Federal Council beat for the Western forces. It was only the economic situation and the fear of a military occupation that caused the Federal Council to do everything possible to keep Switzerland from becoming a center of espionage as it had been in the last war. There have been allegations that not only Italian but also German personalities of high rank had money and gold in Swiss banks and were therefore not interested in occupying Switzerland.1
The second report concerned the new Federal Councilor, Dr. Karl Kobelt, who became chief of the Military Department. The Abwehr would have preferred a pro-German Swiss:
We have heard that Dr. Kobelt is a dangerous man. He is a rightwing liberal, has sympathies for Jews and Freemasons, and is a convinced follower of pastor Niemöller. Therefore Kobelt is absolutely opposed to our National Socialist view of the world. In addition, he is said to be one of the best officers of the Swiss general staff. Supposedly, he has been responsible for improvements in border enforcement and, as an expert in the field of structural and civil engineering, brings considerable professional knowledge to the construction of military facilities. We have reports that Kobelt informed some of his best political friends that, as the head of the Military Department, he will not rest until the Swiss army is so well equipped and trained, and Swiss territory is so well fortified, that even mighty Germany will be afraid of the Swiss armed forces.
Kobelt must have been on the ever-growing list of Swiss leaders to be put in concentration camps or executed when the invasion came. Nazi agents spied on or
dinary Swiss as well. One typical Abwehr report from “liaison agent A 2029” reported conditions in Davos, the Alpine health resort in southeastern Switzerland, and went into minute detail. “Dr. Maurer, head physician of Schatzalp Sanatorium in Davos,” is “not pro-German.” his assistant and friend, Dr. Rossius of Berlin, “associates mainly with foreigners. She keeps making negative and derogatory remarks to these foreigners about the Germans.”2
A great amount of personal detail went into the German files, with reports focusing on untrustworthy German expatriates as well as Swiss. For example, there was Comtesse Sala from Vienna, living at the Wald sanatorium Davos. “She attracts attention with her behavior, shows strong interest in military matters and makes herself conspicuous with her questions about political and military issues addressed mainly to members of the German army. She also frequents Jews.” Finally, agent 2029 shadowed a German named Hilliges at the Waldsanatorium Davos. “He is considered an informant. It is possible he is working against Germany.”
On April 6, 1941, Hitler moved to consolidate control of the eastern Mediterranean by attacking Yugoslavia and Greece. The Swiss immediately denounced the invasions, cheered the resistance mounted by both of these countries and clearly were distressed at the collapse of the resisting armies.3 German Military Attaché Iwan von Ilsemann reported from Bern to OKH:
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