Swiss and the Nazis

by Stephen Halbrook

  Anticipating that Switzerland could now become a stepping-stone to Germany for the Allies, General Böhme addressed the question: “With the present realities, how can Switzerland be quickly subdued with military force?” he proceeded to consider in detail the strength of Swiss national defenses, recognizing the Swiss Army’s roots in the populace. There were 470,000 soldiers to contend with in 1939, but there would be 550,000 by the end of 1943. Domestic industry supplied the army with a good quantity and quality of arms—from 34mm machine guns to 120mm cannon—as well as ammunition and motor vehicles. Fortifications both at the borders and in the interior had been significantly strengthened.

  On the other side of the equation, the Swiss Army was inexperienced in combat; it possessed insufficient tanks and air power; and the country’s industry was concentrated near combat zones. Yet Böhme knew this army should not be underrated. He wrote:

  The fighting spirit of Swiss soldiers is very high, at a level with that of the Finns. A people that produces good gymnasts produces good soldiers, and the unconditional patriotism of the Swiss is beyond doubt. As for skills, despite the army’s dependence on a militia system, Swiss marksmanship is better than that found in, say, the former Austrian Army….

  The goal of a German attack had to be to conquer the country intact. An invasion would be profitable only if Swiss industry remained substantially undamaged. The population had to be willing and able to work, and essentials like electric power and railways could not be destroyed. The reprovisioning of German armies had become precarious, and it would not be advisable to undertake military operations that would transform Switzer land into a wasteland.

  Swiss national defense was based on a large and strong army. It would be difficult to overcome the stubborn resistance of the Swiss troops defending a steep and geographically advantageous Alpine Réduit. The Germans could not get away with using a limited number of troops, no matter how well trained and aggressive. But Böhme had a plan he thought could succeed.

  He detailed two operations to be executed independently of each other. Operation I would focus the main attack against the northern plateau, with swift occupation of the Swiss airfields and the capture of the mass of the Swiss army. Operation II would leapfrog directly into the Réduit with paratroopers, mountain troops, and ground forces. To succeed, paratroopers would have to split Swiss forces by cutting off the plateau from the Réduit within the first 72 hours. The Luftwaffe would fend off any possible Allied bombing attacks.

  Böhme’s plan recommended a surprise attack from all sides with 15 divisions. Casualties were expected to be 20 percent. The operation had not only to eliminate the last army of central Europe opposed to Ger many, but also to seize numerous stores of arms and take possession of a large number of factories able to serve German war industry. It would secure Swiss railway lines and the links to Italy. After the invasion, a permanent German security force would be required to guarantee the pacification of the country.

  Böhme’s attack was targeted for the late summer of 1944, preferably in August. Any preparations, however, were abruptly halted with the Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944. From then on, Nazi battle plans would reel into a cycle of fierce resistance and chaotic, bloody retreats toward the Fatherland.

  In the spring of 1944, that was all in the future. In the weeks before D-Day, the everyday war went on. The German Military Attaché in Bern was reporting on illegal traffic at the Swiss-French border, support based in Switzerland for French partisans in the high Savoy Alps, the Swiss attitude in case of an attack by the Allies, the attempts by polish internees to contact the French resistance and changes in Swiss military dispositions in Ticino ordered by lieutenant General Herbert Constam.36 Constam was now preparing to defend the southern border from German forces in Italy being pushed back by the Allies.

  Then came D-Day, followed in August by an Allied invasion of southern France, and as the weeks wore on, the success of Allied onslaughts from both France and Italy opened up new dangers of a desperate German move against Switzerland. A report to the Army high Command (OKH) and General Staff on August 22, 1944, included a comprehensive analysis of the military situation vis-à-vis Switzerland:

  The Swiss army has sufficient modern weapons and equipment. Its armored force is weak, but armor won’t be a factor in this terrain. The air force is negligible. However, the army is well trained. Its able-bodied men have been mobilized repeatedly since the war began.

  Given the indoctrination of the army with the imperative that the home country must be defended against any attacker, we have to expect that the Swiss soldiers will fight well. Against Allied troops, we would, however, expect them to exhibit certain sympathies for the Allies….

  The main focus of the current mobilization is directed at the southern border, in particular in the area of the Ticino. Recently, Swiss defenses there have been considerably strengthened and extended further south.

  The Swiss plan of operation provides for a vigorous defense of the mass of the field army in the fortified high Alps (National Réduit). Originally, the fortifications along the country’s border were designed to be held by weaker forces only until the assembly in the Réduit had been completed. According to newer plans, however, it appears we would have to expect vigorous resistance along the borders too….

  There are also some significant fortifications in the area between the border protection zone and the high Alps (the Baden-Zurich defensive line). The accesses to the high Alps are protected in the west by the fortification St. Maurice (where the Rhone flows into Lake Geneva), in the south by the St. Gotthard fortifications, in the east by the fortification at Sargans (north of Chur), and in the north by the fortifications Glarus and those along the general line Zug–Luzern–Thun.” All roads leading to the high Alps are defended by substantial roadblocks.37

  Reacting to the Allied campaigns in France and Italy, Switzerland further secured her western and southern borders. After a trip to Bern, a German military intelligence officer reported on September 14, 1944:

  We are aware of the partial mobilizations ordered at the western and southern borders…. From conversations with leading personalities we may assume that Switzerland will fight any attempt to violate her neutrality by use of arms. The old policy that anybody stepping on Swiss soil bearing arms is an enemy of the country is still valid. Whether all Swiss soldiers would fight with enthusiasm and nerve, even against Anglo-American or French soldiers, remains to be seen. Even some Swiss officers doubt that. It appears certain that the Federal Council and the army staff are determined to fight any violation of neutrality. As for the rest, the danger of an attempt by Allied forces to march through Switzer land is considered lower than it used to be, since there are no longer large German units fighting along the Swiss border in the west and the German left wing is assumed to be near Basel/St. Louis. In this connection I would like to mention a statement made to the Envoy by Federal Councilor Pilet-Golaz wherein he maintained that the Allies do not have any plans to march through Switzerland.38

  Minister Pilet-Golaz, now head of the Swiss Foreign Ministry, had every incentive to make this representation, whether true or not. The Swiss knew only too well that an allegedly impending Allied occupation had been used as the pretext for German preemptive invasions of other neutral nations. Swiss diplomats and military spokesmen thus went out of their way to assure German envoys that the Allies would not intrude on Swiss territory. There was to be no justification for a German “preemptive” strike such as occurred against Norway in 1940.

  Yet a very real danger existed that Switzerland would become a battle ground between the Allies and the Axis in 1944. A clash of foreign armies in Switzerland and a devastating occupation had occurred during the Napoleonic wars. Stalin was even urging his Western allies to smash Germany through Switzerland because, among other things, he had a strong dislike of the Swiss way of life. Fortunately, the Americans and British would have none of it. As is now known, the Combined Chiefs of Staff in thei
r instructions for the Supreme headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) removed the question of breaching Swiss neutrality entirely from the realm of discussion.39

  The Germans, however, were unsure of Allied intentions. Thus, German commanders methodically went ahead with plans for meeting the enemy on a “Swiss front.” General Balck, who headed Army Group D—including the 19th Army whose left wing extended to the Swiss border—thought an Allied push through Switzerland possible and set about devising counterstrokes. A September 25, 1944, diary entry of Army Group D noted that one corps headquarters anticipated an Allied march through Switzerland into the south Baden area. Army Group D must prepare a surprise advance at Schaffhausen to be supported by Luftwaffe sorties over Swiss territory.

  The German high command in the West decided against violating Swiss neutrality, which was a risky proposition at best given the prospect of robust Swiss resistance. Field Marshal von Rundstedt, the Commanderin-Chief West, issued an order to secure the left wing of the 19th Army from possible threats to its flank. Strengthening of the left wing along the Swiss border was required, but Swiss neutrality was to be strictly observed, and it was forbidden to cross the border or to communicate with Swiss military personnel or civilians.

  Another entry for Army Group D stated: “Daily reports show that the Army Group has taken measures to protect Switzerland from enemy invasion.” If true, such measures were indeed protection, but not for Switzer land. The Wehrmacht wanted no Allied attack through Swiss territory to reach the southern border of Germany.

  Between November 1944 and April 1945, Army Group D took various jump-off positions along the Swiss border—following the Rhine past Basel to Lake Constance, and also in the Canton of Schaffhausen. That “Case Schaffhausen” and other German strike plans never materialized can be attributed in part to German reluctance to engage the Swiss porcupine—especially when men, transport and planes were desperately needed on other fronts. The Allies also chose to respect Swiss neutrality. Their advances were going well enough elsewhere.

  The full extent of Nazi plans for subversion and invasion against Switzerland, from the birth to the death of the Third Reich, will never be known. After the war ended, the Swiss government prepared a report detailing known Nazi subversive activities against Switzerland. The report was introduced as an exhibit by the Allies in the Nürnberg war crimes trials. The office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes of the U.S. Army described its import as follows: “Report by the Swiss Federal Council to the Swiss National Assembly on anti-democratic activities during the war years has it that SS-obergruppenführer Berger knew of a plan, advanced by the SS Main office, aiming at extending Nazi rule over Switzerland.”40 The report was categorized under “SS” entities and “preparation for Aggressive War.” The summary stated in part:

  This is a report by the Swiss Federal Council (Bundesrat) to the Swiss National Assembly (Bundesversammlung) on anti-democratic activities of Swiss nationals and foreigners during the war years 1939 to 1945…. Disclosed in that report is, especially, the information the Swiss had obtained on German plans aiming at occupying Switzerland and make it another Gau of Greater Germany. Particular reference is made to a document contained in Swiss files, bearing the heading “The Reichsführer SS, SS Hauptamt, Aktion S,” in which a detailed plan is set forth for the realization of the German intention to establish Nazi rule in Switzerland.

  The Swiss report details Nazi threats to Switzerland throughout the war. In fact, actions to undermine Swiss security were planned and executed without interruption until the very end of the conflict. However, Swiss counterespionage was highly effective. The report notes that from September 1944 through January 1945 a Swiss citizen who worked as a clerk at the SS Main office’s Section for Switzerland regularly made secret reports to the Swiss Embassy about the Section’s activities and transmitted important documents.41 Still another invasion plan was being hatched, this one directed by German SS operatives who would make use of Swiss traitors who had joined the Waffen SS and were fighting for Germany. Section head Paul Benz was certain that Germany would conquer Switzerland by military means at some point and that, even in 1945, he was convinced that Germany would win the war. During 1944, while Benz was an official at SS Main office D I/3 h, preparations were made for the period following the expected conquest and seizure of power. Attempts were made to organize Swiss personnel in the Reich within German Sturmbanner (SS battalions) for this purpose.

  During the war years, a small contingent of Swiss had volunteered for service in the Wehrmacht. Some were committed National Socialists; others were young, unemployed, and caught up in the martial ardor of the anti-Bolshevik crusade. A Swiss law passed in 1927, which is still in effect, made it a crime for a Swiss citizen to fight in a foreign war. This law was violated by about 700 Swiss who had joined the proto-Communist International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War.42 It was also violated during World War II by some 870 Swiss who resided in Switzerland and who volunteered to serve in the German forces, as well as by another 1,110 Swiss living abroad, particularly in Germany, who did the same.43 In view of Switzerland’s 4.2 million population at the time, these numbers were insignificant. Far larger numbers volunteered for German service from France, the Netherlands, and other European countries. When it was possible to apprehend them, particularly after the war, such violators were prosecuted and imprisoned under Swiss law.

  These were the Swiss on whom the SS planned to rely. In mid-1944, Benz wrote a plan based on previous discussions with his friend, Waffen SS officer Valdo Rodio. Rodio had forsaken Zurich and his homeland to attend the SS-Junker School in Tölz, became an SS Untersturmführer (second lieutenant) in a panzer regiment, and had died at age 22 of wounds received in combat earlier that year.44

  Addressed to “Reichsführer SS, SS Main office” (Himmler) the Benz plan was entitled “Aktion-S” (Action Switzerland). The plan provided:45

  1. Carefully observe military and political developments. Cooperate with SD [Security Service] and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

  2. Take in Swiss National Socialists and their families. Report by way of Special Commission, Gestapo and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prepare shelters for them.

  3. Retrieve a number of Swiss SS leaders from the front to deploy them in Switzerland for political purposes.

  4. Collect all Swiss SS volunteers. Combine them in a Swiss unit later.

  5. Combine all Swiss National Socialists in the Reich and organize them through the Sturmbanner [SS battalions].

  In Switzerland:

  6. Together with the Reich Main Security office, destroy all enemies of the Reich.

  7. Set up a German head office in Switzerland to serve as central political lead agency.

  8. Set up an Ersatzkommando Schweiz (Swiss replacement command) of the Waffen SS and a Swiss SS unit.

  9. Determine all National Socialists (not economic opportunists) and combine them in one organization.

  10. Set up a German SS in Switzerland as a pool for all good forces and a political fighting organization.

  This last reference to establishing “a German SS in Switzerland” had reference to the sizable German fifth column in Switzerland as well as German agents who would be sent there for that purpose.

  In addition, “Aktion-S” by Benz made lists of the persons who he thought would facilitate the Nazi occupation. The categories of lists included:46

  a. “list of all National Socialist Swiss living in the Reich who could be used for political action,” containing 14 names.

  b. “list of SS leaders earmarked for political deployment in Switzerland,” containing 11 names.

  c. “list of SS leaders stationed at the SS Main office and earmarked for deployment in Switzerland,” containing 3 names.

  d. “list of Reich Germans who could be used for political deployment to Switzerland,” containing the names of Dr. [Georg] Ashton [former German vice counsel] and Mr. Von Chamier, former press attaché in Bern.

  e.
“Connections in Switzerland,” containing 4 names.

  f. Hand-written lists of names under the following headings for Divisions: Agriculture, Education, Church, etc., Economy, Army, Justice and police, Gauleitung [head of Nazi administrative unit], plenipotentiary of the Reich, higher SS and police leader, leader of the German SS, head of the Gau leadership in Switzerland, Youth, and Culture.

  Benz worked with Dr. Max Leo Keller, a Swiss Nazi whose Nationale Bewegung der Schweiz (NBS, or National Movement of Switzerland) had been banned by the Swiss government in 1940 as a subversive organization. Keller and other NBS members were tried before a Swiss military tribunal and imprisoned. After his release, Keller moved to Germany for the rest of the war to engage in anti-Swiss activities for Himmler’s SS.47 Dr. Heinrich Rothmund, Director of the Swiss Federal police Division, referred to Keller as among “the Swiss Lumpen [riffraff] in Germany.”48 After the war, Keller was apprehended by Swiss authorities and sentenced to imprisonment for 14 years.49

  Urging German occupation of Switzerland, Benz wrote a letter on August 28, 1944, to Keller, informing him that Switzerland had mobilized five days before and “may be approaching war faster than we are aware.” he urged Keller to continue exerting his influence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and party headquarters, noting that “Romania’s case has taught us that we can never be careful enough.” (In view of the near approach of the Red Army, Romania had just switched sides to the Soviet union.50)

  Benz continued: “If necessary, we would promote the unification of der Schweizerbünde (Swiss groups) in the Reich. We would do that in a way that the German SS would have complete authority to combine all Swiss National Socialists in the Reich and to send them out for political action in Switzerland.”51 While Benz grossly overrated the ability of his tiny number of Swiss to facilitate this ambitious task, both the SS and Wehr macht were still fully capable of wreaking havoc, as the occupation of Hungary and later the Ardennes offensive demonstrated.