Swiss and the Nazis

by Stephen Halbrook

  This neutrality gave Switzerland recognition by all belligerents as a sanctuary for interned military personnel. During this period the number of American airmen arriving in Switzerland—via parachute, crash-landings or aboard crippled bombers escorted by Swiss fighters—reached its height. The American airmen were cared for by the Swiss military and were put in touch with the U.S. Military Attaché, Brigadier General Barnwell Legge. Dulles reported on August 11, 1944:

  No case of any nature has come to the attention of myself or 520 [Legge] giving the least credence to the report that American airmen are attempting to evade any more combat by landing here. I believe this is nothing but ill-willed propaganda inspired by Nazis, since I learned in a confidential talk with Gen. Guisan a short time after many U.S. Planes landed here, that under his orders each case was thoroughly investigated and it was determined that none of the planes could possibly have returned to its home field…. Naturally, the information from Gen. Guisan should not be disseminated.40

  As the Allied bombers pounded away and Allied forces advanced on all sides, rumors abounded about a Nazi last stand in an Alpine redoubt. Dulles wrote that “511”—General Masson of Swiss Intelligence—“has a rather grave approach to the situation, due to the fact that any such Réduit could be flanked by the Swiss and therefore they are paying close heed to this matter. He seems to feel that there is some leaning towards a concentration of materials in this region.” The Swiss believed the German redoubt would include a portion of northern Italy and extend to the sea in the region of Trieste-Venice. There was only inconclusive evidence that a specific plan existed, but some Nazis believed that a million troops on the Vorarlberg, Austrian, and Bavarian Alps with supplies could resist for six months to a year.41 Both the Allies and the Swiss would continue to monitor intelligence on any such plans.

  Meanwhile, Allied forces were advancing. As the German front in Normandy was cracking, the Allies landed another army on the French Mediterranean coast, quickly advancing northward. Luftwaffe incursions and even attacks spilled over into Switzerland. On August 25, 1944, the Swiss Federal Council called up more troops as American armies reached the Swiss border near Geneva.42 Dulles wrote: “Presumably the arrival of U.S. troops at the Swiss border indicates practical control of the Alpine region from the Mediterranean to Lake Geneva and raises the issue of coordination of our military action with that of Partisan groups across the border in Italy. We have set up many contacts with the Partisans….”43

  Allied advances, desperate German resistance, and the movements of refugees fleeing across borders offered spying opportunities for both sides. The Germans were driven out of strongholds in the Jura Department before the Belfort Gap on the Swiss border. In October 1944 Dulles noted that “refugees who have been moved from the Belfort region via Switzer land into France offer the Nazis good cover for infiltration of spies, saboteurs and the like.” This caused General Jacob L. Devers, who led the U.S. Sixth Army Group from southern France to the Swiss border, to be “apprehensive about the situation on the Franco-Swiss border in the area of Pontarlier.” Contrariwise, Dulles anticipated that “a station at Pontarlier might secure valuable information and could be used to dispatch agents to and from Switzerland for German work as well.”44

  On November 3, Dulles met with General Guisan, who passed on intelligence that Hitler appeared to have made a speedy recovery from the July 20 attack, but was later bedridden for three months due to a cerebral hemorrhage caused by shock. Hitler’s public appearances during that period were reportedly faked. For purposes of this study, it is less important whether the reports were true than the fact that General Guisan shared such intelligence with Dulles—obviously without warranting its veracity. Guisan (“839”) then addressed a different sensitive topic: accidental American bombings of Switzerland:

  839, who is a good friend of ours, was obviously seriously disturbed at repetition of our bombing attacks on Swiss towns and villages. He indicated this was seriously affecting attitude [of the] Swiss people toward USA. While realizing mistakes are inevitable he could not understand low level attacks on Swiss territory. Personally I believe situation created by attacks makes it more difficult to get Swiss cooperation in our present task of penetrating Germany. Assume everything being done to prevent recurrence.45

  General Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Air Forces, told General Donovan that perhaps Germans using captured American planes had bombed the Swiss towns. Instructed to suggest this to the Swiss, an annoyed Dulles responded: “Swiss observers state they clearly identified planes as American, reports indicate 14 to 15 involved. It will be hard to make Swiss believe that Germans had this number of American planes with American bombs assigned to apparent task of blowing up power plant in which Germans have joint interest with Swiss.” Evidence gathered by U.S. Brig. Gen. Legge did not support the thesis that the bombings were committed by the Germans.46

  In fact, these and other American bombings of Switzerland were tragic accidents.47 U.S. Diplomats and military authorities were well aware that the benefits to the Allies of Swiss services as a neutral far outweighed Swiss economic relations with Germany. The above bombings took place in the vicinity of Basel, where—as the Swiss had just warned the Americans—there were three marshaling yards, one each in Switzerland, France, and Germany, all of which appeared indistinguishable from the air.48 A joint Swiss-German interest in a power plant in this area where the Rhine flows through would not have been unusual, and the Americans never intentionally dropped bombs on Switzerland.

  Despite the accidental bombings, the Swiss remained staunchly in favor of the Allies, and cooperation between Swiss and American intelligence agencies continued. Dulles learned the intelligence bombshell from the “highest Swiss source that [Field Marshal Albert] Kesselring has received orders to complete German withdrawal from northwest Italy by December 15th.” Now that Switzerland was accessible through southern France, Allied experts came to learn the status of Germany’s atomic energy program, on which Dulles had been gathering intelligence. In the coming months, German atomic research and development continued to be monitored from Switzerland.49

  The Swiss were even more insistent than the Americans that no one associated with the Nazis should be able to find refuge in Switzerland. As 1944 ended, Dulles anticipated a “brain drain” either to the West or to the Communist East, and was of the opinion that nonpolitical Germans possessing technical expertise should be allowed into Switzerland. He mentioned that the two Schmidt brothers, German industrialists, sought entry with their families. Reflecting Swiss refugee policy, the Schmidt’s minor children were allowed in, but the adult brothers were turned away. The brothers’ professed motive was to escape the Russians and the chaos sweeping into Germany from the East. The Swiss official refused entry to the male adults because they had worked with the Nazis. Dulles disagreed with a blanket policy and suggested that non-political industrialist and technical refugees should be discussed on a case-by-case basis with the Swiss. Dulles proposed: “Possibly such refugees would prefer to surrender to us, say at Annemasse, after they had taken refuge in Switzerland.”50

  The results of such negotiations remain shrouded in mystery, but after the war ended the Americans would take in, recruit, or use the services of German rocket scientists, Nazi intelligence operatives, and other useful ex-enemies to fight the Cold War.

  Meanwhile, Swiss Foreign Minister Pilet-Golaz informed Dulles at the year’s end the details of Hitler’s whereabouts and relapse into illness, together with Himmler’s inability to take the reins of power. Closer to home, Dulles reported:

  Regarding rumors of heavy concentrations of German troops on Swiss border, and of possible German attack via Switzerland (which SI [Secret Intelligence Branch] Paris transmitted but said discounted by SHAEF [Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force]), source believes no basis for such rumors, and Swiss military authorities undisturbed. 2 additional Swiss divisions to be called up early January to
replace other divisions, but latter will not be immediately dismissed, thus in effect substantially increasing Swiss standing army during early weeks of year.51

  The Swiss military exhibited calm, and the uncertainty of the situation demanded they prepare for the substantial risk that retreating German armies would bring the war into Switzerland. In any event, Dulles by now considered Pilet-Golaz to be a regular enough informant to assign him a number—“518.”

  Dulles constantly felt the need to explain to his superiors the special situation of Switzerland and her value to the Allies. In a January 2, 1945, report to General John Magruder, OSS Deputy Director for Intelligence, Dulles urged restraint by the Allies in their demands regarding the transportation of German shipments through Switzerland. In particular, pursuant to turn-of-the-century treaties, to her status as a neutral, and to encirclement by Germany, Switzerland was forced to allow German rail traffic in coal and commercial goods to pass through the Gotthard tunnel en route to Italy, but strictly excluded German troops as well as weapons or munitions. The loosening of the noose allowed the Swiss to begin to curtail this traffic. Dulles explained:

  Traffic [has been] reduced because of changes in [the] war situation and also as result of diplomatic and economic pressure. [The] latter has obtained some results because fear [of an] attack by Germany [is] gone and because [the] Swiss vitally need certain facilities from Anglo-Saxon side, particularly food and raw material imports. Also Swiss firmly convinced of, and in great majority desire, our victory and hope it will come soon.52

  Dulles continued that it would be a mistake “to ask [the] Swiss to give up a principle, particularly one which they consider vital to their neutral status.” Neutrality saved them from two world wars in 25 years. It would be more effective to seek concessions on other specific points. The Allies themselves may need to send transit through Switzerland, particularly “if German project for final stand in Bavarian Alps materializes.” He concluded with some practical advice:

  I am undoubtedly influenced by [the] fact [that] in my work, I constantly need from Swiss favors to which, under strict rules of neutrality, I am not entitled. As we now give Swiss little except dynamite and diplomatic demands, it is not easy to create best atmosphere for my work. Hence I do not favor pressing [the] Swiss to [the] wall for what seems to me to be very small military advantages, particularly as it is a wall [through] which [the] Swiss may not jump.53

  In other words, OSS espionage against the Axis and its promotion of resistance groups from Switzerland was not helped by “dynamite” (accidental Allied bombings) and overbearing “diplomatic demands” to Switzerland. It was unreasonable to press Switzerland to the “wall” by demanding that she violate her formal status as a neutral, when she was constantly bending the rules in favor of the Allies.

  Fear of possible long-term Nazi resistance from Alpine redoubts escalated with fresh intelligence reports. General Donovan’s February 14 report to President Roosevelt reflected Allied reliance on Swiss intelligence:

  When organized German military resistance collapses, there will probably be more than one “Réduit” or inner fortress of Nazi resistance which may remain. It seems generally accepted now that a delayed defense fortress will lie in the Bavarian and Austrian Alps. Swiss sources have information which they consider reliable that substantial amounts of foodstuffs [are] being collected here, and that some underground factories are being prepared to supply arms required for mountain warfare.54

  Besides the primary redoubt, Nazi resistance would center in Thueringen, around Weimar, and in the Black Forest, “flanked by the northern frontier of Switzerland and the Rhine.”

  Such intelligence could hardly be ignored either by the Allies, who would have to conquer any such last stands, or the Swiss, who would have to repel any intrusions into her territory. Allied strategists must have anticipated a possible German redoubt, but day-to-day combat and rapid advances consumed their attention. It was in the interest of the Swiss to ward off a German redoubt and to help facilitate the end of the war.

  Swiss intelligence would play an instrumental role in Operation Sunrise, secret negotiations over two months which resulted in the surrender of German forces in Italy. On March 8, 1945, Dulles and a Swiss intermediary met with SS General Karl Wolff at an apartment held by Dulles in Zurich. Wolff hoped to lead Germany out of the war and thought he could convince Field Marshal Albert Kesselring to join him. These two German military chieftains controlled northern Italy and western Austria, and Hitler and Himmler could not successfully countermand the surrender of German forces in these areas. Wolff hoped to return within the week with Kesselring to Switzerland to meet with the Allies to coordinate military surrender measures.55

  Wolff offered to halt active warfare against the anti-German partisans and to keep up just a pretense of fighting, as well as to release to Switzerland without ransom several hundred Italian Jews interned at Bozen. This would have been consistent with Swiss plans at that time to rescue Jews from Hungary and other Nazi-occupied countries. Dulles wrote that the plan “may present very unique opportunity to shorten war and to permit occupation of North Italy and possibly even penetration Austria under most favorable conditions. Also this might wreck German plans for establishment of maquis.” The term “maquis” meant the French resistance, but in this context referred to German guerilla resistance in a mountainous redoubt. Dulles firmly told Wolff that unconditional surrender would be required.56

  As noted above, Swiss commander-in-chief Guisan had warned Dulles of possible bacteriological warfare by the Nazis. Now, while Operation Sunrise was proceeding, an informant with close contact to the Japanese legation in Bern reported alarming intelligence to the OSS. Dulles telegraphed the following: “Members Jap legation here including their MA [military attaché] and commercial attaché reported to be spreading reports that Hitler [is] determined [to] start gas and bacteriological warfare which will cause epidemics throughout Europe including Switzerland. They say Japs backing up Hitler in this determination but he meeting opposition in military and some party circles.”57 This indicates the continued Nazi threat to Switzerland as well as the ability of the Allies in that neutral country to obtain intelligence of the most serious threats. Countless rumors from many informants abounded, but allegations of such serious consequences made directly by Axis sources could not be ignored.

  Such threats made the success of Operation Sunrise even more urgent. Dulles believed Hitler intended to use most of the German army in Italy for defense of the German Alpine redoubt, for which some stocking of supplies had been made and which “seems inevitable from the force of circumstances.” He thought he could use talks with “Critic” (Wolff) to help defeat Hitler in this strategy.58 Dulles telegraphed General Donovan that “there is evidence that considerable activity has recently developed,” including “that sufficient supplies and weapons have been stored in inner reduit to equip with light arms and feed approximately 25,000 men for period of year. Work on defense of important passes into reduit and on certain underground plants for light arms and on hidden depots has also been pushed.” Portions of this redoubt would extend to the Swiss frontier. Hitler apparently had not yet decided “whether to make last stand there or around Berlin.”59

  It was possible that Wolff was bluffing about his plan to arrange for the surrender of German forces in Italy. Dulles wrote General Lyman Lemnitzer at Allied Force Headquarters (Caserta): “Today I consider at least 50 percent chance it is genuine but agree sufficient margin of doubt to make every precaution necessary. Swiss SI [Secret Intelligence] have rarely been fooled by Nazis in such matters.”60

  At the same time, underlying conflicts of interest among the Allies began to emerge, particularly in regard to a future occupation. In a follow-up message to Caserta, Dulles noted that the Soviets would try to block a German surrender in Italy, because it would allow “our forces” to occupy Trieste, which he thought was more important to the Russians than Berlin. If surrender negotiations failed and the
Germans retreated, then the Soviets would probably reach Trieste first. “While I realize we will deal openly and fairly with our Russian allies, this should not preclude us from doing everything possible to bring about quick surrender which would save the lives of our troops and bring us into the heart of German reduit.”61

  Unfortunately for the cause of saving the lives of American troops, on April 20, 1945, OSS Washington cabled Dulles that the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered an end to surrender talks, due to “complications which have arisen with Russians.” Evidently, Roosevelt did not wish to offend Stalin. Dulles was forced to call a halt to the German surrender effort. He expressed concern about a radio operator who was transmitting intelligence for him from Milan:

  This contact, originally initiated for intelligence purposes, was largely developed through outstanding competent and Allied friendly Swiss officer who had charge of Swiss intelligence work directed toward Germany, and who is rendering us vital services in matters affecting reduit. I have task of effecting break in manner not to alienate this contact which is potentially the most useful and important we have for developing work directed against reduit.62

  Dulles reported on April 24 about SS General Wolff’s visit of the preceding week to Berlin in an attempt to persuade Hitler and the Nazi leadership to surrender. Wolff had provided this information to two Swiss intermediaries in the surrender negotiations, Swiss intelligence Major Max Weibel and Professor Max Husmann. Wolff got the same reaction from Hitler as Dulles had from the Allied leadership: German forces in Italy would not be allowed to surrender to the Americans. Hitler cared not a wit about further senseless destruction in Italy and was quoted as remarking: “In two more months the break between Anglo Saxons and Russians will come about, and then I shall join [the] party which approaches me first, it makes no difference which.”63